

REFRACTIONS OF ROME: THE DESTRUCTION OF ROME
IN LUCAN'S *PHARSALIA*

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Tobias Peter Torgerson

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Tobias Peter Torgerson, Ph.D.

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Lucan repeatedly uses images, metaphors, rhetoric, and historical, mythological, literary, and geographical allusions that evoke the physical destruction of cities. He even implies at the beginning of the *Pharsalia* that Caesar's armies may annihilate the city of Rome itself. Nevertheless, Caesar enters the city in Book 3 without spilling blood and no conflicts occur at Rome during the remainder of the epic's narrative. It is tempting but simplistic to interpret Lucan's portrayal of the civil war as the destruction of Rome as mere metaphor, pathos-imbued hyperbole, or development of the traditional epic topos of the *urbs capta* (captured city). In this dissertation, I argue that the theme of Rome's self-destruction must be understood in light of the progressive separation of the Roman *civitas* (polity) as embodied in Pompey's republican army from the *Urbs* (physical city of Rome) over the course of the poem. Pompey leads his army away from Rome in order to save the city from Caesarian violence, but this choice tragically results in the destruction of the republic at Pharsalus.

First, I establish that Lucan characterizes the Caesarians as ready and willing to destroy the *Urbs*. They do not do so because the republicans abandon Rome, a choice Pompey later justifies as an attempt to protect the city from Caesarian violence. Pompey's identification of his army as the *armata urbs* ("Rome under arms," 2.574)

foregrounds the deep rift in Roman identity Pompey's retreat occasions; the republicans have permitted Caesar to occupy the city they claim to represent. The republicans' desire to return to Rome ultimately leads to their defeat at Pharsalus, which Lucan blames for the physical decline of the *Urbs* at the same time he compares the battle itself to the destruction of Troy. After Pharsalus, the imagery of the physical destruction and reconstruction of cities pervades Lucan's description of both Cato and Caesar's attempts to rebuild the Roman state. Particularly striking are Lucan's allusions to Caesar and his successors' physical reconstruction of the *Urbs* in accordance with decadent imperial mores; albeit indirectly, the civil war finally does destroy the republican city Pompey had tried to protect.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Tobias Peter Torgerson, Ph.D., the son of George Peter and Margaret Ann (née Stussy) Torgerson, was born in 1982 and was raised in Chadwick, Illinois. He was educated in the Chadwick and then the consolidated Chadwick-Milledgeville public schools. Named both an Illinois State Scholar and a National Merit Scholar, he was one of the valedictorians of Milledgeville High School's class of 2000.

Dr. Torgerson subsequently majored in classical languages and classical studies and minored in theology at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. There he graduated *summa cum laude* from the Honors Program in 2004, having been inducted into Phi Beta Kappa and Alpha Sigma Nu and having been awarded the Ignatius Scholarship, the History Scholarship, the Gold Medal Award, and first place in the 2004 President's Latin Contest. Additionally, Dr. Torgerson attended the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's intensive course "Cultural Diversity of Ancient Campania" at the Villa Vergiliana in Cuma, Italy, in 2002 and the University of Chicago's intensive course in intermediate Greek during the summer of 2004. Also in 2004, he was a finalist for the Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship in Humanistic Studies.

From 2004 to 2010, Dr. Torgerson pursued his doctorate in classical philology at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, where he was awarded the Lane Cooper Fellowship for excellence in teaching for the 2007-2008 academic year. In the summer of 2007, it was his great honor to attend Fr. Reginald Foster's "Aestiva Romae Latinitas" course in spoken Latin in Rome.

Memoriae patris carissimi,
qui diligenter me docuit
viris moribusque
temporis acti
studere,
et matri optimae,
quae patientia infinita
favit mihi succurritque
omnibus in tribulationibus.

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Introduction

I. Establishing the problem

The recurring theme of the physical destruction of cities subtends Lucan's treatment of the civil war as the destruction of Rome's republican polity. This is especially true at key points in the narrative. The opening to the *Pharsalia* provides a bleak image of Italy's cities lying in ruins, a state of decay Lucan ascribes to the civil war fought between Caesar and Pompey (1.24-32)¹:

at nunc semirutis pendent quod moenia tectis	
urbibus Italiae lapsisque ingentia muris	25
saxa iacent nulloque domus custode tenentur	
rarus et antiquis habitator in urbibus errat,	
horrida quod dumis multosque inarata per annos	
Hesperia est desuntque manus poscentibus arvis,	
non tu, Pyrrhe ferox, nec tantis cladibus auctor	30
Poenus erit: nulli penitus descendere ferro	
contigit; alta sedent civilis vulnera dextrae.	

But now the walls are tumbling in the towns of Italy,	
the houses half-destroyed, and, the defences collapsed,	25
the huge stones lie; no guardian occupies the homes	
and in the ancient cities wanders only an occasional inhabitant;	
Hesperia bristles now with thorns, unploughed	
through many a year, lacking the hands for fields which demand	
them –	
the author of such a great calamity will prove to be not you,	30
fierce Pyrrhus, nor the Carthaginian [Hannibal]; no foreign sword	
has ever penetrated	
so: it is wounds inflicted by the hand of fellow-citizen that have	
sunk deep. ²	

¹ See Roche 2009, 123-129, for the most recent commentary on these lines. Unless otherwise noted, I follow Shackleton Bailey's edition of Lucan.

² Unless otherwise noted, I use Braund's translation of Lucan (with some slight emendations of punctuation and capitalization), Ahl's 2007 translation of the *Aeneid*, and my own translation of other texts.

For Lucan, the civil war is more than just a passing political conflict. Rather, it marks the disintegration and collapse of the Roman polity. Lucan frequently employs language characteristic of the physical collapse of buildings to describe the end of the republic, an aspect of Lucanian imagery that Joshua Dorchak has analyzed extensively.⁴ In the proem, Lucan claims that late republican Rome had grown too large to support its own weight (1.70-72):

It was the envious chain of destiny, impossibility of the very high standing long, huge collapses under too much weight, Rome's inability to bear herself.

³ Ahl 2007, 383, notes that Vergil never calls Latinus' settlement – the city of the Laurentines – by the name “Laurentum,” the name often used by modern scholars. Lucan follows Vergil by using the circumlocution *Laurentinosque penates* (7.394). It is only by way of anachronism that Lucan blames Caesar for the destruction of cities ruined in Rome's distant past (e.g. Alba Longa, traditionally said to have been destroyed by the Roman King Tullus Hostilius). I will comment on this anachronism in Ch. 3 (pages 192-193).

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(7.412-419), Lucan describes the battle itself as the “Thessalian ruins” (*Thessalicas* . . . *ruinas*, 7.439), Rome perishes on the battlefield (*hic Roma perit*, 7.634), and Pompey prays that Roma may survive the conflict (*Romaque superstite*, 7.660). At 8.528-529, the Egyptian courtier Pothinus claims that Rome lies prostrate under the metaphorical ruin of Pompey: “Ptolemy, can you prop up the fall of Magnus, the fall/beneath which Rome lies crushed?” (*tu, Ptolemaee, potes Magni fulcire ruinam,/sub qua Roma iacet?*).

Moreover, Lucan suggests that Caesar and his followers are willing and able to literally destroy the city. In Book 1, Caesar’s troops do not lend their support to the invasion of Italy until the centurion Laelius declares his willingness to level the city’s walls should Caesar order him to do so (1.383-386):

tu quoscumque voles in planum effundere muros,	
his aries actus disperget saxa lacertis,	
illa licet, penitus tolli quam iusseris urbem,	385
Roma sit.	

[I swear] that if you want any walls leveled to the ground,	
these arms of mine will drive the ram to scatter stones,	
even though the city whose annihilation you command	385
be Rome.	

While the Caesarians march through Italy in Books 1 and 3, the residents of Rome fear that Caesar will sack their city and burn it to the ground (e.g. 1.469-522, 3.97-112).⁵ Caesar himself contemplates permitting his soldiers to sack the city when he faces a mutiny in Book 5 (5.305-307), an idea that recurs in Book 7 when the Caesarian troops regret that they have only the camp of Pompey to plunder and not Rome itself

⁵ I will discuss these passages at length in Ch. 1 (pages 61ff. and 85ff.).

(7.758-760). Lucan thus stresses the willingness of the Caesarians to sack and even destroy the city. There is no limit to what they would do in pursuit of total power.⁶

However, the threat Caesar poses to Rome's physical security and existence presents serious problems for the interpretation of characterization, thematic development, and plot progression in the *Pharsalia*. After Lucan repeatedly raises the idea that Caesar and his troops might sack or even destroy Rome, he does not deviate from the standard historical account according to which Caesar occupied the city with minimal physical violence.⁷ When Caesar enters Rome in Book 3, he proves much less violent than the senators had expected (3.109-112):

sedere patres censere parati, si regnum, si templa sibi iugulumque senatus exiliumque petat. melius, quod plura iubere erubuit quam Roma pati.	110
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The Fathers sat, prepared to vote in favour if he asks for tyranny, for temples for himself, for the slaughter and the exile of the Senate. Thank the gods his sense of shame exceeded Rome's self-degradation.	110
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Lucan's readers in the Neronian age would have remembered Caesar less as a man who threatened to destroy Rome than as the founder of a dynasty that adorned the city with numerous emoluments and public buildings. Due observes, "It is one of Lucan's significant absurdities that, although Rome apparently flourished under the new conditions, he sticks to the conviction that Rome perished in the civil wars and

⁶ Cf. 2.223-233, where an old man laments that Pompey and Caesar will not even observe the limits that Sulla observed in the last round of civil war.

⁷ Caes. *B.C.* 1.32-33. See discussion in Ch. 1 (p. 85ff.).

actually does not exist any longer.”⁸ While I contend throughout this dissertation that Lucan’s image of Rome in ruins is no mere “absurdity,” upon first examination it does seem extremely hyperbolic.

Despite the prominence Lucan gives the theme of the destruction of cities in the *Pharsalia*, very few cities are actually destroyed in the course of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. Caesar successfully besieges a few Italian cities (2.439-461) and occupies Massilia in Gaul after an unsuccessful siege (3.298-762), but he destroys none of these cities.⁹ As we shall see, Pompey defends his retreat from Rome to Thessaly on the grounds that he is sparing Rome the destruction that would result if he shifted the theater of the war back to Italy (6.319-329; 7.87-123). The desolation Lucan attributes to the Rome and Italy of his own day results not from battles actually fought in Italy but from the massacre of the native Roman stock at Pharsalus (7.385-419). On the republican side, Cato destroys the city of Phycus in North Africa (9.39-41). Lastly, bitter street fighting and horrible conflagrations break out in Alexandria as partisans in the Egyptian civil war besiege Caesar in the palace of Cleopatra (10.332-546). In the end, the great *exemplum* of a destroyed city is not Rome, as a reader ignorant of the actual history of the civil war might expect on the basis of the web of imagery, symbolism, and literary and historical allusion in Books 1-3. Rather, the *Pharsalia*’s paradigmatic ruined city is Troy, whose barely visible remains Caesar visits and vows to rebuild in one of the epic’s most famous scenes (9.950-999).

⁸ Due 1962, 118.

⁹ Caesar comments with reference to the impending siege, “there is time to destroy Massilia” (*Massiliam delere vacat*, 3.360). When the siege narrative ends, Lucan fails to note that Caesar did not in fact destroy Massilia and acted with restraint when the city surrendered (Brisset 1964, 96, n. 3; Rowland 1969, 205-206). He ordered his soldiers not to sack the city and abided by these terms even after the Massiliotes broke a truce (Caes. *B.C.* 2.13-14, 2.22.5-6). See Masters 1992, 13-25, on Lucan’s manipulation of his sources in the Massilia episode.

How are we to explain the disparity between Lucan's persistent depiction of Caesar as a threat to the physical security and even the existence of Rome and the fact that he enters the city without bloodshed in Book 3? Why does Lucan suggest that Caesar's invasion is a direct threat to the cities and countryside of Italy when the Battle of Pharsalus, fought in Thessaly, is the actual cause of Italy's desolation? How are we to reconcile, if we can, the prominence of the theme of the destruction of cities in the *Pharsalia* with the fact that almost no cities actually are destroyed in the epic? Does Lucan simply write in an inconsistent style? Do the pursuit of poetic effect in individual scenes and the narrator's own contradictory viewpoints produce fractured, irreconcilable images, characterizations, and narratives?¹⁰ Or are there more self-consistent patterns of imagery, theme, and allusion that inform Lucan's multi-faceted treatment of the destruction of cities?

In this dissertation, I argue that we can answer the preceding questions by studying the relationship Lucan posits between the fate of the physical city of Rome and that of Rome's republican constitution. For Lucan, Rome consists of both the physical city, which I refer to throughout the dissertation as the *Urbs*,¹¹ and the city's republican polity, which I refer to as the *civitas*. I use *civitas* primarily in the sense of an organized community (the state or body politic) and the persons who live in it.¹² Of course, *civitas* does not appear in the *Pharsalia* as it cannot fit in a dactylic hexameter.

¹⁰ See Masters 1992, Bartsch 1997, and O'Hara 2007, 131ff., for claims that the narratorial voice in the *Pharsalia* presents no stable, consistent interpretation of events and undermines its own claims.

¹¹ I capitalize *Urbs* when I refer to Rome specifically, which Roman authors habitually refer to as The City *par excellence*, much as Athenian authors refer to Athens as Ἀστυ (Lewis & Short s.v. I.2). Lucan frequently uses *Urbs* without an epithet or proper name to refer to Rome, e.g. "they [the republicans] fear for Rome and Magnus" (*urbi Magnoque timetur*, 7.138; emphasis added).

¹² See the first and second meanings listed in the *O.L.D.* See Lewis & Short for the distinction between *urbs* and *civitas* (s.v. II). The metaphorical use of *civitas* to refer to a physical city does occur, but primarily in post-Augustan literature and not at all in Caesar or Cicero (ibid. s.v. II.2.B).

Nonetheless, I find it useful to use the word because of the strong tendency in Latin literature to differentiate between the terms *urbs*, which refers to the city qua physical and architectural entity (i.e. an urban physical environment), and *civitas*, which refers to the city qua organized community of human beings.¹³ This fundamental dichotomy is apparent in the following quotations from Cicero:

tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula hominum, quae postea **civitates** nominatae sunt, tum domicilia coniuncta, quas **urbes** dicimus, invento et divino iure et humano moenibus saepserunt.

Then things serving for common use, which we call public, [then] associations of men, which were afterwards called **states**, then continuous series of dwelling-places which we call **cities**, they enclosed with walls, after divine and human law had been introduced. (*Pro Sest.* 42.91)¹⁴

‘ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor [quia sapiens non sum] nec haec **urbs** nec in ea **civitas**.’ . . . Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma **urbs** et eam **civitas** incoheret.

“Because I am not a wise man, Carneades, I do not seem to you to be a praetor nor does this seem to be a **city** nor in this city does there seem to be a **state**.” . . . Aristotle or Xenocrates, whom Antiochus was wont to follow, would not have doubted that he [A. Albinus] was a praetor and that Rome was a **city** and that a **state** inhabited it. (*Acad.* 2.45.137)

In certain contexts, I use the words *civitas* and republic (*res publica*) synonymously to refer to the Roman polity as it existed before the civil war. However, I find it useful to employ the word *civitas* as well as republic because it better describes the concrete body of citizens functioning as a community as opposed to a particular regime taken in the abstract.

¹³ Among recent articles on the topic of the city’s role in the *Pharsalia*, Donato Gagliardi’s “Roma nella Poesia di Lucano” from 2001 approaches Rome as *civitas* and J.-M. Croiselle’s “La Rome de Lucain” from 2002 deals with Lucan’s depiction of the *Urbs*.

¹⁴ I here use Gardner’s translation of the *Pro Sestio*.

The dual identification of Rome as both *Urbs* and *civitas* helps explain why Lucan routinely uses the image of physical destruction to describe the political transformation of the Roman Republic into the Empire. Lucan's deployment of imagery, metaphor, rhetoric, and literary, geographical, and historical allusion establishes a strong bond between the city's old republican *civitas* and the *Urbs*. When Caesar initially marches on Rome, he is seen as a threat to both the city's physical safety and its political constitution. However, the *Pharsalia* tells the story of how Caesar occupied the *Urbs* and thereby cut off the republicans from their native city. Pompey and the other republican leaders recognize the ideological predicament caused by their expulsion from Rome; they claim to constitute the one and only Roman army while at the same time they allow another army, also ostensibly Roman, to occupy the *Urbs*. Their answer is to identify themselves as the embodiment of Rome, i.e. the *civitas*, their exile from the physical city notwithstanding.

The republicans' self-identification with Rome underlies Lucan's portrayal of their catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus as the metaphorical destruction of the city itself. Throughout this dissertation, I use the expression "metaphorical destruction" to refer to the metaphor of the physical destruction of Rome that Lucan uses to depict both the *literal* destruction of Rome's republican *civitas* in the civil war and also that of the republican armies on the battlefield. The image of the ruined *Urbs* reveals the significance of the Battle of Pharsalus as the death of the republic. After Pharsalus, the imagery of the physical destruction and reconstruction of cities pervades Lucan's description of both Cato and Caesar's attempts to rebuild the Roman state. Additionally, as we shall see in Ch. 3 and Ch. 5 (*passim*), Lucan attributes the

subsequent physical decay of the *Urbs* and of Italy's cities to the Battle of Pharsalus. The metaphor of Rome's destruction at Pharsalus therefore suits the nexus of historical causality in which Lucan contextualizes the battle; to the extent that the *Urbs* is ruined in Lucan's day, Pharsalus is to blame.

Pompey's departure from Rome entails numerous paradoxes and crises of identity. The bonds tying the republican *civitas* to the *Urbs* are neither retained in their totality nor completely severed. Additionally, the Caesarian army comes to embody the new tyrannical regime based in the *Urbs* even as the Caesarians themselves leave Rome behind to pursue Pompey. Furthermore, the metaphorical destruction of Rome is expressed in the physical ruins that the rival armies encounter throughout their campaigns.¹⁵ In short, Lucan employs images of the *Urbs*, republican army, and Caesarian army in moments of peril as well as descriptions of various ruined cities and structures to gauge Rome's self-destruction over the course of the civil war. I metaphorically refer to these images as "refractions of Rome."¹⁶ Etymologically derived from a Latin verb meaning "to break" (*refringere*), "refraction" refers to the bending of light when it passes through a medium.¹⁷ The word applies to the type of metaphorical usage I described above because Lucan uses the ruins of Troy (*vel sim.*) as media that reflect Rome's brokenness in the civil war. The former unity of Rome – physical city, native Roman population, republican government, and such eminent leaders as Pompey functioning as a cohesive whole –

¹⁵ Dorchak 1995, 19, observes that for Lucan, as for Vergil and Seneca before him, "*ruina* is almost never purely metaphorical; it is almost always to some degree concrete."

¹⁶ I thank Pietro Pucci and Michael Fontaine for suggesting the word "refraction" to me as the proper term for the phenomenon I am describing.

¹⁷ The *Oxford English Dictionary* (second edition) records a rare English usage of "refraction" meaning "the action of breaking open or breaking up" (s.v. 3.a).

has been shattered into its constituent pieces. These fragments continue to reflect some aspect of the city's fate, but the fragmentation and distortion of this image only testifies to the disintegration of the unity that Rome once was.

II. The background to Lucan's treatment of the destruction of cities

A. Lucan, the *Urbs*, and the Great Fire of 64 A.D.

Before I provide a more detailed introductory outline of my argument, I wish to address some more general aspects of how Lucan treats the destruction of cities in the *Pharsalia*. First of all, what was Lucan's own relationship with the *Urbs*? Although his family, the Annaei, was originally from Cordoba in Spain,¹⁸ he arrived at Rome in 40 A.D. at the age of seven months.¹⁹ Lucan's biographer Vacca writes, "I believe it was by the decrees of fate that this genius which was growing up to fill the world with its fame was raised in the city that ruled the world."²⁰ The only trip outside the city for which we have firm evidence is a stay at Athens that ended when Nero recalled him to Rome to join his *cohors amicorum* a little before 60 A.D.²¹ He went on to become a quaestor, augur, and senator. Lucan mentions Pompey's Theater several times in the course of the *Pharsalia* and would have remembered it well; it was there that he was crowned with laurels for his poetic *Laudes Neronis* during the

¹⁸ At *Silvae* 2.7.24-35, Statius praises Lucan for bringing great honor to his native Spain.

¹⁹ Vacca *Vita Lucani*. Heitland (xiv) describes Vacca as "a grammarian, probably of the 6th century." Croisille 2002, 150-151, reviews the evidence for Lucan's life at Rome. See Rudich 1997, 109-112, for a short biographical sketch of the poet.

²⁰ Vacca *Vita Luc.*: *fatorum credo decretis ut id ingenium quod orbem fama sui impleturum cresceret in domina mundi aleretur urbe*. I thank Michael Fontaine for pointing out to me Vacca's likely play on the words *orbem* and *urbe*.

²¹ Suet. *Vita Luc.* The terminus ante quem for Lucan's return is secured by his participation in the Neronia festival of 60 A.D.; see Croisille 2002, 150.

celebration of the Neronia festival.²² Lucan may have retreated to Campania after the Great Fire of 64; Vacca records a work entitled *Epistolae ex Campania* among his works.²³ He thus lived the preponderance of his twenty-six years within the imperial capital. This circumstance sets Lucan apart from the bulk of Roman poets, most of whom were born and raised far from Rome. Catullus was from Verona, Vergil from Andes near Mantua, Horace from Venusia, Ovid from Sulmo, and Statius from Naples. While not born in the city, Lucan could claim to be a child of the *Urbs* in a way few other Roman poets could.²⁴

In fact, Lucan was a witness to the actual, physical destruction of much of the city. He not only lived through the Great Fire of 64 A.D. but also wrote an account of it entitled *De Incendio Urbis*.²⁵ Statius describes the contents of this work as follows (*Silvae* 2.7.60-61):

dices culminibus Remi vagantis	60
infandos domini nocentis ignes.	

You will speak of the unutterable fires of the guilty	60
master wandering over the roofs of Remus.	

²² Vacca *Vita Luc.*; Stat. *Silv.* 2.7.58-59. Pompey's Theater is mentioned at *Phars.* 1.129-135 and 7.7-24. For discussion of the significance of Pompey's Theater in the *Pharsalia*, see Croisille 2002, 154-155.

²³ See Ahl 1971, 22-24, and McGann 1975, 215-217 (especially 217, n. 8), for discussion.

²⁴ Croisille 2002, 151, writes, "The objective setting of this [Lucan's] dazzling existence, the city of Rome is omnipresent in the filigree of each of the principal stages of his career" ("Cadre objectif de cette fulgurante existence, la cité de Rome est omniprésente en filigrane à chacune des étapes principales de son déroulement"). I thank Michael Fontaine for pointing out to me how few of Rome's most influential writers were natives of the city.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 150 and 153. The work is mentioned by Vacca and by Statius in his *Genethliacon Lucani ad Pollam* at *Silvae* 2.7.60-61. See Ahl 1971, 2-5, and McGann 1975, 213-217, for the disputed question of whether the *De Incendio Urbis* was written in verse or prose.

The mention of the “guilty master” seems to indicate that Lucan blamed Nero for the fire in this work.²⁶ Lucan’s readiness to blame Nero for the literal, physical destruction of much of the *Urbs* accords well with his treatment of the civil war in the *Pharsalia* as Caesar’s metaphorical destruction of Rome. As we shall see in Ch. 5, the initial plans for Nero’s *Domus Aurea* may explain why Lucan so harshly indicts Rome’s palatial estates at 10.110; Book 10 was likely written in the year between the Great Fire and Lucan’s death in 65 A.D.²⁷

B. *Amplificatio* and pathos

What are the general effects of the *topos*²⁸ of the destruction of cities in the *Pharsalia*? The most obvious effects within Lucan’s narrative are *amplificatio* (i.e. exaggeration of the violence of the civil war), fear, suspense, and pathos. The *Pharsalia* is *the* rhetorical epic²⁹ and the fall of cities was a commonplace in the

²⁶ Ahl 1971, 6-8, speculates that this accusation may even have motivated Nero’s decision to ban Lucan from reciting poetry or appearing in law courts. Tac. *Ann.* 15.49 and Cass. Dio 62.29.4 recount the ban on poetic recitation and Vacca mentions the ban on participation in lawsuits as well. No ancient source links the ban with the *De Incendio Urbis*, but this may be due to Tacitus and Suetonius’ bias against Lucan (Ahl 1971, 9-20).

²⁷ Croisille 2002, 153, 158-159. Spencer 2005, 68, sees in the Alexandrian fire in Book 10 a reference to Rome’s Great Fire of 64 A.D.: “[The Alexandrian fire] must surely suggest Rome’s counterpoint as Trojan ruin, the great fire whose effects were still a key feature of the city’s heart.” Cf. *ibid.*, 66: “[T]he text’s denial of closure [at the end of Book 10] allows us to take compositional context as far as possible and to read-in Nero’s Roman architectonics in the wake of the great fire. The fire that ravages Alexandria is preceded by a gala performance of sensuous theatricality (10.56-8, 82-5) that continues in the display feast that Caesar then luxuriates in (10.111-71).”

²⁸ I use the word in the sense given by Hinds 1998, 34: “As normally defined, the *topos* is an intertextual gesture which, unlike the accidental confluence, is mobilized by the poet in full self-awareness. However, rather than demanding interpretation in relation to a specific model or models, like the allusion, the *topos* invokes its intertextual tradition as a collectivity, to which the individual contexts and connotations of individual prior instances are firmly subordinate.” See pages 34-47 of Hinds for further discussion of the intricacies of the *topos* in Latin literature and its relationship with allusion, an intertextual gesture pointing to a specific text or passage.

²⁹ Quintilian famously opines that Lucan should be imitated more by orators than by poets (*magis oratoribus quam poetis imitandus*, 10.1.90). See Bonner 1966, Morford 1967a, Goebel 1981, and

highly rhetorical style of historical writing that modern critics designate as “tragic history.”³⁰ The literary topos of the capture of cities – the *urbs capta* topos³¹ – permitted historians to describe in great detail the collapse of buildings, the spread of fires, rapine and slaughter, the anguish of women, children, and old men, etc. The amplification of the violence by such vivid details inspired fear and pathos in the reader, an effect that renders such historical writing akin to tragic poetry.³² Just before his narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus in Book 7, Lucan explicitly states that he wishes to inspire in future generations “hopes and fears” (*spesque metusque*, 7.211) as they read of the Pompeians’ fate in the battle. This emotional effect is analogous to the pity and fear of which Aristotle speaks in the *Poetics*.³³ The strong generic affinity

D’Alessandro Behr 2007 for useful treatments of Lucan’s rhetoric and for further bibliography on the topic.

³⁰ Ullman 1942; Walbank 1960; Marti 1964. See Paul 1982, 145-147, for a brief discussion of tragic history in the Hellenistic period. Polybius criticizes the Hellenistic historian Phylarchus’ account of the siege of Mantinea in 223 B.C. because he speaks at length of the distress of women, children, and the elderly as the city fell and they were led into captivity (2.56.7). Plutarch similarly claims that Duris of Samos added tragic elements (ἐπιτραγωδεῖν) to his historical narrative to exaggerate the severity of the capture of Samos (*Per.* 28). For an extensive analysis of Lucan’s debt to the tragic school of historiography, see Marti 1964.

³¹ Paul 1982 provides an excellent survey of this topos in ancient Greek and Latin literature. Throughout the dissertation, I treat literary passages describing the siege and sack of cities (i.e. the *urbs capta* topos) as part of the more general topos of city destruction. Even when the city continues to exist afterward, military capture unleashes destructive violence upon the city’s population and buildings and makes the city’s survival contingent upon the self-restraint of the victorious enemy.

³² For discussion of Lucan’s use of detailed description (*enargeia*) to evoke indignation and pity in scenes involving the capture of a city, see in particular Marti 1964, 173-179 and *passim*, and Goebel 1981, 91-94. Marti 1964, 181-186, demonstrates a number of generic conventions of tragedy found in the *Pharsalia*. See Seitz 1965 and Fraenkel 2010 for more detailed treatments of Lucan’s deployment of pathos. Particularly relevant are Seitz’s discussions of that form of pathos which elicits indignation (*indignatio*) on the part of the reader (214ff.) and of the extremes of pathos with which Lucan presents the republicans’ flight from Rome in Book 1 of the *Pharsalia* (222ff.). Cf. Paul 1982, 151-154, on Livy’s use of *enargeia* to arouse pity in accounts of the fall of cities, e.g. the fall of Alba Longa at 1.29.

³³ Ar. *Poet.* 1449B. See d’Alessandro Behr 2007, 9 and 78, for a discussion of the relationship between *Phars.* 7.211 and Aristotle’s description of tragedy; she also discusses at length Lucan’s goal of inciting “hopes and fears” in his readers (*ibid.*, 76-112). Lucan’s readers will be filled with hope (*spesque*, 7.211) for Pompey’s troops so long as they are reading those sections of the epic that precede the defeat at Pharsalus; Lucan treats his imaginary reader as so completely absorbed in the narrative as to forget (at least in part) that all hope for Pompey is futile. For comments on Lucan’s technique of drawing the

of the *urbs capta* motif with tragedy is evident when one considers the number of tragedies that deal exclusively or in passing with the fall of Troy (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.*; Eur. *Andr.*, *Hec.*, and *Tro.*; Sen. *Tro.*), the attempt of the Seven to capture Thebes (e.g. Aesch. *Sept.*; Eur. *Phoen.*; Sen. *Phoen.*),³⁴ and the fall of Miletus (Phryn. *Mil.*) and Athens (Aesch. *Pers.*) to the Persians.³⁵

The fall of a city evokes more pity than does a battle fought in the open field because it afflicts civilians who usually are free from war's peril, entails the destruction of buildings and walls in which generations of citizens have invested their lives and livelihood, and may represent the death of a civilization. Lucan's rhetorical presentation of the civil war generally and of Pharsalus in particular as the very destruction of republican Rome therefore engages the reader's attention and emotions at a deeper level than would a straightforward narration of military movements in the field. Lucan indulges his propensity for depictions of extreme violence³⁶ in episodes where cities fall to conquering armies (e.g. Caesar's siege of Massilia in Book 3³⁷) and in rumors that Caesar was willing to sack, burn, and level Rome. The full violence of

reader into the "present" time of the narrative, see Leigh 1997, 82-99 and 325-329, and Henderson 1998, 182.

³⁴ See Ambühl 2005 and Keith 2007 for Lucan's adaptation of the Theban mythic cycle in the *Pharsalia*. See Zehnacker 2002 on the relation between tragedy and epic vis-à-vis the *Pharsalia*.

³⁵ In his discussion of Caesar and Pompey's speeches before the Battle of Pharsalus in Book 7, Goebel 1981, 83 and 90-91, cites a harangue encouraging the Athenians before the Battle of Salamis (Aesch. *Pers.* 402-405) as an example of the topos *pro aris atque focus* ("for altars and hearths"). See Ch. 2 below (p. 120ff.) for discussion of Lucan's references to the Battle of Salamis.

³⁶ For Lucan's characteristic striving for pathetic extremes in his descriptive passages, see Fraenkel 2010, 23-24, and *passim* in Seitz 1965. Fraenkel writes, "[Lucan] does not consciously seek out the extreme, rather he lives and thinks in the extreme, it is his intellectual form" (24). Seitz speaks of Lucan's "colossal, altogether unbelievably overreaching representation" ("Kolossale, gänzlich Unglaubwürdige übersteigerte Darstellung," 216). Marti 1964, 173-174, provides an excellent summary of the numerous pathetic elements (horrified civilians, mourning suppliants, etc.) that Lucan deploys in his adaptations of the *urbs capta* topos.

³⁷ Dorchak 1995, 213-225, addresses the multiple facets of the destruction that the civil war brings to Massilia (the siege of the city walls, the felling of the sacred grove, etc.). Opelt 1957, 443-445, and Rowland 1969, 204, note the intensity of the pathos that pervades the Massilia episode; Opelt even identifies pathos as the chief objective ("Anliegen") of the passage (443).

war is not revealed until it engulfs the very hearths and homes that people ostensibly fight wars in order to protect. If the possibility of the sack or physical destruction of Rome were not raised, in a sense the civil war between Caesar and Pompey would fall short of what war can be.³⁸

Indeed, were it not for the threat of Rome's destruction, the civil war would prove a lesser threat to the city than had been other wars in Roman history. This would not suit Lucan's claim that the civil war was literally the worst that Rome ever suffered. At the very beginning of the epic, Lucan claims that the civil war was more disastrous to Rome than were the wars with Pyrrhus and Hannibal (1.30-32), a theme he reprises in Book 7 when he states that Caesar exceeded Hannibal in his cruel treatment of the Roman dead (7.799-803).³⁹ Lucan similarly claims that Pharsalus was a worse disaster for Rome than were the Battles of the Allia and Cannae (7.407-409), battles that resulted in the near-total destruction of the *Urbs* and the threat of the same, respectively. After the Gauls routed the Romans at the River Allia in 390 B.C., they occupied Rome and burnt most of the city to the ground.⁴⁰ Furthermore, during the Second Punic War the people of Rome greatly feared that Hannibal would attack and seize Rome after Cannae.⁴¹ Lucan's exaggerated portrayal of Caesar as a threat to

³⁸ Seitz 1965, 224, notes that Lucan portrays "the anguish of the afflicted with maximal intensity" ("das Leid der Betroffenen mit größtmöglicher Intensität") in the scene where the Romans flee the *Urbs* in advance of Caesar's arrival.

³⁹ Lucan also compares Caesar to Hannibal at 1.255 when he claims that both leaders invaded Italy by way of Ariminum. For more extensive treatments of the related themes of Caesar as Hannibal's successor and rival and of the Roman civil war as a punishment for the destruction of Carthage, see Ahl 1976, 82-115, and Casamento 2003.

⁴⁰ I here follow the account given by Livy 5.36-55 without any intention of vouching for the historical veracity of the details. While Roman accounts give the date of the Gallic Sack as 390 B.C., Greek sources place it in 387/6 B.C. (Ogilvie 1970, 629).

⁴¹ Livy 22.54-57. Livy claims that Rome was never more terrified than after Cannae: "Never when the city was safe was there so much terror and tumult within the walls of Rome" (*numquam salva urbe tantum pavoris tumultusque intra moenia Romana fuit*, 22.54.8). Paul 1982, 151-152, treats this scene

the physical safety and existence of the city of Rome thus is a function of *aemulatio*; Caesar is the worst threat Rome has ever faced, worse even than Pyrrhus, the Gauls, and Hannibal, Rome's greatest enemies before Caesar. To quote John Henderson, "Caesar plays a Hannibal that *takes* Rome."⁴²

C. All-pervasive violence

The idea that Caesar threatened the very existence of the *Urbs* is but one aspect of the all-pervasive nature of violence in the *Pharsalia*. The entire world is afflicted in every part – the family, foreign nations, the natural world, the human body, etc. In the first line of the epic, Lucan tells the reader that the wars will be "more than civil" (*bella . . . plus quam civilia*, 1.1). The most common interpretation of this phrase is that the war will involve the breakdown of the family as well as the state.⁴³ Lucan refers to Caesar and Pompey as father-in-law (*socer*) and son-in-law (*gener*) due to Pompey's earlier marriage to Caesar's daughter Julia.⁴⁴ Fathers and sons face each other in battle, as do brothers.⁴⁵

The violence of the war between Caesar and Pompey also convulses human society on a global scale; as Rome is the ruler of the world, so too her civil war is a

as an instance of the *urbs capta* topos. Schrijvers 1988, 350-351, compares Lucan's portrayal of the anguish at Rome before Caesar's arrival (2.1-66) to Livy's portrayal of the panic that overtook Rome when Hannibal approached within three miles of the city (Livy 26.9.6-26.10.10).

⁴² Henderson 1998, 197.

⁴³ See most recently Roche 2009, 101. Dorchak 1995, 198-199, argues that *plus quam civilia* may also refer to the involvement of foreign nations in the war.

⁴⁴ Lucan introduces the recurring theme of Caesar and Pompey's family ties at 1.111-118.

⁴⁵ Dorchak 1995, 191, observes that this interpretation is already present in Isidore (*Orig.* 18.1.4) and the scholia to Lucan. The Bern Scholiast (ed. Usener) explains *plus quam civilia* precisely in terms of family relations: "From [the war's] quality, as waged between a son-in-law and a father-in-law. When both sons with their fathers and brothers with their brothers fought" (*a qualitate, ut (pote) inter generum et socerum gesta. ubi et filii cum parentibus et fratres dimicavere cum fratribus*). The *Adnotationes super Lucanum* (ed. Endt; ad 1.1) offers the same interpretation. For further discussion of the meaning of and the origin of the expression *plus quam civilia*, see Jal 1963, 35-37, and Dorchak 1995, 191.

world war.⁴⁶ Caesarian and republican armies wander over Italy (Books 1-3), Gaul (Book 3), Spain (Book 4), Africa (Book 4), Epirus (Books 5-6), and Greece (Books 6-7). Caesar marshals his troops from throughout Gaul and Germany (1.392-465) and the citizens of Rome fear that he will bring actual Gauls with him to sack Rome (1.473-484). Pompey is backed by vast numbers of Eastern allies (3.169-228) and at one point even proposes summoning the Parthians to his assistance (8.289-327). In Books 8-10, we see the war reach Egypt, not yet a Roman possession, and Cato marches through the Sahara.

Beyond human society, Lucan extends his treatment of civil war to include the very dissolution of the physical world. Lucan frequently compares the civil war to the *ekpyrosis* (ἐκπύρωσις), the periodic destruction of the cosmos posited by Stoic physics.⁴⁷ To give but one example, Cato compares the metaphorical collapse of the Roman Republic to universal destruction at 2.286-297:

summum, Brute, nefas civilia bella fatemur,
sed quo fata trahunt virtus secura sequetur.
crimen erit superis et me fecisse nocentem.
sidera quis mundumque velit spectare cadentem

⁴⁶ This observation is developed by Seitz 1965, 214; Henderson 1998, 187-188 and 205-211; and Dorchak 1995, 194-199, among others. In addition to the relationship between Pompey and Caesar, Henderson lists among other possible interpretations of *plus quam civilia* “the paradox of *Roman* civil war fought in *alien* Thessaly” and “the sheer scale of *world* civil war” (187-188).

⁴⁷ Lucan refers to the destruction of the physical universe at 1.72-80, 2.289-292, 7.134-137, and *passim* elsewhere in the epic. For further discussion of *ekpyrosis* in the *Pharsalia*, see Lapidge 1979; Dorchak 1995, 185-190 and 209-213; and Sklenář 1999. See Long and Sedley 1987, Vol. I: 274-279, and Vol. II: 271-277, for representative citations of Stoic primary sources on *ekpyrosis*; I thank Erik Kenyon for directing me to this resource. It should be noted that most Stoic treatments of *ekpyrosis* posit the rebirth of the universe after each episode of destruction in an ongoing cycle. In contrast, Lucan does not refer to the re-creation of the universe after its destruction (Sklenář 1999, 281-296). I shall revisit this point in Ch. 4 (p. 235) when I discuss images of destruction and rebirth in Book 9. In addition to *ekpyrosis*, the Stoics also taught “the doctrine of *sympathia*, according to which the whole world is one and disease in any of its parts affects the rest of the universe: *sic fata premunt civilia mundum* (8.544)” (Marti 1964, 176). In accordance with this theory, Lucan portrays the destructive violence of civil war pervading all parts of the physical world (ibid.; Ahl 1976, 282-284).

expers ipse metus? quis, cum ruat arduus aether, 290
terra labet mixto coeuntis pondere mundi,
compressas tenuisse manus? gentesne furorem
Hesperium ignotae Romanaque bella sequentur
diductique fretis alio sub sidere reges,
otia solus agam? procul hunc arcete pudorem, 295
o superi, motura Dahae ut clade Getasque
seculo me Roma cadat.

That civil warfare is the greatest crime, I admit, Brutus,
but where the Fates lead, confident will Virtue follow.
To make guilty even me will be the gods' reproach.
Who would wish to watch the stars and universe collapsing,
free from fear himself? to fold his arms and keep them still 290
when ether rushes from on high and earth shudders
beneath the weight of the condensing universe? Shall I alone live
in peace if unknown races and kings beneath another sky,
separated by the sea, comply with this frenzy
of Hesperia and with Roman wars? Keep far away this shame, 295
O gods, that Rome should fall and by her fall rouse up
the Dahae and the Getae – and I remain unmoved.

Cato's comparison of the metaphorical destruction of the city of Rome with that of the physical universe reflects the pervasive Roman association of the *Urbs* and the *orbis*, the city and the world it is supposed to rule.⁴⁸

The terrible strife of the war is also manifest in the destruction of the human body, often in a manner that can be interpreted as a metaphor for the destruction of the body politic.⁴⁹ For instance, we shall see in Ch. 4 that Pompey's son Gnaeus identifies him with Rome by referring to Pompey as "crown and head of the world" (*summa*

⁴⁸ Hunink 1992, 106. For a general discussion of the *urbi et orbi* theme, see Bréguet 1969, who briefly discusses Lucan on p. 142. For Lucan's attribution of the Roman Republic's final demise to a cosmic framework that generates such all-consuming catastrophes, see Johnson 1987, 5-18, with explicit references to *ekpyrosis* at 17-18.

⁴⁹ Bartsch 1997, 10-47, analyzes Lucan's obsession with the violent dissolution of the human body in terms of Julia Kristeva's concept of the "abject." Dinter 2005 provides a detailed analysis of Lucan's literal and metaphorical references to the body and mutilation thereof, as well as bibliography for earlier treatments of the topic. Some of the most notable sequences of mutilation occur in the accounts of the battle at Massilia in Book 3, Scaeva's *aristeia* at Dyrrachium in Book 6, and Cato's encounter with the snakes in Libya in Book 9. See also Most 1992, 397-400.

caputque/orbis, 9.123-124). Earlier in the epic, Lucan refers to the *Urbs* twice as “the head of the world” (*caput mundi*, 2.136, 2.655). Pompey’s literal decapitation thus symbolizes the loss of Rome, both the *Urbs* and the state, to Caesar.⁵⁰

Civil war thus negates every positive principle of order in the universe, from the human body to human society to the cosmos as a whole. Although Lucan cannot literally portray Caesar destroying the city of Rome (just as he cannot portray the physical universe literally collapsing at the time of the civil war), nonetheless he uses characters’ unfulfilled desires and fears, innuendo, imagery, and metaphor to speak of Rome itself being physically destroyed.⁵¹ At times Lucan’s exaggeration of violence within the narrative reaches extremes that defy any principle of realism. Some of these scenes are precisely those in which Lucan develops the metaphor of Rome’s destruction. For instance, in Book 6 Lucan describes the Caesarian centurion Scaeva killing so many Pompeian soldiers that the pile of bodies equals a siege wall in height (6.180-181). We shall see in Ch. 2 that this image is part of a larger theme in the Dyrrachium episode that entails the metaphorical construction of a new Caesarian Rome (i.e. the new imperial state) out of the ruins of the old republican Rome, here represented by the corpses of the republicans. The virtually hallucinogenic⁵² image of a pile of corpses as high as a wall permits Lucan to develop the theme of Rome’s self-destruction – itself a function of *amplificatio* – where realism and straightforward historical narrative would preclude such a theme.

⁵⁰ Hardie 1993, 7; Dinter 2005, 302. See also pages 231-232 below.

⁵¹ For instance, in Book 2 the *senex*’s recollection of massacres committed at Rome by Marius and Sulla permits Lucan to incorporate into his poem scenes of violent destruction that the history of Caesar’s actual entrance into the city denies him (Fantham 1992a, 28). See Ch. 1 (p. 72ff.) below.

⁵² Canali 1997, 7-9, addresses the hallucinogenic quality of Lucan’s extreme descriptions of violence. Cf. Seitz 1965, 216, cited above at n. 36.

D. The characterization of Caesar

Lucan introduces Caesar in Book 1 as a destroyer, a characterization that renders Caesar's restraint when he enters Rome in Book 3 noteworthy. Caesar's destructiveness is most apparent in the famous simile comparing him to a lightning bolt (1.143-157)⁵³:

sed non in Caesare tantum nomen erat nec fama ducis, sed nescia virtus stare loco, solusque pudor non vincere bello.	145
acer et indomitus, quo spes quoque ira vocasset, ferre manum et numquam temerando parcere ferro, successus urgere suos, instare favori numinis, impellens quidquid sibi summa petenti obstaret gaudensque viam fecisse ruina,	150
qualiter expressum ventis per nubila fulmen aetheris impulsu sonitu mundique fragore emicuit rupitque diem populosque paventes terrui obliqua praestringens lumina flamma: in sua templa furit, nullaque exire vetante	155
materia magnamque cadens magnamque revertens dat stragem late sparsosque recolligit ignes.	

Contrast Caesar: he had not only a general's name and reputation, but never-resting energy; his only shame was conquering without war; fierce, indomitable, wherever hope and indignation called he moved to action, never shrank from defiling his sword, he followed up his own successes, pressed hard upon the deity's favour, driving back all obstacles to his high ambitions and rejoicing to create his path by destruction.	145 150
Just so flashes out the thunderbolt shot forth by the winds through clouds, accompanied by the crashing of the heavens and sound of shattered ether; it splits the sky and terrifies the panicked people, searing eyes with slanted flame; against its own precincts it rages, and, with nothing solid stopping	 155

⁵³ For analyses of this simile, see Newmyer 1983 and Rosner-Siegel 1983.

its course, both as it falls and then returns great is the devastation
dealt far and wide before it gathers again its scattered fires.

The essential point of the simile is that Caesar *delights* in ruin: *gaudensque viam fecisse ruina* (1.150). As the destructive lightning bolt, Caesar is destined to overcome Pompey, whom Lucan compares to a withered oak tree ready to fall (1.135-143).⁵⁴ Caesar's failure to sack and destroy Rome when he enters the city seems inconsistent with the lightning simile.

At the symbolic level, Caesar threatens to unmake Roman history⁵⁵ as well as to destroy Rome: "But the fatal day of Emathia, equivalent to all the years,/carried backwards your destiny" (*sed retro tua fata tulit par omnibus annis/Emathiae funesta dies*, 7.426-427). The losers in Rome's past conflicts rejoice in her downfall: "[the *Pharsalia*] fulfils the curse of Dido; terms of Juno; menace of Jugurtha; appeases Hannibal; Gauls, Cimbri and Marius."⁵⁶ We shall see in Ch. 1 how Lucan associates Caesar with both the Gauls and Hannibal. By destroying the Roman Republic, Caesar turns the Roman victories over the Gauls and Carthaginians into mere foils for his own victory over Rome.⁵⁷ Lucan thus amplifies the significance of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar by portraying it as the perverse recapitulation of previous Roman history.

⁵⁴ See Feeney 1986 for analysis of this simile.

⁵⁵ I borrow the expression from John Henderson, according to whom Lucan's poem "deface[s] his city's walls, unmake[s] its foundation and its history, implode[s] its traditions and ideologies" (Henderson 1998, 166). Cf. Ahl 1968, 159: "[The *Pharsalia*] is the utter reversal of history."

⁵⁶ Henderson 1998, 202. Cf. *ibid.*, 197.

⁵⁷ Schrijvers 1988, 342-344, details how in Book 2 Lucan highlights Caesar's status as successor to both the Gauls and Hannibal as scourge of Rome. See Ahl 1976, 82-115, for further comments on the recapitulation of the Punic War in the *Pharsalia*. For further discussion in Ch. 1, see pages 42-43 and 50-51.

Particularly striking is how the historical Caesar reversed Rome's attitudes and policies toward cities the Romans had conquered and destroyed.⁵⁸ Caesar sent a new colony to Capua, a city that the Romans had degraded from its former status after it defected to Hannibal during the Second Punic War.⁵⁹ Most famously, Caesar ordered the reconstruction of Carthage and Corinth in 44 B.C., almost exactly 100 years after the Romans destroyed both cities in 146.⁶⁰ Cassius Dio mentions Caesar's justification for restoring two of Rome's foremost enemies⁶¹:

τούτοις τε οὖν ἐσεμνύνετο, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὴν τε Κόρινθον ἀνέστησεν. πολλὰς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλας ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ ἔξω πόλεις τὰς μὲν ἀνωκοδόμησε, τὰς δὲ καὶ ἐκ καινῆς κατεστήσατο· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἐπέπρακτο, τὴν δὲ δὴ Κόρινθον τὴν τε Καρχηδόνα, πόλεις ἀρχαίας λαμπρὰς ἐπισήμους ἀπολωλυίας, ἥ μὲν ἀποικίας Ῥωμαίων ἐνόμισεν, ἀπώκισεν, ἥ δὲ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ὀνόμασιν ἐτίμησεν, ἀπέδωκεν τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν ἐνοικησάντων ποτὲ αὐτάς, μηδὲν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἔχθραν τοῖς χωρίοις τοῖς μηδὲν σφας ἀδίκησαι μνησικακήσας.

This [Caesar's clemency] was a source of pride to him, as was also the fact that he had restored again Carthage and Corinth. To be sure, there were many other cities in and outside of Italy which he had either rebuilt or founded anew; still, other men had done as much. But in the case of Corinth and Carthage, those ancient, brilliant, and distinguished cities which had been laid in ruins, he not only colonized them, in that he regarded them as colonies of the Romans, but also restored them in memory of their former inhabitants, in that he honoured them with their ancient names; for he bore no grudge, on account of the hostility of those peoples, towards places that had never harmed the Romans.

⁵⁸ I thank Frederick Ahl for pointing out to me the significance of this aspect of Caesar's career.

⁵⁹ Vell. Pat. 2.44; Suet. *Div. Iul.* 20.3; App. *B.C.* 2.10.

⁶⁰ Purcell 1995, 133-148, and West 1998, 4-13, comment on references to the reconstruction of Carthage and Corinth in Latin literature, particularly vis-a-vis the near synchronicity of Caesar's orders with the centenary of these cities' destruction.

⁶¹ Cass. Dio 43.50.3-5. I here use Cary's translation. Cf. Diod. Sic. 32.27; Strabo 8.6.23, 17.3.15; Plut. *Caes.* 57.8; App. *B.P.* 136. Seng 2003, 127, notes that Caesar's plan to reconstruct Carthage was particularly controversial in light of the city's status as Rome's former archenemy.

Caesar thus gave new life to former enemies at the same time that he substituted his own rule for that of the Republic. Ahl has recently argued that Augustus' reconstruction⁶² of Carthage lies behind the scene in *Aen.* 1 where Aeneas observes Dido founding the city (*Aen.* 1.421-437).⁶³ Caesar's role in refounding Carthage may also lie behind Lucan's references to the ruins of Carthage and his portrayal of the civil war as a funereal sacrifice offered to the Punic dead.⁶⁴ In Ch. 2, I suggest that Caesar's resettlement of Capua and his reconstruction of Corinth may likewise inform Lucan's narrative when the republicans establish their bases at Capua and Dyrrachium, which was founded as a colony of Corinth.⁶⁵

E. The *Aeneid* refracted

The fall of a mighty city is also the stuff of epic poetry. The history of Greek and Roman epic begins with the story of the Trojan War and the aftermath of Troy's destruction as narrated in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the Cyclic Epics. There is much evidence that Lucan drew upon Homer directly as well as indirectly via the *Aeneid*.⁶⁶ However, the *Aeneid* is both Lucan's most important intertext and the greatest influence upon his treatment of the destruction of cities. Beyond Lucan's numerous

⁶² As Caesar was assassinated in the same year in which he ordered the colonization of Carthage and Corinth, it was left to Augustus to rebuild the cities.

⁶³ Ahl 2007, 333. Ahl observes that the theater columns described at *Aen.* 1.428-429 belong in the Roman colony at Carthage, not the Punic city.

⁶⁴ Cf. Ahl 1976, 109. Lucan mentions the ruins of Carthage and of Scipio's African camp (the *Castra Cornelia*) at 2.88-93, 4.656-660, and 8.269-271. For further treatments of the Punic theme in Lucan, see n. 39 above and the notes for pages 246-256 below.

⁶⁵ See pages 131-133, 139-141, and 147-148 below.

⁶⁶ Green 1991; Von Albrecht 1999, 229-233; Seng 2003, *passim*.

individual allusions and adaptations of Vergilian lines and scenes,⁶⁷ the *Aeneid* is the primary source for the epic “code” that informs the *Pharsalia* as a whole.⁶⁸ One line of criticism sees Lucan’s project as an anti-*Aeneid*, often in the sense of an anti-Caesarian rebuttal to Vergil’s purportedly pro-Augustan, pro-imperial epic.⁶⁹ This interpretation errs not only in positing a superficial interpretation of the *Aeneid* as an encomium of Augustus but also in denying the perceptive depth of Lucan’s own reading of Vergil. Robert Sklenář observes⁷⁰:

He [Lucan] is breaking down the categories [of historical and mythological epic] to attack the underlying assumptions of the dominant heroic-mythological category, fully aware that Vergil had anticipated him in this enterprise: Lucan is nothing if not one of Vergil’s most perceptive readers, and he recurs time and again to the *Aeneid* as a synecdoche for the epic

⁶⁷ Heitland provides an extensive list of Vergilian borrowings in the introduction to Haskins’ edition of the *Pharsalia* (cviii-cxxxi). For analysis of passages where Lucan seems particularly indebted to Vergil, see Thompson and Bruère’s 1968 and 1970 articles.

⁶⁸ See Conte 1986, 29-31, on the nature of the “Model as Code” as opposed to the “Exemplary Model.” The Exemplary Model is “the single word to be precisely imitated” (ibid., 31). Often Lucan does adapt individual lines and passages of Vergil, as I observe in the preceding note. However, Vergil’s *Aeneid* also provides Lucan with the Model as Code in that “he is also the representative of the epic institution that guarantees the ideological and literary functions of poetry itself” (ibid.; I here adapt Conte’s comments on the role the Homeric model plays for Vergil).

⁶⁹ For varying treatments of Lucan’s anti-Vergilianism, see Thierfelder 1935, 14; Guillemin 1951; Due 1962, 119-120; Seitz 1965, 230; Marti 1975, 75-76; Ahl 1976, 64-67, 183-189, and *passim*; Narducci 1979; Conte 1988, 38; Hardie 1993, 10-14; Rossi 2000a, 571ff.; and Roche 2009, 20-21. Martindale 1976, 52, writes, “The anti-Virgilian content of the *De Bello Civili* justifies the un-Virgilian style.” Not all of these readings are susceptible to the charge of over-simplification.

⁷⁰ Sklenář 2003, 15, n. 5. Ahl 1976, 65-66, similarly argues that the dichotomy sometimes posited between a pro-Augustan Vergil and an anti-Vergilian Lucan lacks nuance. He notes that “Vergil’s vision of Rome, Aeneas, and Augustus is highly ambivalent” and that in composing an unambivalently anti-Caesarian work Lucan could not merely denounce the *Aeneid*’s seductive vision; rather, he had to vie with Vergil as a poet (ibid.). Compare the self-consciously tendentious interpretation of Lucan’s relationship to previous epic provided by John Henderson in his study, “Lucan: the word at war,” a reading which notably highlights city destruction as a major epic theme Lucan has adapted to his own ends. According to Henderson, the epic genre celebrates “the walled city” and its heroic defenders whereas Lucan deconstructs the entire ideology and literary tradition attached to the creation, maintenance, and defense of the city and its values (Henderson 1998, 165-167, 188, 197, and 204). “Epics built The City” (ibid., 166), but Lucan “sings the [metaphorical] razing of Rome” (ibid., 197). While much of this reading is valid, Henderson himself acknowledges its limitations; Vergil’s *Aeneid* in particular defies any simplistic characterization of pre-Lucanian epic as “the mark, norm and sanction of author/ity, literature, civilization” (ibid., 165; see n. 4 for implicit recognition of the *Aeneid*’s exceptionalism).

tradition, precisely because he has so well understood the profound ambivalences in that work.

I believe that Michael Von Albrecht best describes Lucan's profound engagement with the *Aeneid* as "heretical Virgilianism, partly contesting, partly outdoing his predecessor."⁷¹

While it would be simplistic to say that Lucan merely inverts or subverts Vergil's purported endorsement of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, there are some key aspects in which Lucan's narrative does reverse that of the *Aeneid*. Whereas Vergil relates how Troy was destroyed and the groundwork was laid for Rome's eventual foundation, Lucan speaks of Rome's metaphorical destruction in the civil war and Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy.⁷² It is in *this* sense that I treat the *Pharsalia* as an "anti-*Aeneid*," as in Section III of Chapter 3. I refer frequently to Lucan's portrayal of the war between Marius and Sulla, the capitulation of Rome to Caesar, the Battle of Pharsalus, the Alexandrian War, and the siege of various military bases, both Pompeian and Caesarian, as recapitulations of the Trojan War. We shall see in Ch. 5 that Caesar's promise to reconstruct Troy also runs contrary to the warning in *Aen.* 12 that the Romans should never rebuild Troy.⁷³

Furthermore, Lucan treats Pompey as a new, failed Aeneas figure. In the *Aeneid*, Aeneas and the Trojan exiles escape the destruction of Troy, sail west to Italy, and there lay the groundwork for the eventual foundation of Rome. The *Urbs* takes

⁷¹ Von Albrecht 1999, 238; cf. *ibid.*, 241. For Lucan's twofold debt to and rebellion against his Vergilian model, see also Hardie 1993, xi, and Rossi 2000a, 572.

⁷² See the sources cited above in notes 69 and 70 for discussion of this aspect of Lucan's reception of Vergil.

⁷³ Verg. *Aen.* 12.819-828; cf. Hor. *C.* 3.3.57-68. The relevant secondary sources that discuss these intertexts will be cited in Ch. 5.

the place of Troy in Lucan's narrative and Pompey is the Aeneas-like leader of the exiled republicans. He leads his main camp from Rome and Italy to the East in a motion opposed to that of Aeneas and the Trojans in the *Aeneid*.⁷⁴ Ironically, Pompey is defeated by Caesar, who claims descent from Aeneas' son Iulus (1.196-197, 3.213, 9.995). The civil war therefore unravels Rome's legendary prehistory as well as its republican military victories.

F. "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold"⁷⁵

Lucan presents Pompey's eastward flight away from the *Urbs* to the limits of the empire as a conscious policy intended to spare Rome and Italy the violence of the civil war (6.319-329; 7.87-123). Despite Lucan's emphasis upon the damage done to Italy during the civil war, most of the war was waged in foreign lands. Pompey leaves Italy for Epirus at the end of Book 2 (2.714-736) and Caesar departs for Spain by way of Gaul in Book 3.⁷⁶ Already in Book 2, Lucan shifts the focus of his narrative from Rome to Capua, Corfinium, and Brundisium. The only time when a major character in the epic returns to Rome after Book 3 is when Caesar briefly visits the city at 5.381-402. Throughout the remainder of the epic a number of other cities and lands serve as proxies for Rome.⁷⁷ Rather than vie for control of the physical city of Rome, the

⁷⁴ This interpretation of Pompey is found in many of the sources cited above in n. 69, but Rossi 2000a provides the most in-depth analysis of the inversion of Aeneas' journey.

⁷⁵ W.B. Yeats, "The Second Coming," l. 3.

⁷⁶ It is on his way to Spain that Caesar orders the siege of Massilia on the coast of Gaul (3.298-303, 3.358-360, 3.453-455). Dorchak 1995, 199-200, observes, "For the duration of the war, Pompey – along with the Senate and all the true citizens of Rome – is an exile and fugitive from the City, while Caesar is always in pursuit." See *ibid.*, 199-204, for further discussion of Caesar and Pompey's attempts to establish "homes away from home."

⁷⁷ As we shall see in the body of the dissertation, Lucan does make statements about the postwar fate of Rome. Various characters also speak and dream about past or future events taking place in the city.

republican and Caesarian armies spend most of the epic fighting to control these foreign locations. Saylor remarks, “Historically, Lucan could not show Caesar behaving in this way [i.e. conducting actual military operations] against Rome, but such evil designs could be shown played out against surrogates like Massilia, Dyrrachium, or at Pharsalus.”⁷⁸

There is, therefore, a general shift of action in the *Pharsalia* away from the *Urbs* toward ever more remote lands. A number of modern studies of Lucan have noted the destabilizing political, cultural, and ideological ramifications of this centrifugal military movement.⁷⁹ As the republicans move their camp and Caesar follows them, the civil war threatens Rome’s character as the unique seat of Roman political power and the geographical and symbolic center of the Roman world. So long as Caesar, Pompey, and their rival camps wander over the globe, “Everywhere, then, is Rome: Brundisium or Massilia; Ilerda or the *castra Cornelia*; Dyrrhachium or Alexandria.”⁸⁰

Lucan may be alluding to persistent rumors claiming that several members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty wished to move the capital of the empire away from Rome.⁸¹ In the invocation to Nero, Lucan urges the emperor to remain in the center of the heaven so that he may look down upon Rome directly and not askance (1.53-55):

sed neque in Arctoo sedem tibi legeris orbe

⁷⁸ Saylor 1978, 255. Cf. *ibid.*, 243, and Rowland 1969, 204.

⁷⁹ Foremost among modern treatments of the generally centrifugal movement of the action in the *Pharsalia* away from Rome are Saylor 1978, 256-257; Masters 1992, 93-117; Henderson 1998, 205-210; and Bexley 2009, 459-475.

⁸⁰ Henderson 1998, 206.

⁸¹ See Ceaușescu 1976 for a superb analysis of this theme in the literature of the Early Empire. In Ch. 2 (pages 133-136), I discuss Lucan’s explicit reference to the attempted establishment of a rival Italian capital at Corfinium during the Social War (2.134-138).

nec polus aversi calidus qua vergitur Austri,
unde tuam videas obliquo sidere Romam. 55

But choose your seat neither in the northern sphere
nor where the torrid sky of opposing south sinks down:
from these positions you would view your Rome with star aslant. 55

This passage may reflect rumors that Nero wished to quit Rome for the East.⁸² In Books 9 and 10, Caesar first promises to rebuild Troy and then takes up his abode with Cleopatra in Alexandria. According to Suetonius, there were rumors that Caesar wished to move the imperial capital to Troy or Alexandria.⁸³ Furthermore, Caesar's reconstruction of Carthage and Corinth, two cities that had vied with Rome for *imperium*,⁸⁴ also revived rival centers of power within the Mediterranean Basin.

I address the centrifugal motion of the major actors in the *Pharsalia* in Chapters 2 and 3 in particular. One of the major points that I wish to contribute to this line of Lucanian criticism is that there is also a countervailing centripetal motion in the

⁸² See comments by Masters 1992, 98, and Bexley 2009, 459-460. Bexley notes, "If, as Lucan's expression implies, Nero's dominance is such that he may shift his power away from Rome, then the 'Romanocentrism of the Caesarian universe' [a quotation from Masters 1992, 98] is hardly assured. Admittedly, in chronological terms, power has already shifted: it belongs to Nero rather than to the city; Rome is only central by grace of Nero's position" (460). Several ancient sources document rumors that Nero wished to establish his seat of power outside of Rome (Ceașescu 1976, 92-97). To cite but one example, Cassius Dio claims that in the days before his assassination Nero "wished to kill the senators and burn Rome to the ground and sail to Alexandria" (ἐβουλεύσατο μὲν τοὺς τε βουλευτὰς ἀποκτείνειν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καταπρῆσαι ἐς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν πλεῦσαι, 63.27.2).

⁸³ Suet. *Div. Iul.* 79: "Indeed, even an unreliable rumor became widespread to the effect that he was about to move to Alexandria or Troy, simultaneously transfer the wealth of the empire there, drain Italy by means of military levies, and concede the government of Rome to his friends" (*quin etiam varia fama percerebruit migraturum Alexandream vel Ilium, translatis simul opibus imperii exhaustaque Italia dilectibus et procuracione urbis amicis permissa*). See Ceașescu 1976, 81-86, for other ancient sources that relate similar rumors. Ceașescu attributes these rumors to Caesar's sojourn with Cleopatra in Alexandria, which Lucan refers to in Book 10. A number of modern commentators (see p. 318, n. 64 below) connect Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy at *Phars.* 9.990-999 with the Julio-Claudian emperors' rumored plans to transfer their capital away from Rome.

⁸⁴ See p. 22-23 above for further discussion. Seng 2003, 127, connects Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy in *Pharsalia* 9 with the historical Caesar's reconstruction of Carthage.

epic that draws the action back toward the *Urbs*.⁸⁵ While the republicans do flee outward away from Rome, Lucan also portrays them as devoted to the *Urbs* and desirous of returning home, sometimes disastrously so. To give but one example, Lucan attributes the republicans' decision to fight at Pharsalus in Book 7 to a premature desire to win a decisive victory and return to the *Urbs*. As a result of this tragic decision, they lose the war to Caesar and forfeit their return home. The slaughter of multitudes of Romans on the battlefield leaves Italy devoid of native inhabitants.⁸⁶ Lucan thus keeps the *Urbs* in focus even when the rival instantiations of the *civitas* – the armies of Pompey and Caesar – are fighting far from home.

With these remarks said, I shall now summarize the contents of each chapter of the dissertation.

III. Chapter Outline

Ch. 1: The *Urbs* Imperiled

In the first chapter, I address how Books 1-3 of the *Pharsalia* present Caesar's invasion of *Italy* as a threat to the security and even the existence of Rome. As

⁸⁵ The centripetal movement of soldiers back toward the *Urbs* or a site symbolically representing it is briefly noted by Saylor 1978, 256, with a particular focus on Caesar's inwardly-facing, constrictive siege walls at Dyrrachium in Book 6. Masters 1992, 98, recognizes "that centripetal urge of the narrative, away from what is way out in the middle of nowhere to a place that is *main*, near the middle of somewhere (cf. *ibid.*, 106). However, he explores this concept vis-à-vis the republicans' attempts to find a new geographical center for their world in Epirus (*ibid.*, 98-99) or at Delphi (*ibid.*, 106) as opposed to the *Urbs* they have forsaken. Henderson 1998 utilizes the term "centripetal" to denote the turning of violence inward upon the self in the *Pharsalia*. He refers to the "centripetal vortex of 'One World' politics" that leads to "suicidal implosion" (*ibid.*, 168). In an extended discussion of concepts of spatial and temporal location, dislocation, and centrality in the *Pharsalia* (*ibid.*, 176-186), Henderson further comments, "The very choice of Pharsalus proclaims how centripetal the world built round the signifier '*Caesar*' had, lastingly, become" (*ibid.*, 182; cf. *ibid.*, 207). I seek to show that a number of characters in the *Pharsalia* still treat the *Urbs* (not the world-traveling Caesar) as the symbolic center of their world, even if their desire to return to Rome contributes to their own downfall.

⁸⁶ See discussion in Ch. 3 (pages 189-195).

mentioned above, in Book 1 the Caesarian soldier Laelius threatens to level Rome to the ground. The residents of Rome also fear that Caesar will bring Gauls with him to destroy the city. Pompey, the other leaders of the republican faction, and much of the Roman populace accordingly abandon the city. Book 2 begins with an extended speech in which an old man recalls the atrocities committed at Rome during the civil war fought between Sulla and Marius. This flashback provides a historical precedent for the threat that civil war poses to the *Urbs*. Even upon Caesar's arrival in Book 3, the few citizens and senators remaining at Rome fear that he will burn the city to the ground.

Despite these premonitions of impending doom, Caesar and his army enter Rome without committing any serious acts of violence. I argue that this bloodless, anticlimactic entry does not conflict with Lucan's preceding characterization of Caesar and his army as willing and able to destroy Rome. Caesar enters the *Urbs* without physical violence for the same reason that he does not sack Ariminum at the beginning of Book 1: he meets no significant resistance. Pompey's army has retreated, Rome is virtually empty, and the lone tribune who briefly dares to defy Caesar acquiesces rather than face death. Caesar would still destroy the *Urbs* should final victory over the republican *civitas* require it.

In fact, Caesar's bloodless entry into Rome is testimony to the end of republican rule there. I argue that Caesar's entry into a deserted Rome and his theft of the treasury of the Temple of Saturn is a travesty of patriotic Roman accounts of the Gallic Sack of 390 B.C. Book 5 of Livy relates how the Gauls burnt much of Rome to the ground. However, the republicans successfully maintained a stronghold on the

Capitol, rallied, expelled the Gauls, and rebuilt the city. The survival of the *civitas* ensured the survival of the *Urbs*. In contrast, Lucan portrays the republicans in the civil war abandoning the *Urbs* without a fight. When Caesar takes the city without bloodshed or destruction, the survival and physical security of the *Urbs* prove that tyranny has triumphed; Caesar spares the *Urbs* because the republic has perished there.

Ch. 2: The *Civitas* in Exile

In my second chapter, I analyze how Lucan portrays the republican and Caesarian armies as rival instantiations of the city of Rome. The republicans in particular suffer crises of identity on account of their separation from both the *Urbs* and from their fellow citizens in the Caesarian army. In Book 2, Pompey attempts to mollify the sense of defeat the republicans incurred when they surrendered the *Urbs* to Caesar. He argues that, metaphorically speaking, the republican army *is* Rome – the city in exile and under arms. The *civitas* as embodied in the republican army is thus free to continue the fight against Caesar even after he occupies the *Urbs*. The metaphorical identification of Pompey's army with Rome also diminishes the significance of the restraint Caesar showed when he entered the *Urbs*; if the republican camp in some sense is identical with Rome, the true test of Caesar's destructive power will be his treatment of the republican army.

The separation of the republican *civitas* from the *Urbs* is not without tension, however. Lucan compares the situation of the republicans to that of the Athenians when they abandoned their city to Xerxes during the Battle of Salamis, to the

Phocaeans who fled to Massilia rather than endure the Persian conquest, and to the Romans who fought under Camillus at Veii while the Gauls sacked Rome. These *exempla* indicate that it may be patriotic to abandon a city to an invader in order to spare one's *civitas*. However, Lucan's reference to Camillus' sojourn at Veii hints at the Romans' un-patriotic attempts to re-settle at Veii instead of at Rome when the Gallic Sack ended. This suggests that the republicans risk alienation from the *Urbs*.

Also, the republicans occupy and defend a number of cities (e.g. Capua and Corfinium) that once were enemies of Rome and even challenged Rome's status as seat of *imperium*. I argue that Lucan subtly alludes to Rome's past conflicts with these cities in order to portray the separation of the *civitas* from the *Urbs* as a threat to Roman identity. Cities that once threatened to become rivals of Rome thus assume that role again as the republicans seek a base from which to attack the Caesarian regime now installed in the *Urbs*. I argue that this ironic identification of the republicans with cities that once fought the Roman Republic represents a reversal of Rome's history, an undoing of what the republic once achieved. Furthermore, the republicans' claim that they represent the city of Rome is weakened as they adopt and defend enemy cities and countries as proxies for Rome.

I argue that the Battle of Dyrrachium in Book 6 marks the apex of success for the newly exiled republican *civitas* in its struggle against Caesar. It also demonstrates why the republicans are destined to lose the war. Dyrrachium serves as a proxy for the *Urbs* as the republicans attempt to defend the city against Caesar's siege. Lucan characterizes the Caesarian siege wall as a *mur*, or city wall, and compares it to the walls of Babylon and Troy. The siege wall thus represents the new Caesarian regime

just as the republican army embodies the old republican *civitas*. While Pompey destroys much of the wall and is poised to destroy Caesar's army as well, he fatefully decides to permit Caesar to escape. Why does Pompey fail to seize victory for the exiled republican *civitas* at this critical moment? First, the Pompeians lack the extreme devotion possessed by the Caesarians. This devotion is manifested by the Caesarian hero Scaeva, whom Lucan describes as a metaphorical *murus* defending Caesar. Secondly, Lucan states that Pompey spares the Caesarian army out of a sense of *pietas* toward Caesar, his former kinsman. In other words, Pompey continues to identify the Caesarians as his fellow citizens and cannot bring himself to inflict the violence needed to destroy Caesar's new tyrannical regime. Pompey and the republicans thus fail to make the sort of unambiguous stand for their own instantiation of Rome that the Caesarians are willing to make in defense of theirs.

Ch. 3: *Hic Roma perit*: The Battle of Pharsalus and Rome's Destruction

I argue in Ch. 3 that Lucan's identification of the republican army as the *civitas* in exile informs multiple facets of his account of the Battle of Pharsalus in Book 7. First, Lucan ascribes Pompey's decision to meet Caesar in battle at Pharsalus to the demands of his followers to win a quick victory and return home. Pompey tries to dissuade his men from returning to Italy because he intends to spare Rome the destructiveness of the civil war. However, Lucan shows that the psychological bond linking the republicans to their city is too strong for them to endure even an exile that they expect to be temporary. He thus characterizes the battle that defines the future of Rome's political regime as a struggle fought over control of the *Urbs*. In a moment of

tragic *peripeteia*, the army that had relinquished Rome in order to save the republican *civitas* now destroys itself in a vain effort to recover the city. Rome suffers metaphorical destruction because the urge for centripetal movement back toward the *Urbs* prevails over Pompey's centrifugal strategy.

Furthermore, Lucan claims that the Battle of Pharsalus caused the decline of Italy's native population, the desertion of Latium's cities, and the admixture of numerous foreign immigrants into Rome's populace. Much as the republicans cannot function successfully as a metaphorical "Rome" while separated from the *Urbs* for an extended period, the *Urbs* and the surrounding cities of Latium cannot retain their original character after the republicans lose at Pharsalus. Lucan thus represents the separation of the political and physical components that defined republican Rome – Pompey and the republican Senate on the one hand and the *Urbs* on the other – as fatal for both.

Lastly, the narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus incorporates numerous facets of the *urbs capta* topos. For instance, Pompey motivates his troops before the battle by telling them to imagine themselves marching out to battle from the *Urbs*. The entire city cheers them on for fear of what will happen if Caesar triumphs. At the end of the battle, Lucan also contrasts the Caesarians' sack of Pompey's camp with their desire to pillage the *Urbs* itself. Although the Caesarians spared the physical city of Rome in Book 3, Lucan employs the *urbs capta* theme to emphasize their destruction of the republican *civitas* at Pharsalus in Book 7.

Ch. 4: Cato and the Revival of the Republic

Lucan continues to employ the metaphor of physical destruction when he recounts Cato's attempt to revive the republic after the Battle of Pharsalus. First, Lucan uses subtle allusions to the *Aeneid* to liken Cato and the surviving republicans to Aeneas and the Trojan refugees after the destruction of their city. Just as Aeneas lays the groundwork for the later rise of Rome, Cato attempts to rebuild the exiled republican *civitas* after the catastrophe of Pharsalus. Lucan reinforces his portrayal of Cato as refounder of Rome by describing the remnants of the republican army as "ruins" (*ruinas*, 9.33). In another scene, the republicans encounter the ruins of a city wall that have been displaced by the desert winds. I interpret these ruins as an allegory reflecting the displacement of the republicans, the metaphorical ruins of republican Rome, to the desert of Libya. The republican camp itself functions as a proxy for the *Urbs*; Lucan repeatedly avers that it is better to endure the Libyan desert with Cato than to celebrate a triumph at Rome. Whereas the preceding books of the *Pharsalia* stress the destruction of the *civitas*, the theme of cities in Book 9 underscores Cato's role in reviving the republicans' fighting spirit after the disaster of Pharsalus.

Ch. 5: Rome, Alexandria, and Troy Reborn

In my fifth and final chapter, I examine Caesar's visits to Troy and Alexandria in Books 9 and 10 in light of his construction of a new tyrannical regime for Rome. As other modern scholars have already observed, Lucan has Caesar promise to rebuild Troy – an episode that has no discernible basis in historical fact – in order to signify

his substitution of a new political order at Rome for the republican one he has destroyed. I develop this observation by linking Caesar's visit to Troy to his subsequent visit to Alexandria. I show that Lucan repeats several key words, names, and themes from Caesar's tour of Troy when he later tours Alexandria. Lucan does so in order to characterize Alexandria as a latter-day Troy. For instance, Lucan explicitly compares Cleopatra to Helen of Sparta. The likeness of Alexandria to Troy helps explain Caesar's promise to rebuild the latter city. First, he discovers a ready-made image of Troy in Alexandria. Furthermore, Lucan says that Alexandria is filled with decadent royal palaces of a sort that did not appear at Rome until after Caesar won the civil war. In other words, Caesar and his successors will make Rome look more Alexandrian. As Lucan characterizes Alexandria as a new Troy, Caesar and his successors' physical reconstruction of Rome on the basis of Alexandria symbolically fulfills his promise to rebuild Troy. The reconstruction of Troy therefore is not merely a political allegory for the rise of a Caesarian monarchy and the reversal of Rome's republican history. Rather, the destruction of the republic is revealed in the literal remodeling of the *Urbs* in a style befitting the tyranny and decadence of the Caesars. The physical destruction of the old Rome actually does occur, but it is conducted by imperial architects and engineers instead of by rampaging soldiers.

Alexandria's status as a new Troy also informs Lucan's account of the Alexandrian War, the Egyptian civil war in which Caesar becomes embroiled. As the city of Alexandria burns down around him, Caesar finds himself in a recapitulation of the fall of Troy. The final image of civil conflict within the *Pharsalia* is of a city in physical ruin and Caesar on the brink of death. Why do Caesar and his new Roman

regime survive the bitter palace siege and street-fighting at Alexandria? I suggest that Lucan's explanation for Caesar's survival at Alexandria mirrors that which he gives for Caesar's survival at Dyrrachium. At Dyrrachium, the intervention of Caesar's fanatical supporter Scaeva and the *pietas* of Pompey turn back the republican onslaught. The result is the metaphorical destruction of Rome at Pharsalus. At Alexandria, Lucan has Scaeva appear once more to serve as a metaphorical city wall defending Caesar's life; Lucan even cites the Dyrrachium episode as precedent for Scaeva's intervention. Caesar also survives the Alexandrian War in accordance with a sort of providential force or historical nemesis; Caesar must die at the hands of his fellow Romans at Rome and thereby sate the ghost of Pompey.

There is a sort of symmetry, therefore, in Lucan's deployment of the *urbs capta* theme in the Dyrrachium and Alexandria episodes. Caesar first survives the siege at Dyrrachium so that he may destroy the republican *civitas*. He then survives the siege at Alexandria so that he may die in the *Urbs*. After conquering Rome without significant issue and beginning to reconstruct the city in the decadent image of Troy and Alexandria, Caesar meets his end there. This represents a final instance of centripetal motion within the *Pharsalia*; the forces of all-consuming violence Caesar unleashed at Pharsalus, Alexandria, and elsewhere in the course of the civil war are visited upon him only when he has returned to the *Urbs* in triumph.

Chapter 1

The *Urbs* Imperiled

What Caesar intends to do when he enters Rome is perhaps the single question that most haunts Books 1 and 2 and the beginning of Book 3. Caesar's troops do not fully commit themselves to the civil war until the centurion Laelius vows to level Rome to the ground should Caesar order him to do so (1.359-391). The residents of Rome subsequently fear that Caesar will sack and destroy the city as the Gauls did during the Gallic Sack or else commit atrocities within the city as did Marius and Sulla. In the end, however, Caesar anticlimactically enters the city without shedding any blood. In this chapter, I examine the theme of Rome's threatened destruction in Books 1-3 with a twofold goal in mind. First, I establish that until Caesar enters Rome, the civil war is a conflict focused as much on the survival of the *Urbs* as on that of Rome's republican constitution. Of course, Lucan's Neronian readers knew that Caesar did not in fact sack the city. However, one of Lucan's goals is for the reader to re-live the past events recorded in the epic as though they were transpiring in the present (7.207-213).¹

Secondly, I explain how the Caesarians' ostensible restraint when they enter Rome does not conflict with Lucan's characterization of them as willing and able to destroy the city. Caesar is willing to destroy the physical *Urbs*, but only as a means to destroy the republican *civitas*. Since Pompey and the republicans have fled the city, Caesar's potential for physical, military destruction goes unrealized for the time being. In fact, Rome's bloodless, anticlimactic capitulation to Caesar is the greatest testimony

¹ See n. 33 of the introduction for discussion of this effect.

to the extinction of republican *libertas* within the *Urbs*. In later chapters, we shall see that Lucan does provide the violent portrayal of an *urbs capta* that he has prompted his reader to expect, but he situates this episode at Pharsalus instead of at Rome.

The terms by which Caesar refrains from violence against Rome are found *in nuce* in the prayer he addresses to Rome before he and his army enter Italy. The narrative of the *Pharsalia* begins when Caesar crosses the Alps and encounters an apparition of a personified Rome on the banks of the Rubicon (1.183ff.). Lucan describes the vision as “a mighty image of his country in distress” (*ingens visa duci patriae trepidantis imago*, 1.186). When the apparition forbids Caesar and his men to cross the Rubicon (1.190-192), Caesar responds with the following prayer (1.195-203)²:

mox ait, ‘o magnae qui moenia prospicis urbis	195
Tarpeia de rupe Tonans Phrygiique penates	
gentis Iuleae et rapti secreta Quirini	
et residens celsa Latiaris Iuppiter Alba	
Vestalesque foci summique o numinis instar	
Roma, fave coeptis. non te furialibus armis	200
persequor: en, adsum victor terraque marique	
Caesar, ubique tuus (liceat modo, nunc quoque) miles.	
ille erit ille nocens, qui me tibi fecerit hostem.’	

At last he speaks: ‘O Thunderer, surveying great Rome’s	195
walls from the Tarpeian Rock; O Phrygian house-gods of Iulus’	
clan	
and mysteries of Quirinus, who was carried off to heaven;	
O Jupiter of Latium, seated in lofty Alba,	
and hearths of Vesta; O Rome, the equal of the highest	
deity, favour my plans. Not with impious weapons	200
do I pursue you – here am I, Caesar, conqueror by land and sea,	
your own soldier everywhere, now too if I am permitted.	

² See Peluzzi 1999, 127-155, for a recent discussion of this scene and the sources for Lucan’s personification of *Patria*. Henderson 1998, 193, finds parallels between Caesar’s meeting with *Patria* and Coriolanus’ meeting with his mother Veturia when he attacked Rome.

The man who makes me your enemy, it is he will be the guilty one.'

This prayer provides a paradigm for interpreting Lucan's later depiction of Caesar's relationship with Rome. Caesar admits that he will play the role of Rome's enemy, but he assigns the blame to those who resist him (*ille erit ille nocens, qui me tibi fecerit hostem*, 1.203). In other words, he claims that his enemies force him to engage in violence against Rome. We shall see throughout this chapter that Caesar usually does refrain from physical violence against Rome and other cities when he meets no resistance and hence can find no plausible pretext for extreme measures. He does not seek to sack or destroy Rome as a goal in itself and is content to spare the city so long as it submits to him.

I. Ariminum and Rome

The first city that Caesar captures after crossing the Rubicon is Ariminum, the modern Rimini. It is in the Ariminum episode (1.228-391) that Lucan first poses the question of whether Caesar will sack and destroy Rome or not. The behavior and speeches of Caesar and his followers at Ariminum give seemingly contradictory answers to this question. They occupy Ariminum without a struggle and do not commit any actual physical violence within the city (1.236-261). The Caesarian partisan Curio and Caesar himself then deliver speeches in which they pose as defenders of both law and order within the *Urbs* and of Rome's status as the political and symbolic center of the Roman world. In stark contrast, Caesar's troops do not rally to his cause until the centurion Laelius vows to level Rome's walls, loot its

temples, and massacre its population should Caesar order him to do so. How are we to explain the contrast between the bloodless occupation of Ariminum and the ostensibly patriotic rhetoric of Curio and Caesar on the one hand and Laelius' bloodthirsty vow on the other?

In this section, I argue that here as elsewhere in the *Pharsalia* Lucan gives a sinister interpretation to Caesar's ostensible restraint in his conduct of the war.³

Caesar's bloodless passage through Ariminum does not indicate any unwillingness on his part to inflict violence against his homeland and fellow citizens, nor do the locals welcome him as a liberator. Rather, the citizens of Ariminum recognize Caesar as a hostile invader in the tradition of various foreign enemies who passed through their region en route to attacking Rome. Realizing that they stand no chance of repulsing Caesar, the Ariminenses acquiesce to his rule. Accordingly, the ostensible peacefulness of Caesar's occupation results from political intimidation and the threat of physical force should anyone challenge the façade of tranquility. When Caesar can assert his rule over a city without inflicting actual physical violence, he does so. We shall see later in the chapter that the Ariminum episode foreshadows Caesar's behavior at Rome in Book 3.

First, Lucan portrays the occupation of the city as a hostile military action that initially provokes a response in kind on the part of the Ariminenses (1.228-261).

³ This sinister interpretation is most apparent in those passages where Lucan addresses Caesar's famous *clementia*, most notably when Domitius is pardoned (2.511-525) and Cato allows that Pompey might have been willing to accept Caesar's mercy (9.208-214). Much has been written on how Lucan characterizes Caesar's pardons as a manipulative ploy that disgraces the recipient; among other discussions, see Ahl 1976, 192-197; Goebel 1981, 89-90; Masters 1992, 78-79; Sklenář 2003, 135-144; and Leigh 1997, 41-76. The notable exception is when Lucan ostensibly praises the Pompeians who accept Caesar's pardon at Ilerda in Spain (4.254-401). For darker undercurrents of Caesarian absolutism even in this passage, see Leigh 1997, 54-68, and Sklenář 2003, 141-144.

Caesar threatens and then invades Ariminum (*minax invadit*, 1.231). The forum is “captured” (*capto . . . foro*, 1.236-237), not merely entered by the soldiers. The “raucous” and “impious” blaring of the military trumpets (*non pia concinuit cum rauco classica cornu*, 1.238) arouses the townspeople from both the literal quiet (*quies populi*, 1.239) of sleep and the metaphorical quiet of the long peace that has intervened since the last invasion of Italy (1.237-241). The Ariminenses initially reach for their time-worn weapons (1.239-243) but then lay them down again when they realize who the invaders are (1.244-247):

ut notae fulsere aquilae Romanaeque signa
et celsus medio conspectus in agmine Caesar, 245
deriguere metu, gelidos pavor occupat artus,
et tacito mutos volvunt in pectore questus[.]

When they recognized the gleam of Roman eagles, Roman
standards
and caught a sight of Caesar towering among his troops, 245
they stiffened in fear, their icy limbs were seized by terror,
and in their breasts they silently turned over unuttered complaints[.]

Caesar occupies Ariminum without a struggle, but this is only because the locals are too frightened to retaliate, not because they sincerely welcome his rule.

In fact, the townspeople silently lament that Caesar has followed in the footsteps of foreign enemies who threatened Rome in the past (1.248-261):

‘o male vicinis haec moenia condita Gallis,
o tristi damnata loco! pax alta per omnes
et tranquilla quies populos: nos praeda furentum 250
primaque castra sumus. melius, Fortuna, dedisses
orbe sub Eoo sedem gelidaque sub Arcto
errantesque domos, Latii quam claustra tueri.
nos primi Senonum motus Cimbrumque ruentem

vidimus et Martem Libyes cursumque furoris 255
 Teutonici: quotiens Romam fortuna lacescit,
 hac iter est bellis.' gemitu sic quisque latenti,
 non ausus timuisse palam: vox nulla dolori
 credita, sed quantum, volucres cum bruma coercet,
 rura silent, mediusque tacet sine murmure pontus, 260
 tanta quies.

'O how unlucky are these city-walls, established next to the Gauls,
 doomed by bitter position! Throughout all peoples
 deep peace reigns, tranquillity, but we are the booty of madmen⁴ 250
 and their first camp. Fortune, better you had granted us
 a home beneath the eastern sky or icy Arctos
 or wandering abodes than to guard the gate of Latium.
 We were the first to witness movements of Senones, the Cimbrian
 attack, the Libyan war-god, and the charge of frenzied 255
 Teuton: whenever Fortune challenges Rome,
 this is the path of war.' Thus each with stifled sigh,
 not daring to expose his fear; no utterance was entrusted
 to their grief, but deep the silence – so when the winter checks
 the birds, the fields are hushed, and so mid-sea is mute, 260
 unmurmuring.

Caesar resembles these foreign barbarians (1.254-257) in that he imperils Italy and the *Urbs*. The Senones, a Gallic tribe, defeated the Romans at the Battle of the Allia in 390 B.C. and then burnt most of Rome during the course of the Gallic Sack.⁵ Hannibal occupied various parts of Italy from 218 to 203 B.C. during the Second Punic War and famously marched on Rome in 211 B.C.⁶ The Romans similarly feared that the Teutones and Cimbri might try to capture Rome before Marius defeated them in 102 and 101 B.C., respectively. Marius was even hailed as Rome's third

⁴ I have substituted my own translation "the booty of madmen/and their first camp" (1.250-251) because Braund's rather loose "madmen's victims,/their first halt" fails to convey the proper meanings of *praeda* (1.250) and *castra* (1.251).

⁵ See in particular Livy 5.33-55 for a detailed account of the Gallic Sack.

⁶ Livy 26.10.3. See section II.B of the introduction, particularly n. 41.

founder because he saved the city from imminent peril.⁷ Insofar as the Ariminenses see Caesar as the successor of these various foreign invaders, they identify him as a serious threat to the independence and even the existence of the city of Rome.⁸

While the Ariminenses' association of Caesar with rampaging barbarians and their description of their city as the "booty of madmen" (*praeda furentem*, 1.250) are strongly suggestive of physical violence, none occurs during the Caesarian occupation. Paradoxically, at the same time that the townspeople lament their loss of "deep peace" (*pax alta*, 1.249) and "tranquil quiet" (*tranquilla quies*, 1.250),⁹ Caesar himself imposes a profound "peace/quiet" – *tanta quies* (1.261). However, Caesar has changed the political situation subtending that exterior calm. Civil war has changed the meaning of *quies* and of *pax*.¹⁰ Facing imminent death and destruction should they

⁷ Plutarch records that Marius was declared the third founder of Rome because he had averted a threatened invasion no less serious than the Gallic invasion of 390 B.C. had been (*Mar.* 27.5). The first founder was Romulus, who literally founded Rome, and the second was Camillus, who saved the city from the Gauls during the Gallic Sack and accordingly was compared to Romulus (Liv. 5.49.7-8; Plut. *Cam.* 1.1). Cicero refers to "Marius, who twice liberated Italy from siege and fear of slavery" (*Marius qui bis Italiam obsidione et metu servitutis liberavit*, *Cat.* 4.21). Sallust too claims that the Romans fought the Cimbri in order to defend the welfare of their republic (*pro salute*), not for glory (*pro gloria*, *B.J.* 114.2-3). See Bellen 1985, 37-40, for a discussion of the Romans' fear of the Teutones and Cimbri.

⁸ Furthermore, the townspeople claim that Ariminum was the point of entry (*praeda furentum/primaque castra*, 1.250-251; *Latii . . . claustra*, 1.253) for all of these foreign armies when they marched against Rome: *quotiens Romam Fortuna lacessit,/hac iter est bellis* (1.256-257). Getty 1940, xxxix-xl and 62, observes that Lucan here engages in historical and geographical distortion in order to strengthen the Ariminenses' identification of Caesar with barbarian invaders. The Senones invaded Italy and sacked Rome before Ariminum's foundation in 268 B.C. Neither the Cimbri nor the Teutones threatened Ariminum; Marius defeated first the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae in 102 B.C. before they could cross the Alps and then the Cimbri at Vercellae in 101.

⁹ Cf. "the ruptured quiet of the people" (*rupta quies populi*, 1.239) and "long-lasting peace" (*pax longa*, 1.241).

¹⁰ The redefinition of words caused by civil war is a recurring theme in the *Pharsalia*. At 1.667-668, Nigridius Figulus laments that "impious crime shall bear the name of heroism" (*scelerique nefando/nomen erit virtus*). Haskins in his commentary on this passage compares Thucydides' observation on the manipulation of words during civil strife: "The ordinary acceptance of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit" (καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει, 3.82.4; the translation is that of Smith). See Martindale 1976, 47-48; Henderson 1998 (especially pages 176-195); and Sklenář 2004, 11, for more detailed analyses of

resist,¹¹ the frightened and unprepared citizens of Ariminum fatalistically acquiesce to the *fait accompli* of Caesar's tyrannical rule. The people of Ariminum once enjoyed a *quies* (1.239, 1.250) derived from genuine peace, but now they must endure the sort of *quies* (1.261) that comes with the military suppression of republican *libertas*, particularly the citizen's freedom of speech. The Ariminenses rue Caesar's arrival but dare not voice their complaints for fear of retaliation: "and in their breasts they silently turned over unuttered complaints" (*et tacito mutos volvunt in pectore questus*, 1.247). The townspeople thus avert Caesarian military violence away from Ariminum only by accepting the metaphorical destruction of republican freedom in their town. We shall see that Lucan explains Caesar's restraint during his occupation of Rome in Book 3 in much the same manner; he permits physical cities to survive only if republicanism perishes there.

II. The speeches of Curio, Caesar, and Laelius

The remainder of the Ariminum episode consists of a series of three speeches that the Caesarian partisan Curio (1.273-291), Caesar (299-351), and a Caesarian centurion named Laelius deliver in an attempt to rally the troops for the invasion of Italy (1.359-386). One of the most significant issues addressed by each of these three speakers is the correlation between one's status as a citizen and one's presence in or absence from the *Urbs*. Curio and Caesar each in his own way justifies the civil war as an attempt to right wrongs that occurred at Rome, especially those that entail the

the changed signification of words in the *Pharsalia*, the paradoxes that result therefrom, and the Thucydidean precedent for Lucan's treatment of the subject.

¹¹ The Ariminenses would stand no chance against the Caesarians because their weapons have become corroded through lack of use (1.239-243).

unjust dislocation of Romans away from the *Urbs*. They claim that Pompey is the true threat to both the republic and the *Urbs*. In contrast, Laelius vows that he is willing to utterly destroy Rome should Caesar order him to do so. I argue that Lucan uses the setting of these three speeches – the occupied forum of Ariminum – to ironically undercut the message of each speech. The suppression of republican *libertas* at Ariminum shows that Curio and Caesar’s patriotic apology for civil war is a hypocritical ruse. Likewise, Caesar’s restraint at Ariminum strongly suggests that he does not seek the slaughter and destruction Laelius mentions. The Ariminum episode thus allows Lucan to have it both ways, as it were: he can admit that Caesar was not gratuitously destructive in his conduct of the war while characterizing him and his soldiers as willing and able to destroy everything in their path, even Italian cities and the *Urbs* itself.

A. Curio and the theme of exile from the *Urbs*

Curio defends Caesar’s march on Rome as an attempt to defend republican institutions in the *Urbs* from the encroachments of the Pompeians. He first appeals to Caesar to avenge the Pompeians’ expulsion of two pro-Caesarian tribunes (Mark Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus) from Rome.¹² Lucan lends some support to Curio’s interpretation of the expulsion as unjust (1.264-271)¹³:

¹² On the expulsion of the tribunes, see Caes. *B.C.* 1.5.5; Liv. *Per.* 109; Plut. *Caes.* 31.2-3 and *Ant.* 5.4; App. 2.33; Cass. Dio 41.3.2 (sources cited by Getty 1940, xxxi-xxxii, and Roche 2009, 236). Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus left Rome to join Caesar after the Senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* against Caesar on January 7, 49 B.C. For further discussion of Curio’s career before and after his alliance with Caesar, see *Phars.* 4.799-824; Ahl 1976, 88-103; and Getty 1940, 65.

¹³ On Lucan’s admission of the illegality of the expulsion of the tribunes, see Fantham 1999, 112-113, n. 14.

iustos Fortuna laborat
esse ducis motus et causas invenit armis. 265
expulit ancipiti discordes urbe tribunos
victo iure minax iactatis curia Gracchis.
hos iam mota ducis vicinaque signa petentes
audax venali comitatur Curio lingua,
vox quondam populi libertatemque tueri 270
ausus et armatos plebi miscere potentes.

Fortune works to justify
the leader's moves and finds pretexts for fighting. 265
The Senate-house had threatened and expelled the turbulent
tribunes
from a Rome divided, violating their rights and bragging of the
Gracchi's doom.
As they headed for their leader's standards, now brought close to
Rome,
with them came the reckless Curio and his mercenary tongue
– once the people's voice, he dared to champion 270
liberty, to level with the people armed grandees.

Lucan describes the expulsion of the tribunes as just grounds (1.264-265) for action on the part of Caesar. However, he is careful to note that Caesar had already begun his march on Rome (*iam mota ducis vicinaque signa*, 1.268) before the Senate provided him with this particular pretext for war. The *stated* goal of avenging the exiled tribunes is ostensibly legitimate and in accordance with Rome's republican constitution, but Caesar's true aim is tyranny.

Curio develops the theme of unjust exile in his speech (1.273-279):

‘dum voce tuae potuere iuvare,
Caesar,’ ait, ‘partes, quamvis nolente senatu,
traximus imperium, tum cum mihi rostra tenere 275
ius erat et dubios in te transferre Quirites.
at postquam leges bello siluere coactae
pellimur e patriis laribus patimurque volentes
exilium: tua nos faciet victoria cives.’

While with my voice I could assist
 your party, Caesar – when I had the right to hold
 the Rostrum and bring over the wavering citizens to your side, 275
 I extended your command, against the Senate’s wish.
 But now that laws are silent under war’s constraint,
 we are driven from our ancestral homes and suffer exile,
 willingly – your victory will make us citizens again.

Implicit in Curio’s speech is the notion that Caesar’s enemies in the Senate have wrongly separated and displaced the republican institutions of the Roman *civitas* (specifically freedom of speech and a free tribunate¹⁴) from their natural physical setting, the *Urbs*.¹⁵ For Curio, a citizen’s ability to exercise his rights is bound up with his physical presence in the *Urbs* and particularly the Forum, the political center of the city. For instance, Curio uses the expression *rostra tenere*, “to hold the Rostrum” (1.275) as a metonymy for addressing the people from the Rostra.¹⁶ Curio posits such a close tie between the right to address one’s fellow citizens and the usual physical setting for such an address that exile from the *Urbs* is, for him, a virtual denial of citizenship. Caesar’s victory in the civil war will thus have the paradoxical¹⁷ effect of restoring citizenship to those who have in effect lost it at the hands of Caesar’s enemies: “your victory will make us citizens again” (*tua nos faciet victoria cives*, 1.279).

¹⁴ Tribunes were sacrosanct, i.e. legally immune from subjection to physical force. For the origin and details of this right, see Livy 2.33.1 and 3.55.7-12 and Ogilvie’s notes on these passages.

¹⁵ Spencer 2005, 53, cites lines 1.278-279 of Curio’s speech as evidence for the *Pharsalia*’s “anxiety about and interest in the relationship between the site of Rome, its physical integrity, and Roman historical destiny.”

¹⁶ As Roche 2009, 238, notes, Lucan associates Curio with the Rostra once more in the epitaph at 4.799-801: “What help to you now is the Forum and the Rostrum disturbed,/the tribune’s citadel from which you, the standard-bearer of the plebs,/gave weapons to the people?” (*quid nunc rostra tibi prosunt turbata forumque/unde tribunicia plebeius signifer arce/arma dabas populis*).

¹⁷ The paradox of asserting citizens’ rights by means of civil war is noted by Roche 2009, 235.

Curio reprises the theme of exclusion from the *Urbs* when he touts the personal advantages Caesar will derive from marching on the capital (1.286-291):

nunc neque te longi remeantem pompa triumphi
excipit aut sacras poscunt Capitolia laurus:
livor edax tibi cuncta negat, gentesque subactas
vix impune feres. socerum depellere regno
decretum genero est: partiri non potes orbem, 290
solus habere potes.

But as it is, when you return, no long triumphal march awaits you,
the consecrated laurel crown is not required by the Capitol:
devouring spite denies you everything, and for subduing foreign
races
you will scarcely escape punishment. To thrust from power his
father-in-law
is the son-in-law's decision; share the world with him you cannot, 290
rule alone you can.

The pro-Caesarian tribunes were expelled from Rome and now Caesar is denied his triumphal return from Gaul. The civil war is thus in part a matter of returning people to the *Urbs* who have been unjustly exiled.

Whether Caesar is avenging the expulsion of the tribunes, the exile of Curio, or his own failure to secure the right to a triumph, Curio claims that Caesar will restore law and order within the *Urbs*.¹⁸ Caesar would thus be the champion of Rome both as *civitas* and as physical city. However, this patriotic rhetoric is undercut by the setting of Curio's speech. He speaks in the occupied forum of Ariminum (*capto . . . foro*, 1.236-237), where republican freedom has clearly perished. The policies that Lucan imputes to Caesar show that his appeals to republicanism are mere propaganda. If we

¹⁸ However, there is a tension in Curio's speech between appeals to law and order and Curio's claim that Caesar will attain mastery over the world by removing Pompey from power (*partiri non potes orbem, solus habere potes*, 1.290-291).

read Caesar's tyrannical actions at Ariminum as a precedent for his later behavior at Rome, he will impose his personal rule upon the city and suppress the very *libertas* that Curio claims to be defending.

B. Caesar, Pompey, and the *Urbs*¹⁹

As with Curio's speech, there is an ironic contrast between the content of Caesar's speech (1.299-351) and the occupation of Ariminum. First, Caesar complains that his Pompeian enemies in Rome fear him as though he were a new Hannibal. He rhetorically asks how they would react if the Gauls, whom he has conquered, were invading Roman territory (1.303-309)²⁰:

non secus ingenti bellorum Roma tumultu concutitur, quam si Poenus transcenderet Alpes Hannibal: implentur validae tirone cohortes, in classem cadit omne nemus, terraque marique iussus Caesar agi. quid, si mihi signa iacerent Marte sub adverso ruerentque in terga feroces Gallorum populi?	305
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By warfare's vast commotion Rome is shaken just as though the Carthaginian were crossing the Alps, Hannibal: the cohorts are filled to strength with recruits, every wood is felled for the fleet, the order has gone out: 'By land and sea go after Caesar.' What would they do if my standards lay subdued in defeat and the fierce Gallic peoples were charging at our backs?	305
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¹⁹ For a general discussion of the speech, see Tasler 1971, 29-40.

²⁰ See Bellen 1985, 41-44, on Caesar's presentation of himself as Rome's best defense against the Gauls. Cicero praised Caesar for being the first Roman general to take the offensive in the war against the Gauls (*De Prov. Cons.* 32). Antony praised Caesar at his funeral for being the first Roman in three centuries to punish the Gauls sufficiently after they burnt the city to the ground during the Gallic Sack (App. *B.C.* 2.146).

While Caesar boasts of defending Rome from the Gauls, he ironically gives voice to the very lamentations that the citizens of Ariminum are suppressing for fear of his troops. The Ariminenses' identification of Caesar as the successor of the Senones, Carthaginians, Teutones, and Cimbri accords with the Pompeians' characterization of Caesar as a hostile invader and enemy of Rome, the invader's protests to the contrary notwithstanding.

Just as Curio before him, Caesar presents himself as a defender of both republican institutions and the *Urbs* against the transgressions of Pompey. Among other accusations of wrongdoing (1.314-340), Caesar faults Pompey for stationing soldiers in the Forum during the trial of T. Annius Milo in 52 B.C. (1.319-323)²¹:

quis castra timenti	
nescit mixta foro, gladii cum triste micantes	320
iudicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona	
atque auso medias perrumpere milite leges	
Pompeiana reum clausurunt signa Milonem?	

Who does not know how soldiers	
infiltrated the trembling Forum, when the dreadful glitter	320
of swords	
ringed the frightened court, not the usual audience,	
when soldiers dared break through the rule of law,	
when Pompey's standards hemmed in Milo the accused?	

Curio complains of the expulsion of the tribunes from the Rostra and from Rome; he thereby stresses what Pompey has wrongly displaced from the *Urbs*. In the passage cited above, Caesar complains of what Pompey has *introduced* into the *Urbs* – armed

²¹ Getty 1940, 71, notes that Lucan has probably modeled this passage on *Pro Milone* 1.1-2, where Cicero remarks upon Pompey's deployment of a ring (*corona*) of soldiers in the court (cf. the comments of Gagliardi 1989, 88). Getty 1940, 83, compares *Phars.* 1.277 ("laws are silent under war's command," *leges bello siluere coactae*) with *Pro Mil.* 11 ("for laws are silent among arms," *silent enim leges inter arma*).

soldiers – contrary to custom (*insolita*, 1.321). By introducing soldiers into the Forum, Pompey effectively eliminated the distinction in Roman law and custom between the *Urbs*, the domain proper to civilian life, and the camp, the domain proper to the army (*quis castra timenti/nescit mixta foro*, 1.319-320).²² As a result of Pompey's confusion of Forum and camp (i.e. civilian and military government), the jurors were frightened (*timenti*, 1.319; *trepidum*, 321) and Milo received an unfair trial. Hence, the physical displacement of soldiers from outside of the *pomerium* into the very heart of the city resulted in the violation of the rule of law (*auso medias perrumpere milite leges*, 1.322). Pompey transgressed the limits of Rome's republican political constitution by physically transgressing the physical limits of the *Urbs*. Far from being a new Hannibal, Caesar claims that he will rescue both the city and the state of Rome from Pompey's reign of terror. Pompey is the true threat to Rome.

Caesar's complaint about Pompey's deployment of troops within the Roman Forum is disingenuous and hypocritical.²³ Caesar intimidates his civilian opponents at Ariminum by occupying their forum with his troops (1.246, 1.258).²⁴ Hence, Caesar is willing to adopt the same militaristic methods of intimidation that he condemns

²² Henderson 1998, 166-167 and 205, identifies as one of the fundamental features of the *Pharsalia* the breakdown of Roman culture's traditional "polarization of the inside and the outside of the City" into civilian and military realms, respectively. Roman law stipulated that, with the exception of dictators, magistrates were not supposed to possess military *imperium* within the *pomerium*, the sacred boundary of the city of Rome, except during triumphal processions (Whittaker 1994, 21-26). Whittaker observes that the *pomerium* was "the separating line between *domi* and *militiae* – that is, between the civil and military sphere" (ibid., 24). See also Versnel 1970, 169, 190-193, 353ff, and 389ff. Caesar cites Pompey's conduct during the trial of Milo as the effective occupation of Rome at *B.C.* 1.3.3 and 3.1.4.

²³ Marti 1975, 78, lists hypocrisy among the traits Lucan develops in Caesar's speeches: "He [Lucan] therefore subtly attributes to Caesar words that betray the personality with which he has endowed the future tyrant, that will subtly reveal inordinate ambition, cruelty, arrogance, and *hypocrisy*" (emphasis added). Cf. Due 1962, 104, for a similar assessment of Caesar's address to his army at Pharsalus.

²⁴ Caesar describes the jurors in the Roman Forum as frightened (*timenti . . . foro*, 1.319-320) by Pompey's soldiers, just as the people who look upon Caesar's troops in Ariminum's forum (*capto . . . foro*, 1.236-237) do not dare to reveal any signs of their fear (*non ausus timuisse palam*, 1.258; cf. 1.246).

Pompey for employing at Rome. Just as Pompey effectively mixed (*mixta*, 1.320) the *castra* and the Forum at Rome during Milo's trial, Caesar has turned the town of Ariminum into his *prima castra* by occupying its forum (1.251). Once again, the precedent of Ariminum indicates that Caesar is no defender of the rule of law in the *Urbs* and – at the very least – will garrison the city with his own troops.²⁵

In addition to hypocritically protesting against Pompey's deployment of soldiers within Rome, Caesar defends his invasion of Italy on the grounds that his soldiers have a right to return home and enjoy the just rewards for their labors in Gaul (1.340-346):

mihi si merces erepta laborum est,	340
his saltem longi non cum duce praemia belli	
reddantur; miles sub quolibet iste triumphet.	
conferet exanguis quo se post bella senectus?	
quae sedes erit emeritis? quae rura dabuntur	
quae noster veteranus aret, quae moenia fessis?	345
an melius fient piratae, Magne, coloni?	

If I am robbed of my reward for toil,	340
then let my men at least be granted recompense of lengthy	
warfare, without	
their leader; under whatever general let these troops have their	
triumph.	
And after war what refuge will they have in feeble age?	
What home for their retirement? What fields will be given	
for my veterans to plough? What city-walls for men worn out?	345
Or will your pirates, Magnus, make better farmers?	

Insofar as Caesar claims that he will end the unjust detention of his soldiers far from home, his pretext for invading Italy resembles Curio's argument that the civil war will

²⁵ A further instance of Caesar's hypocrisy in this scene is his accusation that Pompey is followed by a cortege of "bribed clients" (*emptique clientes*, 1.314). Caesar's speech is immediately preceded by that of Curio, whom he famously bribed to be his defender (1.269, 4.816ff.); for discussion of Curio's corruption, see Ahl 1976, 88-91.

avenge the exile of the tribunes. Furthermore, Caesar here presents himself as an agent of civilization; his men will cultivate the countryside and populate cities (1.344-345). The words *moenia fessis* at the end of line 1.345 recall the same words at the end of *Aen.* 3.85, where Aeneas begs Apollo to give the Trojans a permanent home:

da propriam, Thymbraee, domum; da moenia fessis	85
et genus et mansuram urbem; serva altera Troiae	
Pergama, reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli.	

Give us a home of our own, god of Thymbra, give walls	85
to the weary,	
Give us a future, a city that lasts. Preserve, for a new Troy,	
Pergamum's remnants missed by the Greeks and ungentle Achilles.	

Caesar thus poses as a *ktistes*, founder of settlements, for his veterans.²⁶ Rome, Italy, and his own veterans all stand to benefit from Caesar's invasion.

In keeping with his self-portrayal as a selfless and civilized general, Caesar explicitly promises at the end of his speech that he will seek neither booty nor tyranny by means of war (1.349-351):

neque numina derunt	
nam neque praeda meis neque regnum quaeritur armis:	350
detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae.	

Nor will the gods abandon us

²⁶ The Vergilian echo is noted by Getty 1940, 74. The fact that Caesar has been fighting in Gaul for ten years (59-49 B.C.), a fact mentioned by Curio (1.283), Caesar (1.300), and Laelius (1.374), may also contribute to Caesar's rhetorical self-identification as an Aeneas-like leader to his weary veterans. Aeneas and his people endured ten years of the Trojan War before embarking on the journey that would eventually bring them to Italy. However, the Trojan resonance of the ten-year campaign is ambiguous; insofar as Lucan portrays Caesar as the metaphorical destroyer of Rome, Caesar is more comparable to Achilles, whose exploits sealed the fate of Troy in the tenth year of the war. See Lebek 1976, 139, n. 50, and Green 1991, 233, for discussion of the Homeric resonances in Lucan's references to the Gallic War and its length. Lausberg 1985, 1583-1592; Green 1999, 234-239; and Seng 2003, 131-132 and *passim*, discuss Lucan's portrayal of Caesar as a new, Roman Achilles and Pompey as an Agamemnon figure.

since with my weapons I seek neither plunder nor power: 350
we are ridding of its masters a Rome prepared for slavery.

Instead of coming to Rome as a master, Caesar claims that he will remove the masters (*dominos*, 1.351) whom the city is itself prone to serve – the Pompeians. Caesar thus presents his invasion of Italy as a twofold movement: first, the return of the legionaries who deserve a triumph at Rome and a fixed *sedes* in Italy, and, second, the removal of the tyrannical Pompeians from the city. Caesar would thus be the champion and savior of the *Urbs* and its status as geographical and symbolic center of Roman life.

Lucan's description of the desolation of Italy in the very opening lines of the *Pharsalia* (1.24-32) preemptively contradicts Caesar's presentation of himself as a man concerned with the peaceful cultivation and settlement of Italy.²⁷ Whereas Caesar rhetorically asks how his veterans will ever plow Italy's fields and inhabit its cities except by civil war (*quae rura dabuntur/quae noster veteranus aret, quae moenia fessis?* 1.344-345), Lucan claims that the civil war has so depopulated Italy that in his own day the city walls (*moenia*, 1.24) are collapsing and the fields have gone unplowed (*inarata*, 1.28) for generations. Furthermore, despite Caesar's claims that he does not wage war in pursuit of booty (*praeda*, 1.350), the people of Ariminum have already lamented the fact that their city has become plunder for his army (*nos praeda furentum/primaque castra sumus*, 1.250-251). Caesar's troops have not literally looted the city in search of spoils, but the city itself is booty insofar as it has fallen under Caesar's new tyrannical regime. Lucan thus presents all of Caesar's

²⁷ See p. 1 of the introduction for a longer citation of this passage.

claims to be the champion of the *Urbs* and of republican institutions there as base hypocrisy.

C. The destruction of Rome in Laelius' speech

What, then, are Caesar's true intentions for Rome? The Caesarian officer Laelius makes a proposal diametrically opposed to that of Curio and Caesar (1.359-386).²⁸ He vows to destroy Rome itself should Caesar order him to do so, a prospect that Lucan introduces here for the first time. As we shall see in later sections of this chapter, the idea that Caesar threatens the very existence of the *Urbs* as well as that of the republic drives fear into the hearts of the Pompeians and motivates much of their initial reaction to the civil war in Books 1-3.

After listening to Caesar's speech, his troops remain reluctant to proceed on the march through Italy (1.352-356):

dixerat; at dubium non claro murmure vulgus
secum incerta fremit. pietas patriique penates
quamquam caede feras mentes animosque tumentes
frangunt; sed diro ferri revocantur amore
ductorisque metu. 355

He ceased; but the wavering mass with inarticulate murmur
mutters indistinctly. Their swelling minds and spirits
made fierce in slaughter are crushed by love of country and
ancestral
gods, but they are recalled by their hideous love of the sword 355
and by their terror of their leader.

²⁸ Laelius is the centurian in charge of the first maniple of the first cohort in his legion (1.356-357); see comments on Laelius' rank by Willeumier and Le Bonniec 1962, 69.

The way in which Caesar's troops weigh the pros and cons of the civil war reveals how ineffective Caesar's patriotic rhetoric is in motivating his troops.²⁹ Caesar invokes the *penates* and other divine protectors of Rome both in his prayer at the Rubicon (1.195-203) and in his speech at Ariminum (*neque numina derunt*, 1.349). Additionally, both Curio and Caesar claim that their goal is to defend the republic against Pompey's creeping tyranny. However, the soldiers judge the civil war to be an impious, unpatriotic exercise in slaughter and tyranny, an evaluation matching that of Lucan himself. For the troops, *pietas*³⁰ and the ancestral *penates* are reasons to *desist* from civil war, not to support it. The soldiers' bleak choice between *pietas* and the slaughter of civil war, like the townspeople's muted reaction to the occupation of Ariminum, exposes the hypocrisy of Curio and Caesar's rhetoric.

Furthermore, Caesar's patriotic rhetoric precludes any appeal to the desires that would actually motivate his men to continue the march on Rome, namely bloodlust (*caede feras mentes animosque tumentes*, 1.354; *diro ferri . . . amore*, 1.355) and fear of their leader, Caesar himself (*ductorisque metu*, 1.356).³¹ The force of Caesar's rhetoric suffers as a result; he apparently persuades none of his men that invading Italy will protect Rome's republican institutions. Consequently, the troops remain torn

²⁹ I mention the effect of only Caesar's speech upon the troops because Curio addresses his speech to Caesar himself (e.g. *dum voce tuae potuere iuvare*, *Caesar*, 1.273-274).

³⁰ Goebel 1981, 90, may exaggerate when he claims, "*Pietas* is never even claimed on the Caesarian side," but he is correct in citing Laelius' speech as an example of Caesarian impiety. See Ahl 1976, 201, 255, and 315, on *militiae pietas*, Vulteius' term for his devotion to Caesar (4.499). Leigh 1997, 191-233, discusses the fanaticism Lucan imputes to Caesar's officers, e.g. Laelius in Book 1 and Vulteius in Book 4.

³¹ Fantham 1992a, 28, observes, "In the scene at Ariminum Caesar offers a false interpretation of the political situation to justify his actions, but his men are not interested in justice," a claim which Fantham justifies by citing Laelius' speech.

between a genuine sense of *pietas* (unlike Caesar's sham *pietas*) and a desire for carnage to which Caesar does not appeal.³²

Laelius breaks the impasse by dispensing with the hypocritical posturing that marks the speeches of Curio and Caesar. Laelius vows to fight for Caesar even if that means killing fellow Romans and destroying the city of Rome itself (1.373-386):

nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,
audiero. per signa decem felicia castris
perque tuos iuro quocumque ex hoste triumphos, 375
pectore si fratris gladium iuguloque parentis
condere me iubeas pleneque in viscera partu
coniugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra;
si spoliare deos ignemque immittere templis,
numina miscebit castrens flamma monetae; 380
castra super Tusci si ponere Thybridis undas,
Hesperios audax veniam metator in agros.
tu quoscumque voles in planum effundere muros,
his aries actus disperget saxa lacertis,
illa licet, penitus tolli quam iusseris urbem, 385
Roma sit.

For no fellow-citizen of mine is the man against whom your
trumpets,
Caesar, sound. By your standards prosperous in ten campaigns,
by your triumphs over all your enemies, I swear 375
that, if you bid me plunge my sword in brother's breast
or parent's throat or womb of wife great
with child, I will do it all, though with unwilling hand;
that if you bid me rob the gods and fire their temples,
the flame of our military mint will melt the deities down; 380
that if you bid me pitch my camp by the waters of Etruscan Tiber,
boldly will I enter the fields of Hesperia to mark the lines;
that if you want any walls levelled to the ground,
these arms of mine will drive the ram to scatter stones,
even though the city whose annihilation you command 385
be Rome.

³² My analysis of the effect of Curio and Caesar's speeches on the soldiers vs. that of Laelius' speech is substantially the same as that of Roller 1996, 329-330, and Roche 2009, 261-262.

According to Laelius, personal loyalty to a despotic Caesar trumps all devotion to humanity, family, the gods, and Rome itself. Laelius' speech thus utterly subverts Curio and Caesar's claims to be protectors of the *Urbs* and the republic.

Laelius' speech inspires in his fellow-soldiers immediate and frenzied enthusiasm for civil war (1.386-391). I suggest that Laelius' speech succeeds in motivating the troops where Caesar's fails because Laelius openly admits what his comrades-at-arms already know: Caesar's war will entail brutal, impious slaughter of their fellow Romans. He thus dispenses with hypocritical appeals to patriotic sentiments that have restrained the soldiers from wholeheartedly supporting Caesar. Additionally, by holding forth the possibility that Caesar might order the massacre of kinsmen and the destruction of Rome, Laelius renders the civil war more appealing to men eager for slaughter. In short, Laelius addresses the desires that actually motivate his comrades-at-arms.

Caesar immediately begins his march on Rome when he sees his soldiers' enthusiastic response to Laelius' speech (1.392-395):

Caesar, ut acceptum tam prono milite bellum
fataque ferre videt, ne quo languore moretur
fortunam, sparsas per Gallica rura cohortes
evocat et Romam motis petit undique signis. 395

When Caesar sees his soldiers welcome war so eagerly
and destiny proceeding onward, to avoid impending Fortune
by any apathy, he summons cohorts scattered through the Gallic
fields
and advancing standards from every region he heads for Rome. 395

After Caesar presents himself as a patriot in his address to the troops, it is striking that he does not reprove Laelius for suggesting that he might order his army to destroy Rome. He is willing to make use of the enthusiasm Laelius has aroused. Caesar thus tacitly abandons the pretext that he is waging war to protect the city and the political constitution of Rome from the encroachments of Pompeian tyranny. All that matters is his own personal rule, which the Caesarians now support wholeheartedly.

Laelius presents the destruction of Rome only as a hypothetical situation; he uses conditional phrases marked by *si* at 1.376, 1.379, and 3.381 and by *licet* at 1.385. He does not explicitly call for the city's destruction, nor does Caesar indicate that he actually wishes to engage in the looting of temples, the destruction of cities, and the other atrocities to which Laelius refers. If the occupation of Ariminum exposes the hypocrisy of Curio and Caesar's professions of love and respect for the *Urbs*, it also indicates that Caesar does not order physical violence or destruction if the mere threat of it suffices to assert his rule. The key factor in determining whether Caesar will destroy Rome and the other cities of Italy or merely occupy them is the reaction of the people within those cities. If a city acquiesces to Caesar's rule, the precedent of Ariminum strongly suggests that he will not destroy it, sack it, or massacre its citizens. If a city does resist, however, the speech of Laelius indicates that there is no measure that the Caesarians are unwilling to take in pursuit of victory. The speeches at Ariminum thus permit Lucan to characterize Caesar on the basis of motives and

propensities as well as actual deeds; he and his minions are shown to be *willing and able* to destroy Rome although in actual fact they never do so.³³

III. Caesar and the Gauls

From the end of the Ariminum episode until Caesar enters Rome at the beginning of Book 3 (3.71ff.), the Pompeians greatly fear that Caesar will sack and even physically destroy the *Urbs*. Nowhere does Lucan indicate that the Pompeians have heard of Laelius' speech, nor does Lucan describe Caesar sacking or destroying any towns until well into Book 2.³⁴ As we shall see in this section, the inspiration for the Romans' fears is the rumor that Caesar will bring Gauls with him to sack and destroy the city.³⁵ In this scenario, Caesar's invasion would repeat the Gallic Sack of 390 B.C.³⁶

Lucan presents Caesar's invasion of Italy as the Roman desertion of their newly-won provinces beyond the Alps (1.394-398):

³³ Fantham 1992a, 28, points out that in Laelius' speech, "Lucan goes beyond the historical record in order to put Caesar and his troops in the succession to Sulla and Marius, who sacked their own city." Marti 1975, 79, observes that the function of many speeches in the *Pharsalia* is "obliquely to reveal motivation and to characterize, without the intrusion of the poet's own explicit interpretation." Lucan's technique of characterization in Laelius' speech shows affinities with his use of "counterfactual" wishes and pleas that history could have been, might have been, otherwise" (Henderson 1998, 187; cf. Marti 1975, 86ff., and Masters 1992, 5ff.). Whereas the narrator's prayers and pleas outline a better scenario that might have been, Laelius' speech portrays a worse scenario. The narrator's counterfactual pleas characterize him as an advocate for Rome; Laelius' speech characterizes him and his enthusiastic supporters as Rome's would-be destroyers.

³⁴ In Book 1, Caesar merely "spreads his troops throughout all of Italy and fills the neighboring towns" ([Caesar] *per omnem/spargitur Italiam vicinaque moenia complet*, 1.467-468; the translation is my own). But see Green 1991, 246, n. 15, who sees in *spargitur* and *complet* an image of Caesar's troops flooding Italy. In a later section of this chapter (pages 83-85), I will analyse Lucan's more detailed description of Caesar's advance through Italy in Book 2.

³⁵ Bellen 1985 provides a detailed study of the Romans' fear of the Gauls (*metus Gallicus*) during the Late Republic.

³⁶ See the preceding discussion (pages 42-44) of the passage where the Ariminenses compare Caesar's army to the Senones who sacked Rome (1.254).

... [Caesar] sparsas per Gallica rura cohortes
 evocat et Romam motis petit undique signis. 395
 deseruere cavo tentoria fixa Lemanno
 castraque quae Vosegi curvam super ardua ripam
 pugnaces pictis cohibebant Lingonas armis.

[H]e summons cohorts scattered through the Gallic fields
 and advancing standards from every region he heads for Rome. 395
 His men abandoned tents which they had pitched by deep Leman
 and encampments high above Vosegus' curving rock
 controlling the aggressive Lingones with their painted weapons.

Throughout the excursus on Gaul's geography and ethnography that follows the Ariminum episode (1.396-465), Lucan shows the Gallic tribes rejoicing to be free at last of Roman military domination.³⁷ Lucan describes many of the tribes as war-like and barbarous, most notably "the Nervii, excessively/rebellious, polluted by the treachery of Cotta's murder" (*nimumque rebellis/Nervius et caesi pollutus foedere Cottae*, 1.428-429).³⁸ Caesar therefore runs the risk of exposing Italy (or, according to Lucan's hyperbole, the entire world) to a new wave of Gallic invasions (1.463-465):

et vos [Romani], crinigeros Belgis arcere Caycos
 oppositi, petitis Romam Rhenique feroces
 deseritis ripas et apertum gentibus orbem. 465

And you, the soldiers posted to keep the curly-haired Cauci
 from war, you head for Rome, leaving the savage
 banks of Rhine, leaving the world exposed to foreign nations. 465

³⁷ See in particular *gaudet* (1.422) and *laetatus* (1.441). For discussion of the Gauls' joy in being released from Roman domination, see Green 1991, 246-247. In her analysis of Lucan's excursus on Gaul (1.392-465), Green stresses the negative ramifications of Caesar's withdrawal (*ibid.*, 243-251).

³⁸ See *Caes. B.G.* 5.37 for the Nervii's role in the betrayal and death of Caesar's subordinate officer L. Aurunculeius Cotta in the winter of 54/53 B.C. (Braund 1992, 231). Lucan characterizes the Gauls as "heroic warriors-in-training" (Green 1991, 247).

With Gaul ungarrisoned, the Gallic tribes are free to resume their former hostilities against Rome. Caesar boasts of subjecting the Gauls to Roman rule at 1.307-309 when in fact, according to Lucan's hyperbole, his return to Italy has freed the still-hostile Gauls to do as they please.

After the Gallic excursus, Lucan recounts how the Pompeians and Roman general populace regard Caesar's invasion as a great impending disaster (*clademque futuram*, 1.470). Rumors tell of Caesar stationing barbarian (i.e. Gallic) auxiliary troops (*barbaricas . . . alas*, 1.476) where the River Nar meets the Tiber (1.475-476). The people of Rome regard Caesar as even more horrible than the Gauls whom he has conquered (*victoque immanior hoste*, 1.480). The most extreme rumor claims that Caesar has uprooted all of the peoples of Gaul with the purpose of letting them sack Rome once he has taken the city (1.481-484):

tunc inter Rhenum populos Albimque iacentes
finibus Arctoïis patriaque a sede revolsos
pone sequi, iussamque feris a gentibus urbem
Romano spectante rapi.

Then follow close behind, they say, the peoples
from between the Rhine and Elbe, uprooted from ancestral home
in northern lands; fierce foreign races are ordered to sack Rome –
with a Roman looking on.

In such a scenario, Caesar would be responsible for replicating the Gallic Sack of 390 B.C., the very act that Caesar's followers claimed he had avenged by conquering Gaul.³⁹ He would be the true successor of the Senones to whom the Ariminenses compared him (1.254).

³⁹ See n. 20 above.

The idea that a Roman revolutionary would use Gallic auxiliaries to destroy Rome during a civil war would have made sense in 49 B.C., the dramatic date of Book 1. Just fourteen years earlier, Catiline had attempted to persuade the Allobroges to participate in his conspiracy.⁴⁰ At *Cat.* 4.12, Cicero alleges that Catiline wished to burn Rome to the ground and settle the Allobroges among the ruins of the city⁴¹:

sic nos in his hominibus, qui nos, qui coniuges, qui liberos nostros trucidare voluerunt, qui singulas unius cuiusque nostrum domos et hoc universum rei publicae domicilium delere conati sunt, qui id egerunt, ut gentem Allobrogum in vestigiis huius urbis atque in cinere deflagrati imperii collocarent, si vehementissimi fuerimus, misericordes habebimur [.]

Thus if we in the case of these men, who wished to butcher us, our wives, our children, who tried to destroy the individual homes of each one of us and this entire domicile of the republic, who attempted to settle the nation of the Allobroges in the traces of this city and in the ash of the incinerated *imperium*, shall have been most vehement, we shall be regarded as merciful [.]

Cicero makes a similar allegation against Lentulus: “this man summoned the Gauls to overthrow the foundations of the republic” (*hic ad evertenda rei publicae fundamenta Gallos accersit*, *Cat.* 4.13). Cicero also alleged more generally that Catiline wished to destroy Rome with fire, which is how the Gauls were said to have destroyed the city in 390 B.C.⁴² When Pompey compares Caesar to Catiline in a speech before his troops,

⁴⁰ See Bellen 1985, 40-41, for a brief discussion of the *metus Gallicus* theme in the surviving accounts of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. For sources other than those cited in the main text above, see Cic. *Cat.* 3.4 and 4.13; Sall. *Cat.* 40.1-6 and 45; Plut. *Cic.* 18.4ff.; and App. *B.C.* 2.4. Drawing upon Bellen’s study, Schrijvers 1988, 343, cites the Allobrogan involvement in the Catilinarian Conspiracy among the precedents for the *metus Gallicus* theme in the *Pharsalia*.

⁴¹ The image of a conquering people occupying the ruins of a destroyed city recurs several times in Late Republican and Early Imperial literature. Poets portray barbarians occupying the ruins of Rome (Hor. *Epode* 16.10-14) and farmers practicing agriculture among the ruins of Veii (Prop. 4.10.27-30) and Troy (Ov. *Her.* 1.51-56). When the tribunes propose transplanting the Roman population to Veii, Livy has Camillus raise the possibility that Gauls might occupy the site of Rome and hence become Romans (5.53.6-7).

⁴² Cicero mentions Catiline’s alleged plan to set fire to Rome at *Cat.* 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 1.12, 1.29, 1.32; 2.1, 2.6, 2.10, 2.11, 2.19; 3.1-2, 3.8, 3.10, 3.14-15, 3.19, 3.21, 3.25; 4.2, 4.4, 4.12-13, and 4.17-18. As

he notes Catiline's conspiracy to burn Rome to the ground: "this is war no more than when Catiline made ready/to attack our homes with burning torches" (*nec magis hoc bellum est, quam quom Catilina paravit/arsuras in tecta faces*, 2.541-542).⁴³

Pompey's comparison of Caesar to Catiline is fitting in light of Caesar's rumored connivance with the Gauls and his designs for the *Urbs*.

However, Lucan explicitly dismisses the rumors of Gallic involvement in the invasion as false (*vana . . . fama*, 1.469; *falsa . . . praeconia*, 1.472). The republicans are deceived in thinking that Caesar stands in need of Gauls to attack and sack Rome. In fact, it is Caesar's own *Roman* troops who threaten the *Urbs*' safety and even its existence, a fact Lucan's reader knows from Laelius' speech. The imaginary Gallic threat serves as a foil in order to highlight the Caesarians' capacity for hostility toward their native city.

IV. The desertion of Rome

The fear that Caesar plans to sack or destroy Rome drives the Pompeians and much of Rome's populace to desert the city in advance of Caesar's arrival. By deserting the city in a state of panic, the Pompeians and populace in many ways create the scene of chaos and destruction that they are trying to avoid (1.486-522). Lucan

Michael Fontaine has pointed out to me, fire imagery is especially prominent in the ominous threat that Sallust has Catiline utter just before he leaves the Senate for the last time: "Then he furiously said, 'Because indeed I have been surrounded by my enemies and am driven headlong by them, I shall extinguish my conflagration with ruins' (*tum ille furibundus, 'quoniam quidem circumventus,' inquit, 'ab inimicis praeceps agor, incendium meum ruina restinguam,'* Sall. *B.C.* 31.9). Batstone 2010, 169, observes that the expression *incendium meum ruina restinguam* simultaneously refers to the Roman custom of containing a fire by demolishing the surrounding buildings and also alludes to Catiline's threatened destruction of the *Urbs* by fire.

⁴³ At 6.793-794, the ghost of Catiline is said to rejoice in Tartarus on account of Caesar's impending victory at Pharsalus.

incorporates many of the common details of the *urbs capta* topos into this scene.⁴⁴

Specifically, the citizens of Rome flee in a panic as though the city was being torched or the houses were collapsing (1.486-498):

nec solum vulgus inani
percussum terrore pavet, sed curia et ipsi
sedibus exiluere patres, invisaque belli
consulibus fugiens mandat decreta senatus.
tum, quae tuta petant et quae metuenda relinquant 490
incerti, quo quemque fugae tulit impetus urgent
praecipitem populum, serieque haerentia longa
agmina prorumpunt. credas aut tecta nefandas
corripuisse faces aut iam quatiente ruina
nutantes pendere domos, sic turba per urbem 495
praecipiti lymphata gradu, velut unica rebus
spes foret afflictis patrios excedere muros,
inconsulta ruit.

The multitude is not alone in panicking,
struck by empty terror, but the Senate, too, yes even
the Fathers leapt up from their seats, and as they flee assign
to the consuls the dreaded declaration of war.
Then, uncertain where to go for safety, where to run from danger, 490
wherever impulse of flight sweeps them on, they drive
the people rushing headlong, breaking out in hordes who stick
together
in a long chain. You might suppose that impious fire-brands
had ignited houses, that homes were swaying, tottering,
shaken by imminent collapse: so the throng rushed 495
through the city heedlessly, frantic with headlong pace,
as if the sole salvation for their battered fortunes
were to leave the ancestral walls.

The simile comparing the Romans' reaction to that of people fleeing the destruction of the city suits the context because they fear that Caesar will in fact set fire to the city

⁴⁴ Paul 1982, 154, mentions that the *urbs capta* motif's "influence may be suspected even where there is no explicit mention of a captured city, as for example in Lucan 1.466 ff., especially 486 ff. (cf. Petronius *Sat.* 123 = *Bellum Civile* 222 ff.), where the atmosphere in Rome before Caesar's arrival is described." Cf. Marti 1964, 174, and Seitz 1965, 229ff.

and demolish its walls and buildings. The simile also permits Lucan to employ the image of Rome collapsing in flames without denying the historical fact that Caesar never committed such violence against the city. Instead of featuring the collapse of buildings, Rome's true *ruina* (1.494) is the disintegration of the citizen body's resistance to Caesar.⁴⁵

Lucan highlights the point in a simile by comparing the desertion of Rome to the wreck of a ship in the Syrtes off Libya (1.498-504)⁴⁶:

qualis, cum turbidus Auster reppulit a Libycis immensum Syrtibus aequor fractaque veliferi sonuerunt pondera mali, desilit in fluctus deserta puppe magister navitaque et nondum sparsa compage carinae naufragium sibi quisque facit, sic urbe relict in bellum fugitur.	500
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When stormy Auster
has driven back the mighty sea from Libyan Syrtes
and when the broken weight of the mast has crashed down with its 500
sails,
the captain and the crew abandon ship and leap
into the waves, and each, before the vessel's frame is smashed,
creates his own shipwreck – just so, they abandon Rome and
flee towards war.

By leaping off of the ship before it sinks, each sailor in the shipwreck makes a shipwreck for himself (1.503). The metaphorical *naufragium* that the Roman refugees are trying to avoid is the destructive violence and mayhem of a Caesarian sack. But

⁴⁵ Dorchak 1995, 185, observes that the theme of ruin in the *Pharsalia* entails “a threefold impiety: familial, civil, and universal”; see *ibid.*, 204-208, for Dorchak's discussion of the theme of ruin as it applies to the Roman state.

⁴⁶ The simile anticipates the republican fleet's course through the Syrtes at 9.301-371.

their flight from Rome causes similar mayhem and the city is abandoned (*urbe relict*a, 1.503) in much the same way as if Caesar had actually arrived and sacked Rome.

Part of the dissolution of the Roman state in this episode is the dissolution of its building-block, the family. In a travesty of traditional *urbs capta* motifs, the refugees feel no compunction about abandoning their parents, wives, and household gods as they seek their own safety (1.504-509)⁴⁷:

nullum iam languidus aevo evaluit revocare parens coniunxve maritum fletibus, aut patrii, dubiae dum vota salutis conciperent, tenere lares; nec limine quisquam haesit et extremo tunc forsitan urbis amatae plenus abit visu: ruit irrevocabile vulgus.	505
--	-----

Now none could be detained by his father weak with age, nor a husband by his wife's laments, nor by ancestral Gods for long enough to utter prayers for preservation so uncertain; none lingered on the threshold and then left, after looking his fill maybe for the last time on beloved Rome: the multitude raced on, unstoppable.	505
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Two useful points of comparison for Lucan's description of the desertion of Rome are Vergil's account of the fall of Troy in *Aen.* 2 and Livy's account of the fall of Alba Longa in Book 1 of the *Ab Urbe Condita*.⁴⁸ First, the failure of a frail father to call back his son (1.504-505) contrasts strikingly with Aeneas' pious rescue of the lame

⁴⁷ See Dorchak 1995, 191-193, on the intimate relationship between the theme of collapsing physical structures in the *Pharsalia* and that of intra-familial discord, most notably the strife between Caesar and Pompey, *socer* and *gener*. The theme of destroyed households complements the imagery of destroyed houses. I discuss the disintegration of the family briefly in the introduction (p. 16).

⁴⁸ Wuilleumier and Le Bonniec 1962, 92, note the influence of Livy 1.29.3 and Verg. *Aen.* 2.673-674 on *Phars.* 1.507-509 in particular. Cf. Seitz 1965, 224, n. 2, on the parallels with Livy 1.29.3, and Roche 2009, 312-313, on the parallels with *Aen.* 2.635ff.

Anchises during the fall of Troy (*Aen.* 2.707ff.).⁴⁹ Likewise, the husband's abandonment of his wife and *lares* (1.505-507) is Lucan's response to Aeneas' preservation of his ancestral gods (*Aen.* 2.747) and his desperate search for Creusa after he loses her (*Aen.* 2.768-795). As fear of Caesar trumps even familial piety, Lucan presents the desertion of Rome as more destructive to Roman society than even the physical destruction of Troy was to Trojan society.

The readiness with which the Romans abandon their homes shows their deficient love for their city (1.507-509). The Romans are even willing to let Caesar loot the city: "and upon the news of Caesar's imminent arrival, the lazy bands abandoned the city for him to loot" (*[urbem] venturo Caesare praedam/ignavae liquere manus*, 1.513-514).⁵⁰ In contrast, Livy emphasizes the Albans' love for their city in the moments leading up to its destruction. He depicts them indecisively wandering about their homes in order to prolong their last look (1.29.3-4)⁵¹:

. . . sed silentium triste ac tacita maestitia ita defixit omnium animos, ut prae metu obliti quid relinquerent, quid secum ferrent deficiente consilio rogitantesque alii alios, nunc in liminibus starent, nunc errabundi domos suas ultimum illud visuri pervagarentur.

. . . but sad silence and silent sorrow so bewitched the minds of all that, their judgment failing them, asking one another what they should leave behind, what they should bring with them (for they had forgotten in their fright), now on their thresholds they were standing, now wandering they walked about their own homes, about to see them for the last time.

⁴⁹ Seitz 1965, 230, and Fantham 1992a, 8-9, note the contrasts between *pious Aeneas* in *Aen.* 2 and the impious Romans in the *Pharsalia*.

⁵⁰ The translation is my own.

⁵¹ Livy also heightens the pathos of the Albans' flight by explicitly noting that they "abandon their *lar* and *penates* and the houses in which each had been born and educated" (*larem ac penates tectaque in quibus natus quisque educatusque esset relinquentes*, 1.29.4). In the *Aeneid*, Creusa similarly halts on the threshold of her house (*in limine*) before fleeing Troy (2.673-674).

The Pompeians' indifference to the fates of their families, homes, temples, and city is analogous to Laelius' more extreme willingness to murder his pregnant wife and destroy Rome in the name of Caesar. Thus both fear of Caesar and devotion to him threaten both the internal cohesion of the Roman *civitas* and the Romans' bond to the *Urbs*.

V. Religious portents and ceremonies

After narrating the flight of Pompey and his faction from Rome,⁵² Lucan turns to a series of portents that presage civil war (1.522-695). Several of these portents and rituals indicate that the city is in serious peril. For instance, the astrologer Nigidius Figulus⁵³ predicts a horrible catastrophe: "imminent destruction is planned for Rome and humankind" (*urbi generique paratur/humano matura lues*, 1.644-645). The virtual hendiadys "Rome and humankind" is in line with the traditional Roman thematic association of the city of Rome (*Urbs*) with the entire world (*orbis*).⁵⁴ Nigidius then lists a series of possible forms that this disaster might take (1.645-648), the first of which is the subsidence of whole cities into the yawning earth (1.645-646): "Will the earth yawn wide/and cities downwards sink?" (*terraene dehiscent/subsidentque urbes*). Nigidius Figulus thus confirms that a great disaster on the scale of total physical destruction awaits the *Urbs*.

⁵² The flight of Pompey is specifically noted at 1.522: "They fear since Pompey flees" (*Pompeio fugiente timent*).

⁵³ For an analysis of Nigidius Figulus' prophecies, see Hoover 1995, 116-134.

⁵⁴ Two codices actually have *orbi* in place of *Urbi* (Gagliardi 1989, 121). See the brief discussion of the association of the *Urbs* with the *orbis* in the introduction (p. 18).

The Romans undertake various religious ceremonies to ward off the impending evil (1.584-672). It is noteworthy that one of the purificatory rites they employ in their attempt to save the city is the *amburbium* (1.592-606), a ritual procession around the city's walls and sacred limits (*pomeria*).⁵⁵ At this point in the *Pharsalia*, the civil war is still very much a local crisis centered on the *Urbs*. Lucan has not yet expanded the geographical scope of the epic to include Gaul, Spain, Libya, Thessaly, etc. Hence, the people of Rome still mistakenly hope that the ritual purification of the *Urbs* will successfully protect them against Caesar.⁵⁶ The procession also reaffirms the bond between the Roman people (led by the colleges of *pontifices*, the *Salii*, the Vestal Virgins, etc.) and their home city. In this respect, the *amburbium* can be seen as the (failed) patriotic answer to the urge to abandon the city.

Book 1 closes with a final portent that indicates that the civil war will imperil Rome. A frenzied woman accurately, if ambiguously, prophesies the course that civil war will take through Thessaly, Egypt, Libya, etc. (1.673-695). Strikingly, the seer predicts violence within the city itself (1.690-691): "Back I come to the abodes of my native Rome, to impious war waged in the Senate's midst" (*patriae sedes remeamus in urbis/impiaque in medio peraguntur bella senatu*). As Lucan's reader knows, the seer here refers to the assassination of Caesar during a meeting of the Senate in Pompey's

⁵⁵ For discussion of this scene and the implications of the procession, see Rambaud 1985, 289ff.; Hoover 1995, 149-184; and Beard, North, and Price 1998, 178. See Beard et al. 1998, 174-181, and Rykwert 1976, 21ff., on the origins and significance of the *pomerium* in Roman ritual. Beard et al. suggest that Lucan has the Romans process around the *pomerium* because he characterizes Caesar as a transgressor of the city's boundaries in the tradition of Remus; ancient sources indicate that Romulus (or, according to an alternative account recorded by D.H. *Ant. Rom.* 87.4, Ov. *Fasti* 4.837-844, and Plut. *Rom.* 10, Romulus' defender Celer) killed Remus for violating the sacred boundary of the *pomerium*. See Ov. *Fasti* 4.825ff. and Plut. *Rom.* 10-11.

⁵⁶ Henderson 1998, 205, stresses the failure of the *amburbium* to strengthen the *pomerium*; the residents of Rome have already fled beyond their city's walls (1.495-498) and Caesar will later enter the city (thereby crossing the *pomerium*) with ease (3.97ff.).

Theater, which certainly provoked a second round of civil war. However, the seer's fictional audience at the beginning of the war would not have known that *impia bella* (1.691) refers primarily to the death of a single man. Rather, the most obvious meaning of her words is that significant military violence will occur within the city. Even as the seer charts the course that the war will take across the known world, she is highlighting the threat Caesar poses to the peace and security of the *Urbs* itself.

VI. Past precedents: Marius and Sulla in the speech of the *senex*

Book 2 provides the most detailed account of the sort of destructive violence that the Romans fear Caesar will unleash against their city. An elderly man (I will refer to him throughout this discussion as the *senex*) recalls the chaos and bloodshed that took place at Rome during the last civil war as first Marius and then Sulla occupied the city (2.68-232).⁵⁷ The *senex* delivers his speech “seeking a precedent for his mighty fear” (*magno quaerens exempla timori*, 2.67). At the end of the speech, Lucan describes how “the melancholy elders/lamented, remembering the past and fearful of the future” (*sic maesta senectus/praeteritique memor flebat metuensque futuri*, 2.232-233). Indeed, he claims that the new war will be worse than the last one because neither Pompey nor Caesar will be content with what Marius and Sulla sought (2.223-232).⁵⁸ The *senex* presents Rome during the earlier war as a scene of immense carnage. In fact, Lucan implicitly likens the atrocities committed within the *Urbs* to the destruction of the city itself. He does so by evoking the destruction of Carthage, the Gallic Sack, and especially the fall of Troy as told in the *Aeneid*, *Iliad*, and Greek

⁵⁷ Conte 1968 and Schrijvers 1988 provide comprehensive treatments of the *senex*'s speech as a whole.

⁵⁸ I will return to this passage at the end of this section (pages 82-83).

and Roman tragedy. Accordingly, the war between Marius and Sulla is the closest Rome has ever come to the sort of self-inflicted⁵⁹ physical destruction that Laelius vows to commit against the city. As the *senex* and other residents of Rome fear that the civil war between Caesar and Pompey will be even worse, Lucan's depiction of the last civil war as the virtual destruction of Rome significantly increases the reader's expectation of severe violence accompanying Caesar's entrance into the city. We shall see that this suspense contributes to the sense of anticlimax when Caesar enters the city without bloodshed.⁶⁰

The scene that opens Book 2 (2.1-66) establishes the general sense of foreboding in Rome that characterizes the rest of the *senex*'s speech that follows. First, Lucan compares the general mood of those citizens who have not fled the city to the shock of a mother whose child has just died (2.21-28). The women of Rome flock to the temples of the gods as they weep, beat their breasts, tear their hair, ululate, and scratch their cheeks in lamentation (2.28-37). This passage in particular foreshadows the allusions to the *Iliou Persis* that mark the *senex*'s speech. In Greek and Roman histories and epic poems, the flight of women to temples frequently precedes the destruction of a city or indicates that the women fear for the safety of their city. Fantham remarks,⁶¹

The crowds of women hopelessly thronging the temples correspond to the futile supplications of the Trojan and Latin *matronae* before the destruction of

⁵⁹ The Gauls had burnt most of the city in 390 B.C., but that devastation was not *self*-inflicted.

⁶⁰ Fantham 1992a, 28, observes that the speech of the *senex* serves "to make vivid the *scelus* of attack on the city and to provide effects of horror and indignation which the mildness of Caesar's actual entry into Rome will not permit in book 3." See Fantham 1996, 137-139, for further comments on the challenge Caesar's anticlimactic entrance into Rome posed to Lucan as an epic poet.

⁶¹ Fantham 1992a, 84-85.

their cities in *Aen.* 1.479-481 and 11.477-82, and directly evoke the Trojan women's supplication in *Il.* 6.293f. [Lucan] sees the city of Rome as falling to the enemy. This is the starting point of his counter-*Aeneid*, as the end of the free republic reverses the foundation of Rome, re-enacting the fall of Troy[.]

The lamentations of Rome's matrons set a lugubrious, sinister tone both for Caesar's eventual entrance into Rome (which Lucan will not actually narrate until Book 3) and for the *senex*'s descriptions of Rome's tribulations during the last civil war.

The speech is divided into two sections, the first of which covers Marius' occupation of Rome (2.68-138) and the second Sulla's (2.139-222). The *senex* charts the vicissitudes of Marius' career⁶² in terms of his changing relationship with the *Urbs* (2.68-75):

'non alios,' inquit, 'motus tum fata parabant
cum post Teutonicos victor Libycosque triumphos
exul limosa Marius caput abdidit ulva. 70
stagna avidi texere soli laxaeque paludes
depositum, Fortuna, tuum; mox vincula ferri
exedere senem longusque in carcere paedor.
consul et eversa felix moriturus in urbe
poenas ante dabat scelerum.

The commotions caused by Fate were just the same
when Marius, victorious after his Teutonic and his Libyan
triumphs, in exile, hid his head in muddy sedge. 70
Lagoons of greedy earth and spongy swamps concealed
your treasure, Fortune; then the old man was corroded
by iron chains and lengthy squalor in a prison.
Destined to die in happiness as consul in Rome he ruined,
first he paid the penalty for his crimes.

Marius was rewarded with triumphs in the *Urbs* after defeating Rome's enemies in Africa, Gaul, and Northern Italy (2.69). Conversely, he suffered exile from Rome as a

⁶² For the theme of Marius' changing fortunes in the *senex*'s speech, see Schrijvers 1988, 342-343.

preemptive punishment for inflicting a disastrous civil war upon the city (2.74-75).

The *senex*'s striking description of Rome under Marius as *eversa . . . urbe* (2.74) evokes an image of physical destruction; *evertere* ("overthrow, ruin, destroy") is a particularly vivid and violent word that Roman authors frequently use to refer to the physical destruction of cities.⁶³ Hence, the *senex* characterizes Marius as first a *triumphator* and champion of Rome, then an exile, and at last the city's virtual destroyer.

We may compare Marius' volatile relationship with the *Urbs* to that of Caesar, his nephew.⁶⁴ Caesar defeated the Gauls,⁶⁵ was denied the triumph he thought he deserved for his conquests,⁶⁶ and defiantly returned to the *Urbs* at the head of an army ready and willing to destroy the city.⁶⁷ Like Marius, Caesar died as consul in the city that he had overturned.⁶⁸

In metaphorically overturning Rome, Marius avenges the harsh punishments that the Romans – and Marius himself – has previously dealt out to the Cimbri,

⁶³ Lewis & Short s.v. I.B.1.b. Examples include Cic. *De Re Pub.* 6.12: *hanc [Carthaginem] hoc biennio consul evertes* ("You, consul, will destroy this city [Carthage] within two years"); Verg. *Aen.* 2.603: *has evertit opes sternitque a culmine Troiam* ("he destroys this wealth and lays Troy low from its height"); Verg. *Aen.* 2.746: *aut quid in eversa vidi crudelius urbe?* ("Or what crueller thing did I see in the ruined city"); Ov. *Met.* 13.169: *quid dubitas ingentem evertere Troiam?* ("Why do you hesitate to destroy huge Troy?"). These translations, including those of the *Aeneid*, are my own.

⁶⁴ Schrijvers 1988, 342-343, compares the vicissitudes of Marius and Caesar's political careers as victors-turned-enemies of Rome, but his analysis does not specifically address each general's relationship to the *Urbs*. Accordingly, Schrijvers does not mention triumphs in his study or the fact that uncle and nephew both died in the city they had conquered.

⁶⁵ In the *Pharsalia*, Caesar portrays himself as the defender of the *Urbs* against the Gallic hordes (1.307-309). Schrijvers (ibid., 343) notes that from 60-50 B.C. Caesar had fought the Gauls "as another Marius" ("comme un autre Marius") and further explains the role of Marius in the *senex*'s speech in light of the *metus Gallicus* theme in Book 1.

⁶⁶ For references to the triumph that Caesar desired for his victories over Gaul, see 1.286-289, 1.342, and 3.73-82. The victorious Marius had been exiled "after his Teutonic and his Libyan/triumphs" (*post Teutonicos victor Libycosque triumphos*, 2.69).

⁶⁷ As noted above at n. 33, the speech of Laelius is critical to Lucan's portrayal of Caesar as successor to Marius and Sulla; he too threatens the *Urbs* with destructive violence (Fantham 1992a, 28).

⁶⁸ In Book 7, Lucan stresses the fact that Caesar died at the summit of his power (7.590-596).

Teutones, and Libyans. While in exile, Marius encounters the sorry remnants of the nations he triumphed over. First, a Cimbrian slave is sent to execute him while he is imprisoned in Campania (2.75-88). A mysterious voice stops the Cimbrian by telling him that Marius will live to avenge “the extermination of your people” (*ulcisci deletae funera gentis*, 2.84). By waging civil war, Marius will fulfill “destiny’s desire/to destroy Rome” (*Romam cupienti perdere fato*, 2.87). By having the *senex* characterize the civil war as a condign punishment for the Romans’ earlier obliteration of the Cimbrian nation, Lucan hyperbolically suggests that Marius destroyed the Roman people during the civil war.

After the Cimbrian slave spares Marius’ life, he sails to Africa. Marius there dwells among the ruins of Carthage (2.88-93)⁶⁹:

idem pelago delatus iniquo	
hostilem in terram vacuisque mapalibus actus	
nuda triumphati iacuit per regna Iugurthae	90
et Poenos pressit cineres. solacia fati	
Carthago Mariusque tulit, pariterque iacentes	
ignovere deis. Libycas ibi colligit iras.	

That very man was carried by a stormy sea	
to enemy land and driven through the plundered kingdom	
of Jugurtha, whom he had paraded in a triumph, and lay down	90
in deserted huts and trod on Punic ashes. Marius and Carthage	

⁶⁹ Velleius Paterculus (2.19.4), Manilius (4.44-48), and Plutarch (*Mar.* 40.3-4) explore the theme of Marius’ sojourn among the ruins of Carthage; see Carney 1961 for an examination of the history of this topos. Lucan returns to the theme at 8.269-271 when Pompey compares his plight after Pharsalus to Marius’ stay among the ruins of Carthage (see p. 207, n. 82). The *mapalia* to which Lucan refers at 2.89 (indigenous African huts; Vergil uses the alternative name *magalia*) are particularly indicative of Carthage’s desolation. Fantham 1992a, 97, writes, “*Mapalia* points the return to barbarism by the allusion to *Aen.* 1.421 where Dido’s city replaces former barbarism, *magalia quondam*”; see Labate 1991, 173-175, for classical authors’ comparison of the site of a city before its foundation and after its destruction. As Fantham notes (*ibid.*), Lucan augments the site’s desolation by specifying that even the huts at Carthage are empty (*vacuisque mapalibus*, 2.89; cf. 4.684). The emptiness of the huts is thematically linked to the desolation of Italy after the civil war between Caesar and Pompey (1.24-32; see pages 1-2 and 189-195 for further discussion); Roman Italy will become as barren as Punic Africa.

had consolation for their fate: both equally prostrate,
they forgave the gods. Here he gathered his Libyan wrath.

The *senex* links the physical destruction of Carthage and Marius' civil war causally as well as thematically. While exiled at Carthage, Marius develops a typically Libyan hatred for Rome (*Libycas ibi colligit iras*, 2.93).⁷⁰ In other words, the metaphorical destruction of Rome by Marius (*eversa . . . urbe*, 2.74; *Romam . . . perdere*, 2.87) is vengeance for the destruction of Carthage as well as that of the Cimbri. The effect of civil war upon the *Urbs* is therefore analogous to the physical destruction of Carthage.

As befits Marius' role as avenger of the destruction of Carthage, he marks his return to Rome by committing numerous atrocities within the city's walls (2.98-138). Lucan employs various components of the *urbs capta* topos throughout this passage. First, the *senex* describes Marius as though he were a destructive fire or plague engulfing Rome (2.98-102)⁷¹:

pro fata, quis ille,
quis fuit ille dies, Marius quo moenia victor
corripuit, quantoque gradu mors saeva cucurrit!
nobilitas cum plebe perit, lateque vagatus
ensis, et a nullo revocatum pectore ferrum.

100

What a day,

⁷⁰ Marius' absorption of hatred from the soil of Carthage foreshadows Lucan's retelling of the myth of Antaeus, the giant who absorbs power from his native African soil, at 4.593-660 (Fantham 1992a, 98). The end of line 2.93 (*Libycas ibi colligit iras*) also recalls Lucan's similes comparing Caesar to a lightning bolt (1.151-157) and to a Libyan lion (1.205-212). The lightning bolt gathers its scattered fires (*sparsosque recolligit ignes*, 1.157 at line-end) and the lion gathers its anger (*totam dum colligit iram*, 1.207 at line-end). The connection between the Marius episode and the lion simile is especially strong because Caesar is compared to a Libyan lion (*Libyes*, 1.206) and Marius is banished to Africa where he gathers Libyan anger (*Libycas*, 2.93). As Fantham (ibid.) observes, Lucan uses these repeated phrases to compare Caesar to his uncle Marius; both are fierce, deracinated enemies of Rome whose hatred for their fellow Romans would be more typical of a Carthaginian. Cf. Ahl 1976, 82-115, and Schrijvers 1988, 344.

⁷¹ Fantham 1992a, 99.

what a day that was when Marius in victory seized
the city-walls! How huge the strides of savage, racing death! 100
Noble and plebeian together died, and the sword ranged
far and wide, with blade called back from no one's breast.

Once *victor* over Numidia and the Teutones (2.69) and then *exul* (2.70), Marius is again *victor* (2.99), but over his own city. The verb *corripere* ("seize, plunder," 2.100) captures the violence of Marius' return. Roman authors frequently use *corripere* to describe the advance of a fire or plague.⁷² In Book 1, Lucan uses the verb in his description of the Roman refugees' flight from their city: *credas aut tecta nefandas/corripuisse faces* (1.493-494). Either fire or plague imagery would match the deadliness of Marius' return, but the image of Marius as a fire engulfing the walls (*moenia*, 2.99), an image typically associated with the fall of a city, would better suit the context of his brutal atrocities within the city.

The *senex*'s speech also evokes Book 2 of the *Aeneid* and other literary accounts of the fall of Troy.⁷³ First, the speech's location within the epic and its subject matter both recall Aeneas' speech recounting the fall of Troy in Book 2 of the *Aeneid*. Just as Aeneas' account of the fall of Troy occupies the second book of the *Aeneid*, the *senex*'s lengthy⁷⁴ account of the successive capitulations of Rome, the new Troy, to Marius and Sulla makes up a considerable portion of Book 2 of the *Pharsalia*. Furthermore, both stories are flashbacks narrated by survivors who witnessed the atrocities committed in their respective cities. The very form of the *senex*'s speech

⁷² *ibid.* See Lewis & Short s.v. I.B.3 for the use of *corripere* to describe the advance of a fire or a disease, e.g. *turbine caelesti subito correptus et igni* ("swept up suddenly by a heavenly whirlwind and by fire," Lucr. 6.395).

⁷³ Ambühl 2007 provides a perceptive survey of Lucan's adaptation of the *Iliou Persis* tradition (including such non-Vergilian sources as Euripidean and Senecan tragedy) in the speech of the *senex*.

⁷⁴ At one hundred and sixty-five lines, it is the longest speech in the *Pharsalia* (Fantham 1992a, 91).

and its location within the *Pharsalia* thus indicate the particular intertext or, in the language of Conte, code model that most informs it.⁷⁵ The *Urbs* is therefore the new Troy being destroyed via civil war.

There are also numerous details of Marius and Sulla's reigns of terror that evoke episodes in the fall of Troy.⁷⁶ Only a few examples suffice to demonstrate that Lucan portrays Rome as an *urbs capta*. For instance, Lucan models the killing of Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, on the death of Priam during the Greek sack of Troy (2.126-129):

te quoque neglectum violatae, Scaevola, Vestae
ante ipsum penetrale deae semperque calentis
mactavere focos; parvum sed fessa senectus
sanguinis effudit iugulo flammisque pepercit.

You, too, Scaevola, they sacrificed, unheeded, before
the very inner shrine and ever-burning hearths
of desecrated Vesta: your weary old age poured from your throat
a trickle of blood and allowed the flames to live.

Lucan here adapts Ovid's description of Priam's weak flow of blood: *exiguumque senis Priami combiberat ara cruorem* ("the altar had drunk up the meager gore of the elderly Priam," *Met.* 13.409).⁷⁷ Lucan adapts this scene by making Scaevola's flow of blood too weak to reach the flames (2.128-129), a detail that heightens the pathos, gruesomeness, and melodrama of the scene.⁷⁸ Other Trojan resonances can be found

⁷⁵ Fantham 1992a, 28-29; Von Albrecht 1999, 237. Cf. p. 24, n. 68, above.

⁷⁶ See *ad loc.* in Fantham 1992a and Ambühl 2007.

⁷⁷ Cf. Sen. *Tro.* 656-658. For Ovid's influence upon Lucan, see Phillips 1962 and Von Albrecht 1999, 244-247.

⁷⁸ Fantham 1992a, 105.

in the sacrifice of M. Marius Gratidianus over the grave of L. Lutatius Catulus (2.173-193)⁷⁹ and the damming of the Tiber by the corpses of Sulla's victims (2.209-220).⁸⁰

Lucan assimilates the rule of Marius to the destruction of Rome during the Gallic Sack as well. At 2.121, Lucan apostrophizes Antonius Baebius as “foreknowing troubles” (*praesage malorum*) because he is said to have predicted that Marius would do to Rome what the Gauls had done, i.e. subject the city to a violent and destructive sack.⁸¹ By referring to Antonius as an accurate prophet, the *senex* treats Marius' reign of terror as equivalent to the destruction of Rome.

The climax of the *senex*'s speech is his description of Sulla's conquest of Praeneste and his massacre of Samnite prisoners of war held within the voting booths, or *Ovilia*, located on the Campus Martius (2.193-201)⁸²:

⁷⁹ M. Marius Gratidianus had driven Catulus to suicide by means of legal prosecution. When the Sullans seized Rome, they brutally killed Gratidianus over the tomb of Catulus. Lucan portrays this killing as an offering to the shade of Catulus: “Why tell of the ghost/of Catulus appeased with blood? – when as victim Marius, with the shades perhaps not liking the bitter offerings,/made a sacrifice unspeakable to a tomb never satisfied” (*quid sanguine manes/placatos Catuli referam? cum victima tristes/inferias Marius forsitan nolentibus umbris/pendit inexplēto non fanda piacula busto*, 2.173-175). Lucan here evokes the sacrifice of Polyxena over the tomb of Achilles during the fall of Troy (Ambühl 2007, 9-10). Additionally, the extreme wounds inflicted on Gratidianus (2.177-193) are modeled on those of the Trojan Deiphobus at *Aen.* 6.494-501 (*ibid.*, 10-13). See Fantham 1992a, 112-113, for historical sources on the murders of Catulus and Gratidianus and for other relevant literary parallels for human sacrifice at tombs, e.g. Aeneas' offering of human victims at the funeral of Pallas (*Aen.* 10.517-520).

⁸⁰ Fantham 1992a, 117-118, points out that the damming of the Tiber, a detail found in earlier accounts of Sulla's excesses (e.g. Val. Max. 9.2.1), recalls the damming of the Scamander by the corpses of Achilles' victims at *Iliad* 21.1ff. See Leigh 1997, 295-303, for discussion of the broader “rivers of blood” motif in the *Pharsalia* and its literary pedigree.

⁸¹ Fantham 1992a, 103, cites the *Adnotationes super Lucanam* (ed. Endt; ad 2.121) for the following anecdote: “This is the Antonius who told Metellus that unless he quickly brought his army to the city, the people of Rome would suffer the same treatment that the Senones had inflicted” (*hic [Antonius] est qui Metello dixit ni mature adduxisset exercitum hoc passurum p.R. [populum Romanum], quod Senones iam fecerunt*).

⁸² For discussion of Sulla's harsh (even genocidal) dealings with Samnite forces during the civil war of the 80s, see Salmon 1967, 373-392. I will address the Samnite general Pontius Telesinus' attempt to move the capital of Italy (2.134-138) in Ch. 2 (pages 133-136).

vidit Fortuna colonos Praenestina suos cunctos simul ense recepto unius populum pereuntem tempore mortis. tum flos Hesperiae, Latii iam sola iuventus, concidit et miserae maculavit Ovilia Romae. tot simul infesto iuvenes occumbere leto saepe fames pelagique furor subitaeque ruinae aut terrae caelique lues aut bellica clades, numquam poena fuit.	195 200
Praeneste's Fortune saw all her inhabitants together met with the sword, a people perishing in the time it takes for a single death. Then fell Hesperia's bloom, now Latium's only soldiers, staining with their blood forlorn Rome's Sheepfold. Often have so many men together fallen in savage death by famine, by the frenzy of the sea, by sudden fall of building, by plague of earth or sky, or by calamity of war, but never by execution.	195 200

By closely linking the fall of Praeneste to the massacre Sulla committed in the *Ovilia*, the *senex* implicitly likens the Sullan massacres at “miserable Rome” (*miserae . . . Romae*, 2.197) to the massacre of an entire city’s populace (*populum*, 2.195). Fantham notes that Lucan might make of *Ovilia* (literally, “sheep pens”) a double entendre suggesting that Sulla led the Italian prisoners to Rome like sheep to the slaughter.⁸³ Never before had there been such a mass execution; death on so large a scale had only been wrought by war or natural disasters (2.198-201). Among the natural disasters listed are *subitaeque ruinae* (2.199), here a reference to the sudden collapse of buildings during an earthquake. Therefore, Lucan suggests that the

⁸³ Fantham 1992a, 115-116. Fantham additionally notes that *flos Hesperiae, Latii iam sola iuventus* (2.196) refers specifically to the fighting men of Italy (cf. *Aen.* 7.162, 8.500). By massacring both the civilian residents of Rome (2.140) and the pro-Marian soldiers he has taken prisoner, Sulla’s violence overwhelms every segment of the Italian population (ibid.).

number of deaths caused by Sulla would normally attend upon the physical destruction of a city rather than a mere execution.

To sum up this section, in the speech of the Roman *senex* (2.68-232) Lucan amplifies the violence committed at Rome during the time of Marius and Sulla by likening their atrocities to the destruction of the city itself. He implicitly or explicitly compares the devastation to the Gallic Sack, the defeat of the Cimbri, and the destruction of Troy and Carthage. At the beginning of Book 2, it remains to be seen whether or not Caesar will repeat the massacres of Marius and Sulla when he arrives at Rome. The *senex* fears that the impending civil war will entail even worse disasters than did the war between Marius and Sulla (2.223-233)⁸⁴:

‘haec rursus patienda manent, hoc ordine belli ibitur, hic stabit civilibus exitus armis. quamquam agitant graviora metus, multumque coitur humani generis maiore in proelia damno. exulibus Mariis bellorum maxima merces Roma recepta fuit, nec plus victoria Sullae praestitit invisas penitus quam tollere partes: hos alio, Fortuna, vocas, olimque potentes concurrunt. neuter civilia bella moveret contentus quo Sulla fuit.’ sic maesta senectus praeteritique memor flebat metuensque futuri.	225 230
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These sufferings await, again to be endured, this will be the sequence of the warfare, this will be the outcome fixed for civil strife. Yet graver threats arouse our fears, the rush to battle brings much greater loss to humankind. For the Marian exiles, war’s greatest prize was Rome regained; for Sulla, victory provided no more than complete destruction of enemy factions: these rivals, Fortune, you summon for another purpose	225 230
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⁸⁴ Fantham 1992a, 121, takes lines 2.230-232 to mean that before the civil war both Caesar and Pompey were already as powerful as Sulla was during his dictatorship and neither was content with this extreme power.

they go to war long powerful. Neither would rouse civil war,
if content with what contented Sulla. Like this, the melancholy
elders
lamented, remembering the past and fearful of the future.

If, as the *senex* fears, the war between Marius and Sulla sets the precedent for worse extremes of violence during the war between Caesar and Pompey, his speech raises the expectation that Caesar's entrance into Rome will entail a bloodbath. In fact, as Lucan hyperbolically portrays the civil war between Marius and Sulla as the virtual destruction of Rome on a par with the literal destruction of Troy, Caesar should inflict upon the *Urbs* some unfathomably violent catastrophe. If the mere recovery of Rome (*Roma recepta*, 2.228) and the annihilation of his rivals (2.228-229) are not enough for Caesar, the physical destruction of the city and massacre of its population seem all too possible.

VII. Caesar's campaign in Italy in Book 2

In the main narrative of Book 2, Caesar advances through Italy with his armies. In striking contrast to the Ariminum episode and the rather bare references to the Caesarian army's subsequent movements in Book 1 (1.392-468), Lucan at last portrays the brutality of Caesar's conquest of Italy. Caesar perversely prefers to storm cities and send farmers fleeing from their fields rather than win bloodless victories over his fellow citizens (2.439-454, 2.460-461):

Caesar in arma furens nullas nisi sanguine fuso
gaudet habere vias, quod non terat hoste vacantis
Hesperiae fines vacuosque irrumpat in agros
atque ipsum non perdat iter consertaque bellis

440

bella gerat. non tam portas intrare patentis quam fregisse iuvat, nec tam patiente colono arva premi quam si ferro populetur et igni.	445
concessa pudet ire via civemque videri. tunc urbes Latii dubiae varioque favore ancipites, quamquam primo terrore ruentis cessurae belli, denso tamen aggere firmant moenia et abrupto circumdant undique vallo,	450
saxorumque orbes et quae super eminus hostem tela petant altis murorum turribus aptant. pronior in Magnum populus, pugnatque minaci cum terrore fides,	
facilis sed vertere mentes	460
terror erat, dubiamque fidem Fortuna ferebat.	
Caesar, mad for war, rejoices to proceed only by shedding blood, rejoices that Hesperia's lands he tramples are not empty of the enemy, that the fields he invades are not deserted,	440
that his march itself is not for nothing, that non-stop he wages war after war. He would rather smash the city-gates than enter them wide open, with sword and fire devastate the fields than tread them with the farmer unresisting.	445
He is ashamed to go by paths permitted, like a citizen. At that time Latium's cities, faltering and poised with wavering allegiance, though ready to submit at the initial panic of war's approach, yet fortify their walls with thick ramparts and on all sides surround them with a sheer palisade	450
and equip the walls' high towers with round stones and with weapons to shoot the enemy from far above. The people favour Magnus more, and loyalty contends with threatening terror	
But terror turned their minds	460
with ease, and Fortune carried off their wavering loyalty.	

Lucan later refers to Caesar not being satisfied “with capture of so many city-walls at first/assault, with sudden conquest of so many citadels” (*primo tot moenia cursu/rapta, tot oppressae depulsis hostibus arces*, 2.653-654). The delight Caesar takes in bloodshed (*nullas nisi sanguine fuso/gaudet habere vias*, 2.439-440) recalls Lucan's earlier description of Caesar at 1.150 as “rejoicing to create his path by

destruction” (*gaudensque viam fecisse ruina*).⁸⁵ This image of Caesar as the bloodthirsty sacker of cities comports well with the Pompeians’ apprehensions in Book 1 and the *senex*’s comparison of Caesar to Marius and Sulla.

At the same time, however, Caesar does not sack or destroy cities that capitulate immediately to him as did Ariminum. He prefers to take cities by storm but requires that they resist first so as to give him a rationale for using such violent means (2.439-446). As Caesar faces one Pompeian lieutenant after another in his march through Italy, almost all surrender their cities with little or no significant resistance (2.462-477).⁸⁶ Caesar besieges Pompey’s army at the port city of Brundisium (2.610-736), but ultimately the republicans sail away as the locals open their gates to Caesar (2.704-707). If Caesar ultimately enters Rome without bloodshed, it is not because he quails at inflicting such violence upon his fellow citizens and their home cities. Rather, Rome’s fate will be determined by whether or not the locals resist him.

VIII. Caesar’s arrival at Rome

I turn now to Lucan’s account of Caesar’s occupation of Rome (3.71-168). Caesar postpones his entrance into the city until after he has first banished Pompey from Italy (2.653-660).⁸⁷ Long since abandoned by Pompey’s army, the *Urbs* is easy prey: “Rome itself, capital of the world, the greatest prize of war, easy to capture”

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 165.

⁸⁶ I will address one exception, Domitius’ attempt to defend Corfinium (2.478-525), in Ch. 2 (pages 133-136).

⁸⁷ At the end of Book 2, Pompey retreats from Capua to Brundisium and then escapes Caesar’s siege works at Brundisium to sail to Epirus (2.526ff.). I shall analyze this sequence of events in the next chapter.

(*ipsa, caput mundi, bellorum maxima merces,/Roma capi facilis*, 2.655-656).⁸⁸ The story of Caesar's return is fraught with tension because he will finally reveal whether or not he intends to spare Rome the type of carnage it saw during the civil war between Marius and Sulla. In this section, I argue that Caesar's return to the *Urbs* follows the precedent of bloodless occupation set at Ariminum. Although Caesar commits no wanton acts of destruction within the city, he uses the threat of violence to intimidate his enemies into doing as he wishes. The failed resistance of the tribune Metellus shows that Caesar is willing to crush any republican resistance within the city by means of military force. Caesar spares the *Urbs* only because the old republican *civitas* no longer exists there. However, the fact that the Pompeians who fled the city are still at war with Caesar indicates that the Romans have not yet escaped the sort of extreme violence envisaged by Laelius in Book 1 and by the *senex* at the beginning of Book 2. We shall see in the next two chapters that the civil war's destructive violence has merely been displaced from Rome to Pharsalus and, to a lesser extent, the other theaters of the war.

Caesar intends to enter Rome without committing physical violence, but the common people do not believe him. Lucan explicitly states that Caesar puts aside thoughts of war when he departs from Brundisium for Rome after Pompey escapes to Epirus: "Then from his heart/he drove anxieties of warfare and concentrated on peace" (*tum pectore curas/expulit armorum pacique intentus agebat*, 3.52-53). First, Caesar sends Curio to Sicily to secure Rome's corn supply, a measure intended to win

⁸⁸ The translation is my own. The *senex* uses the same expression when he claims that the Marian exiles regarded the recovery of Rome as the "greatest reward" of their own civil war (*exulibus Mariis bellorum maxima merces/Roma recepta fuit*, 2.227-228; see also pages 82-82 above).

the affection of the people (3.52-70). The Caesarians are no longer under arms when they march toward Rome: “he then in victory/headed for the houses of his fatherland, leading companies not armed/but with the face of peace” (*tunc agmina victor/non armata trahens sed pacis habentia vultum,/tectata petit patriae*, 3.71-73). The fact that Caesar has thus far been victorious (*victor*, 3.71) over the Pompeians explains why he can approach Rome with the “face of peace” (*pacis . . . vultum*, 3.72), an expression that captures the superficiality of Caesar’s peace.⁸⁹

The people of Italy doubt Caesar’s ostensible commitment to peace. As Caesar proceeds through the towns between Brundisium and Rome, the frightened Italians meet him with silence (3.80-83):

non illum laetis videntem coetibus urbes	80
sed tacitae videre metu, nec constitit usquam	
obvia turba duci. gaudet tamen esse timori	
tam magno populis et se non mallet amari.	

As he marched, the cities saw him not with happy gatherings	80
but silent with fear, and nowhere did a crowd	
assemble to meet the leader. Yet he rejoices to be so dreaded	
by the people and would not prefer to have their love.	

The townspeople of Ariminum greeted Caesar with the same silence despite his rhetorical appeals to republican values (1.247, 1.257-261). Caesar’s “peace” is still rooted in intimidation, a fact he recognizes and delights in.

⁸⁹ As Lucan explains in lines 3.52-58, Caesar’s bid to control the grain supplies is merely a means to enslave the people: “For surely hunger alone frees cities from slavery, and fear is purchased when magnates feed the lazy mob; a hungry populace does not know fear” (*namque asserit urbes/sola fames, emiturque metus, cum segne potentes/vulgus alunt: nescit plebes ieiuna timere*, 3.56-58). Lucan here revisits the theme of Caesar’s hypocrisy (cf. notes 23 and 25 above); at Ariminum, Caesar condemned Pompey’s manipulation of the *annona* (1.318-319): “Why need I now bemoan his limitation of grain through all the world/and famine made his slave” (*quid iam rura querar totum suppressa per orbem/ac iussam servire famem?*).

As Caesar approaches Rome, Lucan once more reprises the theme of physical violence at or within the *Urbs*. When Caesar catches sight of Rome, he rhetorically asks why no one comes forth to defend the city from him (3.91-97)⁹⁰:

tene, deum sedes, non ullo Marte coacti
deseruere viri? pro qua pugnabitur urbe?
di melius, quod non Latias Eous in oras
nunc furor incubuit nec iuncto Sarmata velox
Pannonio Dacisque Getes admixtus: habenti 95
tam pavidum tibi, Roma, ducem Fortuna pepercit,
quod bellum civile fuit.

Were you, abode of the gods, abandoned by men who were
compelled
by no warfare? For what city, then, will people fight?
Thank the gods that eastern frenzy did not now swoop down
upon the Latian borders, nor the swift Sarmatians, joined
with the Pannonians, nor the Getae mixed with Dacians; 95
when your leader is so fearful, Rome, it is merciful that Fortune
made this war a civil war.

Thus even Caesar acknowledges that it is unworthy of Rome that the self-proclaimed defenders of the republic, the Pompeians, have deserted the *Urbs* before Caesar has driven them from the city.⁹¹ At the very least, a battle before the walls such as Sulla and the Marians fought before the Colline Gate (2.135-138), a siege, or street fighting would have testified to the Pompeians' desire to keep the city out of the hands of a man they regard as a tyrant.⁹² Instead, the fates of the *Urbs* and the *civitas* of Rome

⁹⁰ This passage echoes Lucan's own disapproving criticism of the abandonment of Rome at 1.510-522. Both Caesar and Lucan as narrator find it unfitting that the Pompeians should surrender the city so easily. See Seitz 1965, 226-232, for discussion of the tone of *indignatio* that pervades Lucan's narrative of the republican flight from Rome at 1.486-522.

⁹¹ See Mitchell 1973, 50, and Fantham 1996, 139-140, for perceptive discussions of Caesar's comment and its significance in the context of the beginning of Book 3.

⁹² Caesar states that it is fortunate for Rome that she has fallen victim to civil war and not a barbarian invasion; at least the *Urbs* will stay under Roman rule, albeit the rule of one Roman, namely Caesar. Caesar's reference to a barbarian invasion recalls the rumors of Gallic participation in Caesar's invasion

have diverged from one another; the physical city has fallen to Caesar while the republican government remains unconquered.

The remaining residents of the city still fear that Caesar will pillage and burn the city (3.97-101)⁹³:

sic fatur et urbem
attonitam terrore subit. namque ignibus atris
creditur, ut captae, rapturus moenia Romae
sparsurusque deos. fuit haec mensura timoris: 100
velle putant quodcumque potest.

So he speaks and enters a Rome
thunderstruck by terror, because they believe that he will sack
the walls with black fires and scatter the gods,
as if he had captured Rome. This was the extent of their fear: 100
they equate his wishes with his power.

Lines 3.98-100 thematically recall Laelius' threat to pillage temples (1.379-380) and destroy the walls of Rome (1.383-386). The expression *velle putant quodcumque potest* (3.101) then plays a dual role. First, it reaffirms that Caesar does not in fact wish (*velle*) to sack or destroy Rome. At the same time, however, Lucan reminds his reader that Caesar possesses the *power* (*potest*) to effect the alternative program of total annihilation proposed by Laelius. Caesar may not be a destroyer of buildings, but he is a totalitarian ruler subject to no external restraints.

Recognizing the extreme retaliation of which Caesar is capable, the few senators remaining in the city acknowledge him as their ruler and resolve to vote for any measure he proposes (3.101-112):

that were partly responsible for prompting the evacuation of Rome (1.469-476, 1.481-484). Caesar's words are ironic in that Lucan as narrator wishes that Rome had reserved its aggression for foreign enemies (e.g. 1.19-23).

⁹³ Hunink 1992, 76, writes, "The motif of the *capta urbs* is clearly present here (cf. 99)."

non omina fausta,
 non fictas laeto voces simulare tumultu,
 vix odisse vacat. Phoebæ Palatia complet
 turba patrum nullo cogendi iure senatus
 e latebris educta suis; non consule sacrae 105
 fulserunt sedes, non, proxima lege potestas,
 praetor adest, vacuaeque loco cessere curules.
 omnia Caesar erat: privatae curia vocis
 testis adest. sedere patres censere parati,
 si regnum, si templa sibi iugulumque senatus 110
 exiliumque petat. melius, quod plura iubere
 erubuit quam Roma pati.

No favourable greetings,
 no feigned cries of happy uproar do they pretend;
 hardly have they room for hatred. The Palatine halls of Phoebus
 are filled by a crowd of Fathers brought out from their lairs,
 though no one has the right to summon the Senate; the sacred 105
 chairs
 were not resplendent with the consul, no praetor – by law the next
 in rank –
 is present, and the empty curule chairs are missing from their place.
 Caesar was everything: the Senate-house listened to one
 man's voice. The Fathers sat, prepared to vote in favour
 if he asks for tyranny, for temples for himself, for the slaughter 110
 and the exile of the Senate. Thank the gods his sense of shame
 exceeded Rome's self-degradation.

Caesar's uneventful occupation of Ariminum, not Marius and Sulla's massacres, is the
 true precedent for his bloodless entry into Rome.⁹⁴ First, fear prevents the people
 from expressing their genuine feelings or even the false flatteries with which they
 might have greeted Caesar. Secondly, the Senate's fearful reaction to Caesar's
 destructive capacity gives the tyrant no occasion to resort to such extreme measures.

⁹⁴ As Ahl says of the passage describing the Romans' fears at 2.16-21, "The atmosphere that pervaded Ariminum when Caesar arrived (1.257-258) now grips Rome" (Ahl 1976, 234). The senators act under compulsion, just as Milo's jury had done when Pompey stationed his troops in the Roman Forum. Caesar thus imitates the very action of Pompey that he had used as a pretext for launching the civil war (1.319-323). Fantham 1999, 116-117, discusses the abject capitulation of the senators who remained at Rome.

Paradoxically, Lucan attributes Caesar's ostensibly peaceful entry into Rome to his well-merited reputation as a ready and willing destroyer.

Furthermore, fear motivates the senators to perform the sort of extreme actions that Laelius and his bloodthirsty comrades have pledged themselves to commit. The senators are willing to grant Caesar extra-constitutional personal power (*regnum*)⁹⁵ or divine honors (*templa*) and to decree exile or even death for themselves (3.109-111). In the new regime, "Caesar was everything" (*omnia Caesar erat*, 3.108). The description of the senators as "prepared" (*parati*, 3.109) to grant these requests recalls Caesar's earlier claim that he is marching on Rome in order to remove masters (i.e. the Pompeians) from a city "prepared for slavery" (*detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae*, 1.351) when he justifies his march on Rome. The senators who have remained in the *Urbs* are indeed "prepared to serve," but Caesar now is the *dominus* in place of Pompey.

IX. Metellus, the Temple of Saturn, and the Gallic Sack

Lucan describes Caesar as being more ashamed to order extreme measures than the Senate is to enact them (3.111-112). However, this rhetorical *sententia* does not mean that Caesar would shrink back from violence should he meet resistance.

⁹⁵ O'Hara 2007, 133, glosses *regnum* in the *Pharsalia* as "tyrannical one-man rule." See Wirszubski 1950, 5, 61ff., 87-88, and 121-122, for the definition and connotations of *regnum* in the political discourse of the Late Republic and Early Principate. While noting that the proper definition of the term "invariably implies absolute monarchy" (ibid., 5), Wirszubski observes that the meaning was looser in polemical writings: "The odious term *regnum* signifies a power, or a position, which, even if formally legal, is incompatible with the spirit of the republican constitution, but not necessarily monarchy" (ibid., 64). The term therefore was often applied to the extraordinary personal commands entrusted to various Roman generals (ibid., 61ff.), and even Cicero accused Pompey of aiming at *regnum* (*Ad Att.* 8.11.2, cited at ibid., 64). Cf. Martindale 1984, 72 and 78, n. 47. See pages 175-180 below for republican allegations of *regnum* against Pompey in the *Pharsalia*.

Lucan drives this point home when Caesar breaks into the Temple of Saturn in pursuit of the treasure stored inside (3.112-168). The lone tribune named Metellus tries to prevent Caesar from despoiling the temple (3.112-122)⁹⁶:

tamen exciet iram,
viribus an possint obsistere iura per unum
Libertas experta virum; pugnaxque Metellus,
ut videt ingenti Saturnia templa revelli 115
mole, rapit gressus et Caesaris agmina rumpens
ante fores nondum reseratae constitit aedis
(usque adeo solus ferrum mortemque timere
auri nescit amor; pereunt discrimine nullo
amissae leges sed, pars vilissima rerum, 120
certamen movistis, opes), prohibensque rapina
victorem clara testatur voce tribunus.

Yet Freedom rouses
wrath, through one warrior testing if right
can resist force: and when aggressive Metellus
sees Saturn's temple being torn apart by huge 115
exertion, with rapid step he breaks through Caesar's lines
and stands before the doors of the temple, not yet opened.
– To this extent the love of gold alone knows
no fear of sword or death: the laws are lost and perish
with no crisis, but you, wealth, the lowest part of life, 120
you provoked a fight. – Keeping the victor
from the booty, the tribune declares with ringing voice⁹⁷ . . .

Lucan's description of the scene suggests that military violence is set to break out within the *Urbs*. For the first time in Book 3, the reader learns that Caesar has brought his troops (*agmina*, 3.116) within the Forum, where the Temple of Saturn is located.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Hunink 1992, 82, discusses the historical sources that report the despoliation of the temple and Metellus' opposition. The most detailed account is that of Plut. *Caes.* 35, who records that Caesar threatened Metellus' life when the tribune opposed him at the doors of the temple (cf. *Caes. B.C.* 1.33; Plut. *Pomp.* 62.1.2; App. *B.C.* 2.41).

⁹⁷ Metellus' address to Caesar (3.123-133) follows immediately after this line; I cite it in its entirety below.

⁹⁸ See Platner-Ashby 1929, 463-465, for the history and configuration of the Temple of Saturn and its role as the location for the *aerarium populi Romani* ("treasury of the Roman people").

Caesar has entered Rome without meeting any resistance, but he attempts to break open the temple by force (3.115-116).⁹⁹ Metellus is eager for a fight (*pugnax*, 3.114) and, as Hunink notes, bursts through Caesar's columns in an aggressive manner (*rapit gressus et Caesaris agmina rumpens*, 3.116). Lucan's description of the theft as an act of *rapina* evokes the *urbs capta* topos, of which the despoliation of temples is a common component.¹⁰⁰ The violent robbery of the temple treasury by Caesar's troops also partially fulfills Laelius' vow, to which the other soldiers at Ariminum assented (1.386-388), to plunder temples at Caesar's behest (1.379-380).¹⁰¹

Lucan presents Metellus' challenge to Caesar as a battle between republican *Libertas* (3.114) on one side and Caesar's raw military force on the other (*viribus*, 3.113). Metellus speaks in opposition to Caesar with all the authority of a tribune when all others have fallen silent (3.121-122). In fact, Metellus directly challenges Caesar to violate tribunicial immunity (3.123-133):

non nisi per nostrum vobis percussa patebunt templa latus, nullasque feres nisi sanguine sacro sparsas, raptor, opes. certe violata potestas invenit ista deos; Crassumque in bella secutae saeva tribuniciae voverunt proelia dirae. detege iam ferrum; neque enim tibi turba verenda est spectatrix scelerum: deserta stamus in urbe.	125
non feret e nostro sceleratus praemia miles: sunt quos prosternas populi, quae moenia dones. pacis ad exutae spolium non cogit egestas: bellum, Caesar, habes.	130

⁹⁹ Hunink 1992, 115, observes that the consuls had taken the keys to the temple's treasury with them when they fled the city (Cass. Dio 41.17). He also discusses varying interpretations of *mole* (3.116) as a reference either to a battering ram or other machine of war (the meaning Hunink seems to favor), a mass of soldiers, or mere effort.

¹⁰⁰ Paul 1982, 147.

¹⁰¹ Fantham 1996, 146-147.

Only over my body will you smash the temple open;
 no wealth will you carry off unless stained
 by my sacred blood, you robber. Without a doubt, this rank 125
 of mine
 finds gods to avenge its violation; the tribune's curses
 followed Crassus to war, promising cruel battles.
 Now unsheathe your sword: nor need you fear a crowd
 to witness your crimes: we stand in an abandoned Rome.
 No wicked soldier will take his pay for his crimes from our 130
 treasury:
 there are other people for you to overthrow, other city-walls
 for you to give your men.
 Poverty does not compel you to despoil the peace which you have
 thrown aside:
 Caesar, you have your war.

In defying Caesar to open the Temple of Saturn only over his dead body (3.123-125), Metellus links the physical integrity of the temple with the institution of tribunicial immunity.¹⁰² Relatively minor physical damage to one of the buildings of the *Urbs* (in fact, the only building at Rome that Caesar seeks to damage in the least)¹⁰³ would entail manifest and massive injury to Rome's political identity as a republican city-state. Metellus alone offers the sort of resistance that even Caesar acknowledges Rome deserves.

Throughout his speech, Metellus stresses the fact that Caesar has come to Rome as a conqueror to a fallen city. First, he rejects Caesar's outward semblance of peace and calls him a *raptor*, "robber" (3.125). Next, although Caesar's army did not carry weapons as they marched from Brundisium to Rome, Metellus defies Caesar to

¹⁰² In killing a tribune in the Forum, Caesar's "criminal soldiers" (*sceleratus . . . miles*, 3.130) would also be guilty of two of the crimes of which Curio and Caesar accused the Pompeians in their speeches at Ariminum – the violation of tribunes' rights (1.264-279) and the confusion of Forum and camp (1.319-323).

¹⁰³ Hunink (*ad loc.*) notes that the Temple of Saturn is the only temple that Caesar despoils in the *Pharsalia*.

unsheathe the sword against him (*detege iam ferrum*, 3.128). He claims that no crowd of onlookers will object to the crime because the civil war has rendered Rome a ghost town: “we stand in an abandoned Rome” (*deserta stamus in urbe*, 3.129).¹⁰⁴ Caesar’s men have entered the city as soldiers (*miles*, 3.130), not as civilians. Metellus reproaches Caesar for attacking Rome when there were numerous other peoples and cities that he could have attacked and despoiled (3.131-133; cf. 1.8-20). Hunink also points out that the end of line 3.131 (*quae moenia dones?*) echoes an earlier rhetorical question asked by Caesar: *quae moenia fessis?* (1.345).¹⁰⁵ Caesar posed the latter question at Ariminum when he tried to justify the invasion of Italy as an attempt to secure colonies for his veterans. Metellus argues that there were *moenia* that Caesar might have given his troops other than those of Rome, abandoned through fear of Caesar’s own advance. Instead, Caesar has decided to treat Rome as a foreign, captured city: it is Rome whose *populus* he has set out to destroy, whose city he has handed over to his veterans, and whose spoils he has taken.

Despite Metellus’ bold challenge to Caesar, the last manifestation of *libertas* at Rome ends anticlimactically. Caesar first dismisses Metellus as an insignificant nuisance unworthy of the noble death he courts (3.133-140). When Metellus refuses to remove himself from the doors of the temple, Caesar briefly forgets that he has assumed the outward façade of a civilian leader and looks about the Forum for swords to put Metellus to death with (3.142-143): “he looks around for his savage swords,/forgetting to feign the toga of peace” (*saevos circumspicit enses/oblitus*

¹⁰⁴ The hyperbolic description of Rome’s desertion conflicts with Lucan’s earlier comments about Rome’s panicked inhabitants at 3.97ff. Rome’s purported desertion therefore has less to do with historical realism than with eliciting pathos for the plight of the city in the civil war (Hunink 1992, 89).

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*

simulare togam). The fact that Caesar prepared to kill Metellus shows that Caesar's ostensible restraint upon entering Rome is predicated upon the Pompeians' flight and the remaining Romans' capitulation; if taking the city had required force, Caesar would not have hesitated to employ it. At this point, Cotta¹⁰⁶ intervenes to dissuade Metellus from making himself a martyr for *libertas* (3.143ff.). Cotta reasons that even the sham façade of republican liberty that Caesar permits will vanish if men like Metellus attempt to exercise genuine freedom of speech (3.145-150)¹⁰⁷:

‘libertas,’ inquit, ‘populi quem regna coercent libertate perit; cuius servaveris umbram, si quidquid iubeare velis. tot rebus iniquis paruimus victi; venia est haec sola pudoris degenerisque metus, nullam potuisse negari. ocius avertat diri mala semina belli.	145 150
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He says: ‘The freedom of a people coerced by tyranny perishes by freedom; its semblance you will preserve if willingly you do whatever ordered. In defeat we have submitted to so many wrongs; for our dishonour and degenerate fear this is the only excuse – that nothing now could be refused him. Quickly let him steal away the evil seeds of hideous war.	145 150
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¹⁰⁶ While Cotta may be an historical person (see Ferrary 1976 and Fantham 1996, 143, n. 16, for further discussion), his intervention in the quarrel between Metellus and Caesar is almost certainly an invention that reflects the “baseness and cowardice” of those politicians who awaited Caesar instead of fleeing with Pompey (Hunink 1992, 92-93). Hunink compares this invented speech with that which Lucan attributes to Cicero at 7.68-85 (see pages 176-180 for discussion).

¹⁰⁷ In Book 9, Cato declares that the last decades of the Republic knew only fake *libertas*: “Long ago, when Marius and Sulla were admitted, the true guarantee/of liberty disappeared: with Pompey taken from the world,/now even the bogus guarantee has gone” (*olim vera fides Sulla Marioque receptis/libertatis obit: Pompeio rebus adempto/nunc et ficta perit*, 9.204-206). See also pages 239-246 below.

and brought by Cato over seas from far-off Cyprus.
 Then the riches of the east and the remotest treasure 165
 of captured kings, carried before Pompey in his triumphs,
 is brought out. With dreadful plunder the temple is robbed
 and then for the first time Rome was poorer than a Caesar.

Lucan stresses the fact that Caesar has seized the temple's treasures by force (*tristi spoliantur templa rapina*, 3.167)¹⁰⁹ as though he were sacking the city. In robbing the Temple of Saturn, Caesar robs the entire Roman people of its accumulated wealth – the *Romani census populi* (3.157).¹¹⁰ Furthermore, through one act of theft Caesar becomes richer than the rest of the city of Rome taken together: *pauperiorque fuit tum primum Caesare Roma* (3.168).¹¹¹ Caesar now possesses both the wealth and the political power that formerly belonged to the republican *civitas* and its duly appointed magistrates.

Hunink observes that Lucan decries Caesar's theft of the *aerarium* not so much as the theft of money (which Lucan calls *pars vilissima rerum* at 3.120), but rather as an assault upon Rome's glorious history.¹¹² The wealth of the temple – the *aerarium* – consists of the spoils from Rome's victories over her various foreign enemies from the time of the Gallic Sack (3.159) until that of Pompey himself (3.165-167). A number

¹⁰⁹ Lucan's use of the word *stridor* to describe the loud, harsh grating sound of the temple doors (3.154-155) augments the sense of militaristic violence that pervades the episode. *Stridor* is the word Lucan uses at 1.237 to describe the sound the Caesarians' military trumpets make within Ariminum's forum. Just as the *stridor* at Ariminum disrupts the *pax longa* (1.241) that has prevailed there, the *stridor* in Rome's own Forum testifies to the sacrilegious theft of treasure that has never been touched through the ages (*multis non tactus ab annis*, 3.156). Fantham 1996, 144, notes the restricted use of *stridor* in the *Pharsalia* (it occurs only at 1.237 and 3.155) and argues that Lucan models the opening of the doors of the Temple of Saturn on the opening of the gates of Janus at *Aen.* 7.607ff.; Vergil describes the thresholds of Janus' temple gate as *stridentia* (*Aen.* 7.613).

¹¹⁰ For *census* in this sense, see Lewis & Short s.v. II.B. Cf. Hunink 1992, 99.

¹¹¹ *Primum* in this line ominously refers to the fact that "subsequently it often happened that the State was poorer than the Emperor (Caesar)" (Braund 1992, 251).

¹¹² Hunink 1992, 97. See pages 21-23 above for further discussion of Roman history's recapitulation and reversal in the *Pharsalia*.

of the wars mentioned in the catalogue (3.157-167) entailed a serious threat to Rome's independence or even the city's survival, among them the Punic Wars (3.157) and the war with Pyrrhus (3.160).¹¹³ In capturing Rome and the spoils that the Romans won from the Carthaginians and from Pyrrhus, Caesar succeeds where these enemies of Rome failed. All of Rome's previous triumphs and the threats of all previous enemies become mere foils for Caesar's victory. Curio's promise to Caesar at Ariminum has been fulfilled: "Rome will have conquered the world for you" (*tibi Roma subegerit orbem*, 1.285; the translation is my own).

Lucan's reference to the Gallic Sack at 3.159 is particularly evocative of the *urbs capta* motif: *quod tibi, Roma, fuga Gallus*¹¹⁴ *trepidante reliquit*. Lucan here refers to the ransom that the Romans paid to the Gauls in order to end the siege of the Capitol during the Gallic Sack of 390 B.C. In Livy's account (5.49),¹¹⁵ Camillus¹¹⁶ intervenes just as the gold is being weighed in the Forum. He then annihilates the Gauls in battle. As I have noted earlier in this chapter,¹¹⁷ the people of Rome fled the *Urbs* because they feared that Caesar would permit Gauls to pillage the city (1.473-476, 1.481-484; cf. 1.254, 1.307-309). When Caesar finally does enter Rome, he

¹¹³ Lucan lists both Hannibal (whom he designates as *Poenus*) and Pyrrhus among Rome's greatest enemies at 1.30-31. At 3.160, Lucan refers to the bribe that Pyrrhus reportedly offered to C. Fabricius Luscinus in order to persuade him to surrender (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20.2-3; Cass. Dio 9.34ff.). See Hunink 1992, 100, for commentary.

¹¹⁴ Gallus is Housman's emendation for the MS reading *Pyrrhus*, which seems to have begun as a gloss on *regi* in the next line. *Gallus* also fits better in the context of *fuga trepidante* since the Gauls fled Rome in haste when attacked by Camillus. Duff and Shackleton Bailey accept the emendation. For a defense of Housman's reading, see Hunink 1992, 99-100. Fantham 1996, 141, n. 10, notes that Appian (*B.C.* 2.6.41) also dates the origins of the *aerarium*'s treasure to the time of the Gallic Sack.

¹¹⁵ Luce 1971 argues persuasively that the account of Camillus' disruption of the weighing of the gold is Livy's own invention.

¹¹⁶ See the next chapter (pages 119-129) for discussion of Camillus' appearances in the *Pharsalia*.

¹¹⁷ See 61-65 above.

partly realizes the people's fears by stealing the very gold that the Gauls failed to win during their sack of the city.

I believe that Lucan's direct reference to the Gallic Sack in this passage points his reader toward a key intertext, Book 5 of Livy.¹¹⁸ Caesar's occupation of Rome in *Phars.* 3 reads as though it were written as a travesty of Livy's narrative of the Gallic Sack. Perhaps it would be too strong a claim to state categorically that Lucan parodies Livy 5. However, Lucan certainly reprises and inverts many of the key motifs that Livy deploys in his patriotic account of the Gallic Sack.

First, the people's desertion of Rome in advance of Caesar's entry recalls Livy's account of the abandonment of the city before the Gallic Sack commenced. After the Gauls routed a Roman army at the Battle of the Allia, almost the entire population of Rome abandoned the city (with the exception of the *Arx* on the Capitol¹¹⁹) in anticipation of the Gauls' arrival (Livy 5.39.9-13). Elderly senators remained in the city so that they might offer themselves as a *devotio* on behalf of the city (5.39.13-5.40.1, 5.41.1-3, 5.41.8-10).¹²⁰ They even left the doors of their houses open so that the Gauls might enter and see them dressed in their full official garb

¹¹⁸ It is generally accepted that Lucan relied upon Livy as a source for much of his historical material. See Pichon 1912 and, for a rebuttal of Pichon's simplistic interpretation of Livy as Lucan's primary source, Masters 1992, 15-19.

¹¹⁹ In Ch. 2 (pages 126-129), we shall note Lucan's deviation from the standard account of the Gallic Sack; he seems to claim that even the Capitol fell to the Gauls (5.27).

¹²⁰ See commentary by Ogilvie *ad loc.* for discussion of the *devotio* (the ceremonial offering of one's own life for the benefit of one's army) of the senators during the Gallic Sack. The most famous instances of *devotio* in the Roman historiographical tradition are those of the Decii. Two generations of Decii are said to have offered their lives in acts of *devotio* – P. Decius Mus in battle against the Latins in 340 B.C. (Livy 8.6.8-8.6.13, 8.9.1-8.11.1) and his son of the same name in battle against the Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians at Sentinum in 295 (Livy 10.28.12-18). Some sources also report a third, historically problematic *devotio* of P. Decius Mus, grandson and son of the preceding commanders, at the Battle of Ausculum in the year 279 (Cic. *De Fin.* 2.61, *Tusc. Disp.* 1.89). See Janssen 1981, 357, n. 1, for a list of sources and Fantham 2006, 553-555, for discussion of the third Decian *devotio*. We shall discuss the *devotio* theme in the *Pharsalia* again in Ch. 3 (pages 202-203).

(5.41.1-3, 5.41.7-9). One of the senators boldly provoked a Gaul by striking him, an act that resulted in the massacre of all of the other senators left outside of the Arx (5.41.9-10). Like the Gauls in 390 B.C., Caesar finds the *Urbs* nearly empty, a point Metellus stresses in his address to Caesar: *deserta stamus in urbe* (*Phars.* 3.129). However, the few cowardly senators whom Caesar can draw out of their hiding places (*e latebris educta suis*, 3.105) submit to his tyrannical rule. Even the bold Metellus fails to achieve the noble death he seeks at Caesar's hand.¹²¹ When Caesar steals the same gold that the Gauls once weighed out, no Camillus arrives in the Forum to stop him. At the very least, the senators who meet Caesar in Rome display none of the virtues possessed by the senators who faced the Gauls in Rome during the Gallic Sack.

The basic difference between the Gallic Sack and Caesar's occupation of Rome lies in the divergent fates of the physical city and the Roman polity in the two events. The Gauls burn and loot the city only when the senators defend their honor to the death. Most of the *Urbs* perishes in the flames, but the *civitas* grows back¹²² because of the brave resistance of the hold-outs on the Capitol and of the refugees led by Camillus. The Romans are thus able to overcome the Gauls and rebuild their city. Caesar does not need to kill Metellus or set fire to Rome because all resistance to him falters. Unlike the Romans who resisted the Gauls from the Capitol, all the Pompeians have abandoned the city, even if they intend to wage war on Caesar elsewhere. The few republicans who remain at Rome either willingly submit to Caesar or, as in the

¹²¹ Caesar tells Metellus, "You are entertaining a vain hope for noble death" (*vanam spem mortis honestae/concipis*, 3.134-135).

¹²² In fact, Livy claims that Rome was "reborn from its roots more luxuriantly and with greater fertility" after the Gallic Sack (*ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis*, 6.1.3). I discuss this metaphor again in Ch. 4 (p. 236) with reference to Cato's revival of the republican cause after Pharsalus.

case of Metellus, make a show of passive resistance before backing down. The senators at the time of the Gallic Sack proved a sufficient irritant to provoke the Gauls to burn the city. In contrast, the resistance to Caesar at Rome ultimately proves too meager to coax him into extreme acts of violence and destruction. At the risk of extreme simplification, we may say that the Romans in the year 390 B.C. sacrifice their physical city to the Gauls in order to preserve their republic. In contrast, the Romans in 49 B.C. preserve their city by sacrificing their republican liberties and their national treasury.

X. The mutiny in Book 5

Lucan once more identifies Caesar as a potential threat to the physical safety of the *Urbs* in Book 5 when his troops mutiny (5.237-373). One of their complaints is that they were not permitted to pillage Rome when they took the city (5.270-274):

cepimus expulso patriae cum tecta senatu, 270
 quos hominum vel quos licuit spoliare deorum?
 imus in omne nefas manibus ferroque nocentes,
 paupertate pii. finis quis quaeritur armis?
 quid satis est, si Roma parum est?

When we drove out the Senate and took our country's homes, 270
 which mortals and which gods were we allowed to rob?
 We proceed to every crime, guilty in hand and sword,
 guiltless in our poverty. What limit is sought for warfare?
 What is enough, if Rome is too little?

Although Caesar eventually quells the revolt without acceding to the mutineers' demands (5.364-373), nevertheless Lucan states that Caesar would be willing to permit the sack of Rome if it should serve his own purposes (5.305-309):

non illis urbem spoliandaque templa negasset 305
 Tarpeiamque Iovis sedem matresque senatus
 passurasque infanda nurus. vult omnia certe
 a se saeva peti, vult praemia Martis amari;
 militis indomiti tantum mens sana timetur.

He would not have refused them Rome and temples to be 305
 plundered
 and Jupiter's Tarpeian seat and the Senate's mothers and
 daughters
 to suffer the unspeakable. He wants them to demand from him
 all atrocities, without a doubt, to love the prizes of war;
 only the sanity of his unbridled troops makes him afraid.

Although Caesar will in fact permit none of these atrocities, Lucan uses the
 contrafactual condition (*negasset*, 5.305) to characterize him as *willing* to sack Rome.
 Barratt observes, "Lucan makes no attempt to disguise his attitude towards Caesar in
 his desire to blacken his memory."¹²³ The atrocities Caesar countenances – the
 pillaging of Rome, despoliation of temples, and violence against women – recall the
 crimes that Laelius vowed to commit in Book 1 (1.376-386).¹²⁴ The uneventful
 occupation of Rome in Book 3 is, therefore, a mere accident of circumstance, not
 testimony to any piety or genuine clemency on Caesar's part. It remains to be seen
 where Caesar's full potential for terror, violence, and destruction will finally be
 realized.

¹²³ Barratt 1979, 100.

¹²⁴ Fantham 1985, 119-126 and 131, establishes numerous parallels in style and content between Caesar and Laelius' speeches at Ariminum and the speeches of the mutineers and Caesar in Book 5. She notes the importance of the *Urbs* as the intended target of the Caesarian soldiers' violence and greed in both episodes (ibid., 120 and 124-125).

XI. Conclusion

In comparison with Laelius' vow to pulverize the city, Caesar's occupation of Rome may seem anticlimactic. However, the fact that Caesar occupies Rome without a climactic struggle of the sort that attended the Gallic Sack, Hannibal and Pyrrhus' marches through Italy, the invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones, and Marius and Sulla's civil wars is itself the greatest possible testimony to the ignominy of the city's capitulation. That the city was taken with so little effort marks a failure of the republicans to defend their constitution and native city alike. As at Ariminum, the ostensible peacefulness of Caesar's occupation of Rome only shows how completely he has succeeded in establishing his tyranny.

Caesar thus spares the physical city of Rome only because the spirit of the republic has utterly perished there. The *senex* and other residents of Rome feared that Caesar's destruction of the republic would be accompanied by the physical destruction or sack of the city. Instead, the fates of the *civitas* and of the *Urbs* have diverged. We are left with the *Urbs*, where Caesar now has total political control (*omnia Caesar erat*, 3.108), and the republican *civitas*, which is now in exile with Pompey.

However, Laelius' vow and the other intimations that Caesar will sack Rome are not mere foils for Caesar's entry into the *Urbs* in Book 3. Sulla's massacres at Praeneste and in the *Ovilia* in particular will serve as a precedent for Pompey and Caesar's conduct of the war in the books to follow. We shall see in the next chapter¹²⁵ that Pompey loses the war because he fails to imitate Sulla's ruthlessness at the Battle

¹²⁵ Pages 160-164.

of Dyrrachium. In Ch. 3,¹²⁶ we shall see that Caesar wins the civil war because he does imitate Sulla at Pharsalus. Lucan causes his audience to expect Rome's destruction only to delay the fulfillment of this expectation until later in the epic.¹²⁷ Furthermore, this metaphorical destruction is displaced from the *Urbs* to Pharsalus and, to a lesser extent, other locations along Pompey and Caesar's trek across the world.

¹²⁶ See pages 213-215 below.

¹²⁷ For the critical role of delay in Lucan's poetics, see Masters 1992, 1-10, and Henderson 1998, 183-185. Henderson and Masters posit that Lucan repeatedly defers his narration of the events of the civil war in order to register his disdain for the sordid subject matter of his epic and to postpone Caesar's victory. Of course, delay also causes suspense to build.

Chapter 2

The *Civitas* in Exile

At the end of the last chapter, we saw what the *Urbs* looks like in the absence of republican *libertas*. In this chapter, we shall see how Lucan portrays the republican *civitas* once separated from the *Urbs*. In particular, we shall investigate how the republicans of Pompey's main camp justify their retreat from Rome and how they relate to the cities they take as their temporary bases during the course of the war. I trace the progress of Pompey's main camp as opposed to his lieutenants' movements or Caesar's campaigns at Massilia and in Spain because Pompey and the Senate claim to embody Rome, i.e. the *civitas*.¹ I show that Lucan develops this theme by means of several highly evocative historical *exempla*, notably Camillus' command at Veii during the Gallic Sack, the Athenians' abandonment of their city during the Battle of Salamis, and the Phocaeans' resettlement at Massilia when the Persians conquered their home city. The redefinition of Rome as the *civitas* embodied in the republican army helps negate the stigma incurred when Caesar occupied the *Urbs*.

However, Pompey's self-serving interpretation of events is not without its drawbacks. I show that at least one *exemplum* that the republicans cite – that of Camillus – does not in fact support their strategy of retreat from Rome. Furthermore, the republicans find themselves adopting foreign cities as their bases of operation against Caesar. Earlier treatments of the *Pharsalia* have failed to note that several of

¹ The theme of the decline and destruction of cities does occur in episodes not involving Pompey's main camp. For instance, Curio's visit to "great Carthage's citadels, half in ruins" (*semirutae magnae Carthaginis arces*, 4.585) and the ruins of Scipio's Libyan camp (the *Castra Cornelia*, 4.656-660) in Book 4 testify to Rome's decline after its zenith during the Punic Wars, a decline Curio's own role in the civil war exemplifies (Thompson and Bruère 1970, 170; Ahl 1976, 96-97).

these cities (e.g. Capua and Corfinium) were once major rivals of Rome. On account of their separation from the *Urbs*, the republicans come to defend and identify with past enemies of the republic. I propose that Lucan subtly adverts to these past conflicts, thereby suggesting that prolonged exile from Rome threatens to alienate the republicans from their native city.

Lastly, I show that the Battle of the Dyrrachium is where the republican *civitas* in exile comes face to face with the new, tyrannical Rome represented by Caesar's army. Far from relying on the defenses of foreign cities, Caesar's regime is instantiated in the massive siege wall that he builds around Dyrrachium and in the person of Scaeva, a centurion whom Lucan explicitly compares to a wall. The republicans nearly crush Caesar's forces, but in the end Pompey halts because of his attitude of piety toward his father-in-law Caesar. Pompey's failure to press his advantage is symptomatic of the fundamental differences between the republicans and the Caesarians. I demonstrate that Pompey and the republicans suffer an identity crisis after evacuating Rome. They are torn between past attachments (devotion to the *Urbs* and *pietas* toward their fellow Romans) and current realities (separation from the *Urbs* and the demands of the war). In contrast, the Caesarians are single-minded fanatics devoted to nothing except Caesar. This fundamental difference explains why the republicans permit the Caesarians to escape from Dyrrachium, a tragic error that leads inevitably to the republicans' own destruction at Pharsalus.

I. Brutus, Cato, and the republican *civitas*

Lucan abruptly shifts the focus of his narrative away from the fate of the *Urbs* to that of the republic at the end of the *senex*'s speech. In the next scene, Brutus and Cato debate whether they should participate in the civil war or refrain entirely from a conflict in which the two rival leaders, Caesar and Pompey, have both disregarded the republican rule of law (2.234-325). It is in this passage that Lucan begins to conceptualize Rome less as a physical city than as a political ideal, i.e. republican *libertas*. Cato fears for the destruction of Rome in the political sense of the end of the republic, not the physical destruction of the *Urbs*. Cato's speech thus prepares the way for the further redefinition of Rome by Pompey and the republican senators in later episodes of the epic.

Brutus argues that Cato should not participate in the civil war because neither side is worthy of his support (2.234-284). He begins his speech by proclaiming to Cato, "Of Virtue long ago expelled and banished from all lands/you are now the sole support" (*omnibus expulsae terris olimque fugatae/virtutis iam sola fides*, 2.242-243). Cato's metaphorical references to the expulsion of virtue marks a critical turn in how characters within the *Pharsalia* respond to the war. Book 1 recounts first the forcible expulsion of the Caesarian tribunes from Rome and then the republicans' evacuation of the city. Earlier references to the literal exile of the various warring factions from the *Urbs* thus provide the context for Brutus' metaphor. Lucan raises the theme of exile from the physical to the metaphorical level. At the same time, Brutus raises the stakes of the war from the expulsion of this or that faction from a physical city to the fate of *virtus* itself.

In his response to Brutus, Cato redefines Rome itself in metaphorical terms

(2.292-305):

gentesne furorem
Hesperium ignotae Romanaque bella sequentur
diductique fretis alio sub sidere reges,
otia solus agam? procul hunc arcete pudorem, 295
o superi, motura Dahae ut clade Getasque
seculo me Roma cadat. ceu morte parentem
natorum orbatum longum producere funus
ad tumulos iubet ipse dolor, iuvat ignibus atris
inseruisse manus constructoque aggere busti 300
ipsum atras tenuisse faces, non ante revellar
exanimem quam te complectar, Roma; tuumque
nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram.
sic eat: immites Romana piacula divi
plena ferant, nullo fraudemus sanguine bellum. 305

Shall I alone live
in peace if unknown races and kings beneath another sky,
separated by the sea, comply with the frenzy
of Hesperia and with Roman wars? Keep far away this shame, 295
O gods, that Rome should fall and by her fall rouse up
the Dahae and the Getae – and I remain unmoved. As grief itself
bids the father robbed of his son by death conduct the long
funeral procession to the grave, he wants to thrust
his hands into the black fires, and on the pyre's piled-high mound 300
himself to hold the torches black, so I will not be torn away
before embracing your lifeless body, Rome; and, Liberty,
your name, even an empty shade, I shall follow all the way.
So be it: let the pitiless gods have in full Rome's
sacrifice of expiation, let us defraud the fighting of no blood. 305

Cato's reference to the fall of Rome (*Roma cadat*, 2.297) and the uprising of such foreign nations as the Dahae and the Getae are consistent with the Romans' pervasive fear throughout Books 1-3 that Caesar and his barbarian allies will sack their city. However, Cato also presents himself as the metaphorical father of a personified and

lifeless (*exanimem*, 2.302) Rome.² This Rome is not identical with the mere physical city as Cato closely associates it with *libertas*, republican liberty (2.302-303). Insofar as he defines Rome as republican, Cato refers to the Roman *civitas*, not the *Urbs* whose buildings can persist under different political regimes. Cato cares less whether Caesar seizes control over the physical settlement on the Tiber than whether *libertas* survives.

In the previous chapter, we saw how Lucan portrays the extinction of republican *libertas* at Rome in Book 3 when Metellus is silenced (3.112-153). Cato's speech subtly foreshadows the divorce of the *civitas* from the *Urbs*. Cato states that he will pursue the "name" and "empty shade" of Liberty (2.302-303). This pursuit (*persequar*, 2.303) is both metaphorical in that Cato aspires to the ideals of republicanism in his conduct and literal in that Cato's espousal of republicanism causes him to follow Pompey's army in its journey eastward from Rome. In order to pursue the *libertas* that he so closely associates with Rome, Cato must quit the *Urbs* before Caesar arrives.

Furthermore, the time-worn Roman Republic is also represented allegorically in this passage by Marcia, Cato's wife (2.326-391).³ Marcia had borne several children to Cato and was then given in marriage to Hortensius, from whose funeral Marcia returns to marry Cato again (2.326-337). She is past child-bearing years (2.338-341) and Cato does not sleep with her after resuming their marriage (2.377-380). Marcia represents the republic, old and no longer fertile. Their wedding is somber and both wear mourning garments, she for Hortensius (2.327-328, 2.333-337,

² See Ahl 1976, 243-244, on Cato's paternal attitude toward Rome.

³ I here follow the allegorical interpretation of the wedding advanced by Ahl 1976, 247-252.

2.365-367) and he for Rome (2.372-378). Lucan continues the allegory of the mournful wedding by saying of Cato: “for Rome he is father and for Rome he is husband” (*urbi pater est urbique maritus*, 2.388). This line means both that he married Marcia and fathered children for the sake of the city⁴ and that he metaphorically plays the role of father (cf. 2.297-303) and husband for Rome.⁵ Cato fulfills the same role – that of disinterested guardian⁶ – for both Marcia and the desiccated republic she represents.

The speeches of Brutus and Cato and the allegorical wedding of Cato to Marcia show that Lucan has begun to shift his focus away from the immediate fate of the *Urbs* under Caesar to the political implications of Caesar’s rebellion. This scene therefore provides Lucan’s first major commentary on the ideological stakes of the civil war since he ironically undercut Curio and Caesar’s hypocritical rhetoric at Ariminum. As we shall see below, the shift of focus away from the *Urbs* to the imperiled republic lays the groundwork for Lucan’s identification of the republicans as the Roman *civitas*-in-exile. In Ch. 4, we shall also see the effect of Cato’s single-minded devotion to *Libertas* and his life of self-discipline when he assumes symbolic leadership of the republican troops after Pompey’s death.⁷

⁴ Cato believes that the “the greatest value of Venus [i.e. of sex]/was offspring” (*Venerisque hic maximus usus,/progenies*, 2.387-388).

⁵ I see no reason to preclude the latter interpretation as does Fantham 1992a, 152. See Ahl 1976, 181 and 249-252, for further explication of Cato’s role as Rome’s father and husband.

⁶ See the lengthy praise of Cato’s asceticism at 2.380-391, especially his devotion to the common good (*in commune bonus*, 2.390) and his refusal to engage in “self-centered pleasure” (*sibi nata voluptas*, 2.391). See Ahl 1976, 181 and 249, and Fantham 1992a, 150-152, for commentary on Cato’s asceticism and its bearing on his selfless devotion to republican political ideals. It is not my intention here to critique recent readings of the characterization of Cato in Book 2 as a parody (e.g. Sklenář 2003, 76-79), but in Ch. 4 (pages 218-219 and 233ff.) I do counter similar interpretations of Cato in Book 9.

⁷ See p. 239ff. below.

II. The *armata urbs*

Pompey makes the next major step in the redefinition of Rome as a political and ideological entity rather than as a physical city. After leaving Rome, Pompey retreats to Capua (2.392-395) and there delivers a speech in a vain attempt to rally his troops (2.531-595). In part of his speech, Pompey portrays Caesar as a military threat to Rome's physical safety and a successor to earlier foreign and domestic enemies who had imperiled the city. He further characterizes Caesar as un-Roman by reprising the association of Caesar with Gaul (2.534-535): "The Hesperian fields are ablaze with savage devastation,/the rabid frenzy of Gaul is pouring over icy Alps" (*ardent Hesperii saevis populatibus agri,/Gallica per gelidas rabies effunditur Alpes*).

Pompey then identifies Caesar with Roman criminals and rebels (2.539-554, of which I cite 2.539-546):

neque enim ista vocari	
proelia iusta decet, patriae sed vindicis iram;	540
nec magis hoc bellum est, quam cum Catilina paravit	
arsuras in tecta faces sociusque furoris	
Lentulus exertique manus vaesana Cethegi.	
o rabies miseranda ducis! cum fata Camillis	
te, Caesar, magnisque velint miscere Metellis,	545
ad Cinnae Mariosque venis.	

And in fact those battles ahead are not called rightly real battles, but the wrath of your avenging country; 540
this is war no more than when Catiline made ready
to attack our homes with burning torches with Lentulus his partner
in madness and Cethegus' frenzied arm stripped bare for action.
O the pitiable frenzy of Caesar! When destiny is willing
to match you, Caesar, with the Camilli and with the great Metelli, 545
you deign to join the ranks of Cinna and Marius.

Pompey clearly portrays Caesar as a threat to the physical safety of the *Urbs*. He compares Caesar to Catiline, Lentulus, and Cethegus, who threatened to set fire to the *Urbs* (2.541-543).⁸ As we saw in the preceding chapter, the *senex* lays out in his speech the terrors that Marius and his supporters, Cinna among them, inflicted upon Rome (2.68-138). Though Caesar resembles these men, he could join the ranks of such patriotic heroes as Camillus and the Metelli if he wished to. Camillus is, as it were, the antithesis of Catiline in that he rescued the *Urbs* by raising the siege of the Capitol during the Gallic Sack.⁹

However, Pompey is not concerned exclusively with the security of the *Urbs*. He is also concerned with Roman national identity, which is one of the reasons why he associates Caesar with Gauls and notorious Roman traitors. Pompey begins his speech by explicitly identifying his republican soldiers as the “true Roman troops” (*O vere Romana manus*, 2.532) in opposition to the Caesarians, who are Romans by birth but loyal to Caesar and not to the republic. Practically speaking, the *Roma* of which Pompey speaks is identical with the *Romana manus* that is fighting Caesar.¹⁰ Pompey also portrays himself as the guardian of Rome (2.538-539): “now, now, with me as leader,/let Rome seek punishment and penalty” (*iam iam me praeside Roma/supplicium poenamque petat*). Just as he calls his troops “true Romans” at 2.532, Pompey here identifies Rome strictly with the senatorial party.

⁸ As noted in the preceding chapter (p. 64), Catiline and his co-conspirators sought an alliance with the Allobrogan Gauls. The memory of the Allobrogan role in the Catilinarian Conspiracy may add a further sinister dimension to Pompey’s allegation that Caesar pours forth upon Italy “the rabid frenzy of Gaul” (*Gallica . . . rabies*, 2.535).

⁹ See the discussion of the Gallic Sack at the end of the preceding chapter (pages 99-102).

¹⁰ Roller 1996, 324.

However, Pompey's propagandistic equation of Rome with the senatorial party is problematic because the republicans have already abandoned the *Urbs* to Caesar.

Pompey refers to his desertion of Rome in an apostrophe addressed to the absent Caesar at 2.573-575:

an vanae tumuere minae quod fama furoris
expulit armatam patriis e sedibus urbem?
heu demens, non te fugiunt, me cuncta secuntur. 575

Or have his empty threats swollen up because the rumour of his
blood-lust
has driven Rome in weapons from her ancestral abode?
What delusion! It is not you they flee but I they follow. 575

Line 2.574 is particularly striking and provocative. Pompey obviously means that the Senate and its republican supporters have fled the city but he paradoxically speaks as though Caesar has expelled Rome itself (*urbem*) from its ancestral foundations (*patriis e sedibus*). Fantham remarks, "*Armata urbs* is a double paradox, equating the city with its people, not the place, in which arms were constitutionally forbidden."¹¹ The *Urbs* proper was marked off by the *pomerium* as a civilian space. Military *imperium* was invalid within the *pomerium* except during triumphs.¹² In contrast, Pompey's *urbs* is under arms (*armatam*, 2.574).

¹¹ Fantham 1992a, 191. The metaphor of the *armata urbs* has several precedents in Thucydides. In his note on *Phars.* 2.574, Haskins compares Pompey's identification of his military camp with Rome to the claims of the Athenian democratic party meeting at Samos to represent the true Athens (Thuc. 8.76.3). Thucydides further relates how the democrats intended to have the Athenian allies send their tribute to Samos so long as oligarchs ruled at Athens (8.76.4-7). More precise parallels are found in the speeches of Nikias, who at 6.23.2 and 7.77.7 compares the Athenian army assembled for the Sicilian Expedition to a city. Polinskaya 2006, 78, and Kosak 2006, 178-179, cite the latter passage in their discussions of the definition of urban and rural space in classical antiquity. I thank Jeffrey Rusten and Michael Fontaine for directing my research toward Nikias' speeches.

¹² See p. 52, n. 22, above.

According to Pompey's metaphor, his army makes up the true, republican city of Rome whereas the physical city is merely the "ancestral abode" (*patriis e sedibus*) from which Caesar has expelled the republicans. By making the republic virtually synonymous with Rome, Pompey occludes the fact that his abandonment of the city's "ancestral abode" is precisely the abandonment of the *Urbs* itself. Pompey in this way attempts to mitigate the blow that the Pompeians' desertion of the *Urbs* would normally deal to their morale and sense of Roman identity. Although Caesar will soon occupy the defenseless city on the Tiber, Pompey's new "Rome in exile" still enjoys freedom, most notably the freedom to conduct armed resistance against Caesar.

Pompey's speech signifies that there are now two competing Rome's in existence. There is the actual *Urbs*, i.e. the hills and buildings that Caesar will soon occupy without bloodshed. The republic died at Rome when Metellus' resistance to Caesar failed. Now there is also the metaphorical *armata urbs*, Pompey's republican Rome in exile and under arms. This Rome, identical with the *civitas* of the old republic, has been uprooted from the *Urbs* and moves with Pompey's army wherever it goes. In the remainder of the dissertation, I shall use the expression *armata urbs* to refer to the republican army in its capacity as the exiled instantiation of Rome.

III. The Senate in Epirus

Lucan's most thorough elaboration on the sundering of the republican *civitas* from the *Urbs* comes in Book 5 when the Senate meets in Pompey's camp in Epirus

(5.7-47).¹³ The consul Lentulus finds it necessary to justify the Senate's claims to authority when they are meeting in a military camp in a foreign country (5.9-14):

peregrina ac sordida sedes
 Romanos cepit procures, secretaque rerum 10
 hospes in externis audivit curia tectis.
 nam quis castra vocet tot strictas iure securis,
 tot fasces? docuit populos venerabilis ordo
 non Magni partes sed Magnum in partibus esse.

A foreign and a lowly place
 received the Roman chieftains, and, as a guest 10
 in an alien house, the Senate heard the secrets of state.
 For who can give the name of 'camp' to so many Rods, so many
 Axes
 bared legally? The venerable Order taught the nations
 that they were not Magnus' party but that Magnus was in theirs.

Lucan as narrator takes the side of the Senate¹⁴; he is concerned to establish that the Senate retains the same authority when it meets in a military camp abroad (and hence under the authority of Pompey's *imperium*) as when it met in the peace and security of the *Urbs*. In other words, the old republic has not been reduced to a body of Pompeian partisans in a private army. In contrast, Lucan is sharply critical of Caesar's rival Senate at Rome, the proper seat of Rome's free republican government (3.108-109):

"Caesar was everything: the Senate-House listened to one/man's voice" (*omnia Caesar erat; privatae curia vocis/testis adest*).¹⁵

¹³ For analyses of Lucan's portrayal of the Senate in Epirus, see Masters 1992, 93-99; Fantham 1999, 118-121; and Rossi 2000a, 578-583.

¹⁴ We shall see below (pages 126-129) that Lucan's stated agenda in these lines does not rule out subversion of Lentulus' pro-senatorial claims later in the passage. For the sometimes harshly critical, sometimes stridently supportive, sometimes nuanced stance that Lucan adopts in his narratorial comments regarding Pompey and his followers, see Bartsch 1997, 101-130.

¹⁵ See Fantham 1999, 115-118, for an insightful analysis of Lucan's portrayal of Caesar's Senate.

The consul Lentulus begins his speech by emphatically denying that the Senate's separation from Rome in any way reduces its legitimacy (5.17-37):

indole si dignum Latia, si sanguine prisco
 robur inest animis, non qua tellure coacti
 quamque procul tectis captae sedeamus ab urbis
 cernite, sed vestrae faciem cognoscite turbae, 20
 cunctaque iussuri primum hoc decernite, patres,
 quod regnis populisque liquet, nos esse senatum.
 nam vel Hyperboreae plastrum glaciale sub Ursae
 vel plaga qua torrens claususque vaporibus axis
 nec patitur noctes nec iniquos crescere soles, 25
 si Fortuna ferat, rerum nos summa sequetur
 imperiumque comes. Tarpeia sede perusta
 Gallorum facibus Veiosque habitante Camillo
 illic Roma fuit. non umquam perdidit ordo
 mutato sua iura solo. maerentia tecta 30
 Caesar habet vacuasque domos legesque silentis
 clausaque iustitio tristi fora; curia solos
 illa videt patres plena quos urbe fugavit:
 ordine de tanto quisquis non exulat hic est.
 ignaros scelerum longaue in pace quietos 35
 bellorum primus sparsit furor: omnia rursus
 membra loco redeunt.

If in your minds you have the strength worthy of the Latian
 character and of ancient blood, do not see the land in which
 we are convened or how far from the homes of captured
 Rome we sit, but recognize the appearance of your own company 20
 and, Fathers, empowered to issue any order, first make this decree,
 a fact clear to kingdoms and to peoples – that we are the Senate.
 For whether Fortune carries us beneath the icy wagon
 of Hyperborean Bear or where the burning zone
 and clime enclosed by heat lets neither nights nor days 25
 grow unequal, rule of the state will attend us,
 and power will be our companion. When the Tarpeian sanctuary
 was burnt by Gallic torches and Camillus lived at Veii –
 there was Rome. Not ever has our Order lost
 authority by change of soil. The mourning houses, 30
 empty homes, the silent laws, and Forum closed
 in grim suspension – those are Caesar's; that Senate-House
 sees only Senators whom it expelled when Rome was full:
 from such mighty Order whoever is not an exile is here.

War's first frenzy scattered us, ignorant of wickedness, 35
reposing in long peace: now all the limbs return
to their place again.

Lentulus here redefines the significance of the city and of exile. The republicans need not be vexed by Caesar's mastery over the *Urbs* because there Rome is, as it were, dead. Caesar is lord over a city without residents or rule of law (5.31); he controls only empty buildings (*maerentia tecta*, 5.30; *vacuasque domos*, 5.31) and empty spaces (*clausaque iustitio tristi fora*, 5.32). Caesar's Rome thus lacks the republican *civitas* that made it great and truly made it Rome. Even though the exiled Caesarians have returned to the *Urbs*, the Senate's flight from Rome has ironically rendered the *Urbs* itself a place of exile. The true, republican Rome is wherever the Senate goes. In fact, Lentulus claims that the senators in Epirus are politically in their proper place – *omnia rursus/membra loco redeunt* (5.36-37) – even if they are geographically dislocated.

Lentulus' claims regarding the irrelevance of geography to the Senate's authority have major ramifications. Lentulus delivers his defense of the republican Senate during the days leading up to January 1, 48 B.C., the day on which the term of the sitting consuls was due to expire (5.3-9).¹⁶ Later in Book 5, Lucan narrates Caesar's return to Rome and the celebration of the ceremonies that customarily

¹⁶ See Fantham 1999, 116-121, on the legal predicament of the Pompeian consuls and the exiled Senate. For the rather tenuous correlation between Lucan's account of the Senate meeting in Epirus and the republican conferences reported in extant historical sources, see *ibid.*, 119-120, and Masters 1992, 99-106. Only Appian mentions a republican conference in Epirus (*B.C.* 2.50). However, he claims that the speaker was Pompey, not Lentulus, and the audience was a council of war, not a meeting of the Senate (Fantham 1999, 120). Masters argues persuasively that Lucan has manipulated his sources in order to invent a senatorial meeting in which Pompey not only does not seem to rule over the Senate but does not even speak; Pompey respects republican rule at the risk of becoming a non-entity in the very camp that he should be leading. We shall revisit the theme of Pompey's weakness in the next chapter (pages 175-180).

marked the election and installment of new magistrates (5.381-402). Caesar's occupation of Rome and of the former site of Alba Longa, setting for a mandatory sacrifice offered by the consuls (5.400-402),¹⁷ permits him to conduct the traditional rites at their appointed time and in their accustomed manner. Caesar's possession of the *Urbs* thus allows him to claim legitimacy for his pseudo-*civitas*, a sham of the old republic.¹⁸

IV. The precedents of Camillus, Themistocles, and Massilia

We have seen that Pompey and Lentulus claim to have abandoned the *Urbs* while retaining both Roman identity and the full authority of the Roman state. Lucan provides several relevant *exempla* from Greek and Roman history for the strategy of abandoning one's city in order to save one's state or polity. The most prominent *exemplum* is Lentulus' explicit reference to the story of Camillus, the general who commanded the Roman forces outside of Rome during the Gallic Sack.¹⁹ According to Lentulus, Rome (i.e. the seat of the Roman government) was transferred from the occupied *Urbs* to Veii, which Camillus used as the base for his army: "When the Tarpeian sanctuary/was burnt by Gallic torches and Camillus lived at Veii/there was Rome" (*Tarpeia sede perusta/Gallorum facibus Veiosque habitante Camillo/illic*

¹⁷ Lucan here refers to the *Feriae Latinae* (Latin Festival), held in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. See Barratt 1979, 129, for commentary and bibliography.

¹⁸ This at least is the characterization of Caesar's regime provided by both the epic's republican characters and by Lucan as narrator, particularly in his biting attack on the ceremonies narrated at 5.381-402. To give but one example of Lucan's vitriol, he claims that Jupiter Latiaris no longer deserves worship because he suffered Caesar to conquer Latium (5.400-402): "And the deity presiding over Trojan Alba/saw the Latian Festival performed in flame-lit night, though, with Latium quelled, he did not deserve the sacred rites" (*nec non Iliacae numen quod praesidet Albae,/haud meritum Latii sollemnia sacra subacto,/vidit flammifera confectas nocte Latinas*).

¹⁹ Camillus appears elsewhere in the *Pharsalia* as an exemplary Roman of the past: 1.165-170, 2.544-546, 6.786, and 7.358.

Roma fuit, 5.27-29). I will analyze the specific ramifications of Lentulus' reference to Camillus' command below.²⁰

Next, the catalogues of Pompey's foreign allies (3.169-297; 5.49-64) feature several other cities whose citizens abandoned them in order to resist an enemy army. The *exemplum* that most closely parallels that of Rome during the Gallic Sack is that of Athens during the Persian Wars. First, Lucan states that three Athenian ships joined Pompey's forces (3.181-183):

exhausit totas quamvis dilectus Athenas,
exiguae Phoebea tenent navalia puppes
tresque petunt veram credi Salamina carinae.

Although recruitment drained Athens totally,
a few ships reach Phoebus' dockyards
and three vessels ask us to believe that Salamis is true.

The Athenians testify to their ancestors' valor and might at Salamis by sending ships to join Pompey. This suggests a parallel between Pompey's situation and that of the Athenians in 480 B.C. Before the Battle of Salamis, Themistocles had persuaded the Athenians to abandon their city, which the Persians then destroyed. Only by staking their future on "wooden walls," i.e. their ships, were the Athenians able to defeat the Persians and recover the city.²¹

Lucan's reference to Salamis is particularly evocative in the context of *Phars*.
3. The catalogue of Pompey's allies occurs immediately after Lucan narrates first the escape of Pompey's fleet from Brundisium to Epirus (2.725-736, 3.1-45) and then Caesar's occupation of Rome (3.46-168). Like the Athenians at Salamis, the

²⁰ See pages 126-129 below.

²¹ Herod. 7.141-144; Plut. *Them.* 10.2-6.

republicans have abandoned their city and their country (Italy) to the enemy and have taken to their ships. Furthermore, the Pompeian levy of Athenian young men “drained Athens totally” (*exhausit totas . . . Athenas*, 3.181). The image of a city emptied of its inhabitants who have gone off to war recalls both the situation at Athens during the Battle of Salamis and the Pompeians’ own abandonment of Rome. Additionally, Book 3 ends with a naval engagement. After enduring a bitter siege, the Massiliotes fight a sea-battle with Caesar’s fleet in a desperate attempt to preserve their city’s independence (3.509-762). Caesar’s victory provides a counterpoint to the Athenians’ victory over the Persians at Salamis.²² Lastly, Lucan compares Caesar to Xerxes, the Persian king who occupied and burnt Athens to the ground before losing the Battle of Salamis (2.672-677).²³ Pompey hopes to recover Rome from Caesar just as Themistocles once successfully won Athens back from Xerxes. The conduct of the Athenians at the Battle of Salamis thus serves as a precedent for Pompey’s retreat from Rome.

Lucan is not alone in comparing Pompey’s strategic retreat to that of Themistocles. First, Cicero criticized Pompey for adopting the strategy of Themistocles when he was in a position to act like Pericles (*Ad Att.* 7.11.3)²⁴:

quale tibi consilium Pompei videtur? hoc quaero quod urbem reliquerit. ego enim ὁπποῦ. tum nihil absurdius. Urbem tu relinquis? ergo idem, si Galli

²² Masters 1992, 40, discusses the numerous literary and historical models that inform Lucan’s narrative of the Battle of Massilia. He writes, “Since Rome was founded by refugees from Troy, is the Massilian campaign a replay of the Trojan War, Trojans versus Greeks [i.e. the Massiliotes qua Greek colonists from Phocaea]? Or does the east-versus-west theme recall the battle of Salamis? Things are so confused that you do not know if the man you strike is Greek, Trojan, Persian or Roman.”

²³ Lucan compares the *moles* that Caesar builds across the harbor of Brundisium (2.660-679) to the bridge that Xerxes built across the Hellespont and to the channel that he cut across the peninsula of Athos (Her. 7.22-24, 7.33-37).

²⁴ Cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 63.1.

venirent? ‘non est,’ inquit, ‘in parietibus res publica.’ at in aris et focis. ‘fecit Themistocles.’ fluctum enim totius barbariae ferre urbs una non poterat. at idem Pericles non fecit annum fere post quinquagesimum, cum praeter moenia nihil teneret; nostri olim urbe reliqua capta arcem tamen retinuerunt.

How does Pompey’s strategy seem to you? I want to know why he abandoned Rome. For I am at a loss. Moreover, nothing is more absurd. Would you abandon Rome? Therefore would you do the same, if the Gauls were coming? “The republic,” he says, “does not consist in the walls of buildings.” No, but in the altars and the hearths. “Themistocles did the same.” For one city was not able to endure a deluge of the entire barbarian world. But Pericles did not do the same after almost five years, although he retained nothing except the walls of his city; once upon a time we Romans retained our citadel even though the rest of the city had been lost.

Cicero here contrasts Themistocles’ abandonment of Athens with Pericles’ decision to stand his ground and defend Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Cicero also precludes any appeal to the memory of Camillus by noting that a garrison of Roman troops still retained control of the Capitol during the Gallic Sack. In other words, Rome was not completely abandoned. We shall investigate below²⁵ why Lucan suppresses this detail in Lentulus’ speech.

Furthermore, Appian reports that Pompey delivered a speech in Epirus in which he compared himself to both Themistocles and Camillus (*B.C.* 2.50)²⁶:

καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν πόλιν ἐξέλιπον, ὧς ἄνδρες, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας τοῖς ἐπιούσι πολεμοῦντες, οὐ τὰ οἰκήματα πόλιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι νομίζοντες· καὶ τόδε πράξαντες ὁξέως αὐτὴν ἀνέλαβόν τε καὶ εὐκλεεστέραν ἀπέφηναν· καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ πρόγονοι Κελτῶν ἐπιόντων ἐξέλιπον τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ αὐτὸ ἀνεσώσατο ἐξ Ἀρδεατῶν Κάμιλλος ὀρμώμενος.

Fellow soldiers, the Athenians, too, abandoned their city for the sake of liberty when they were fighting against invasion, because they believed that it was not

²⁵ See pages 126-129 below.

²⁶ I here use White’s translation. See Masters 1992, 101-102, for discussion of this passage and its relevance to the metaphorical displacement of Rome in the *Pharsalia*.

houses that made a city, but men; and after they had done so they presently recovered it and made it more renowned than even before. So, too, our own ancestors abandoned the city when the Gauls invaded it, and Camillus hastened from Ardea and recovered it.

This speech appears at the point in the narrative of the war where Lucan has Lentulus cite the *exemplum* of Camillus during the Gallic Sack.²⁷ The two *exempla* both support Pompey's strategy of temporarily forsaking his native city in order to recover it in the end. In fact, the stories of the two generals are so similar that Plutarch paired Themistocles and Camillus in his *Parallel Lives*. Perhaps the similarity between the two *exempla* explains why Lucan has the republicans award honors to "Athens ancient in renown" (*fama veteres laudantur Athenae*, 5.52) after Lentulus delivers the speech in which he appeals to the precedent of Camillus (5.27-29). Lucan has already established that Athens owes its renown in large part to the Battle of Salamis.

Lucan refers to the Battle of Salamis again not long after Lentulus' speech. When Appius seeks guidance from the Delphic Oracle in Book 5,²⁸ Lucan mentions the Athenians' recourse to the oracle before Salamis (5.106-109):

iustisque benignus
saepe dedit sedem totas mutantibus urbes,
ut Tyriis, dedit ille minas impellere belli,
ut Salaminia cum meminit mare [.]

[A]nd generous to the just,
he [Apollo] often gave abode to people leaving entire cities,

²⁷ See n. 16 above. Commenting on the similarities and differences between Pompey's speech in Appian and Lentulus' speech in the *Pharsalia*, Masters 1992, 105, refers to "Lucan's deviousness in his treatment of historical sources," i.e. of the historical tradition from which Appian presumably draws and Lucan deviates. Masters observes that Lentulus' argument in the *Pharsalia* is "Themistoclean in origin" (ibid., 98-99).

²⁸ Lucan makes extensive use of Appius' journey to Delphi to explore notions of symbolic geography and spatial displacement (Ahl 1976, 128-129; Masters 1992, 106-117, 148-149; Bexley 2009, 461-464). For example, Lucan notes that Delphi was traditionally regarded as the center of the world (5.71-72).

such as the Tyrians; he often gave ability to drive back threats
of war,
as the sea of Salamis remembers [.]

Athens and Tyre appear earlier in the catalogue of Pompey's allies at 3.181-183 and 3.217, respectively. The reported migration of the Tyrians away from Tyre (5.107-108) may refer to refugees escaping the earthquake-prone city or, more provocatively in light of Lucan's persistent Vergilian and Hannibalic allusions, to the Tyrian colonization of Carthage.²⁹ The Athenians temporarily changed their own *sedes* when they abandoned their city to fight at Salamis. Following in the tradition of the Tyrians and Athenians, Appius seeks out the Delphic Oracle at a time when the republican Senate has exchanged the *Urbs*, now under Caesar's control, for exile in "a foreign and a lowly place" (*peregrina ac sordida sedes*, 5.9) in Epirus. The *exempla* of Athens and Tyre confirm that the *civitas* of republican Rome has shifted its geographical center of power.³⁰

The history of Phocaea and its colony Massilia provides yet another precedent for Pompey's abandonment of Rome.³¹ One line after Lucan mentions the gifts awarded to Athens (5.52), he recounts how the Senate granted Phocaea its freedom in

²⁹ Haskins 1887, 157, interprets the Tyrian migration mentioned at 5.107-108 in light of Lucan's reference to "unstable Tyre" (*Tyros instabilis*, 3.217), an allusion to Tyre's earthquakes. See Hunink 1992, 119, for further comments on line 3.217. Masters 1992, 114, n. 58, interprets lines 5.107-108 as a reference to the foundation of Carthage and suspects a "snub" at Vergil; whereas in the *Aeneid* the Trojans do not consult the Delphic Oracle when they go in search of a new city, Lucan states that the oracle did guide the Tyrians. The republicans in Book 5 therefore consult an oracle that aided the foundation of Carthage, Rome's archenemy.

³⁰ Henderson 1998, 206, cites the reference to Tyre (but not Athens) in Book 5 as an *exemplum* for Rome's metaphorical movability.

³¹ Henderson (ibid.) cites the Phocaean migration to Massilia as yet another variation of the "movable Rome" motif. Commenting on the Massilia episode as a whole (3.298-762), Rowland 1969, 204, observes, "Massilia is, in fact, paradigmatic of Rome and . . . Massilia's sufferings and fate are the analogue of Rome's."

reward for the resistance its colony Massilia offered to Caesar (5.53).³² The Massiliotes claim to descend from refugees who fled the Persian conquest of Phocaea in the sixth century B.C. (3.337-342)³³:

non pondera rerum
nec momenta sumus, numquam felicibus armis
usa manus, patriae primis a sedibus exul,
et post translatae exustae Phocidos arces 340
moenibus exiguis alieno in litore tuti,
illustrat quos sola fides.

Not weighty in the world are we
nor do we swing the balance; never have we used weapons
prosperously, exiles from our country's first abodes;
and since burnt-out Phocis' citadels were transferred, 340
we are protected on a foreign shore by tiny city-walls,
with loyalty our only glory.

I suggest that Lucan has the republican Senate reward Phocaea in part to remind the reader of the circumstances of Massilia's foundation. Just as the Massiliotes once fled Phocaea and now dwell in exile on a foreign shore, the republicans have fled Rome and are now meeting in Epirus.³⁴ Furthermore, the themes of exile from one's

³² Here as elsewhere in the *Pharsalia*, Lucan incorrectly refers to Massilia's mother city as Phocis (*Phocidos*, 3.340) instead of Phocaea. The same confusion of names is evident in other classical Latin texts, e.g. Sen. *Cons. Helv.* 7.8. See comments by Barratt 1978, 20. Despite Lucan's references to Phocis, I consistently use the historically correct name Phocaea to refer to Massilia's mother city.

³³ Lucan here follows the version of the foundation of Massilia found at Isocr. *Arch.* 84; Paus. 10.8.6; Aul. Gell. 10.16.4; and Solin. 2.52. Another version dissociates the foundation of Massilia from the Persian conquest of Phocaea (Ps.-Scymn. 209-214; Harpocr. *Lex.* 199.3-7). Herodotus narrates the Persian conquest of Phocaea and mentions refugees who fled westward, but he does not mention the foundation of Massilia in this context (Her. 1.164-167). See Hunink 1992 (*ad loc.*) and Westall 2010 for further discussion of these and other sources documenting Massilia's origins.

³⁴ It should also be noted that in *Epode* 16, a poem about a later phase in Rome's civil wars (that between Octavian and Antony), Horace encourages his fellow Romans to abandon Rome and sail to the legendary Blessed Isles "just as the oath-bound polity of the Phocaeans" (*Phocaeorum/velut . . . exsecrata civitas*, 16.17-18) once abandoned their city and sailed westward. See Mankin 1995 and Watson 2003 for further commentary on this passage. Spencer 2005, 54-55, observes, "Lucan's quaking, tottering city of Rome may pick up on the Sibylline connotations of Horace's poem [*Epode* 16], whilst also warning of the impossibility of escape."

homeland (*patriae . . . exul*, 3.339) and the destruction of the mother city by fire (*exustae*, 3.340)³⁵ recall the fall of Troy in the *Aeneid*.³⁶ Massilia thus stands in the same relation to Phocaea as Rome does to Troy and the republican *armata urbs* to the physical city of Rome. Massilia's brave resistance to Caesar (3.298-762) provides hope that the exiled republicans will fight Caesar with similar resolve.³⁷ At the very least, Lucan's association of the republican Senate with Massilia immediately after the reference to Salamis reinforces Lucan's portrayal of the Pompeians as an *armata urbs* in exile from its ancestral foundations.

V. Problems with the precedent of Veii

Lentulus explicitly compares the republicans' lot with that of Camillus at Veii. However, this historical event does not necessarily support Lentulus' claim that the republicans' complete evacuation of Rome had precedent in the Roman past. Lentulus speaks of the Capitol being burnt by the Gauls (*Tarpeia sede perusta/Gallorum facibus*, 5.27-28). The standard account of the Gallic Sack as told by Livy and other historical sources is that a group of senators occupied the Capitol and resisted the Gauls for some time before attempting to ransom the city.³⁸ The Gauls at one point launched a nocturnal attack upon the Capitol, but the sacred geese of Juno Moneta

³⁵ I follow Braund in accepting the reading *exustae*, "burnt-out," in line 3.340 instead of Shackleton Bailey's reading *exhaustae*, "drained empty."

³⁶ Rowland 1969, 205; Hunink 1992, 153; Masters 1992, 40; Dorchak 1995, 214; Sklenář 2003, 16.

³⁷ But see Mitchell 1973, 50-54, who observes that Lucan's lengthy narrative of Massiliote resistance to Caesar at the end of Book 3 highlights the republicans' deplorable failure to defend their own city when Caesar arrives there earlier in the same book (3.46-168). See Fantham 1996, 137-153, for further parallels and contrasts between the Caesarian occupation of Rome and the siege of Massilia.

³⁸ Livy 5.39.9ff.; Plut. *Cam.* 20.2-3.

alerted the Romans by honking.³⁹ Whether Lucan follows an otherwise poorly attested alternative account of the Gallic Sack⁴⁰ or has invented one of his own, the precedent sought by Lentulus is valid only if the Gauls occupied and destroyed the entire city. The Senate's resistance on the Capitol was well-known during the Late Republic and Early Principate and Lucan's deviation from the standard account would have been noticed by his audience. The point of the standard version is that the Senate did *not* abandon the city.⁴¹

Why then does Lucan have Lentulus cite a precedent that depends upon a minor tradition at best or an outright fiction at worst? Following Rossi, I suggest that in Lentulus' occlusion of the Senate's resistance on the Capitol Lucan's audience is supposed to see the desperation to which the Senate's exile has reduced Lentulus.⁴² He lacks strong *exempla* from standard Roman historical and legendary traditions and thus does not carry his point. His anomalous account of the Gallic Sack shows that the Senate's exile really does deal a major blow to its claim to be the *armata urbs*, the true Rome, in opposition to the physical city controlled by Caesar.

Furthermore, Lentulus' claim that Rome was at Veii (*Veiosque habitante Camillo/illic Roma fuit*, 5.28-29) when Camillus held command there⁴³ evokes the historical episode in which Camillus defended Roman identity precisely by resisting a

³⁹ Livy 5.47. This scene appears in the Latin epic tradition at *Aen.* 8.652-662.

⁴⁰ See Skutsch 1953 and 1978 and McGann 1957 for claims that an alternative Roman tradition had the Gauls occupy even the Capitol.

⁴¹ As noted above (pages 121-122), Cicero denied that the Gallic Sack provided precedent for Pompey's retreat from Rome precisely because some Roman soldiers remained on the Capitol.

⁴² In the following paragraphs I follow the interpretation of Lentulus' speech put forward by Rossi 2000a, 580-583.

⁴³ Even this detail involves a slight distortion of the historical record; while Camillus did take command of a group of Roman soldiers stationed at Veii (Livy 5.46.11), historical sources link him more closely with the city of Ardea, where he was enduring exile at the time of the Gallic Sack (5.43.6-5.45.3). See Masters 1992, 105, and Rossi 2000a, 581-582.

proposal to relocate Rome's population to Veii. According to Livy's account,⁴⁴ the Romans conquered Veii and sold its population into slavery in 396 B.C. (Livy 5.22.1). The attractive amenities of the vacated city first prompted a proposal to move part of the Roman population and Senate to Veii (5.24.5ff.). Then, after the Gauls destroyed most of Rome in 390 B.C., the tribunes proposed to abandon the city completely and resettle the entire population at Veii (5.50.8). Camillus was instrumental in defeating both of these measures by appealing to patriotism and ancestral religious ties to the site of the *Urbs* (5.30, 5.51-55). He also argued that if the Gauls or other foreign peoples were to occupy the abandoned site of Rome, then they would be the Romans and the relocated Romans would be Veientes (5.53.6-7). In other words, Camillus tied national identity directly to the physical location of the population and the seat of government; a "Rome" transferred to Veii could not truly be Rome.

Mutatis mutandis, the precedent of Camillus' command suggests that, *contra* Lentulus, the republican Senate's prolonged separation from the *Urbs* does in fact undercut its claim to represent the Roman state. Rossi sums the matter up well⁴⁵:

Lentulus' rhetorical speech becomes, therefore, a gross distortion of the events and the paradigmatic behavior of the Senate and Camillus. This distortion, moreover, highlights the fallacy underlying the Senate's behavior on the present occasion and the fallacy of their assumptions. The Senate's refusal to abandon the city during the Gallic attack and Camillus' fierce speech in defense of the city show the impossibility of a displacement of Rome outside its own sacred *moenia*. No Rome can exist outside Rome, not even temporarily.

⁴⁴ All subsequent citations in this paragraph are from Book 5 of Livy.

⁴⁵ Rossi 2000a, 582.

By retreating from Rome, the republicans risk becoming a free-floating entity cut loose from the historical, ideological, and emotional ties with the *Urbs* that traditionally defined Roman identity.

VI. The threatened recapitulation and reversal of republican history

I suggest that there are other instances in the republicans' movement from Rome to Thessaly where Lucan portrays them less as the old republican *civitas* in exile than as a nascent rival "Rome"⁴⁶ progressively shedding its ties to the *Urbs*. First, throughout the *Pharsalia* Lucan calls the Roman identity of both the Pompeians and the Caesarians into question by associating them with foreign peoples. We have seen in the preceding chapter how both Lucan's own narration and various characters' speeches link Caesar with the Gauls. Lucan also faults the Pompeians for allying themselves with Juba, the Libyan king who defeats the Caesarian army of Curio in Book 4.⁴⁷ Caesar censures Pompey for relying on barbarous Eastern allies at Pharsalus (7.274-285),⁴⁸ and Lentulus, himself a republican, severely reprimands

⁴⁶ I use the aspectual quotation marks to highlight Lucan's skepticism about the persistence of *Romanitas* among citizens separated from the *Urbs* for extended periods of time.

⁴⁷ Lucan portrays Juba's victory over Curio (4.581-824) as a reversal of the Punic Wars (see pages 21-23 above for discussion of the reversal of Roman history in the *Pharsalia*). Lucan notes Curio's proximity to Carthage (4.585) and Scipio's Libyan camp (the *Castra Cornelia*, 4.656-660) and refers to Juba's military prowess as "Punic wars" (*Punica bella*, 4.737). At 4.788-793, Lucan explicitly laments the fact that Pompey won a victory over Curio by relying upon an African ally; the true victors were "grim Carthage's hated ghosts" (*invisas dirae Carthaginis umbras*, 4.788) and "blood-stained Hannibal/and the Punic shades" (*cruentus/Hannibal et Poeni . . . manes*, 4.789-790). At 8.283-288, Pompey faults Juba for aspiring to become a new Hannibal and claims that Juba rejoiced to see the Roman officer Varus dependent on him. Pompey's alliance with Juba, would-be African champion, thus poses a threat to the Roman Republic's past victory over Carthage. For further discussion, see Ahl 1976, 82-115, and Casamento 2003. See Ch. 4 (pages 251-252, notes 75-79) for further discussion of the Punic theme in the *Pharsalia*.

⁴⁸ See Sanford for a discussion of the "Eastern question" in Lucan.

Pompey for proposing an alliance with the Parthians after Pharsalus (8.331-441).⁴⁹ In the world of the *Pharsalia*, to journey away from the *Urbs* and ally oneself too closely with a foreign people, especially a former enemy, is to risk undoing Rome's past conquests and to imperil one's own claim to Roman identity.⁵⁰

I propose that the risk of alienation from both the *Urbs* and the *civitas* of Rome is a thematic undercurrent in those sections of Books 2, 5, and 6 that recount Pompey's retreat from Rome to Thessaly. Earlier scholars have either overlooked the theme of cultural alienation in these episodes or have treated the subject with insufficient detail. Specifically, I argue that Lucan portrays Pompey's journey as the recapitulation and reversal of Rome's past dealings with the cities and territories that Pompey and his followers adopt as their bases, namely Capua, Corfinium, Epirus, and Dyrrachium, a Greek city whose origin as a Corinthian colony Lucan explicitly notes. Capua, Corfinium, Epirus, and Corinth each challenged Rome's status as the seat of political power in Italy and the Mediterranean at some point during Rome's legendary prehistory or its republican period. Lucan's subtle allusions to these past conflicts reveal the tensions inherent in the exiled republicans' claim to represent Rome. Whereas Caesar controls the *Urbs*, the republicans are cast in the role of enemy cities and kingdoms that formerly vied with Rome for *imperium*. The republicans' close

⁴⁹ The negative, contaminating effect of foreign alliances, however, proves very difficult for the republicans to escape. Lentulus persuades the republicans to avoid Parthia on patriotic grounds and instead urges Pompey to seek the help of the Egyptian King Ptolemy, who owes his throne to Pompey's past assistance (8.441-455). It is in Egypt that the deracinated Roman soldier Septimius participates in Pompey's assassination (8.595-610). I address the corrupting effect of Egyptian culture upon Caesar in Ch. 5 (pages 318-330).

⁵⁰ Henderson 1998, 210, identifies alienation from Rome as a prevalent theme in Lucan's discourse: "Lucan's amplification of the military to the cosmic order disorients citizen-readers, making Caesar's victims more 'Antaeuses', uprooted from Rome, Sweet Rome, losing themselves, their heritage, as they lose their territoriality, get out of 'touch' with their land, eternally alienated from their language, discourse and culture." Cf. Dorchak 1995, 204.

association with rival hegemonic cities in Italy and the Mediterranean Basin bolsters Lucan's characterization of their army as a metaphorical city and a major threat to Caesar's power base in the *Urbs*, but it does so to the detriment of the republicans' Roman identity. In the following sections, I address in turn the significance of Capua, Corfinium, Epirus, and Dyrrachium as republican bases in light of Pompey's problematic separation from the *Urbs*.

A. Capua

As Pompey's first base after he flees Rome, Capua is also the first foreign city to serve as a proxy for Rome as seat of the republican government. Lucan highlights Capua's role as refuge for the republicans when he identifies the city as a Trojan settlement (2.392-395):

interea trepido discedens agmine Magnus
 moenia Dardanii tenuit Campana coloni.
 haec placuit belli sedes, hinc summa moventem
 hostis in occursum sparsas extendere partis . . . 395

Meanwhile Magnus left [Rome]⁵¹ with his fearful throng
 and occupied the Campanian walls of the Dardanian settler.
 This he chose as his seat of war, from here his chief objective
 was to stretch out his scattered party to meet the enemy . . . 395

Sources available to Lucan provided him with the option of attributing Capua's foundation to either Trojan or Etruscan settlers.⁵² The Trojan account helps Lucan

⁵¹ The scholiast who wrote the *Commenta Bernensia* (ed. Usener) explains *discedens* at 2.392 as *discedens ab urbe* (Fantham 1992a, 156).

⁵² For the claim to Trojan origins, see Cato, *Orig.* fr. 69 and Verg. *Aen.* 10.145. For the Etruscan claim, see Vell. Pat. 1.7.3 and Strabo 5.4.3 (Fantham 1992a, 157). Below I shall also discuss the account of Suetonius, who seems to assume a Trojan foundation at *Div. Iul.* 81.

develop the theme of Pompey's exile from Rome. Capua resembles Rome in having been founded by refugees from Troy. Capys, the legendary Trojan founder of Capua, is mentioned as a companion of Aeneas at *Aen.* 10.145: "And Capys – Capua's named after him, the Campanian city" (*et Capys: hinc nomen Campanae ducitur urbi*). Now Rome is abandoned as Troy once was and Pompey, a new Aeneas figure, leads a new set of refugees to the security of Capua.⁵³ Capua thus displaces Rome and briefly takes on the role held by the *Urbs* (at least by way of prolepsis, given the time interval between Aeneas and Romulus) in the original narrative of Aeneas.

The vicissitudes of Capua's dealings with Rome throughout its history may also inform Lucan's treatment of the city in the *Pharsalia*. During the Second Punic War, the Capuans defected to Hannibal with the hope that he would make their city the capital of Italy in place of Rome.⁵⁴ After the war, the Romans did not destroy the city, but they did revoke Capua's political autonomy and reduce its population to an agricultural workforce.⁵⁵ When the tribune Rullus proposed to settle Roman colonists there in 63 B.C., Cicero, then consul, rebuked him in the three speeches known as the *De Lege Agraria contra Rullum*. Cicero claimed that a populated Capua would quickly become "another Rome," an *altera Roma*, that Roman colonists would come

⁵³ This is not the only time the republicans seek refuge in a city whose own foundation by Aeneas-like refugees Lucan highlights. Ahl 1976, 76-77, and Henderson 2010, 485, n. 242, point out the Vergilian undertone in Lucan's account of the foundation of Brundisium, Pompey's next stop in his eastward flight. Pompey flees as a fugitive (*profugus*, 2.608) to Brundisium, a city founded by Cretan fugitives (*profugos*, 2.611); behind this passage lurks the memory of Aeneas *profugus* (*Aen.* 1.2). Masters 1992, 51; Dorchak 1995, 225; and Henderson 2010, 461, similarly note the Vergilian resonance in Lucan's description of the Pompeians' Celtiberian allies at Ilerda: "and the Celts who, **fugitives**/from an ancient race of Gauls, joined names with the Iberians" (*profugique a gente vetusta/Gallorum Celtæ miscentes nomen Hiberis*, 4.9-10). See also pages 124-126 above for discussion of the Phocaeen/Phocian refugees who founded Massilia. While Henderson (*ibid.*) mentions Brundisium, Ilerda, and Massilia as analogues for the *Urbs* ("Everywhere, then, *is* Rome"), he passes over Capua.

⁵⁴ Livy 23.6.

⁵⁵ Cic. *De Lege Agr.* 1.19, 2.88-91; Livy 26.16.5-13.

to love more than Rome. As a result, the Capuans would inevitably grow haughty and wage war upon Rome in a contest for mastery over the empire.⁵⁶

While Rullus' proposal failed, Caesar eventually succeeded in sending 20,000 Pompeian veterans to repopulate Capua during his consulship in 59 B.C.⁵⁷ I suggest that Lucan portrays this newly re-colonized Capua as the potential *altera Roma* and enabler of civil war that Cicero prophesied. Capua not only provides Pompey with a more secure *belli sedes* (2.394) than does Rome, but it is also the location where he describes his army as the *armata urbs* torn from its ancestral foundations (2.574). In transferring the seat of the republican *civitas* from the *Urbs* to Capua, Pompey establishes the city as a rival capital of Italy. He thereby symbolically fulfills the Capuans' desires during the Second Punic War and Cicero's fears from 63 B.C. Lucan's reference to the foundation of Capua therefore provides a subtext that may undermine the republicans' claims to represent the city from which they have been exiled.

B. Corfinium

I suggested above that the history of Rome's interaction with Capua informs Lucan's portrayal of the city as a proxy for Rome during the civil war. The history of Corfinium may similarly help us interpret Domitius' determined defense of that city

⁵⁶ Cicero refers to Capua as "another Rome" (*altera Roma*) at *De Lege Agr.* 2.86 (cf. Cicero's adaptation of the theme when he praises the Capuans' resistance to Antony at *Phil.* 12.7). He claims that the Roman colonists would prefer Capua's superior natural resources and urban amenities, the source of Capuan haughtiness, to those of Rome (*De Lege Agr.* 2.92-97). See *De Lege Agr.* 2.77 and 2.86-88 for Cicero's claim that the inhabitants of a restored Capua would vie with Rome for *imperium*.

⁵⁷ Vell. Pat. 2.44.4; Suet. *Div. Iul.* 81.

against Caesar in Book 2 (2.478-525). Lucan alludes to the city of Corfinium earlier in Book 2 as a potential substitute for Rome as capital of the world (2.134-138):

iam quot apud Sacri cecidere cadavera Portum
aut Collina tulit stratas quot porta catervas, 135
tum cum paene caput mundi rerumque potestas
mutavit translata locum, Romanaque Samnis
ultra Caudinas speravit vulnera Furcas!

How many squadrons overthrown did the Colline Gate endure,
on that day when the capital and power of the world 135
was nearly changed to another place, when the Samnites hoped
to inflict wounds on Rome exceeding the Caudine Forks!

This passage forms part of the *senex*'s account of the civil war between Marius and Sulla. The *senex* states that the capital of the world (*caput mundi rerumque potestas*, 2.136) came close to being transferred. To where? Lucan seems to conflate two historical events in this passage.⁵⁸ First, during the Social War (91-88 B.C.), Rome's rebellious allies, including the Samnites, renamed Corfinium "Italica" and attempted to establish a rival Italian capital there.⁵⁹ Secondly, just before the Battle of the Colline Gate (82 B.C.), the Samnite general Pontius Telesinus threatened to destroy the city of Rome.⁶⁰ Although Lucan's allusion to Corfinium at 2.134-137 is oblique, the city first appears in the *Pharsalia* as the capital of Rome's enemies and as potential replacement for Rome as world capital.

Whereas Corfinium was Rome's mortal foe during the civil war between Sulla and the Marians, in the next round of civil war Corfinium was a republican bastion in

⁵⁸ Fantham 1992a, 106-107.

⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. 37.2.4ff.; Strabo 5.4.2; Vell. Pat. 2.16.4. See Salmon 1967, 75, 92, 98, 100, 348-350, and 365.

⁶⁰ Vell. Pat. 2.27.1-2.

the war against Caesar. As Caesar marches from Ariminum toward Rome, all of the republican generals surrender their cities (2.462-477) except for L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who boldly defies Caesar at Corfinium (2.478-525). Lucan closely associates Domitius with Corfinium in the apostrophe that introduces him (2.478-480):

at te Corfini validis circumdata muris
 tecta tenent, pugnax Domiti; tua classica servat
 oppositus quondam pullato tiro Miloni. 480

But you, warrior Domitius, are stationed in Corfinium's abodes,
 surrounded by strong walls, and your trumpet-call is obeyed
 by the recruits arrayed against dark-clothed Milo once. 480

Lucan's juxtaposition of the words *te Corfini* (2.478) reflects Domitius' close association with the city he defends. Domitius' troops ultimately betray him and relinquish the city to Caesar (2.507-509). Nonetheless, Corfinium briefly features as the center of republican defiance. While Pompey shamefully abandons the *Urbs* itself, Corfinium's strong walls (*validis . . . muris*, 2.478) – walls that once housed the government of the rebellious Italian allies during the Social War – now protect the only republican leader willing to defy Caesar.⁶¹

Lucan mentions that Domitius' troops occupied the Roman Forum during the trial of Milo (2.480).⁶² The fact that these soldiers received their first military training (*tiro*, 2.480) within the Roman Forum further suggests that Corfinium serves as a

⁶¹ See Burns 1966 for discussion of the historical significance of Domitius' resistance at Corfinium, particularly vis-à-vis Pompey's decision to retreat from Rome.

⁶² See discussion in Ch. 1 (pages 51-53).

proxy for the *Urbs* within this episode of the civil war; civil strife that once occurred within the city of Rome has now been transferred to Corfinium.

In the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, the Senate and the republican army move ever further away from the *Urbs*. As the Senate is the heart and soul of the old republic, the seat of the republic's power moves along with them.⁶³ It happens that the first place where the senatorial army actively resists Caesar is Corfinium, a city Lucan elsewhere alludes to as Rome's former rival for world hegemony. Is this a mere coincidence or is it significant for the interpretation of the text? It is difficult to say. The two references to Corfinium do appear in the same book, but Lucan does not name the city in the first passage. It is possible that Lucan realized that he would present Domitius' defense of Corfinium as a brave, patriotic act and did not wish to diminish this deed by explicitly identifying Corfinium with the rebellious party in the Social War. Nevertheless, if this was his concern, he need never have alluded to Corfinium in the earlier passage. Perhaps Lucan is hinting that even Domitius' valorous attempt to defend Corfinium was compromised by the fact that he defended an old enemy city instead of the *Urbs*. In any event, it is striking 1.) that Lucan refers to the city of Corfinium twice in the same book (albeit obliquely in the first instance) and 2.) that first Rome's enemies in the Social War and then Domitius, a republican, treat the city as a substitute for Rome.

⁶³ Caesar refers to the Senate as the *viscera*, literally the "guts" of the republic, at 7.578-581; see Leigh 1997, 209, n. 50, and Dinter 2005, 308, for analysis of this anatomical imagery. Masters 1992, 93-99, provides further discussion of the movement of the republican "capital" along with the Senate. Henderson 1998, 206, links Pontius Telesinus' threat to move the capital with several other passages we have discussed in this chapter (e.g. Lentulus' reference to Camillus, the Phocaeans' migration to Massilia, and the Tyrians' recourse to the Delphic Oracle) because they all point to Rome's metaphorical movability.

C. Epirus

The legendary and historical associations of Epirus may also undermine the republicans' claims to Roman identity when they transfer their main camp there. Lucan remarks upon the shabby surroundings of Pompey's camp: "a foreign and lowly place" (*peregrina ac sordida sedes*, 5.9). Then Lentulus claims that the camp metaphorically is Rome since the Senate is meeting there (5.27-37). In the story of the Senate meeting at the beginning of Book 5, Rossi has found echoes of Aeneas' sojourn at Buthrotum, the Trojan settlement in Epirus established by Andromache and Helenus after the Trojan War (*Aen.* 3.293-505).⁶⁴ Andromache and Helenus have constructed a miniature copy of Troy that reminds Aeneas of the original at the same time that it falls pitifully short (*Aen.* 3.349-351)⁶⁵:

procedo et parvam Troiam simulataque magnis
Pergama et arentem Xanthi cognomine rivum 350
agnosco, Scaetaeque amplector limina porta [.]

On getting closer I know it: a miniature Troy, simulating
Mighty Pergamum, even a bone-dry creek that is now named 350
Xanthus. And I'm at the Scaean Gate, and embracing its
threshold.

Andromache and Helenus behave as though they are still living at Troy, i.e. in the past.⁶⁶ The dry creek and the miniature quality of their Troy show that they are deluding themselves. Like Andromache and Helenus, Lentulus and the republican Senate seek to reassure themselves that their expulsion from their homeland has not

⁶⁴ In this paragraph, I largely follow the interpretation of Lentulus' speech advanced by Rossi 2000a, 579ff.

⁶⁵ Buthrotum is also equipped with a "false River Simois" (*falsi Simoentis ad undam*, *Aen.* 3.302).

⁶⁶ See Bettini 1997 for a discussion of nostalgia's prominent role in this passage of the *Aeneid*.

definitively cut them off from the past. Just as Aeneas describes Buthrotum as a copy of the former city of Troy, Lentulus claims that Pompey's camp in Epirus is somehow still Rome, i.e. that physical distance from the *Urbs* does not entail discontinuity with the regime once ensconced there. However, we have seen above⁶⁷ that his claims are just as susceptible to refutation as is Andromache's "miniature Troy."

Aeneas rejects the miniature imitation of a perished Troy in order to seek a new homeland for his people. After visiting Buthrotum in Epirus, Aeneas sails across the Adriatic and for the first time sees Italy, the land where he will establish his people (*Aen.* 3.506ff.). The situation is reversed in the *Pharsalia* as the republicans have just arrived in Epirus from Italy and will never return home.⁶⁸ In light of these Vergilian resonances, Lentulus' attempt to render exile more palatable – to pretend that there is no difference between meeting in the *Urbs* and in a camp in Epirus – seems to bespeak alienation from home and from Roman identity.

On a much more speculative note, it may also be relevant that Epirus was the homeland of Pyrrhus, the king whose war against the Roman Republic Lucan alludes to twice. At 1.30, Lucan states that Caesar proved more devastating to Italy than Pyrrhus had been. At 3.160, Caesar steals from the Temple of Saturn the gold with which Pyrrhus could not bribe Fabricius. In Book 5, prior republican history and

⁶⁷ See pages 126-129 above.

⁶⁸ Martindale 1984, 77, n. 33, suggests that Pompey's last sight of Italy's hills as he sails toward Epirus recalls Aeneas' first sight of the same hills as he sails from Epirus; Pompey "sees disappear . . . the peak veiled in clouds and indistinct mountains" (*tectumque cacumen/nubibus et dubios cernit vanescere montis*, *Phars.* 3.6-7) and Aeneas and his men "see dim, vague hills in the distance and, low in its profile, Italy" (*procul obscuros collis humilemque videmus/Italiam*, *Aen.* 3.522-523). Pompey's sea voyage from Brundisium to Epirus (3.1-7) also shows the influence of Aeneas' departure from the coast of Troy (*Aen.* 2.801ff. and 3.8ff.). Hunink 1992, 28, observes, "But unlike Aeneas, Pompey has no promising future in a new fatherland, but is leaving his past without any hopeful prospect." See also Martindale 1984, 70, and Rossi 2000a, 574-575, particularly n. 15.

geography are reversed. Epirus' king had once ravaged Roman Italy. Epirus now offers the republicans a base of operations from which to attack Caesar, successor of Pyrrhus,⁶⁹ who controls Italy and even re-enters the *Urbs* at 5.381-402.

D. Dyrrachium

The last city that Pompey employs as a base before the Battle of Pharsalus is Dyrrachium,⁷⁰ a Greek city on the coast of Epirus (6.11-18):

ut videt ad nullos exciri posse tumultus
in pugnam generum sed clauso fidere vallo,
signa movet tectusque via dumosa per arva
Dyrrachii praeceps rapiendas tendit ad arcis.
hoc iter aequoreo praecepit limite Magnus,
quemque vocat collem Taulantius incola Petram
insedit castris Ephyraeaeque moenia servat
defendens tutam vel solis turribus urbem.

15

When he [Caesar] sees his son-in-law can be roused to battle
by no commotion but trusts his closed earthwork,
he moves his standards; hidden, through the brambly fields
he marches headlong to seize the citadels of Dyrrachium.
This journey Magnus anticipated on a seaside track,
and set his camp upon the hill called Petra
by the native Taulantian, and he guards the Ephyraean walls,
defending a city made safe by its cliffs alone.

15

Lucan mentions the foundation of Dyrrachium by Corinthian colonists when he refers to the city as “Ephyraean [i.e. Corinthian] walls” (*Ephyraeaeque moenia*) at 6.17. If the reader did not know the context, he might take *Ephyraeaeque moenia* as a direct reference to Corinth. Lucan mentions Corinth again at 6.57 when he claims that the

⁶⁹ See Seng 2003, 145, for further comments on Pyrrhus and his typological associations in the *Pharsalia*.

⁷⁰ The city's alternative name is Epidamnus, a name Lucan uses at 2.624 and 10.545.

energy Caesar expends besieging Dyrrachium could have been used to dig a channel through the Isthmus, thereby cutting Corinth (here called by its alternative name, Ephyre) off from the Peloponnese (*Pelopis latis Ephyren abrumpere regnis*). What is striking about Lucan's references to Corinth is that the city lay in ruins in 48 B.C., the year in which the Battle of Dyrrachium occurs. The Romans had destroyed it in 146 B.C., the same year in which they destroyed Carthage.⁷¹ A perusal of Ciceronian texts shows how large the destruction of Corinth loomed in the consciousness of the Late Republic, if not in Lucan's own day.⁷² This fact may help explain why Lucan refers to Dyrrachium with the oblique reference "Ephyraean walls" at 6.17. In most instances, such an epithet would merely identify the city as a colony of Corinth. However, given the notoriety of Rome's destruction of Corinth, I do not believe that Lucan could have a Roman army (Caesar's) besiege a city called *Ephyraea moenia* without thereby evoking the destruction of Corinth.

We have seen above⁷³ that Lucan often associates the republicans with cities founded by refugees from other cities that had been destroyed or conquered by foreign enemies. While the original colonists of Dyrrachium were not fleeing the destruction of Corinth, their mother city had perished since the foundation of their city. Hence, the "Corinthian walls" of colonies like Dyrrachium are all that remain of the city of

⁷¹ I discuss Caesar's reconstruction of Corinth below (pages 147-148).

⁷² In addition to the texts cited above, Cicero mentions the destruction of Corinth at *Verr.* 2.1.55 and *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 12. Servius Sulpicius famously describes the desolation of the site at *Cic. Ad Fam.* 4.5, and Cicero speaks of being moved when he personally viewed the ruins of the city (*Disp. Tusc.* 3.22.53). At *De Off.* 1.11.35, Cicero even reverses the position he adopted in the *De Lege Agraria* (see the following note) and wishes that Corinth had not been destroyed. We might compare the contemporary American debate about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the fire-bombing of Dresden. See Feger 1952 and Purcell 1995 for further discussion of Cicero's attitude toward Corinth. Among poets, Vergil mentions Mummius, the general who destroyed Corinth, at *Aen.* 6.836-837.

⁷³ See p. 132, n. 53.

Corinth. Similarly, the Pompeians who seek shelter at Dyrrachium claim that they are all that remain of the old Roman Republic.

More importantly, in linking Dyrrachium so closely with its defunct metropolis, Lucan identifies the republicans with yet another city that strove with Rome for hegemony over the Mediterranean basin. In the *De Lege Agraria*, Cicero justifies the destruction of Corinth and Carthage and the severe punishment of Capua on the grounds that these three cities alone strove with Rome for *imperium*.⁷⁴ Corinth's history of rivalry with Rome may explain why Lucan stresses Dyrrachium's Corinthian foundation. The challenge facing the republicans is to assert their own claim to constitute Rome, i.e. to possess political legitimacy and military *imperium*, although Caesar controls the *Urbs*. It seems fitting that their geographical base should be a city that, at least according to Roman patriotic rhetoric, had challenged the *Urbs* for hegemony.

However, the fact that the republicans are defending a Corinthian foundation against Caesar's Roman army calls into question their claim to embody the Roman *civitas* that once decreed Corinth's destruction. In short, the republicans are cast in the role of the Corinthians who once fought the republic. Lentulus' patriotic protestations notwithstanding, the exile of the republican *armata urbs* from Rome necessarily entails unsettling historical and ideological ramifications. We will see in the next chapter⁷⁵ how a similar identity crisis in the republican camp motivates their disastrous attempt to engage Caesar's troops in the Battle of Pharsalus.

⁷⁴ Cic. *De Lege Agr.* 2.32.87-88.

⁷⁵ See pages 175-180.

VII. Caesarian reconstruction projects at Dyrrachium and Corinth

The metaphorical *armata urbs* of the republican army finds temporary bases of operation in former enemy cities. When Caesar and his army leave Italy to pursue the republicans in Epirus, they too find a physical proxy for the *Urbs*. Unlike the republicans, however, Caesar does not establish his base in a pre-existing city. Instead, he builds a siege wall at Dyrrachium that Lucan explicitly compares to the wall of a city. Caesar's circumvallation and the wall of Dyrrachium thus resemble two city walls facing each other. We shall see in this section and the following ones how Lucan treats first the siege wall and then the Caesarian centurion Scaeva as instantiations of the new Caesarian regime. The two walls that face each other in the Battle of Dyrrachium therefore showcase the de facto division of Rome into two rival cities – the old Rome of the republic and the new Rome of Caesar.

Caesar's siege works are noteworthy for their massive size and the amount of land they encompass (6.29-40):

hic avidam belli rapuit spes improba mentem Caesaris, ut vastis diffusum collibus hostem cingeret ignarum ducto procul aggere valli. metatur terras oculis, nec caespite tantum contentus fragili subitos attollere muros ingentis cautes avulsaque saxa metallis Graiorumque domos direptaque moenia transfert.	30 35
extruitur quod non aries impellere saevus, quod non ulla queat violenti machina belli. franguntur montes, planumque per ardua Caesar ducit opus; pandit fossas turritaque summis disponit castella iugis . . .	40
Here Caesar's mind, greedy for the fight, was drawn by hope extravagant to encircle his unwitting enemy, though he was spread across	30

the vast hills, with an earthwork's ramp traced far away.
 He measures out the land by eye and, not content
 to raise up hasty walls of crumbling turf alone,
 he brings huge boulders, blocks torn from quarries,
 and the homes of Greeks and dismantled city-walls. 35
 No savage battering-ram, no other machine
 of violent war can overthrow his construction.
 Caesar shatters mountains and he draws his work
 level through the heights: he opens trenches, places
 towered forts on highest ridges . . . 40

Whereas Caesar so often plays the role of a destroyer throughout the *Pharsalia*, here he demonstrates his abilities as a master engineer and builder.⁷⁶ In fact, as Saylor notes in his seminal article on the theme of walls in the Dyrrachium episode,⁷⁷ Lucan describes Caesar's siege wall in terms that are more proper to the wall of a city. For instance, Lucan refers to the siege walls as *muri* (6.33, 6.175, 6.180, 6.280) and *moenia* (6.35, 6.128), terms that typically refer to the walls of cities. Additionally, the siege walls are built to resist battering rams and siege machines as though they themselves were besieged city walls (6.36-37).⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Cf. Lucan's description of Caesar's siege works at Brundisium (2.660ff.) and Massilia (3.375ff.). For an insightful analysis of the symbolic import of Caesar's construction projects in these two scenes, see Masters 1992, 29-42. Caesar's ability to build as well as destroy sets him apart from Pompey, who merely occupies the naturally defended city of Dyrrachium and does not alter its fortifications in any way (6.19-28). Lucan explicitly states, "This city [Dyrrachium] is protected by no work of ancients nor by built-up/masonry nor by human toil" (*non opus hanc veterum nec moles structa tuetur/humanusque labor facilis*, 6.19-20). Saylor 1978, 245, opines that Pompey "acquires all the associations of man, city, and nature aptly joined" by relying on the natural defenses of Dyrrachium and not altering the city. In contrast, Caesar's construction of his wall across natural boundaries (cf. 6.38-39) is violent and unnatural (ibid., 246-247). See n. 84 below for further discussion of Caesar's destructiveness.

⁷⁷ ibid., 246-248. I draw extensively upon Saylor's article to advance my argument in this section of the chapter and the next one.

⁷⁸ ibid., 246.

Lucan further characterizes Caesar's siege walls as city walls when he states that they surpass the walls (*muros*, 6.48; *moenia*, 6.50) of Troy and Babylon (6.48-54)⁷⁹:

nunc vetus Iliacos attollat fabula muros
 ascribatque deis; fragili circumdata testa
 moenia mirentur refugi Babylonia Parthi. 50
 en quantum Tigris, quantum celer ambit Orontes,
 Assyriis quantum populis telluris Eoae
 sufficit in regnum, subitum bellique tumultu
 raptum clausit opus. tanti periere labores.

Now let ancient legend praise the walls of Ilium
 and ascribe them to the gods, let Parthians in retreat
 be amazed at the walls of Babylon built of brittle brick. 50
 Look: as much land as Tigris and swift Orontes encircle,
 as much of eastern earth as satisfies Assyrian peoples
 for their realm, is enclosed by hasty building-work,
 hurried on by turmoil of war. Yet all that toil was wasted.

Lucan's reference to Troy in this passage brings the theme of the destruction of cities to the fore. The destruction of Troy is Lucan's primary poetic model for the metaphorical destruction that its daughter city, Rome, undergoes in the course of the civil war.⁸⁰

In light of Lucan's reference to Troy, a ruined city, it is noteworthy that Caesar builds his wall out of the ruined houses of the Greeks and their transferred city walls (6.35).⁸¹ Hence, his wall represents both the destruction of the Greek cities he finds in Epirus and their re-construction in the form of a perverse new structure that resembles

⁷⁹ *ibid.* Pompey later remarks upon Babylon's impressive walls: "and Babylon proud/of her walls, the home of the Assyrians" (*murisque superbam/Assyrias Babylona domos*, 8.299-300).

⁸⁰ We shall return to Lucan's Trojan theme in Ch. 5.

⁸¹ Caesar's siege wall is made up of Greek city walls that have been torn down and transferred (*transfert*, 6.35) to a new location outside of Dyrrachium. Moreover, Dyrrachium's own walls might be metaphorically described as "transferred" insofar as they are *Ephyraea moenia* built by men from Corinth.

the wall of a city. In turn, Caesar intends to use this new “city wall” to capture yet another Greek city, Dyrrachium, that currently shelters the metaphorical *armata urbs* of the republican army.⁸² Caesar destroys in order to build and builds in order to destroy.

Furthermore, Dyrrachium and the republicans inside are themselves comparable to Troy and the Trojans since they are the target of Caesar’s siege. In respect to Lucan’s intertextual engagement with the *Aeneid*, the republicans are also the successors of Aeneas’ Trojan refugees. Civil war therefore pits two Roman armies, two Greek walls (Dyrrachium’s Corinthian wall and Caesar’s wall made of Greek ruins),⁸³ and two epic successors to Troy against one another. Only one member of this pair can survive. Similarly, Caesar must destroy the republic in order to establish his own regime. This is why his wall at Dyrrachium may be seen as both an offensive siege work directed against republican Rome and as a city wall in its own right; it defends the new metaphorical Rome of Caesar’s regime.

Additionally, Caesar promises to rebuild Troy when he visits the city’s ruins after the Battle of Pharsalus (9.950-999). His construction of a wall at Dyrrachium that surpasses the walls of Troy foreshadows this episode. As we shall see in Ch. 5, the rebuilt city of Troy is, like the siege works at Dyrrachium, a symbol of Rome’s

⁸² Saylor comments on the “mixed, abnormal character” of Caesar’s siege works; they resemble a city wall when in fact they are military ramparts designed to oppose the city wall of Dyrrachium (ibid., 248).

⁸³ Saylor speaks of the sense of rivalry that inspires Caesar to build his wall in opposition to the city of Dyrrachium and its excellent natural defenses (ibid., 247).

new Caesarian regime. Caesar's siege works also prove that he is capable of the vast construction efforts required to rebuild a city such as Troy.⁸⁴

Besides Troy, Babylon is a point of reference for assessing Caesar's wall (6.49-50). Lucan frequently treats Babylon as a synecdoche for Parthia, the foreign archenemy that the Romans should be fighting instead of each other. At 1.8-12, Lucan laments that the Romans made war on one another during the civil war when they should have concentrated on defeating Babylon:

quis furor, o cives, quae tanta licentia ferri?
gentibus invis Latium praebere cruorem
cumque superba foret Babylon spolianda tropaeis 10
Ausoniis umbraque erraret Crassus inulta
bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos?

What madness was this, O citizens? What this excessive freedom
with the sword – to offer Latian blood to hated nations?
And when proud Babylon was there to be stripped of Ausonian 10
trophies and when Crassus wandered with his ghost unavenged,
did you choose to wage wars which would bring no triumphs?

In other words, the Romans' aggression should have been turned outward upon Babylon instead of inward upon Rome. In Book 8, Lentulus goes so far as to call for Babylon's destruction. Specifically, he remarks that it would have been best for the Caesarians and republicans to have suspended all other conflicts "until deceitful Susa/and Babylon lay low, collapsed as tombs for the generals" (*dum perfida Susa/in tumulos prolapsa ducum Babylonque iaceret*, 8.425-426). As Caesar poses a greater

⁸⁴ Spencer 2005, 53, observes the irony of Caesar's reconstruction project at Troy in Book 9 in light of his persistent portrayal as an (indeed *the*) agent of destruction throughout the preceding books of the *Pharsalia*. She resolves the apparent problem by interpreting the reconstruction of Troy as itself an act of destruction wrought against Rome's republican past. I would add that episodes such as the siege of Dyrrachium provide earlier examples of Caesar's hybrid role as simultaneous destroyer-cum-rebuilder. See pages 300-308 below for discussion of Caesar's proposal to reconstruct Troy in Book 9.

threat to Rome than does Parthia, it is fitting that Lucan describes the Caesarian wall at Dyrrachium as more imposing than the city walls of Babylon.

The history of Corinth, another past enemy of Rome, also looms in the background of Lucan's account of the Caesarian siege works. As noted above, Lucan claims that the energy Caesar spent building his siege wall would have been better spent cutting a canal across the Isthmus at Corinth (6.57-58), Dyrrachium's mother city.⁸⁵ Perhaps Lucan stresses the connection between Dyrrachium and Corinth because Caesar decided to rebuild the latter city at the end of the civil war.⁸⁶ The city-like nature of Caesar's siege wall shows the sheer extent of his power; he can transform ruins into cities as well as destroy existing cities. Furthermore, the reconstruction of Corinth demonstrated Caesar's indifference to the past hostilities between Corinth and Rome that had driven the Romans to destroy the city. Caesar's power and *clementia*⁸⁷ toward fallen enemies thus transcended his country's traditional enmities; Caesar was not bound by considerations of the past or of nationalistic policies that did not serve his own purposes. Nor did Caesar care that the restoration of a city and commercial center at Corinth might threaten Rome's status as focal point of the Mediterranean world.⁸⁸ Or perhaps Lucan stresses the Corinthian

⁸⁵ See pages 139-140 above. Caesar later did attempt to cut a canal across the Isthmus (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 44.3). As Haskins remarks in his note on lines 6.57-58, Nero also attempted to dig a canal at Corinth (Plin. *H.N.* 4.10; Suet. *Nero* 19.2). I thank Frederick Ahl for pointing out the canal projects to me.

⁸⁶ For the reconstruction of Corinth, see Diod. Sic. 32.27.3; Cass. Dio 43.50.3-5; Plut. *Caes.* 57.8; and Strabo 8.6.23.

⁸⁷ Diodorus Siculus (32.27.3) and Cassius Dio (43.50.3-5) ascribe the reconstruction of Corinth to Caesar's clemency. Clemency in this instance was also a profound demonstration of power; what the Roman Republic decided to destroy, Caesar alone was able to restore. See further discussion of Caesar's reconstruction of ruined cities in the introduction (pages 22-23) and in Ch. 5 (pages 300-308 and p. 318, n. 64).

⁸⁸ Cicero stated that the very location of Corinth on the Isthmus drove its government to strive with Rome for *imperium* (*De Lege Agr.* 2.87) and induced the vices that inevitably led to the city's destruction (*De Re Pub.* 2.7-9).

foundation of Dyrrachium for the purpose of irony; before rebuilding Corinth, Caesar first recycles the ruins of Greek homes and city walls in order to besiege Corinth's own colony.⁸⁹

Lucan may compare the siege work at Dyrrachium to the walls of foreign cities such as Troy and Babylon and to engineering projects at a rebuilt Corinth, but he does not compare Caesar's wall to the *Urbs*. I largely agree with Saylor when he claims that Dyrrachium functions as a substitute for Rome in this scene. Caesar's assault on the city therefore is a symbolic attack on Rome.⁹⁰ At least per Lentulus' claim in Book 5, Rome is wherever the Senate meets, which at the beginning of Book 6 means Dyrrachium. Lucan provides several more explicit indications that Dyrrachium takes the place of Rome as the focal point of the civil war. At the beginning of the Dyrrachium episode, Lucan comments that Caesar "left nothing undone in Latium's fall" (*numquam Latiae se desse ruinae*, 6.10). Lucan here reminds the reader that, though the upcoming battle will be fought in Epirus, it is in fact the Latin race and homeland that will ultimately pay the price for the war.

Furthermore, Lucan magnifies the danger that Caesar's wall poses to the future of the republic by speaking as though the wall metaphorically enclosed Rome itself. Lucan makes this point explicit when he measures the expanse of land enclosed by Caesar's wall by comparing it to distances between Rome and different locations in Latium (6.73-77):

⁸⁹ In a future research project, I plan to investigate whether Lucan's account of the Battle of Dyrrachium and his references to Corinth are influenced by Thucydides' narrative of civil strife at Dyrrachium, which Thucydides refers to by its alternative name Epidamnus (1.24-30). Corinth's involvement in its colony's internal struggles was one of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. It is likely that Lucan was aware of the fact that sieges at Dyrrachium played a critical role in both the Peloponnesian War and the civil war between Caesar and Pompey.

⁹⁰ Saylor 1978, 253-255.

ac tantum saepti vallo sibi vindicat agri,
 parva Mycenaeae quantum sacrata Dianae
 distat ab excelsa nemoralis Aricia Roma, 75
 quoque modo terrae praelapsus moenia Thybris
 in mare descendit, si nusquam torqueat amnem.

For himself he claims some land, surrounded by a rampart,
 as much as separates small Aricia of the grove,
 sacred to Diana of Mycenae, from lofty Rome; 75
 with this same length of land Tiber, flowing past the walls,
 falls into the sea, if his stream nowhere meandered.

Saylor observes that this passage “is designed to suggest that the area of Dyrrachium within Caesar’s walls is to be thought of as Rome and the locations mentioned indicative of Pompey’s chosen position in respect to the city.”⁹¹ Lucan has already established that “glades and forested wilds/and woods” (*saltus **nemorosaque** tesca/et silvas*, 6.41-42) grow and entire rivers arise and run their course within the circuit of Caesar’s wall (6.45-46). Now, he has the reader envision the space enclosed by the wall as equivalent to that between Rome and ***nemoralis** Aricia* (6.75) and between Rome and the sea if the Tiber flowed in a straight line (6.76-77). By likening Dyrrachium to Rome and the land enclosed by Caesar’s siege works to Latium, Lucan underscores the point that Caesar’s siege is aimed not so much against a miscellaneous Greek city in Epirus as against the Roman Republic as embodied in Pompey’s army.⁹²

From the preceding observations, I conclude that Lucan uses Caesar’s siege wall as a metaphor for the new, tyrannical regime that he is constructing to replace the

⁹¹ *ibid.*, 255.

⁹² Saylor observes, “[The violence of civil war] Caesar brings to bear not against Dyrrachium but against Rome itself. Historically, Lucan could not show Caesar behaving in this way against Rome, but such evil designs could be shown played out against surrogates like Massilia, Dyrrachium, or at Pharsalus” (*ibid.*; cf. Saylor’s analysis at 253-255).

republic. Taking the form of a city wall, Caesar's siege work rivals the walls of Troy and Babylon and foreshadows Caesar's reconstruction of Corinth. However, Caesar uses this wall to besiege another city, Dyrrachium. Likewise, Caesar's new tyrannical regime is premised on the destruction of the republic and he aims to destroy what remains of the republican regime, namely Pompey, the Senate, and their army. To the extent that Dyrrachium is a temporary physical receptacle for Pompey's metaphorical Rome in exile, Caesar's siege wall is an anti-Rome. In short, the walls of Dyrrachium and of Caesar's siege work represent the two versions of Rome – republican and Caesarian – that are vying with each in the civil war.

VIII. *Scaeva, pro Caesare murus*

Lucan further develops his characterization of Caesar's siege works as a city wall when he has the Caesarians suffer afflictions that more typically beset a besieged army (6.80-117). Lucan highlights the paradox that the Caesarian besiegers starve while the besieged Pompeians have sufficient food (6.106-117, of which I here quote lines 106-109 and 117)⁹³:

at liber terrae spatiosis collibus hostis
aere non pigro nec inertibus angitur undis,
sed patitur saevam, veluti circumdatus arta
obsidione, famem.

. . . dirapiens miles saturum tamen obsidet hostem.

But the enemy [i.e. Caesar's army], ranging free on spacious hills,
is not choked by sluggish air or stagnant waters

⁹³ For further commentary on the paradox, see Martindale 1976, 47, and Saylor 1978, 248-249. The besieged Pompeians are not devoid of their own hardships; when their horses starve for lack of fodder, the rotting corpses cause a plague (6.80-105).

with trees give concealment. To this place he brings his troops,
betrayed by no dust, and, unexpected, comes upon the walls.
Then together from the plains so many Latian Birds glittered,
so many trumpets sounded.

In order to break through Caesar's *murus*, Pompey must become a besieger, a role that Caesar usually plays in the *Pharsalia*. In Book 1, Lucan compares Caesar to a lightning bolt that "causes destruction far and wide" (*dat stragem late*, 1.157)⁹⁵ since it has "nothing solid stopping/its course" (*nullaque exire vetante/materia*, 1.155-156). In Book 6, Lucan uses similar language to describe Pompey's plan to escape through the widespread destruction of Caesar's wall: *latis exire ruinis/quaerit* (by wide destruction he seeks/to pass out, 6.122-123). Additionally, just one line before Lucan begins the famous lightning simile, Lucan describes Caesar as "delighting to create his path by destruction" (*gaudensque viam fecisse ruina*, 1.150).⁹⁶ At 6.122-124, it is Pompey who seeks to make a ruin (*ruinis*, 6.122) of Caesar's rampart and to prepare a path by way of slaughter: *qua via caede paranda est* (6.124). Pompey wishes to tear down the siege wall (*impulso turre confringere vallo*, 6.123), which Lucan again refers to as "city walls" at 6.128: *subitusque in moenia venit*. Pompey has thus adopted the more typically Caesarian role of besieger of cities, but the metaphorical city in question is the new Rome represented by Caesar's rampart.

At first, Pompey successfully destroys part of Caesar's walls and defeats the garrison stationed there (6.130-139):

⁹⁵ The translation is my own. See discussion of the lightning simile in the introduction (pages 20-21).

⁹⁶ Dorchak 1995, 240, cites the resemblance between 6.122-123 and 1.150 and notes the Caesarian "policy of ruin" that Pompey uncharacteristically pursues in this scene.

ne quid victoria ferro 130
 deberet, pavor attonitos confecerat hostes.
 quod solum valuit virtus, iacuerere perempti
 debuerant quo stare loco. qui vulnera ferrent
 iam derant, et nimbus agens tot tela peribat.
 tum piceos volvunt immissae lampades ignes, 135
 tum quassae nutant turres lapsumque minantur,
 roboris impacti crebros sonat agger ad ictus.
 iam Pompeianae celsi super ardua valli
 exierant aquilae, iam mundi iura patebant [.].

So his victory should owe nothing 130
 to the sword, the enemy were stunned and overwhelmed by terror.
 All their valour could achieve was that they lay in death
 where they should be standing. Now there were not enough
 to suffer wounds: the shower of so many weapons was wasted.
 Then torches that they hurl roll pitchy fires, 135
 then battered towers sway and threaten to collapse,
 the rampart groans at blow on blow of timber battering it.
 Already Pompey's Eagles had emerged above the heights
 of the lofty rampart, already world rule lay in front [.]

Before dying, the Caesarians respond to Pompey's attack with fear and astonishment (*pavor attonitos*, 6.131), the same emotions that fill the people of Ariminum and Rome when Caesar enters their cities.⁹⁷ The republicans set fire to the wall and commence knocking down its towers (6.135-137). They thus display a capacity for physical violence that matches that of the Caesarians. Pompey therefore threatens to destroy Caesar's so-called *muri* in a variation of the *urbs capta* theme. Although greater than Troy's walls (6.48-49), the siege work is on the verge of meeting Troy's fate.

At this point, Lucan introduces Scaeva, the Caesarian soldier who singlehandedly holds back Pompey's advance in an *aristeia* that occupies 125 lines

⁹⁷ Lucan uses the terms *pavor*, *attonitus*, and variations thereof (i.e. *pavidus*) to describe the people of Ariminum and Rome at 1.246, 1.484, 1.487, 1.521, 1.592, 1.616, 1.673, 1.676, 2.22, 2.32, 2.235, and 3.98.

(6.138-262).⁹⁸ Scaeva is an exemplar of the perverse, fanatical, and misdirected *virtus* with which the Caesarians fight against the republicans. One marked feature of this passage is the persistent metaphor by which Lucan likens Scaeva to a wall.⁹⁹ Lucan begins by identifying Scaeva as a defender of Caesar's siege wall. Scaeva concludes an appeal to his comrades by urging them to stand their ground despite the collapse of the wall, which he refers to as their citadel (6.162-165):

iam longinqua petit pulvis sonitusque ruinae,
securasque fragor concussit Caesaris aures.
vincimus, o socii: veniet qui vindicet arces
dum morimur.

Now the dust and sound of our destruction reaches distant parts;
the din has struck on Caesar's carefree ears.
We are the victors, comrade: he will come to claim his stronghold
while we die.

Scaeva then takes his position on the collapsing wall (*ruenti/aggere*, 6.169-170) and proceeds to fight off the Pompeians (6.169-179). He even turns the disintegration of the wall to his own benefit by throwing pieces of it at the enemy: "and all the ruined mass provides the warrior with weapons:/with timbers, boulders, with himself, he menaces the enemy" (*totaeque viro dant tela ruinae,/roboraque et moles hosti seque ipse minatur*, 6.172-173). Scaeva thus takes the destructiveness of the Caesarian siege

⁹⁸ The Scaeva episode is one of the most discussed in modern Lucanian scholarship; among other analyses, see Marti 1966; Saylor 1978, 250-253; Johnson 1987, 57-60; Leigh 1997, 158-190; Henderson 1998, 171-176; Gorman 2001, 277-279; Sklenář 2003, 45-58; and D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 45-53. Most modern studies stress the perversion of *virtus* that Scaeva displays; to paraphrase Lucan's narratorial comment at 6.257-262, Scaeva would be a hero if he were fighting for the right side. Lucan's Scaeva is an exaggerated version of an actual Caesarian soldier whose exploits are mentioned by Caesar (*B.C.* 3.53.4), Valerius Maximus (3.2.23), Plutarch (*Caes.* 16), Florus (2.13.40), Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 68), and Appian (*B.C.* 2.60). See Marti 1966 for discussion of Lucan's sources and his original contributions to the episode.

⁹⁹ Marti 1966, 247-248; Saylor 1978, 250-252.

work to a new level: it is built of ruined cities, its purpose is to help besiege yet another city, it collapses in the face of Pompeian aggression, and now Scaeva uses its fragments to kill Pompeians.

Scaeva even compensates for the collapse of the wall by killing so many Pompeians that the mound of bodies equals the wall in height: “the growing heap of corpses made the soil/level with the wall” (*cumulo crescente cadavera murum/admoveo solo*, 6.180-181).¹⁰⁰ The mound of corpses represents the same sort of perverse construction via destruction that typified Caesar’s use of ruined homes and city walls (6.35) when he built the siege wall. At the risk of overstatement, Scaeva seems to repair the breach in the Caesarian wall by substituting the bodies of the republican besiegers for the missing stones.¹⁰¹ Whereas the original wall was made of ruined Greek cities, the new mound is made of the metaphorical ruins of the republican *armata urbs*, i.e. the corpses of Pompey’s men.¹⁰²

Next, Scaeva himself assumes the role of Caesar’s besieged wall. Scaeva goes on the offensive by leaping down from the fortifications and into the Caesarian host (6.180-262).¹⁰³ The Pompeians surround Scaeva, whom Lucan now describes as *vallatus bello* (6.185). Since *vallatus* literally means “surrounded by a palisade

¹⁰⁰ Dinter 2005, 307, notes the hyperbolic nature of the scene. See Canali 1997, 7-9, and p. 19 above for a discussion of the hallucinogenic quality of Lucan’s extreme descriptions of violence.

¹⁰¹ Dinter 2005, 307, observes that “[h]uman bodies and human buildings become interchangeable” in the Scaeva episode. Dinter thinks that the mound of Pompeian corpses mentioned in lines 6.180-181 was raised by the Pompeians themselves in response to Scaeva’s defense of the wall (ibid., n. 64). Rather, it seems that the wall of corpses was raised by Scaeva as he slew the attackers (6.172-179) and tossed their bodies off of the rampart (6.170-172). This is the interpretation of Marti 1966, 247-248, and Dorchak 1995, 241-242.

¹⁰² I here build upon an observation of Dorchak 1995, 242: “Caesar’s wall had been built with the ruins of houses; Scaeva rebuilds this wall with the ruins of soldiers.” Focussing as he does upon imagery of destroyed houses as opposed to cities, Dorchak fails to note that Caesar’s wall was also built of ruined city walls (*direptaque moenia*, 6.35) and that the republican soldiers embody Rome.

¹⁰³ Marti 1966, 247-249; Saylor 1978, 243-244, and 250-252.

(*vallum*),” Scaeva is metaphorically “circumvallated by war.”¹⁰⁴ It is at this point that Lucan, speaking as narrator, explicitly identifies Scaeva himself as the true Caesarian bulwark (6.196-202):

quid nunc, vaesani, iaculis levibusve sagittis
perditis haesuros numquam vitalibus ictus?
hunc aut tortilibus vibrata falarica nervis
obruat aut vasti muralia pondera saxi,
hunc aries ferro ballistaque limine¹⁰⁵ torta 200
promoveat. stat non fragilis pro Caesare murus
Pompeiumque tenet.

Madmen, why now with your javelins and light arrows
do you waste blows doomed never to fasten in his vitals?
He must be crushed by the falarica propelled
by twisted cords or by wall-breaching weight of a mighty stone;
he must be pushed back by iron ram and by ballista whirled 200
on the threshold. Firm he stands, no frail wall in front of Caesar,
and keeps Pompey back.

Lucan has already extolled the apparent indestructability of Caesar’s physical rampart by denying that it was *fragilis* (explicitly at 6.32-37, implicitly at 6.49). Nonetheless, Pompey was able to make a breach in this wall (6.135-139, 6.263-281). It seems that the true strength of Caesar’s siege work lies not in the physical structure so much as in fanatical defenders such as Scaeva, the perfect exemplar of Caesarian valor. Even as Scaeva’s huge number of wounds cause him to collapse (6.202-227), he “with steps now weary, selects an enemy on whom to fall” (*iam gradibus fessis, in quem cadat, eligit hostem*, 6.206). The image of Scaeva collapsing upon one last victim recalls his

¹⁰⁴ Marti 1966, 248; Saylor 1978, 250. The battle becomes a “one-man siege” (Henderson 1998, 172 and 206).

¹⁰⁵ I here accept the reading *limine*, which Shackleton Bailey marks with *crucis*.

earlier tactic of turning the collapsing siege wall back upon the men who were tearing it down. Scaeva himself has now assumed the role of the collapsing wall.¹⁰⁶

In characterizing Scaeva as a wall for Caesar (*pro Caesare murus*, 6.201), Lucan draws upon an old topos reaching far back into the history of Greek and Latin literature. In Book 6, Scaeva the fighting man succeeds in holding back Pompey where the stone wall fails. Numerous Greek and Latin authors write that a city's true defense should be its soldiery, not walls made of masonry.¹⁰⁷ I would like to add to past scholars' analyses of this scene (notably Saylor's and Leigh's)¹⁰⁸ the observation that in the traditional topos the soldier usually stands as a wall for his city or for his army as a whole. Achilles is a "bulwark for the Achaeans" (μέγα πᾶσιν/ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν . . . πολέμοιο κακοῖο, *Il.* 1.283-284).¹⁰⁹ In Seneca's *Troades*, Hecuba describes Hector in similar terms (124-126):

columen patriae, mora fatorum,
tu praesidium Phrygibus fessis,
tu murus eras. 125

The summit of the fatherland, the delay of fate,
A bastion for the worn-out Phrygians you were,
You were their wall. 125

Alcaeus describes a city's fighting men as its "mighty tower": ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλ(ι)ος πύργος ἀρευί)ος (fr. 112.10, Lobel-Page). The soldier's wall-like status helps his fellow warriors and the citizens of his city.

¹⁰⁶ Saylor 1978, 244.

¹⁰⁷ See Leigh 1997, 185-190, for a list of relevant passages, including the ones I cite in the next few paragraphs.

¹⁰⁸ Saylor 1978, 250-253; Leigh 1997, 185-190.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Graium murus*, *Achilles*, *Ov. Met.* 3.281, an intertext noted by Marti 1966, 247. Homer also gives the epithet ἕρκος Ἀχαιῶν to the Greater Ajax (e.g. *Il.* 3.229).

As Leigh observes, the soldier-as-wall motif frequently occurs in descriptions of Sparta and its way of life.¹¹⁰ In contrast to the Athenians, the Spartans famously did not build walls of stone. Instead, they depended upon their soldiers to defend them.¹¹¹ Philostratus' *Vit. Soph.* 514 is representative of this topos¹¹²:

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀγωνιζόμενος τοὺς βουλευομένους περὶ τοῦ τείχους ἀπὸ τῶν Ὀμήρου ἐβραχυλόγησε τοσοῦτον· ἀσπίς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρος κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνὴρ. οὕτω στήτέ μοι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τετειχίσμεθα.

For, when addressing the Spartans as they took counsel on the question of building a wall, he [Isaeus] summed up his argument with the following quotation from Homer: “Shield pressed shield, helmet helmet, man man”: stand like this for me, Spartans, and we have a wall.”

In Sparta, therefore, the soldier-as-wall was no mere metaphor; the army literally substituted for physical fortifications.

At least one Greek writer conspicuously applies the Spartan soldier-as-wall motif to Rome.¹¹³ Strabo writes that the site of Rome is for the most part lacking in natural defenses and can be protected by a wall on only one flank. Accordingly, the

¹¹⁰ See Leigh 1997, 185-190, for discussion of this topos. Leigh links the soldier-as-wall motif in the Scaeva episode to the rhetoric of the Spartan military tradition. He cites numerous examples in both Greek and Latin literature in which the Spartans are said to dispense with stone walls on account of their military valor: Pl. *Leg.* 778D; Plut. *Lyc.* 19.4; Plut. *Mor.* 210E, 217D, and 228E; Seneca the Elder *Suas.* 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.14, and 2.16; and Livy 39.37.1-3.

¹¹¹ One of the most famous observations regarding the inverse relation between the strength of a city's physical fortifications and of its military is made by Thucydides in his first book. He remarks that if one had only the physical remains of the two cities to judge by, one would think that Athens, a city with mighty walls, was much more powerful than it was, and that Sparta, a city of very modest buildings, was much less powerful (1.10.2-3). I thank Michael Fontaine for pointing out to me the relevance of this passage.

¹¹² The translation is that of Leigh 1997, 188.

¹¹³ Although Leigh does not mention this passage of Strabo, he does note that Cato the Elder traced the Romans' ancestry to the Spartans via the Sabines (ibid., 188, n. 49). See Cato the Elder, *Orig.* fr. 50-1 [Peter]; Cn. Gellius, fr. 10 (Peter); and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.49.4-5. Leigh writes, “At Rome, in the Sabine Cato's fantasies of Spartan descent, Sparta is celebrated as the great military state, the state Rome ‘is’ or should be. And yet it is that very military state – and with it the *exempla* that embody its wisdom – which Lucan is concerned to portray in collapse” (ibid., 190).

Romans became valiant warriors in order to defend their city from attack (Strabo

5.3.7):

καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τὸν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν διαλογισμὸν περὶ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ὕστερον, διότι Ῥωμαίοις προσῆκεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔρυμάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐπορίαν, προβλήματα νομίζοντες οὐ τὰ τείχη τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρας τοῖς τείχεσι.

And, in my opinion, the first founders took the same course of reasoning both for themselves and for their successors, namely, that it was appropriate for the Romans to depend for their safety and general welfare, not on their fortifications, but on their arms and their own valour, in the belief that it is not walls that protect men but men that protect walls. (Jones' Loeb translation)

According to Strabo, Rome is mighty in war precisely because its army is its only sure means of defense.

In all of these passages, the soldier rhetorically serves as a wall for his city or, in the case of Achilles, for the Achaean army as a whole. In the case of Sparta and, at least according to Strabo, Rome, the soldier literally replaces the physical wall of the city. Scaeva's ability to make a wall-like stand against the enemy is thus one aspect of traditional *virtus* that Scaeva possesses and indeed embodies. However, just as Scaeva's *virtus* is directed against the republic instead of against its enemies,¹¹⁴ Scaeva is a *murus* for Caesar (*pro Caesare*, 6.201), not for the *Urbs* or the republican *civitas* of Rome. It seems that Caesar has replaced Rome, or, from a different perspective, Rome has now been reduced to Caesar. Just as Laelius vowed to destroy

¹¹⁴ For Scaeva as the embodiment of perverted *virtus*, see 6.254-255: "and they worship the deity, so to speak, confined inside/his stabbed breast and the living semblance of mighty Heroism" (*ac velut inclusum perfosso in pectore numen/et vivam magnae speciem Virtutis adorant*). For Scaeva as an exemplar of *virtus* turned against Rome, see especially 6.257-262.

Rome at Caesar's behest and "Caesar was everything" (*omnia Caesar erat*, 3.108) in the Caesarian Senate, so too does Scaeva commit himself to Caesar alone.¹¹⁵

IX. Pompey's choice

Despite Scaeva's valiant stand, Pompey continues to break through Caesar's wall at other points (6.263-313). Lucan likens him to a wave that erodes the side of a mountain until it eventually collapses (6.265-267)¹¹⁶ and to the River Po in flood as it exceeds its banks (6.272-278). At this point, Caesar finally realizes the extent of the physical destruction Pompey has wrought (6.278-284):

vix proelia Caesar	
senserat, elatus specula quae prodidit ignis:	
invenit impulsos presso iam pulvere muros,	280
frigidaque, ut veteris, deprennit signa ruinae.	
accendit pax ipsa loci, movitque furorem	
Pompeiana quies et victo Caesare somnus.	
ire vel in clades properat dum gaudia turbet.	

Scarcely had Caesar been aware	
of the battle which a fire on high in a look-out post revealed:	
he found the walls knocked down, the dust already settled	280
and discovered signs of ruin cold, as if of long ago.	
The place's very peace inflamed him and his madness was aroused	
by the Pompeians' rest and slumber after conquering Caesar.	
He presses on, even to disaster, provided he can spoil their joy.	

This description of Caesar's ruined rampart evokes the image of a destroyed city. The walls (*muros*, 6.280) covered in dust resemble those of a city that was destroyed centuries ago (*ut veteris . . . ruinae*, 6.281). Caesar's *muris* eclipsed the wall of Troy

¹¹⁵ See the fanatical partisanship in Scaeva's speeches at 6.150-165 and 6.241-246. On the extreme devotion to Caesar that motivates both Laelius and Scaeva, see Ahl 1976, 201.

¹¹⁶ The word Lucan uses for the collapse of the cliff is *ruina* (*ruinam*, 6.267), a term that links this simile to the later description of the ruined wall (*ruinae*, 6.281).

in colossal grandeur (6.48-49) and now resembles it lying in ruins.¹¹⁷ Just as Caesar established a false sense of tranquillity (*quies*, 1.261) at Ariminum when he occupied the city, Pompey has created peace (*pax*, 6.282) and quiet “sleep” (*Pompeiana quies et . . . somnus*, 6.283) along the circuit of Caesar’s siege wall by vanquishing the Caesarians (*victo Caesare*, 6.283). The imagery of ruin and pacification shows how great a threat Pompey’s destruction of the wall poses to the new Caesarian Rome.

Caesar decides to attack the troops of the Pompeian officer Torquatus, but in the process he nearly causes the total destruction of his own army (6.284-299):

ire vel in clades properat, dum gaudia turbet.	
Torquato ruit inde minax, qui Caesaris arma	285
segnius haud vidit, quam malo nauta tremante	
omnia subducit Circaeae vela procellae;	
agminaque interius muro brevior receptit,	
densius ut parva disponderet arma corona.	
transierat primi Caesar munimina valli,	290
cum super e totis immisit collibus arma	
effuditque acies obsaeptum Magnus in hostem.	
non sic Hennaëis habitans in vallibus horret	
Enceladum spirante Noto, cum tota cavernas	
egerit et torrens in campos defluit Aetna,	295
Caesaris ut miles glomerato pulvere victus	
ante aciem caeci trepidus sub nube timoris	
hostibus occurrit fugiens inque ipsa pavendo	
fata ruit.	

He [Caesar] presses on, even to disaster, provided he can spoil	
their [i.e. the Pompeians'] joy.	
He then swooped with menace on Torquatus, but he as quick	285
saw Caesar’s troops as when a sailor furls	
all his sails on the shaking mast before the Circaean gale;	
and drew his forces inwards with a narrower wall,	
more tightly to arrange his troops in a tiny ring.	

¹¹⁷ We might even compare the fire signal (6.279) that alerts Caesar to the destruction of his wall to the conflagrations that are often found in descriptions of the fall of cities (for examples, see Paul 1982, 147-148 and 153-154). In Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, a fire signal alerts the people of Argos to Troy’s destruction by fire (281ff.).

Caesar had passed through the defences of the outer rampart 290
 when, from all the hills above, Magnus launched
 his army and poured down his lines against the hemmed-in enemy.
 Not so does the dweller in Henna's valleys shudder
 at Enceladus when Notus blows and Etna empties
 all its caverns and flows molten down on to the plains 295
 as Caesar's soldiers then: defeated by the rolling dust,
 quaking under a cloud of blind terror before the battle,
 fleeing they met the enemy and in their panic rush
 towards their own destruction.

As Saylor notes,¹¹⁸ Lucan emphasizes the role that Caesar's own walls play in rendering his army helpless. The Caesarians stand between the *muris brevior* (6.288) behind which Torquatus has arranged his troops and the "defences of the outer rampart" (*primi . . . munimina valli*, 6.290). However we imagine the precise configuration of these walls,¹¹⁹ Caesar is trapped (*obsaeptum*, 6.292) within the walls of the metaphorical Rome that he has constructed. He faces imminent destruction there.

But it is not to be. Pompey refuses to crush the Caesarians when he has the opportunity to do so (6.299-315):

totus mitti civilibus armis
 usque vel in pacem potuit cruor: ipse furentis 300
 dux tenuit gladios. felix ac libera regum,
 Roma, fores iurisque tui, vicisset in illo
 si tibi Sulla loco. dolet, heu, semperque dolebit
 quod scelerum, Caesar, prodest tibi summa tuorum,
 cum genero pugnasse pio. pro tristia fata! 305
 non Uticae Libye clades, Hispania Mundae
 flectet et infando pollutus sanguine Nilus
 nobilius Phario gestasset rege cadaver,
 nec Iuba Marmaricas nudus pressisset harenas

¹¹⁸ Saylor 1978, 249-250.

¹¹⁹ See *ibid.*, 249, n. 12, for a discussion of the precise layout of the battlefield as represented by Lucan and by Caesar (*B.C.* 3.66-72).

Poenorumque umbras placasset sanguine fuso 310
 Scipio, nec sancto caruisset vita Catone.
 ultimus esse dies potuit tibi Roma malorum,
 exire e mediis potuit Pharsalia fatis.
 deserit averso possessam numine sedem
 Caesar et Emathias lacero petit agmine terras. 315

 All the blood of civil war
 they could have shed, even to peace; their general himself 300
 restrained their frenzied swords. Fortunate you could have been,
 and free of tyrants, Rome, and your own mistress, had a Sulla
 conquered for you there. How bitter now, for ever bitter,
 that the greatest of your crimes is your advantage, Caesar:
 to fight a righteous son-in-law. O cruel Fates! 305
 Then Libya would not have wept for her calamity at Utica
 nor Spain for Munda; nor would Nile polluted by blood
 unspeakable
 have borne a corpse more noble than the Pharian king,
 and Juba on Marmaric sands would not have lain exposed,
 nor Scipio appeased the Carthaginian ghosts with blood 310
 poured out nor life been gone from sacred Cato.
 Rome, that could have been your final day of misery:
 Pharsalia could have disappeared from destiny.
 Caesar left the place he had occupied against the deity's
 will and with his mangled forces headed for Emathian lands. 315

Lucan's apostrophes to Rome at 6.301-303 and 6.312-313 reinforce the sense that the battle at Dyrrachium has been fought over the fate of the city and its political regime.¹²⁰ The freedom of the city of Rome depended on Pompey repeating within the metaphorical city walls of Caesar's siege works at Dyrrachium the massacres that Sulla committed within the literal walls of Rome, Praeneste, and the Saepta (6.301-303).¹²¹ But Pompey cannot bring himself to commit typically Sullan acts within the

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, 254.

¹²¹ See the preceding chapter for discussion of Sulla's massacres at Rome (2.139ff.). In his speech at Ariminum, Caesar insults Pompey by recalling his service to the brutal Sulla during Rome's first round of civil war (1.324-335). Caesar claims that Pompey wishes to inflict similar atrocities upon Rome in the new war (1.330-331): "[S]o too, Magnus, grown accustomed to licking Sulla's sword,/your thirst endures" (*sic et Sullanum solito tibi lambere ferrum/durat, Magne, sitis*). As we shall see in the next chapter (pages 185-187), Caesar will tell his troops at Pharsalus that a victorious Pompey would imitate

proxy Rome of the Dyrrachium siege walls. Lucan's presentation of Caesar's siege wall as an *urbs capta* ends anticlimactically as the Caesarians live to fight another day, i.e. at Pharsalus.

Why does Pompey let Caesar escape? Saylor suggests that Pompey has too much regard for Rome and the lives of his fellow Romans to make full use of Caesar's own siege walls – the walls that both represent the new tyrannical regime and entrap Caesar's army – as a weapon.¹²² I believe that Saylor is correct insofar as Lucan does not present Pompey as a destroyer at heart and total annihilation was the only means to victory Pompey had at his disposal. However, I believe that Saylor carries the theme of walls too far when he suggests that Pompey objects to using Caesar's walls to win the battle. Lucan explicitly states that Pompey fails to behave like Sulla because he is a “righteous son-in-law” (*genero . . . pio*, 6.305). In other words, Pompey does not destroy Caesar because he still regards Caesar as his kinsman.¹²³ In contrast, the Caesarians disown all familial ties at the same time they respond enthusiastically to Laelius when he pledges to destroy the *Urbs* should Caesar so demand.¹²⁴ In honoring his past marriage to Caesar's daughter, Pompey refuses to treat the Caesarians as an incipient new Rome opposed to the republican one.

Sulla and commit atrocities at Rome (7.303-307). He cites the precedent of how Pompey trapped the Caesarians at Dyrrachium (7.315-317) while failing to note that Pompey restrained himself from utterly destroying the Caesarians.

¹²² *ibid.*, 256-257. Saylor also points to Pompey's tentativeness and failure to seize the moment, a quality also observed by Ahl 1976, 156-182, and Due 1962, 117-118.

¹²³ Roller 1996, 325.

¹²⁴ See Ch. 1 (pages 56-61) for a discussion of the speech in which Laelius pledges to commit violence against his closest relatives (1.376-378) and to level Rome (1.383-386).

X. Conclusion

At the risk of over-simplification, the Battle of Dyrrachium shows the republican and Caesarian armies as rival instantiations of Rome. The republicans are based in Dyrrachium and the Caesarians in their newly built siege wall. The resistance of Scaeva shows that the Caesarians are willing to overcome any obstacle and endure any wound in order to triumph. They value nothing other than Caesar. In contrast, Pompey's clemency toward Caesar reveals the profound identity crisis within the republican camp. The civil war has driven the republicans away from Rome and has separated them from the Caesarians. This physical separation and the consequent freedom of operation give the republicans the opportunity to demolish Caesar's army and end the war. However, Pompey still identifies with Caesar and his Roman troops to such an extent that he cannot bring himself to deliver the sort of mortal blow that Sulla was willing to deliver to the Marians even within the walls of Rome and on the Campus Martius. The republicans speak of themselves as the sole embodiment of republican Rome but fail to act that way at the moment of crisis. They lack both the creative and destructive energy of Caesar. They vehemently maintain that their own *armata urbs* is identical with the old republic despite their exile from the physical *Urbs*, yet they cannot bring themselves to destroy Caesar's new regime. They occupy and defend cities that once defied Rome and thereby raise questions about their Roman identity. Nevertheless, they cannot make the decisive break with the past that would permit them to massacre their fellow Romans. In the end, the Caesarians, unencumbered by any identity crises and devoted solely to Caesar, live to fight and win at Pharsalus.

Chapter 3

Hic Roma perit: The Battle of Pharsalus and Rome's Destruction

Lucan's presentation of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey as the metaphorical destruction of Rome is most evident in the narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus in Book 7. Let us begin our investigation by analyzing why the definitive battle in the civil war is fought at Pharsalus in Thessaly and not in Italy. Once Caesar has escaped from Dyrrachium, Pompey refuses to return to Rome although he has the opportunity to do so. He does so in order to spare the city violence (6.316-329):

arma secuturum soceri, quacumque fugasset,
temptavere suo comites devertere Magnum
hortatu, patrias sedes atque hoste carentem
Ausoniam peteret. 'numquam me Caesaris,' inquit,
320 'exemplo reddam patriae, numquamque videbit
me nisi dimisso redeuntem milite Roma.
Hesperiam potui motu surgente tenere,
si vellem patriis aciem committere templis
ac medio pugnare foro. dum bella relegem,
325 extremum Scythici transcendam frigoris orbem
ardentisque plagas. victor tibi, Roma, quietem
eripiam, qui, ne premerent te proelia, fugi?
a potius, ne quid bello patiaris in isto,
te Caesar putet esse suam.'

As Magnus was about to chase the army of his father-in-law
wherever he had routed it, his comrades tried to turn him back
by urging him to head for ancestral abodes and for Ausonia
now free of enemy. He says: “Never shall I return
to my fatherland following Caesar’s model, never shall Rome 320
see me come back unless I first disband my soldiers.
I could have held Hesperia, when turmoil started,
had I been willing to join battle in ancestral temples
and to fight in the middle of the Forum. To banish war,
I would go beyond the furthest zone of Scythian cold, 325
beyond the burning tracts. Rome, shall I as victor despoil you
of tranquillity when I retreated to prevent battles afflicting you?

Rather, to spare you suffering in this war,
let Caesar think you all his own.”

Pompey vividly imagines that fighting in Italy would entail fighting within the ancestral temples of Rome and in the middle of the Forum itself: *patriis aciem committere templis/ac medio pugnare foro* (6.323-324). He allows no third option between fighting on foreign soil and fighting within the *Urbs* itself. Pompey refuses the latter alternative. Lucan here distinguishes Pompey from Caesar, who had no scruples about invading Italy under arms and conquering his homeland (6.319-321).¹ Rather than simply being fought at some random location far removed from the *Urbs*, the definitive battle of the civil war is fought at Pharsalus precisely so that the *Urbs* may be physically secure (6.329-332).²

This scene raises several major questions: how do the sites of Pharsalus and Rome relate to one another? Can physical distance from Thessaly prevent Rome and Italy from experiencing the destructive violence wrought at Pharsalus? Are the Pompeian and Caesarian armies absent from Rome because they are at Pharsalus or is Rome metaphorically present together with its soldiers? As we shall see in this chapter, throughout Book 7 Lucan repeatedly revisits the tensions resulting from Pharsalus’ physical distance from Rome and from the city’s metaphorical presence there. On the eve of battle, Pompey dreams of standing in his theater on the Campus Martius once more. In speeches to their troops before the battle, Pompey and Caesar

¹ Ironically, at Ariminum Caesar faults Pompey precisely for stationing troops within the Forum during the trial of Milo (1.319-323). In Book 6, Lucan shows Pompey putting this reputation behind him. In the biographical tradition, Plutarch similarly affirms that Pompey moved his army to Thessaly because he desired to keep the war away from Italy (Plut. *Pomp.* 66.3-6).

² At 6.326-329, Pompey admits that even the superficial peace (*quietem*, 6.326) provided by Caesar’s tyranny is worth preserving if the only alternative is bloodshed. See Ch. 1 (pages 42-45) for discussion of the role of *quies* in Lucan’s account of Caesar’s occupation of Ariminum in Book 1.

both try to place the city of Rome before the eyes of their soldiers by means of the rhetorical technique of *enargeia*. Lucan also devotes much of the book to describing the devastating effects that the war will have upon Italy and the city of Rome in the century intervening between the battle and his own day. For instance, Lucan claims that the civil wars reduced the native population of Italy to such a point that cities lay in ruins and Rome needed to be re-populated with foreign immigrants. Furthermore, Rome is symbolically present at Pharsalus insofar as Lucan characterizes Pompey, the Roman soldiers, their foreign allies, and the republican senators as the embodiment of Rome. Lastly, Lucan incorporates several features of the literary topos of the *urbs capta* into the final scenes of the battle narrative.

Rome ultimately suffers many of the same effects – enslavement, tyranny, decline of its native population, and, in the case of the cities surrounding Rome, physical ruin – that would have resulted had the Pompeian and Caesarian armies fought their decisive battle in Italy. This is because the Roman Republic as embodied in the Senate and the republican army – the so-called *armata urbs* displaced from the physical city of Rome – is destroyed at Pharsalus. In Books 1-3, Caesar is able to spare Rome and Italy the full force of his destructive power because the Pompeians flee from Italy without much of a fight. When Caesar and Pompey meet in a pitched battle at Pharsalus, the result is the mass slaughter of the Roman people and all that this entails – namely the physical, demographic, and social destruction, decline, and decay that Lucan sees as typical of Rome and Italy in his own day. Despite Pompey's desperate attempt to deflect the war away from Italy, the fates of the Roman people, the Roman state, and the physical *Urbs* are inextricably linked. Lucan stresses this

fact by means of his persistent references to the *Urbs* in Book 7 and his modeling of key scenes in the battle on the basis of the *urbs capta* motif. In the short term, Pompey does prevent the destruction and sack of the physical city of Rome by fighting in Thessaly rather than in Italy. However, he cannot alter the long-term effects of the war upon the *civitas* and *Urbs* of Rome that would have resulted from the destruction of the republican faction regardless of where in the world it happened to occur. When the Pompeians are catastrophically defeated at Pharsalus, Rome is symbolically destroyed along with them.

I. Pompey's dream of Rome

The first major scene in Book 7 tells the story of a dream that Pompey has on the night before the Battle of Pharsalus (7.7-44).³ Despite Pompey's dire circumstances at Pharsalus, the dream returns him to the security of a happier time and place, namely Rome at the height of his popularity among the people (7.9-19):

nam Pompeiani visus sibi sede theatri	
innumeram effigiem Romanae cernere plebis	10
attollique suum laetis ad sidera nomen	
vocibus et plausu cuneos certare sonantes;	
qualis erat populi facies clamorque faventis	
olim, cum iuvenis primique aetate triumphi,	
post domitas gentes quas torrens ambit Hiberus	15
et quaecumque fugax Sertorius impulit arma,	
Vespere pacato, pura venerabilis aequae	
quam currus ornante toga, plaudente senatu	
sedit adhuc Romanus eques . . .	

[H]e dreamt that, as he sat in his own theatre, he saw

³ Pompey's dream of his theater on the eve of Pharsalus is recorded in several ancient historical sources, e.g. Plut. *Pomp.* 68.2 and Flor. 2.13.45. See Cancik 1970, Rose 1970, Rutz 1970, Gagliardi 1975 (*ad loc.*), and Ahl 1976, 178-182, for discussion.

the innumerable likeness of the Roman plebs, 10
 and his name was raised to the stars by joyful
 voices and the resounding tiers competed in applause;
 such was the appearance and applause of the admiring people
 long ago, when as a young man, at the time of his first triumph,
 after conquering the tribes encircled by torrential Hiberus 15
 and all the troops driven onwards by elusive Sertorius,
 with the west pacified, revered in his plain toga as much
 as in the one that adorns the chariot, with the Senate clapping
 he sat, still a Roman knight.

By means of Pompey's dream, Lucan turns not only Pompey's attention but also that of the reader from Thessaly to Rome and then, at the end of the dream, back to Thessaly. This shift of focus will occur repeatedly in Book 7 as Lucan interrupts his narrative of the battle in order to chart its persistent negative consequences for Italy and the *Urbs*.⁴ In part, the shift of focus from Pompey's camp in Thessaly to the Rome of his dream increases the sense of distance between Rome and Pharsalus. Rome is now accessible to Pompey only in a dream in which he remembers past celebrations held within the city in his honor. At the same time, however, the dream also permits Pompey to bridge the distance between the two locations. Although he is sleeping in his camp at Pharsalus, Pompey's mind takes him back to his beloved *Urbs*. Seen from this perspective, the dream makes Rome seem present to Pompey despite his sojourn in Thessaly. For a brief time, Pompey is no longer aware of the exile⁵ he entered upon when he fled the city. Paradoxically, the closest that Pompey ever

⁴ Marti 1975, 82 and 84-85; Martindale 1984, 75. These instances of foreshadowing also delay the progression of the narrative. See Masters 1992, 1-10, and Henderson 1998, 183-185, on Lucan's tendency to stall his narrative, as well as p. 105, n. 127, above and p. 189, n. 49, below.

⁵ Lucan refers to Pompey as an exile (*exul*) when he departs from Italy at 2.730.

comes to experiencing the *Urbs* in the narrative of the *Pharsalia*⁶ comes on the eve of the battle that will prevent him from ever returning home.⁷

The content of Pompey's dream is not the only element in this scene that diminishes the sense of distance between Rome and Pharsalus. Lucan also stresses that the fate of Rome hinges on what occurs at Pharsalus. Even before Lucan gives his account of the battle, he provides the reader with a foretaste of the effect it will have upon the *Urbs* and the people living there. We see Rome before (7.9-19) and after Pompey's fall from power (7.28-44), the definitive moment in that fall being his defeat at Pharsalus. The sign of Caesar's victory at Pharsalus is the celebration that he will force upon the people at Rome despite their grief over Pompey's death (7.40-44):

nunc quoque, tela licet paveant victoris iniqui, 40
nuntiet ipse licet Caesar tua funera, flebunt,
sed dum tura ferunt, dum laureaserta Tonanti.
o miseri, quorum gemitus texere dolorem,
qui te non pleno pariter planxere theatro.

Now too, though they fear the unjust victor's weapons, 40
though Caesar personally announce your death, they will weep,
even while bringing incense, bringing laurel garlands to the
Thunderer.
O how unhappy – their groans concealed their anguish;
they could not bewail you together in full theatre.

The changed conditions in the *Urbs* – the rule of Caesar and the absence of Pompey, even of his tomb (7.36) – manifest the significance of the battle fought at Pharsalus.

⁶ While the proem refers to Pompey's presence in Rome during the years leading up to the civil war (1.129-135), within the actual narrative of the epic Pompey first appears already in flight from the city: *Pompeio fugiente* (1.522).

⁷ On a related point, Spencer 2005, 61, n. 37, observes that Pompey's dream before Pharsalus is paradoxically "his only 'success' at Rome in Lucan's text." At the end of Book 6, the witch Erichtho reveals to Sextus Pompey that the only issue to be determined by the Battle of Pharsalus is where Pompey and Caesar will die. The battle's victor will die at Rome, the loser in Egypt (6.810-811).

In addition to making Rome seem present to Pompey in Thessaly, the dream sequence provides Lucan with an opportunity to establish the causal relationships between events at Pharsalus and Rome; it is at Rome that Pharsalus' full impact will be felt.

Let us now analyze how Lucan portrays (indeed, defines) Late Republican Rome in the dream episode. Pompey dreams of a Rome where he, the physical city, and the *populus* (both the *plebs* and the Senate) form a cohesive, idealized union. Lounsbury writes, "The poet's first care in Book Seven is to unite Pompey to Rome herself, thus setting his hero in the proper place by which he will be judged in the rest of the book."⁸ First, we see in the dream passage how Pompey's past happiness (*tempora laeta*, 7.20) was tied up with the physical *Urbs*. Pompey imagines himself standing in his theater, the part of the city that he himself had built and which was named for him (*Pompeiani visus sibi sede theatri*, 7.9).⁹ Lucan then compares the admiration that Pompey receives from the people in his theater to that which he received when he ascended the Capitol during his first triumph (7.13-19).¹⁰ By referring to both Pompey's Theater and his triumphal marches up the Capitol, Lucan

⁸ Lounsbury 1976, 229.

⁹ Lucan refers already in the proem (1.129-135) to Pompey's enjoyment of popular acclaim in his theater: "[Pompey was] wholly driven by the popular winds, rejoicing in applause in the theatre he had built" (*totus popularibus auris/impelli, plausuque sui gaudere theatri*, 1.132-133). Rutz 1970, 523-524, and Ahl 1976, 178-179, both connect this description of Pompey's Theater and the Roman public's adulation for him with his later dream in Book 7.

¹⁰ Lucan incorrectly identifies the first of Lucan's three triumphs as that won over Sertorius in Spain (7.14-19). In fact, Pompey won his first triumph over the Numidian King Iarbas and his second over Sertorius (Gagliardi 1975, 10-11). Pichon 1912, 6 (cited by Gagliardi), argues that Lucan substituted the Spanish triumph for the Numidian one in order to make Pompey's first triumph entail a patriotic victory over a more serious threat to the republic, namely Sertorius. Additionally, the substitution of Sertorius for Iarbas has Pompey celebrate his first triumph after defeating a Roman who, like Caesar, has engaged in civil war; in his first harangue to his troops, Pompey lists Sertorius at the end of the catalogue of domestic enemies he has vanquished (2.539-549). The description of Sertorius as *fugax* (*fugax Sertorius*, 7.16; cf. *Sertorius exul*, 2.549) and his reliance on Spanish troops drawn from the Roman world's western frontier (*Vespere pacato*, 7.17) may also serve to highlight Pompey's own flight from Rome and his reliance on troops drawn from the East.

portrays the *Urbs* as the setting for Pompey's greatest accomplishments in peacetime and in war, respectively.¹¹ Lucan first mentions the accolades of the *plebs*:

innumeram effigiem Romanae cernere plebis . . . et plausu cuneos certare sonantes

(7.10, 7.12). At his first triumph, Pompey was similarly applauded by the Senate

although he himself was yet an equestrian: *pura venerabilis aequae/quam currus*

ornante toga, plaudente senatu/sedit adhuc Romanus eques (7.17-19). The upper and

lower classes of the *populus* therefore are united in their praise for Pompey, a member

of the middle *ordo*.¹² Lucan thus presents the reader with an image of Late

Republican Rome as a union composed of Pompey, the physical *Urbs* in which he

celebrated his triumphs and built his theater, and the various classes of the Roman

populus that praised him during those triumphs and his appearances in that theater.¹³

¹¹ Rutz 1970, 516-517, notes that Pompey's dream joins together the two greatest forms of achievement he had known in his life, namely victory on the battlefield and the applause of the citizens of the *Urbs* ("Sein Leben lang hat Pompeius zwei Formen höchster Daseinsverwirklichung gekannt: den Sieg auf dem Schlachtfelde und den brausenden Jubel der städtischen Menge. Sie beide sind hier in Traum und Vergangenheit vereint.").

¹² It may be significant that Lucan specifically associates the applause of the Senate with Pompey's early triumph and that of the *plebs* with his appearance in the theater. This may recall Lucan's claim in Book 1 that late in his career Pompey was swept away by the "popular winds" (*popularibus auris*, 1.132) and indulged the common crowd (*volgus*, *ibid.*) when he courted the masses in his theater (1.129-135). As Pompey's popularity with different social classes varied over time, it would be incorrect to interpret Lucan's Pompey so much as a reconciler of otherwise disparate classes than as a common object of their admiration over the course of his public career. Nonetheless, it seems that in the dream sequence Lucan is less interested in demarcating periods in Pompey's changing popularity with various groups than in emphasizing the fact that he had at one time or other won acclaim from all classes. Furthermore, Lucan stresses the correspondence between the theater appearance and the triumph, not the differences, and the *populus* as well as the the Senate cheers on the triumphant Pompey: "such was the appearance and applause of the admiring people" (*qualis erat populi facies clamorque faventis*, 7.13). Also, whereas the proem to the *Pharsalia* clearly associates Pompey's enjoyment of popular acclaim in his theater with vainglory and decrepitude after his military career (1.129-135), the dream sequence in Book 7 lacks any such note of censure that might divide Pompey's later career from what went before; see Lounsbury 1976, 229, for discussion of the contrast between the two scenes.

¹³ We will see below (pages 201-209) that Lucan qualifies this pro-Pompeian idealization over the course of Book 7.

Lucan intensifies the theme of the bond between Rome and Pompey by describing their relationship in the language of romantic love. In an apostrophe addressed to both Pompey and a personified Rome, Lucan wishes that they had been given one last day in which they might enjoy their mutual *amor* (7.29-32):

o felix, si te vel sic tua Roma videret!
 donassent utinam superi patriaeque tibi que 30
 unum, Magne, diem, quo fati certus uterque
 extremum tanti fructum raperetis amoris.

O blessed would your Rome be, if she could see you [Pompey]
 even like this!
 If only the gods above had granted to your fatherland and you, 30
 Magnus, a single day when both of you, certain of your fate,
 could have snatched the final pleasure of your love so great.

Line 7.32 (*extremum tanti fructum caperetis amoris*) recalls Lucan's reference to Pompey's parting from Cornelia at Lesbos: *extremusque perit tam longi fructus amoris* ("the last enjoyment of a love so long is lost," 5.794). The long-distance love of Pompey for Rome is thus assimilated to that which he has for his wife.¹⁴

But this love is doomed; Pompey's dream of better days (*tempora laeta*, 7.20) spent in Rome runs directly contrary to his actual fate (*contraria . . . omina*, 7.21-22). Lucan opines that perhaps Fortune has given Pompey one last vision of Rome in his dream because he will never see the city again (7.23-24). Although Pompey left Rome with the expectation of dying in the city and the city fully expected to see him

¹⁴ Gagliardi 1975, 14; Ahl 1976, 180-181. For a discussion of Pompey as lover, see Ahl 1976, 173-183. The analogy between Cornelia and Rome as objects of Pompey's love informs his statement upon landing at Lesbos, where Cornelia has been living in safety, after the Battle of Pharsalus: "with this hostage Lesbos held/my love; here was my sacred home, here my beloved house-gods,/here was Rome for me" (*tenuit nostros hac obside Lesbos/adfectus; hic sacra domus carique penates,/hic mihi Roma fuit*, 8.131-133). This passage is one of the clearest examples of the metaphorical displacement of Rome in the epic (cf. Henderson 1998, 206). For discussion of other passages in the second half of the *Pharsalia* where Pompey seeks, as it were, a "Rome away from home," see p. 207, n. 82.

again (7.33-36), Pharsalus will result in his death in Egypt (7.37-44). Pompey's dream reveals what both he and Rome will lose in the next day's battle – each other. The battle is thus responsible for shattering the intimate bond between Pompey and the city that defines the pre-war Rome of Pompey's dream. We shall see below¹⁵ that Pharsalus will also divide the *plebs* and the Senate, two classes that had both admired Pompey during his time at Rome. Pharsalus is, therefore, where the fragile union that defined the *civitas* of Late Republican Rome – Pompey, the *Urbs*, and the various classes of the Roman people – is dissolved into its components.

II. Cicero and Pompey's decision to fight

We have seen above that Pompey initially resists his attendants' pleas to return to Italy and marches toward Thessaly instead (6.314-332). However, part of the reason why Pompey agrees to fight a pitched battle at Pharsalus is his fellow republican soldiers' desire to return to Rome. On the morning of the battle, the common soldiers¹⁶ of the Pompeian army shout out that they are eager for battle (7.45-55). They allege that Pompey has deferred battle for so long because he delights in and wishes to prolong the virtual world dominion that his military command affords him (*orbis/indulgens regno*, 7.53-54). Pompey's foreign allies similarly complain about the war's delay, but on the grounds that they are being detained far from home: “And more, the kings and peoples of the east protest that the war/is long drawn out, that they are detained far from their native lands” (*nec non et reges populi*

¹⁵ See pages 198-200.

¹⁶ Lucan refers to them as the “camp's throng” (*turba/castrorum*, 7.45-46) and the “unlucky crowd” (*miseri . . . vulgi*, 7.47).

queruntur Eoi/bella trahi patriaue procul tellure teneri, 7.56-57). Ancient sources¹⁷ indicate that Pompey agreed to fight at Pharsalus because of such accusations, but the accusers were patrician leaders, not the common soldiers. For instance, the patrician L. Domitius Ahenobarbus faulted Pompey for his purported monarchical ambitions when he mockingly called him Agamemnon and “King of Kings.”¹⁸ Lounsbury persuasively argues that Lucan attributes the complaints to the common soldiers in order to exonerate the Senate of animus against Pompey and of complicity in his fateful decision to fight at Pharsalus.¹⁹

It is Cicero who voices the widespread discontent in a speech calling upon Pompey to take immediate military action (7.68-85).²⁰ Lucan ascribes to Cicero motives thematically linked to those of both the republican Romans, who are anxious about the nature of Pompey’s command, and the Eastern allies, who are eager to return home (7.62-66):

cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor
Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaue
pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina securis,
pertulit iratus bellis, cum rostra forumque
optaret passus tam longa silentia miles.

65

The utterances of all were conveyed by the greatest master
of Roman eloquence, Tullius – under his civilian authority

¹⁷ See Caes. *B.C.* 3.82.2, 3.86.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 67, *Caes.* 41.1-2; App. *B.C.* 2.67; and Cass. Dio 42.5.5. For further sources for these accusations, see Lounsbury 1976, 211-212.

¹⁸ Plut. *Pomp.* 67.3. For discussion of the epithets hurled against Pompey, see Champlin 2003, 297. See also p. 226, n. 19, below.

¹⁹ Lounsbury 1976, 211-212.

²⁰ Once again, Lucan’s narrative deviates from the historical record. Cicero was not present at Pharsalus because he remained at the camp at Dyrrachium (*De Div.* 1.68; *Ad Fam.* 9.18.2; Livy *Per.* 111; Plut. *Cic.* 39.1). Lounsbury 1976, 212-214, persuasively argues that Lucan intentionally misplaces Cicero at Pharsalus and attributes this speech to him in order to make a *novus homo* the mouthpiece for a disastrous policy. Lucan thus exonerates the *optimates*, whose class interests he supports. See also Malcovati 1953 for further discussion.

fierce Catiline had trembled at the peace-making Axes.
He was enraged at warfare, because he longed for Rostrum 65
and for Forum, after enduring silence so long as a soldier.

Like his fellow republicans, Cicero chafes under the restrictions imposed upon his freedom of speech and action by Pompey's military command (7.66). Lucan conveys Cicero's desire for the *libertas* typical of civilian life by ascribing to him the desire to return to Rome, and specifically the Rostra and the Forum (7.65-66), the proper physical setting for the oratorical exercise of *libertas* under the republic. To desire an end to Pompey's military *imperium* therefore implies a concomitant desire to return to the *Urbs*, the realm of civilian life. Hence, Cicero and, by extension, the other republicans for whom he speaks join their foreign allies in wishing to return home.

We see in Cicero's desire to return to the *Urbs* the failure of the identification of the Pompeian camp with Rome that Lentulus makes in his speech in Epirus (5.17-37).²¹ Lentulus attempts to silence all complaints about the Senate's separation from Rome by claiming that its rights are not limited by geography.²² Rome is where the Senate is, even if the Senate meets in a military camp (5.9-30). At the beginning of Book 7, the fact that the mass of Pompeians accuse Pompey of imposing personal rule (*regno*, 7.54)²³ over the camp indicates that they do not share Lentulus' understanding of the relation of geography to civilian rule. In other words, they do not see Pompey's prolonged military command as consonant with the liberty proper to republican government. In Book 5, Lentulus claims that military command (*imperium*) will

²¹ See discussion in the preceding chapter (pages 115-119).

²² Lentulus claims: "Not ever has our Order lost/authority by change of soil" (*non umquam perdidit ordo/mutato sua iura solo*, 5.29-30).

²³ For discussion of the meaning and role of *regnum* in the *Pharsalia*, see p. 91, n. 95, above.

attend the Senate wherever it goes: “rule of the state will attend us,/and power will be our **attendant**” (*rerum nos summa sequetur/imperiumque comes*, 5.26-27; emphasis added). In Book 7, Cicero implicitly rejects Lentulus’ claims when he rhetorically asks Pompey whether the Senate follows him as a soldier or as an attendant: “The Senate longs to know: does it follow you, Magnus, as soldier or as **attendant**” (*scire senatus avet, miles te, Magne, sequatur/an comes*, 7.84-85).²⁴ The word *comes* frequently refers to the attendant of a provincial governor.²⁵ If the senators are Pompey’s *comites* and not his *milites*, then they are there not to fight but rather to serve at the behest of Pompey, the possessor of *imperium*.²⁶ Cicero thus implies that, contra Lentulus’ claims in Book 5, the Senate’s separation from Rome and its presence in a military camp have diminished its authority.²⁷

In short, the choices placed before the republicans are either 1.) to prolong the war by persistently deferring battle, or 2.) to risk all in a pitched battle with Caesar in the hope of thereby winning a speedy return to Rome. Unfortunately for the Pompeian army, the desire to return prematurely to the *Urbs* results in catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus (7.58-61).²⁸ Pompey and many of his soldiers will never return home. Those who do return will find the city enslaved to Caesar. When Pompey accedes to the wishes of Cicero and the other republicans for a pitched battle (7.87-123), he calls

²⁴ Braund translates *comes* as “companion” at 5.27 and as “retinue” at 7.85. I have deviated from her translation in order to highlight the fact that Lucan uses the same word in each passage.

²⁵ The observation is made by Ahl 1976, 160, and Dilke 1978, 93. See Lewis & Short s.v. II.B for examples (e.g. Suet. *Div. Iul.* 42).

²⁶ Gagliardi 1975, 85-86; Dilke 1978, 93.

²⁷ Cicero also raises the issue of the Senate’s superiority over Pompey at 7.79-80: “If you are our bidden leader, if the war is waged for us,/give the men the right to fight on whichever field they wish” (*si duce te iusso, si nobis bella geruntur,/sit iuris, quocumque velint, concurrere campo*; emphasis in Braund).

²⁸ At 7.58-61, Lucan explicitly attributes the disaster of Pharsalus to the errors (*erroribus*, 7.59) of the Pompeians.

upon Rome as his witness (*testor, Roma*, 7.91) that it is not upon his own initiative that he abandons a successful strategy of delay for a disastrous one of confrontation (7.87-94). Pompey's appeal to Rome as witness²⁹ highlights the central role that the city, physical *Urbs* as well as political *civitas*, plays in the debate over strategy occurring within the republican camp. It was for Rome that Pompey pursued his former strategy of deferring battle with Caesar (7.92-93). Now, he feels forced to adopt a disastrous policy in part because his troops wish to return to civilian life and hence to the *Urbs*.

But why does Pompey accede to the wishes of Cicero and the republican army?³⁰ Pompey forsakes his initial course of action several times in the *Pharsalia* when his followers and comrades disagree with him.³¹ Lucan's portrayal of Pompey as willing to change his mind when opposed by his comrades has some historical basis; Plutarch explicitly ascribes this tendency to Pompey at *Pomp.* 67.4. At Pharsalus, however, there is also an ideological motivation for Pompey's decision to accede to his fellow republicans' wishes. Cicero has challenged Pompey to demonstrate that the Senate is truly in charge of the republican camp. If Pompey were to overrule Cicero's specific request to engage in battle, he would have to invoke his military *imperium* in order to do so. He would thus behave as a commander and not as

²⁹ Apostrophe is one of Lucan's methods of stressing the importance of Rome in his account of the civil war. D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 179, n. 2, observes, "The three most frequent objects of apostrophe in the *Bellum Civile* are Caesar, Pompey, and Rome." Gagliardi 2001, 166, records seventeen apostrophes addressed to Rome.

³⁰ In this discussion, I follow the line of interpretation advanced by Ahl 1976, 160-164.

³¹ For other instances, see 2.596-600 (the retreat from Capua) and 8.453-455 (the decision to seek refuge in Egypt instead of in Parthia). See Ahl 1974, 314-315, and Ahl 1976, 173ff., for discussion of Pompey's desperate craving to be loved by others and his corresponding inability to impose unpopular decisions on subordinates if it might mean losing their approval.

a servant of the Senate.³² Forced either to save the republican military position by means of a unilateral order or to lose the war by following the rule of the Senate, Pompey opts for the latter. In so doing, he effectively abdicates the very right of *imperium* that he possessed as a Roman military commander fighting abroad. At the same time, the Senate comes to exercise over the military affairs of an encamped army the authority that it would normally exercise only over political affairs within the *pomerium* of the *Urbs*.³³ In this sense, Lentulus' claim that Rome is present with the Senate in the republican camp is vindicated, but tragically so because Pompey's military strategy was superior to that proposed by Cicero.

III. Rome's fate in an anti-*Aeneid*³⁴

Whereas Pompey's policy of delaying battle protected the *Urbs* from violence, Cicero's plan for immediate combat at Pharsalus results in the permanent establishment of Caesar's dominion and the loss of numerous citizens. In lines 7.131-138, Lucan observes that Pharsalus determines what Rome will be for all time to come:

³² Ahl 1976, 161-162.

³³ I here follow the interpretation of the passage put forth by Rambaud 1955, 264-266, and developed by Lounsbury 1976, 218-219. They argue that Pompey's epithet *rector* at 7.85 reflects his effective abdication of military command in favor of civilian rule; *rector rerum publicarum* ("guide of public affairs") is the title that Cicero in his *De Re Publica* (e.g. at 5.6) gives to his idealized *civilian* leader (cf. Ahl 1976, 161-162, and Martindale 1984, 78, n. 47). In Book 9, Cato eulogizes Pompey as *rectorque senatus, / sed regnantis* ("he was ruler/of the Senate – but it still ruled," *Phars.* 9.194-195). However, as Lounsbury notes, the decision to fight at Pharsalus was by rights a strictly military decision that legally was within Pompey's rights as a commander holding *imperium*. Hence, Cicero's victory over Pompey reveals both the tragic results of the Senate's displacement from Rome and its "helplessness in the moment of crisis" (Ahl 1976, 162).

³⁴ I provide a short bibliography for the reading of the *Pharsalia* as an anti-*Aeneid* in the introduction (pages 23-26). I also address the limitations of this interpretation there.

advenisse diem qui fatum rebus in aevum
conderet humanis, et quaeri, Roma quid esset,
illo Marte, palam est. sua quisque pericula nescit
attonitus maiore metu. quis litora ponto
obruta, quis summis cernens in montibus aequor 135
aetheraque in terras deiecto sole cadentem,
tot rerum finem, timeat sibi? non vacat ullos
pro se ferre metus: urbi Magnoque timetur.

It is clear that the day has come which will establish the destiny
of human life for ever, that the battle will decide
what Rome will be. Each man is unaware of his own dangers,
stunned by a greater dread. Who would fear for himself 135
if he saw the shore inundated by the deep or sea-water
on the mountain-tops and ether falling towards the earth
and the sun hurled down – widespread destruction? There is no
time
to feel terror for themselves: they fear for Rome and Magnus.

Roma quid esset (7.132): either the republic or Caesar's tyranny must perish. The crisis will be resolved by the extreme violence of Pharsalus, which Lucan compares to the *ekpyrosis*, the cyclical destruction of the universe hypothesized by Stoic physics.³⁵ The juxtaposition of Lucan's reference to the physical, cosmic destruction of *ekpyrosis* and to the republicans' fears for the *Urbs* reflects Lucan's persistent characterization of the civil war as the metaphorical destruction of Rome. In the face of battle, the republicans fear neither for their own safety nor for abstract republican principles. Rather, they fear for Rome and Pompey, who are joined in a virtual hendiadys³⁶: *urbi Magnoque timetur* (7.138). Their concern "for the city" is all the more striking because Caesar has long since established his rule at Rome and the city itself will see no additional bloodshed if Caesar wins at Pharsalus. The word *urbi* therefore refers to

³⁵ See the introduction (pages 17-18) for a brief discussion of Lucan's references to *ekpyrosis*.

³⁶ Ahl 1974, 308, notes the identification of Pompey and the city in this line: "It is no wonder that the soldiers at the battle of Pharsalus are afraid not only for the city, but for Pompey, *urbi Magnoque timetur* [7.138], for it is not easy to differentiate the two." Cf. Ahl 1976, 159.

Rome's republican constitution, which Caesar actually will destroy, and its prospect of ever being restored within the *Urbs*. The anxieties of the republicans "for the city and for Pompey" thus reveal that they conceptualize the republican regime in much the same way that Pompey does in his dream, i.e. as a union of Pompey and the city of Rome.

We have seen how the Pompeians identify Rome with the republican regime. I argue that Lucan also likens the establishment of Caesar's new regime to the establishment of a new city. He does so by means of a Vergilian allusion at *Phars.* 7.131-132: *advenisse diem qui fatum rebus in aevum/conderet humanis, et quaeri, Roma quid esset*. At almost exactly the same point in Book 7 of the *Aeneid* (7.144-145),³⁷ the Trojans conclude that they have reached the land they have sought: *diditur hic subito Troiana per agmina rumor/advenisse diem quo debita moenia condant* ("Here the rumor is suddenly disseminated through the Trojan troops/that the day has come on which they should establish the city owed to them").³⁸ The line opening *advenisse diem* followed by a relative clause containing the verb *condere* links both lines. Vergil speaks of the foundation of what will be called Lavinium (12.194), the

³⁷ Among several other structural parallelisms between the *Aeneid* and the *Pharsalia*, Von Albrecht 1999, 237, observes that "the great battle" in each epic begins in Book 7, i.e. the Trojan conquest of Latium in *Aen.* 7 and the Battle of Pharsalus in *Phars.* 7. Following the analysis of Guillemin 1951, Von Albrecht (ibid., n. 4) cites the allusion to *Aen.* 7.145 at *Phars.* 7.131 as a more specific instance of Lucan's "imitation by contrast," specifically the contrast between Rome's genesis in the *Aeneid* and her downfall in the *Pharsalia*. Cf. Narducci's similar interpretation of this allusion in the following note.

³⁸ This allusion to Vergil is noted by Narducci 2002, 82, who provides bibliography for previous discussions of the passage. The reading I advance above is fairly standard in contemporary Lucan scholarship. According to Narducci, the point of the allusion is the contrast between the foundation of the city of Lavinium and the metaphorical destruction of Rome. According to this reading, Lucan uses the words of the *Aeneid* to subvert the earlier epic's content. This is a valid interpretation of the passage but not a complete one; it misses the point that at Pharsalus Caesar succeeds in establishing his new Roman regime. The destruction of the old Rome thus entails the foundation of a new one. Cf. Serres 1991, 38-39, and Kraus 1994, 270-271, for discussion of a similar pattern in Livy's account of the foundation of Rome in Book 1; Lavinium cannot be founded until Troy is destroyed and Rome's foundation is not secure until the Romans destroy Alba Longa, their mother city.

Trojans' first permanent settlement in Italy. This settlement will in turn eventually give rise to Rome. Lucan adapts Vergil's reference to the foundation of a new city to refer to the redefinition of Rome. The reader already knows both from history and from Lucan's repeated foreshadowings and direct references to Pompey's defeat that the new foundation at Rome is Caesar's tyranny. Lucan's Vergilian allusion thus reveals the answer to the question *Roma quid esset* (7.132): Caesar's new Rome will supplant Pompey's old one.

Lucan uses another Vergilian allusion to liken the Battle of Pharsalus, the decisive moment in the redefinition of Rome's political constitution, to the physical destruction of Troy. Among various other portents of ensuing disaster (7.151-213), the Paduan seer Gaius Cornelius sees a vision of Pharsalus (7.192-196)³⁹:

Euganeo, si vera fides memorantibus, augur
 colle sedens, Aponus terris ubi fumifer exit
 atque Antenorei dispergitur unda Timavi,
 'venit summa dies, geritur res maxima,' dixit, 195
 'impia concurrunt Pompei et Caesaris arma,' . . .

If those who tell can truly be believed, the augur sitting
 on the Euganean hill, where Aponus emerges steaming
 from the earth and wave of Antenor's Timavus is split,
 said: 'The final day has come, the greatest issue is fought, 195
 the wicked armies of Pompey and of Caesar clash'; . . .

The words *venit summa dies* (7.195) reprise the theme of 7.131, namely the arrival of the definitive day in the war (*advenisse diem*).⁴⁰ In this passage, Lucan closely

³⁹ The vision is also recorded by Plut. *Caes.* 47 (who cites the lost Book 111 of Livy, C. Cornelius' fellow Paduan), Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 15.18.1-3, and Cass. Dio 41.61.4-5. For further analysis and a list of other ancient sources, see Leigh 1997, 6-40.

⁴⁰ Goebel 1981, 81-84, comments on the related "wished-for-day" topos in the speeches delivered by Caesar (7.254-260) and Pompey (7.342-344) before the battle.

identifies Rome with the republican regime that is about to receive its mortal blow.

The words *venit summa dies* at the beginning of line 7.195 are taken from the beginning of a passage spoken by Panthus to Aeneas during the fall of Troy (*Aen.* 2.324-327)⁴¹:

venit summa dies et ineluctabile tempus
Dardaniae. fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium et ingens 325
gloria Teucrorum; ferus omnia Iuppiter Argos
transtulit; incensa Danaï dominantur in urbe.

Doomsday has come, inescapable hour of Dardania's destruction.
Trojans we were. But no more. No more Ilium, no more 325
stupendous
Glory for Teucer's sons. Savage Jupiter's moved it to Argos,
All of it. Now, in our blazing city Danaïns are masters.

Due remarks that, "Lucan directs the understanding of his readers towards the famous *fuimus Troes*," Vergil's epitaph for the city of Troy, by means of the expression *venit summa dies*.⁴² Like Troy, Rome (i.e. the Roman *civitas*) is perishing.

Unlike the *summa dies* of Troy, that of Rome does not entail the literal physical destruction of the city by a rampaging army. Rather, it means the end of the city's republican constitution and, as I shall explain at length below,⁴³ the death of much of the city's native stock. Lucan nevertheless amplifies the sense of Pharsalus' devastation by implicitly likening the fall of the republic to the physical destruction of

⁴¹ Due 1962, 118; Martindale 1984, 75; Von Albrecht 1999, 237-238; Narducci 2002, 81. In linking the Vergilian allusions at *Phars.* 7.131 and *Phars.* 7.195, I follow Narducci, who discusses the two allusions on succeeding pages of his study (see n. 38 above).

⁴² Due 1962, 118. Lucan's allusion to the fall of Troy is bolstered by the epithet *Antenorei* applied to the Timavus River in line 7.194. Just as Aeneas fled Troy and founded Lavinium, Antenor was a Trojan refugee who came to Italy and founded Padua. The legend of Antenor's foundation of Padua appears most notably in the opening passage of Livy's first book (1.1-3) and at *Aen.* 1.242-249, where Vergil specifically refers to Antenor's arrival at the Timavus River (*Aen.* 1.244). I thank Frederick Ahl for pointing out to me the latter passage.

⁴³ See pages 189-200.

Troy. Rome is metaphorically destroyed – sees its last day – when Caesar and Pompey join battle in Thessaly.

IV. The speeches of Caesar and Pompey

After Pompey's dream and Lucan's reference to Cicero's longing for the Forum, the *Urbs* reappears in both Caesar and Pompey's addresses to their troops immediately prior to the battle. As we shall see in this section, both generals attempt to place the city before the eyes of their men by means of *enargeia*, the vivid description of events.⁴⁴ That is to say, they attempt to render the image of Rome present and perceptible to their soldiers at Pharsalus. They turn to this rhetorical technique because they claim to be protecting the city from dire consequences that will befall it if the other side wins. Caesar claims that Pompey will make the city a scene of carnage much as it was under Sulla. Pompey portrays the people of Rome appealing to the republican army from the walls of the city. Both leaders thus use the image of the city in peril in order to stress the importance of the battle.

Ancient rhetoricians regarded *enargeia* as an especially effective way of inspiring pity and indignation. The pathetic description of the sack or destruction of a city in particular was regarded as a stock example of *enargeia*.⁴⁵ In his harangue,

⁴⁴ Among other definitions, Quintilian refers to *enargeia* as *credibilis imago rerum* ("the credible picture of events," 4.2.123-124) and *sub oculis subiectio* ("placement under the eyes," 9.2.40-44). The author of the *ad Herr.* also discusses the technique at 4.39.51 and 4.55.68. For a list of these and similar sources, see Goebel 1981, 90ff. Goebel analyzes Lucan's use of *enargeia* in the speeches of Caesar and Pompey. For a more general treatment of *enargeia* in Lucan, see Leigh 1997, 10-15, 39, and *passim*, as well as *passim* in D'Alessandro Behr 2007.

⁴⁵ See Goebel 1981, 90-94. For the *captae urbis miseratio* ("pity for the capture of a city") as a standard example of *enargeia*, see Quint. 8.3.67-69, *ad Herr.* 4.39.51, and, for a modern discussion, Paul 1982. The author of the *ad Herr.* writes, "This embellishment [*enargeia*] is most profitable when a matter stands in need of amplification or pity" (*haec exornatio plurimum prodest in amplificanda et*

Caesar motivates his troops by claiming that Pompey will butcher the Caesarians if he wins the war (7.303-307):

aut merces hodie bellorum aut poena parata.
Caesareas spectate cruces, spectate catenas,
et caput hoc positum rostris effusaque membra 305
Saeptorumque nefas et clausi proelia Campi.
cum duce Sullano gerimus civilia bella.

Today provides either the reward or the penalty of war.
Picture the crosses, picture the chains for Caesar's side,
this head of mine placed on the Rostra, my limbs flung far and 305
wide,
crime committed in the Saepta, and battles in the closed-in
Campus:
we are waging civil war with a general of Sulla.

Caesar locates Pompey's massacres in the parts of Rome where Sulla, Pompey's former commander, committed massacres after the Battle of Praeneste and during the course of his proscriptions. Caesar's characterization of a Pompeian Rome thus mirrors the *senex*'s memories of Rome under Sulla (2.139-222). As we have seen in Ch. 1,⁴⁶ the old man's speech in *Phars.* 2 is Lucan's answer to Vergil's narrative of the fall of Troy in *Aen.* 2. Caesar would have his troops believe that such pitiable, destructive violence will recur at Rome (once more an *urbs capta*) if Pompey wins at Pharsalus. Therefore, his troops are fighting to protect the city from Pompey's rapine and slaughter.

Caesar attempts to make the vision of Pompeian massacres particularly vivid for his soldiers. He does not tell his soldiers merely to imagine what Pompey would

commiseranda re, 4.55.69). Cf. Quint. 6.2.34, who advises that *enargeia* be used "where there will be need for pity" (*ubi vero miseratione opus erit*).

⁴⁶ See p. 78ff. above.

do at Rome. Rather, he uses the imperative *spectate* twice in line 7.304. It is as though the city is present before them at Pharsalus and they need only to open their eyes in order to see it awash in blood. Quintilian comments on this effect of *enargeia* when he calls it *sub oculis subiectio* (“placement under the eyes,” 9.2.40-44). Caesar thus attempts to diminish the sense of Pharsalus’ distance from Rome; by means of rhetoric, he makes Rome seem present to his troops in order to show them how the effects of the battle will play out in the *Urbs*.

Pompey similarly plays on the concept of Rome’s metaphorical presence on the field of battle (7.346-348)⁴⁷:

quisquis patriam carosque penates,
qui subolem ac thalamos desertaque pignora quaerit,
ense petat: medio posuit deus omnia campo.

Whoever desires his land and house-gods dear,
his children, marriage-chamber, the ties he has left behind, must win them
by the sword: the god has set all prizes in the field in between us.

Pompey here refers to the families, homes, and gods abandoned (*desertaque*, 7.347) by the republicans when they left Italy. They are metaphorically present on the field of Pharsalus (*medio . . . campo*, 7.348) much as prizes in games were set in the open for all to see; they are the reward offered the republicans in return for victory.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Commenting on this passage, Bexley 2009, 466, observes, “Pharsalus takes center stage because it is the site where the future of Rome, the ostensible center of the world, will be decided.”

⁴⁸ See Dilke 1978, 120, who cites *Aen.* 5.109-110 (*munera principio ante oculos circoque locantur/in medio*, “First, the prizes are placed before the viewers’ eyes in the middle of the circle”), and Hom. *Il.* 23.704, where the prizes are set in the middle of the gathering (ἐς μέσσον) for all to see. Bexley 2009, 466, observes, “Roman power and all the reaches of the world that Rome controls, *omnia*, are literally positioned *medio campo*, condensed into a midpoint within the midpoint that is Pharsalus.” For further discussion of *Phars.* 7.346-348, see Goebel 1981, 83-84.

Pompey next appeals to his men by portraying the entire population of Rome hanging from the city walls as they encourage the republican army to fight (7.369-382):

credite pendentes e summis moenibus urbis	
crinibus effusis hortari in proelia matres;	370
credite grandaevum vetitumque aetate senatum	
arma sequi sacros pedibus prosternere canos	
atque ipsam domini metuentem occurrere Romam;	
credite qui nunc est populus populumque futurum	
permixtas afferre preces: haec libera nasci,	375
haec vult turba mori. si quis post pignora tanta	
Pompeio locus est, cum prole et coniuge supplex,	
imperii salva si maiestate liceret,	
volverer ante pedes. Magnus, nisi vincitis, exul,	
ludibrium soceri, vester pudor, ultima fata	380
deprecor ac turpes extremi cardinis annos,	
ne discam servire senex.	

Imagine that your mothers, leaning from Rome's highest	
city-walls with hair streaming, are urging you to battle;	370
Imagine that the aged senators, prevented by their years	
from joining the army, are laying at your feet their white and	
hallowed hair;	
that Rome herself, in fear of a master, is coming to meet you;	
imagine that the people now and the people of the future	
bring their prayers combined; to be born in freedom is one	375
throng's wish;	
to die in freedom the other's. If after appeals so great,	
there is a place for Pompey, a suppliant, with child and wife,	
I would throw myself before your feet if I could do so with the	
dignity	
of high office intact. Unless you conquer, Magnus will be an	
exile,	
his father-in-law's laughing-stock and your disgrace: I pray that	380
I escape	
the worst destiny and degrading years at life's final pivot –	
may I not in old age learn to be a slave.	

Much as the conceit of Pompey's dream is that he and Rome see each other one last time, this passage of his speech has the people of Rome see the republican army go off to battle and the republican soldiers see their city in turn. Like Caesar, Pompey uses rhetoric to mitigate his soldiers' sense of geographical separation from Rome and to reemphasize the bond between the republicans and their city. According to Pompey, the republican army is fighting for Rome and its present and future liberty (*libera*, 7.375), not for any partisan interest. The Senate (7.371-372), general populace (*populum*, 7.374), and Pompey and his family (7.376-382) are united in support of the republican army. The physical city, Senate, *populus*, and Pompey thus form a unity as they did in Pompey's dream. This vivid image is meant to impress upon the soldiers what is at stake at Pharsalus – the perpetual enslavement of the entire city to the tyranny of Caesar and his dynastic successors.

V. Pharsalus and the devastation of Italy

After a brief mention of the speech's positive effect upon the Pompeians' fighting spirit (7.382-384), Lucan describes the two armies rushing forward to meet one another in battle (7.385-386). However, he almost immediately digresses from the narrative of the battle to an extended description of the devastating effect that the battle will have upon Rome and Italy during the century intervening between the civil war and his Neronian present (7.387-459).⁴⁹ In the first half of this passage, Lucan links his persistent metaphor of Rome's self-destruction with the literal destruction of cities in Italy (7.387-407):

⁴⁹ This digression is yet another instance where Lucan stalls plot progression; cf. p. 105, n. 127, and p. 170, n. 4, above.

hae facient dextrae, quidquid non expleat aetas,
 ulla nec humanum reparet genus omnibus annis,
 ut vacet a ferro. gentes Mars iste futuras
 obruet et populos aevi venientis in orbem⁵⁰ 390
 erepto natale feret. tunc omne Latinum
 fabula nomen erit; Gabios Veiosque Coramque
 pulvere vix tectae poterunt monstrare ruinae
 Albanosque lares Laurentinosque penates,
 rus vacuum, quod non habitet nisi nocte coacta 395
 invitus questusque Numam iussisse senator.
 non aetas haec carpsit edax monimentaue rerum
 putria destituit: crimen civile videmus
 tot vacuas urbes. generis quo turba redacta est
 humani! toto populi qui nascimur orbe 400
 nec muros implere viris nec possumus agros:
 urbs nos una capit. vincto fossore coluntur
 Hesperiae segetes, stat tectis putris avitis
 in nullos ruitura domus, nulloque frequentem
 cive suo Romam sed mundi faece repletam 405
 cladis eo dedimus, ne tanto in corpore bellum
 iam possit civile geri.

These sword-hands will achieve things that no future age
 can make good nor humankind repair in all the years,
 though it be free from warfare. That fight will crush
 the future races, and it will rob of birth and sweep away 390
 the people of the generation entering the world. Then all
 the Latin name will be a fable: Gabii, Veii, Cora
 hardly will be indicated by their dust-covered ruins,
 the hearths of Alba and the house-gods of Laurentum,
 an empty country which no senator inhabits except unwillingly 395
 on night ordained, complaining of the decree of Numa.
 It is not devouring time which has eroded and abandoned in decay
 these memorials of the past: it is the crime of civil war we see,
 so many empty cities. To what has the multitude of humankind
 been reduced! We peoples born in all the world 400
 are not enough to fill with men the town-walls and fields;
 a single city holds us all. The cornlands of Hesperia are worked
 by chained labourer, the house with its ancestral roof decaying
 stands, about to fall on no one; and Rome, crowded
 by no citizen of her own but filled with the dregs of the world, 405
 we have consigned to such a depth of ruin that in a body so
 immense

⁵⁰ I here accept the reading *orbem*, which Shackleton Bailey obelizes.

civil war cannot now be waged.

Along with Laelius' vow to destroy Rome at 1.373-386 and Caesar's visit to the ruins of Troy at 9.950-999, this passage is one of the clearest examples of the theme of the destruction of cities in the *Pharsalia*. By diverting the reader's attention away from Pharsalus to Rome and Italy, Lucan complements Pompey's reference to the *Urbs* in his speech. Just lines after Pompey uses *enargeia* to depict the people and Senate of Rome lining the walls of Rome (7.369-382), Lucan describes the city's walls as too large for the remaining native population (7.399-407). Lucan's digression in lines 7.387-419 thus confirms that Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in Thessaly really did have a disastrous effect upon the *Urbs* in Italy, just as Pompey predicts in his speech.

Although the Battle of Pharsalus entails no outbreak of military violence in Italy, the ultimate effect of the battle is much the same as if the war had been fought in Italy and Laelius had in fact leveled cities in Caesar's name (1.383-386). Lucan explains that Pharsalus severely reduced the native population of Roman Italy (7.387-391, 399-407). As a result, in Lucan's own day numerous cities in the Latin heartland lie abandoned and in ruins (7.391-396). Lucan here reprises the image of Italy's desolate, ruined cities found in the proem to the *Pharsalia* (1.24-29).⁵¹ In Book 7, Lucan sharpens this dystopian vision of Italy in his day by providing a list of destroyed Italian cities (7.392-394).

⁵¹ I quote this passage in the introduction to the dissertation (pages 1-2).

Strikingly, all of these cities were abandoned before the time of the civil war.⁵²

From the accounts given by Livy and other historians, Lucan's readers would have been well aware of Alba Longa's destruction by the Roman King Tullus Hostilius and the capture and depopulation of Veii by Camillus in 396 B.C.⁵³ Propertius also mentions the destruction of Veii, and Gabii and Cora appear in Late Republican and Early Imperial literature as *exempla* of ruined cities or cities in decline.⁵⁴ Why then does Lucan claim that Pharsalus destroyed these cities? Is he simply a poor reader of Rome's early history?

The explanation for Lucan's peculiar catalogue lies rather in Lucan's intertextual engagement with Vergil. Numerous modern scholars have observed that Lucan here reworks the passage in Book 6 of the *Aeneid* in which Anchises lists the cities of Latium that his descendants will build (6.773-776)⁵⁵:

hi tibi Nomentum et Gabios urbemque Fidenam,
hi Collatinas imponent montibus arces,
Pometios Castrumque Inui Bolamque Coramque; 775
haec tum nomina erunt, nunc sunt sine nomine terrae.

These men will found Nomentum for you, Gabii and Fidenae.
These men will place Collatia's fortress high on the hilltops,
Also Pometia and Castrum Inui, Bola and Cora. 775

⁵² See Ahl 1976, 216, notes the anachronism: "It would be truer to say that the civil war had completed the process of destruction already begun. Appian tells us that that the greater part of Italy had been devastated during the Roman conquest (*Civil Wars* 1.7)."

⁵³ See Livy 1.29 for the destruction of Alba Longa and Livy 5.22-23 for the conquest of Veii.

⁵⁴ Propertius famously laments the destruction of Veii at 4.10.25-38; for a perceptive discussion of the theme of the destruction of cities in this passage, see Welch 2005, 133-170. Classical sources for the desolation of Gabii in the first centuries B.C. and A.D. include Cic. *Pro Planc.* 23, Hor. *Epist.* 1.11.7-8, Prop. 4.1.34, Dion. Hal. 4.53, and Juv. 6.56-57 and 10.100. Cora too was deemed an insignificant backwater (Prop. 4.10.24; Flor. 1.11.6). For previous discussions of these towns' proverbial state of decay, see the commentary of Butler and Barber 1933 on Prop. 4.1.33-34; Ahl 1976, 216-217; and Feeney 1986, 7-8.

⁵⁵ Among other modern scholars, this Vergilian allusion is addressed by Gagliardi 1975, 59-60; Ahl 1976, 218; and Narducci 2002, 167-169. My interpretation of the allusion's meaning is indebted to theirs.

They will exist in the future as names; now they're lands, but
they're nameless.

Both Vergil and Lucan include Gabii and Cora in their catalogues of cities (*Aen.* 6.773, 6.775; *Phars.* 7.392). A more certain proof of Lucan's allusion to Vergil, however, is the expression *tunc omne Latinum/fabula nomen erit* (*Phars.* 7.391-392), an adaptation of Vergil's *haec tum nomina erunt* (*Aen.* 6.776). According to the interpretation of these lines advanced by Ahl and Feeney, Lucan develops an ambiguous aspect of Anchises' prophecy.⁵⁶ Anchises' words *haec tum nomina erunt* can be read either as a prophecy of the days when these cities will exist and have names or of the later period (the Late Republic and Early Principate) when these cities will no longer exist (at least not in their former state of grandeur) and they will be *mere* names. Lucan takes Anchises' ambiguous prophecy and opts for the pessimistic meaning; Cora, Gabii, and the other cities of Latium are now (i.e. in the Neronian age) a mere *fabula*.⁵⁷

Lucan implies that the buildings of Rome would also be in ruins if not for the influx of foreign immigrants. He claims that because of Pharsalus one city, i.e. Rome, now contains the entire Roman population and no people are left to populate the other cities of Italy: *toto populi qui nascimur orbe/nec muros implere viris nec possumus agros; urbs nos una capit* (7.400-402).⁵⁸ At the same time, Rome itself is filled with foreign immigrants (whom Lucan insults by calling them "dregs") and seldom sees a

⁵⁶ Ahl 1976, 217-218; Feeney 1986, 7-8.

⁵⁷ Pliny the Elder, a contemporary of Lucan, reports: "fifty-three peoples out of ancient Latium have perished without a trace" (*ex antiquo Latio LIII populi interiere sine vestigiis*, *N.H.* 3.70; see *N.H.* 3.68-69 for a catalogue of these cities).

⁵⁸ The English translation for this passage and the following one are provided with the block-citation of lines 7.387-407 above.

native citizen: *nulloque frequentem/cive suo Romam sed mundi faece repletam/cladis eo dedimus, ne tanto in corpore bellum/iam possit civile geri* (7.404-407).⁵⁹ There is a break in continuity between the population of Rome under the republic and that under the Principate since the makeup of the old native stock has perished. Lucan thus attributes Rome's obvious persistence under the Empire to the corrupting admixture of foreign elements into the Roman population. At the risk of exaggeration, we may conclude that only the presence of these immigrants explains why Rome is not a desolate city like Veii or Gabii. In the world of Lucan's poem, even the persistence of the physical city of Rome is, paradoxically, the sign of the destruction of what Rome once was. Additionally, the peace typical of the Early Principate is a sign of Rome's spent energy and reduced population, not of inner harmony (7.406-407).⁶⁰

As the Roman soldiers present on the field of battle constituted the people of Rome, Rome was metaphorically destroyed along with them at Pharsalus. Lucan states that the number of Romans slain at Pharsalus exceeds the number of people one would expect to die when fires or earthquakes destroy cities: "cities given up to fires,/quakes which bring the walls of crowded cities tumbling down" (*permissasque ignibus urbes/moeniaque in praeceps laturos plena tremores*, 7.413-414). The immediate purpose of the comparison is to amplify the gravity of Pharsalus. However,

⁵⁹ As Michael Fontaine has pointed out to me, one may compare Lucan's nativism to that of Juvenal in *Sat.* 3. Lucan's affinities with post-Augustan satire and the similarities between his style of social criticism and Juvenal's have been noted by Bonner 1966, 262, 264, 273, 275, and 280-281; Marti 1975, 76, 82, and 84; Martindale 1976, 52; and Martindale 1984, 76, n. 13. Marti 1975, 82, writes, "[Lucan's] indignation at the state of the republic, his bitter sorrow at the consequences of the war are set forth with an exaggerated passion designed to arouse reactions similar to his own, much in the manner of a Juvenal." Despite his protests against foreign immigrants, Lucan himself was born at Corduba in Spain. I thank Frederick Ahl for pointing this out to me.

⁶⁰ Likewise, Caesar's anticlimactic entry into Rome in Book 3 testifies to the death of the republic there (see Ch. 1, pages 85-102).

Lucan also revisits the metaphor of Rome's self-destruction by using the destruction of cities by fire and earthquake as his point of reference for gauging the disaster of Pharsalus. In an apostrophe to Rome, Lucan claims that Fortune uses the Battle of Pharsalus "to show you in your fall,/Rome, how mighty was your fall" (*tibi, Roma, ruenti/ostendat quam magna cadas*, 7.418-419). The references to burning cities and Rome's collapse are particularly striking in light of Lucan's claim that Pharsalus exceeds the Battle of the Allia in terms of its disastrous effect upon Rome: "The fatal names of Cannae and of Allia,/long cursed in the Roman calendar, must yield their place" (*cedant feralia nomina Cannae/et damnata diu Romanis Allia fastis*, 7.408-409). As the Battle of the Allia resulted in the Gallic Sack and a Carthaginian capture of Rome seemed imminent after Cannae, Lucan claims that the metaphorical collapse (*ruenti*, 7.418; *cadas*, 7.419) of the republican regime is even worse than the literal, physical destruction of the *Urbs*.⁶¹

VI. Foreign allies, the Senate, and Rome's destruction

In the preceding section, I analyzed the theme of Rome's metaphorical destruction in the long expository passage that divides Lucan's mention of the armies lining up for battle (7.385-386) from his resumption of the narrative at 7.460. The image of Rome undergoing destruction at Pharsalus also pervades the narrative of the battle itself (7.460-711). Lucan begins his narrative by refusing to report what happened: "whatever you did in this battle, Rome, I shall not tell" (*quidquid in hac*

⁶¹ See discussion of this passage in the introduction (pages 15-16, especially n. 41).

acie gessisti, Roma, tacebo, 7.556).⁶² The apostrophe to *Roma* and the emphasis on what the city did (*gessisti*) shows that Rome is metaphorically present in its armies and destroys itself. First, Lucan portrays the death of Pompey's foreign auxiliaries as the death of nations that one day will be assimilated into the Roman state in order to fill up the number of native citizens killed in the civil war. Secondly, Lucan gives special prominence to the death of senators on the battlefield. In Book 5, Lentulus claims that the Senate constituted Rome (5.17-37). Similarly, the deaths of senators represent the destruction of Pompey's republican version of Rome.

Given Lucan's disdain for the incorporation of foreign peoples into the populace of Rome,⁶³ the role Pompey's allies play in the Battle of Pharsalus should pose a problem for his identification of the republican party as the party of Rome itself. For instance, he notes that in fighting against the Caesarians the foreign contingents direct their weapons against Romans (7.510-513). Lucan later laments that Pharsalus cannot be content with foreign deaths, but then he admits that no one will be left to populate Rome after the war unless foreign nations survive the battle (7.535-543):

utinam, Pharsalia, campis	535
sufficiat cruor iste tuis, quem barbara fundunt	
pectora, non alio mutantur sanguine fontes,	
hic numerus totos tibi vestiat ossibus agros.	

⁶² Taken literally, this proclamation would signify that Lucan will *not* relate what Rome did on the field of Pharsalus. Duff 1943 (*ad loc.*) comments, "Lucan makes this promise and then proceeds to break it" (cf. Johnson 1987, 98-99). Masters 1992, 147-148 (who is responding to Duff); Ormand 1994, 53-54; and Henderson 1998, 185, cite this passage as an example of Lucan's programmatic (if, of course, ultimately unsuccessful) resistance against narrating the terrible *nefas* of Caesar's victory in the civil war. As Henderson notes (*ibid.*), this programmatic resistance is related to Lucan's habit of delaying his narrative, on which see p. 105, n. 127; p. 170, n. 4; and p. 189, n. 49 above. Cf. O'Higgins 1988, 215-216, on the preceding lines 7.552-555, and Masters 1992, 1-10.

⁶³ See the preceding section of this chapter (pages 193-194).

aut, si Romano compleri sanguine mavis,
 istis parce, precor; vivant Galataeque Syrique,
 Cappadoce Gallique extremique orbis Hiberi,
 Armenii, Cilices; nam post civilia bella
 hic populus Romanus erit. 540

I wish, Pharsalia, 535
 that that gore which barbarian breasts shed may satisfy
 your plains, that your springs may be dyed by no others' blood,
 that this mass may cover all your fields with their bones.
 Or if you prefer to be glutted with Roman blood,
 then, I pray, spare these men: let the Galatians live, Syrians 540
 Cappadocians, Gauls, Iberians from the world's edge,
 Armenians, Cilicians, for after civil war
 these will be the Roman people.

In a sense, the foreign allies' deaths are Roman by anticipation, a conceit Lucan has prepared his reader for in the digression on Rome's post-Pharsalian future.

Lucan later interprets the death of foreign allies as part of Rome's own metaphorical death (7.632-637):

non istas habuit pugnae Pharsalia partes
 quas aliae clades: illic per fata virorum,
 per populos hic Roma perit; quod militis illic,
 mors hic gentis erat: sanguis ibi fluxit Achaeus, 635
 Ponticus, Assyrius; cunctos haerere cruores
 Romanus campisque vetat consistere torrens.

Pharsalia did not have those elements of battle
 which other calamities had: there, Rome was ruined by the
 destinies
 of warriors, here by entire peoples; a soldier's death there
 was here a nation's death; here streamed Achaean blood, 635
 Pontic and Assyrian – all that gore is stopped from sticking
 and congealing on the plain by a torrent of Roman gore

Lucan here equates the fate of Rome with that of its armies on the battlefield; Pharsalus (*hic*, 7.634) is where Rome perishes.⁶⁴ In past battles, Rome perished through the deaths of its own men (*per fata virorum*, 7.633). Now, it perishes through entire nations fighting on its behalf (*per populos*, 7.634).⁶⁵ Because Pompey's foreign troops are fighting in the name of the republic and their nations will later be incorporated into the Roman state, the casualties they sustain in the battle render Rome's self-destruction truly catastrophic. In fact, Rome's metaphorical death is universal in scope.

Rome also perishes at Pharsalus through the deaths of senators. Lucan strongly identifies the Pompeian forces with the Senate. First, Caesar forbids his men to fight against plebeians and instead directs them against men of senatorial and equestrian rank (7.578-585):

. . . in plebem vetat ire manus monstratque senatum:
 scit cruor imperii qui sit, quae viscera rerum,
 unde petat Romam, libertas ultima mundi 580
 quo steterit ferienda loco. permixta secundo
 ordine nobilitas venerandaque corpora ferro
 urguntur; caedunt Lepidos caeduntque Metellos
 Corvinosque simul Torquataque nomina, rerum
 saepe duces summosque hominum te, Magne, remoto. 585

[Caesar] forbids them to strike the masses and indicates the Senate;
 well he knows which is the empire's blood, which are the guts of
 the state,
 he knows the starting-point of his course to Rome, the spot to 580
 strike
 as the Liberty of the world makes her final stand. Nobility mingled

⁶⁴ Henderson 1998, 206, cites *hic Roma perit* (7.634) as an example of Rome's metaphorical movability.

⁶⁵ After Pompey's death, however, the allies will claim that they were fighting for Pompey and not for the republic (9.217-252, answered by Cato at 9.253-283). See discussion in the next chapter (pages 240-243).

with the Second Order and venerable persons are overwhelmed
by the sword; they slaughter Lepidi, Metelli,
Corvini along with famed Torquati, often leaders
of the state and greatest of men, with you excepted, Magnus. 585

According to Lucan, the heavy toll Pharsalus took upon Rome is a matter of quality – men hailing from the republic’s most illustrious families – as much as quantity.

Particularly striking is Lucan’s characterization of the Caesarian attack on the Senate as a direct attack upon Rome (*unde petat Romam*, 7.580), i.e. upon the republican constitution and institutions that defined the Roman *civitas* before the civil war.⁶⁶ The virtual identification of the Senate with Rome itself is a continuation of Lentulus’ claims in Book 5 that, metaphorically speaking, Rome is wherever the Senate meets.

If Lucan’s logic is followed to its conclusion, the destruction of the Senate at Pharsalus amounts to the virtual destruction of Rome.

As a number of commentators have observed, Lucan’s desire to exaggerate the severity of Rome’s self-destruction at Pharsalus led him to invent the wholesale massacre of patricians featured in Book 7.⁶⁷ According to Appian (*B.C.* 2.82), only ten republican senators died at Pharsalus. Among these senators, Appian (*ibid.*) and Caesar (*B.C.* 3.99) name only Domitius. Lucan seems well aware of the facts of history; Domitius is also the only individual senator slain at Pharsalus whom Lucan mentions by name. But given Lucan’s equation of the republic with the Senate, the survival of the preponderant number of senators would preclude him from portraying

⁶⁶ Lounsbury 1976, 221, writes, “Lucan defines the Senate as the life-blood (*cruor imperii*) of empire, as Rome herself; most of all, the Senate is the personification of *libertas*, hence Caesar’s eagerness to destroy it.”

⁶⁷ In this paragraph, I follow arguments previously advanced by Dilke 1978, 143; Ahl 1976, 50-51; Lounsbury 1976, 221-224; and Fantham 1999, 121.

Pharsalus as the virtual annihilation of the republican regime. By inventing a vast slaughter of unidentified senators from the most illustrious families in Rome, Lucan renders the impact of Pharsalus upon Rome's ruling class (and therefore upon Rome) truly apocalyptic in scope.⁶⁸

Caesar's mercy for the plebeians in Pompey's army and his ruthlessness toward patricians (*in plebem vetat ire manus monstratque senatum*, 7.578) also marks the fissure of the Roman *civitas* along the lines of social class. Caesar thus ruins the old Rome of Pompey's dream, the old republic whose upper and lower classes united behind Pompey (7.7-45).⁶⁹

To sum up this section, Rome perishes at Pharsalus when both Pompey's foreign allies and, per a fiction of Lucan's own making, the republican senators die in vast numbers. The Senate represents what Rome formerly was (a free, republican city) and the foreign nations will become Roman after Pharsalus in order to make up for the number of native Romans slain in the battle. By massacring both senators and foreign allies, Caesar destroys both Rome's past and its future. Moreover, Caesar specifically targets senators while sparing plebeian Pompeians, a class distinction that further demonstrates the dissolution of the formerly unified Roman state.

⁶⁸ Lucan's exaggeration of the numbers of dead senators also glorifies the Senate's role in the battle (Lounsbury 1976, 221-228).

⁶⁹ See pages 172-175 above.

VII. Pompey's flight and the fate of Rome

Lucan also develops the relationship between Pompey and Rome in his battle narrative.⁷⁰ Pompey identifies the calamity of Pharsalus as first and foremost his own and laments that Rome should be overthrown together with him (7.654-666):

nec, sicut mos est miseris, trahere omnia secum
mersa iuvat gentesque suae miscere ruinae: 655
ut Latiae post se vivat pars maxima turbae,
sustinuit dignos etiam nunc credere votis
caelicolae, fovitque,⁷¹ sui solacia casus.
'parcite,' ait, 'superi, cunctas prosternere gentes.
stante potest mundo Romaque superstite Magnus 660
esse miser. si plura iuvant mea vulnera, coniunx
est mihi, sunt nati: dedimus tot pignora fati.
civiline parum est bello, si meque meosque
obruit? exiguae clades sumus orbe remoto?
omnia quid laceras? quid perdere cuncta laboras? 665
iam nihil est, Fortuna, meum.'

But he does not choose – as is the custom of the doomed – to drag
down everything
with him and plunge it into ruin and embroil the nations in his fall: 655
even now he persisted in believing the heaven-dwellers worthy
of his prayers that most of Latium's multitude would live on
after him and cherished this as consolation for his defeat.
'Refrain, gods,' he says, 'from overthrowing all the peoples.
With the world still standing and with Rome surviving, Magnus 660
can
be ruined. If you choose to wound me more, I have
a wife and sons: so many hostages have I given to the Fates.
Is it not enough for civil war to crush both me
and mine? Are we a trivial disaster without the inclusion of
the world?
Why mangle everything? Why work for universal ruin? 665
Now, Fortune, is nothing mine?'

⁷⁰ Due 1962, 104, observes, "In the seventh book the destinies of Rome and Pompey are intimately connected."

⁷¹ I hear follow Braund in adopting the reading *fovitque* in this line (Braund 1992, lv); Shackleton Bailey obelizes *voluitque*.

Lucan speaks of Pharsalus as Pompey's *ruinae* (7.655), an expression that implicitly identifies the metaphorical destruction of Rome with that of its leading republican commander. Both Lucan as narrator and Pompey in his speech treat the very existence of Rome as imperiled. Pompey prays that the majority of the Romans (literally "Latin crowd," *Latiae . . . turbae*, 7.656) may survive the battle, which shows that he fears that the majority might perish. In the actual course of his prayer, he protests that the world and Rome need not be destroyed in order for him to be miserable: *stante potest mundo Romaque superstite Magnus/esse miser* (7.660-661). The implication is, of course, that the continuation of the battle threatens to destroy both the world and Rome.

In order to spare Rome and the world from suffering for, as he imagines, his own sake, Pompey flees the field of battle (7.666-697). First, Pompey orders the soldiers to cease from battle because he is not worth their deaths (7.666-669). Lucan claims that Pompey was willing to die in battle but feared that this would only cause more of his soldiers to die (7.669-672). Pompey imagines that flight is the best way to end the violence. The explanation that Pompey fled the battle in order to spare the city is an inversion of the common motif in Latin literature of the general who offers his life in combat on behalf of his troops in an act of *devotio*.⁷² Rather than die to secure victory for his troops and for the republic, Pompey saves himself and flees the scene.

⁷² Before Pharsalus, Pompey cites the Decii as *exempla* for his troops (7.358-360); as noted above at p. 100, n. 120, several generations of the Decian *gens* had devoted themselves to death on behalf of the armies they were commanding. See Leigh 1997, 128-157, for a comprehensive treatment of the theme of *devotio* in *Phars.* 7.

Whether we are to read Pompey's bizarre counter-*devotio* as sincere or cowardly,⁷³ the excuse proffered for it is the salvation of Rome.⁷⁴ The scene therefore strengthens Lucan's portrayal of Pharsalus as a threat to Rome's existence.

Pompey's dream presented Rome as a union consisting of Pompey, the *Urbs*, and the various classes of the *populus* – the Senate (7.18), the *equites* (Pompey was still an *eques* when he first triumphed, 7.19), and the *plebs* (7.10). Of course, the only way Lucan can portray the casualties on the field of Pharsalus as the death of the Roman *populus* is because it has been separated from the *Urbs* while on campaign. We have seen in earlier passages how Caesar separates the senators and equites from the plebeians and marks the former for death (7.578-585). As a result of countless Roman deaths, the *Urbs* will be occupied by a new *populus* consisting largely of foreigners. Lastly, Pompey purposely separates himself from the metaphorical *armata urbs* of Rome as it perishes on the field of Pharsalus. All of the components of the idealized Rome Pompey dreamt of have come apart in the course of the battle.

Nevertheless, Lucan does not portray Pompey's separation from Rome (i.e. the republican army) at Pharsalus as negative. The idealized Rome of Pompey's dream is just that – idealized. In numerous passages in the *Pharsalia*, both Lucan as narrator and other republican characters in the epic characterize Pompey as a would-be tyrant,

⁷³ Leigh 1997, 135-143, argues that we are not to take Lucan's portrayal of Pompey's flight as a *devotio* at face value. Rather, we are to see it as evidence of Pompey's failure to live up to the selfless dedication exemplified by the Decii.

⁷⁴ Lounsbury 1976, 230-231, claims that Lucan glorifies Pompey by ascribing his flight to patriotic motives. I do not view Lucan's portrayal of Pompey's motives as entirely favorable. At the very least, Pompey seems vain in thinking that the republicans are dying for him, a point made by Leigh (see n. 76 below). However, Lounsbury is correct in noting that Pompey does not wish to see Rome destroy itself: "Pompey does not fear death but rather for his men and the Roman world itself" (230).

or at least as a seriously flawed leader under whom there was no true *libertas*.⁷⁵ His egotism is most obvious at Pharsalus when he imagines that the republican army is fighting only for him.⁷⁶ Pompey's interpretation of the situation mirrors his nostalgic, sentimental memory of Rome as a place where everyone loves and adores him. When Pompey quits the field of Pharsalus and the republicans continue the fight, they prove that they are fighting for a Rome defined by *libertas*, not by Pompeian partisanship (7.689-697):

fuge proelia dira	
ac testare deos nullum, qui perstet in armis,	690
iam tibi, Magne, mori. ceu flebilis Africa damnis	
et ceu Munda nocens Pharioque a gurgite clades,	
sic et Thessalicae post te pars maxima pugnae	
non iam Pompei nomen popolare per orbem	
nec studium belli, sed par quod semper habemus,	695
libertas et Caesar, erit; teque inde fugato	
ostendit moriens sibi se pugnassee senatus.	

Escape the hideous battles,	
call the gods to witness that none who stays to fight	690
now dies for your sake, Magnus. Like Africa, lamentable for	
her losses,	
like guilty Munda and the calamity by Pharian flood,	
so too, most of the Thessalian battle, after you, will be inspired	
no longer now by Pompey's name so popular throughout the	
world	
or eagerness for war, but by that pair of rivals always with us –	695
Liberty and Caesar; and once you had left the battle,	
the Senate showed by dying that it was fighting for itself.	

⁷⁵ Lucan denounces Pompey's participation in the first triumvirate at *Phars.* 1.84-97 and 1.126-128. Pompey's serious limitations as a republican leader – often manifested in monarchical leanings – are mentioned by Brutus at 2.277-281 and by Cato at 2.320-323 and 9.190-214. I find that Bartsch 1997, 73-100, provides the best recent discussion of the *Pharsalia*'s varying assessments of Pompey's career as a republican statesman. See Ch. 4 (pages 239-240 and 244-245) for further discussion of Cato's view of Pompey in Book 9.

⁷⁶ Leigh 1997, 143-156, links Pompey's egotism to his monarchical leanings and proposes that Pompey sees himself as a "synecdochic hero" who "stands for his entire nation" (ibid., 153).

By portraying Pompey's flight as a boon for Rome, Lucan exonerates him of the charge of participation in the on-going destruction of the city.⁷⁷ While Pompey's departure does not actually put a halt to the violent slaughter of the republican army, it does establish that it is a republican Rome being destroyed and not a mirror image of Caesar's tyrannical regime.

Within Book 7, Lucan follows Pompey as far as the Thessalian city of Larisa, the first stop in his flight (7.712-727). Larisa functions as a proxy for the city of Rome within Lucan's narrative of Pharsalus insofar as it is the first city to change allegiance from Pompey to Caesar as a result of Pharsalus.⁷⁸ I argue that the story of Larisa's fate therefore is an allegory for the permanent establishment of Caesarian rule over the Roman *Urbs* and *civitas* which Lucan attributes to Pompey's loss at Pharsalus. The first sign that Larisa symbolically represents Rome is the intense love for Pompey that Lucan attributes to the Larisaean people (7.712-716):

vidit prima tuae testis Larisa ruinae
nobile nec victum fatis caput. omnibus illa
civibus effudit totas per moenia vires
obvia ceu laeto: promittunt munera flentes, 715
pandunt templa, domos, socios se cladibus optant.

Larisa first was witness of your fall, first to see
your noble head, not subdued by destiny. With all her citizens
she poured forth her entire strength through her walls,
to meet you as in victory: with tears they promise gifts, 715
open up their homes and temples, long to be your partners
in defeat.

⁷⁷ Lounsbury 1976, 230-231.

⁷⁸ The Larisaean's protestations of loyalty to Pompey and their city's status as a proxy for the *Urbs* foreshadow the Lesbians' similar pledge of support (8.109ff.), after which Pompey declares their island to have been his "Rome" (8.131-133). See p. 174, n. 14, above for further discussion.

The Larisaeans pour out of their walls (*per moenia*, 7.714) to greet Pompey just as though he were triumphant (*obvia ceu laeto*, 7.715). We may compare this scene to the passage in Pompey's address to his troops where he imagines the people of Rome hanging from the top of the city's walls as they urge on the republican army: *pendentes e summis moenibus urbis* (7.369). When Pompey decides to relegate Larisa to Caesar (7.720-724), the townspeople lament his defeat (7.724-727). In so doing, the Larisaeans testify to their genuine love for Pompey: "Now, Magnus, you have genuine proof and enjoyment of the popularity/you sought: the successful man knows not that he is loved" (*nunc tibi vera fides quaesiti, Magne, favoris/contigit ac fructus: felix se nescit amari*, 7.727).⁷⁹ As noted above, love is precisely the bond that joined Pompey and Rome at the beginning of the book: *extremum tanti fructum raperetis amoris* (7.32). As Lucan observes in his account of Pompey's dream, the people of Rome will never be able to see him again, even after his death (7.29-44). However, the Larisaeans express their love and loyalty to Pompey in the Romans' stead. Unable to address the people of Rome of whom he dreamt and spoke before the Battle of Pharsalus, Pompey instead directs his poignant admission of defeat to the Larisaeans.

Lucan's allegorical association of Larisa with Rome is further confirmed by Lucan's characterization of Larisa as a "city once powerful" (*olim Larisa potens*, 6.355) in the catalogue of Thessalian cities in Book 6.⁸⁰ Having fallen into a period of decadence, Larisa is defenseless against Caesar. As Masters notes, Lucan portrays

⁷⁹ Ahl 1976, 174-175, analyzes this passage in the course of a longer discussion of Lucan's characterization of Pompey as a lover. Cf. Ahl 1974, 314-315.

⁸⁰ For a brilliant study of the catalogue of Thessalian cities in Book 6, see Masters 1992, 150-178.

Rome too as an *olim urbs potens* that has declined from past grandeur to the point where it can no longer resist Caesar's tyranny.⁸¹

The fate of Larisa also represents a literal fulfillment of the *urbs capta* metaphor that informs so much of Lucan's interpretation of Pharsalus in Book 7. Whereas Caesar conquered the *Urbs* long before Pharsalus and merely retains the city on account of the battle, Larisa literally falls under Caesar's control as an immediate result of his victory. The city functions as a proxy for Rome in that Caesar's occupation of Larisa makes manifest the finality of his dominion over the *Urbs*. Pompey's decision to surrender Larisa to Caesar without a fight (7.720-723) also recapitulates his decision to abandon Rome in Book 1.

The story of Rome's destruction at Pharsalus would be incomplete if we failed to note how Lucan models Pompey's death in Book 8 on the death of Priam in *Aen.* 2.⁸² Lucan speaks of the trunk of Pompey's beheaded corpse being battered by the waves of the sea (8.698-699): "the shores strike Pompey, and his headless corpse is tossed/this way and that by shallow waters" (*litora Pompeium feriunt, truncusque vadosis/huc illuc iactatur aquis*). In *Aen.* 2, Priam's beheaded trunk similarly lies on the shore, a strange circumstance given that he was slain within his palace inside the

⁸¹ Masters 1992, 160. Masters also observes that Larisa's state of decline and decay parallels Pompey's own.

⁸² It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze Book 8's continuing characterization of the civil war as the destruction of Rome. For instance, Pompey claims that he can rise again from the disaster of Pharsalus much as Marius found new strength while in exile among the physical ruins of the city of Carthage (8.269-271): "If the ruins of Libya could elevate Marius/to the Rods and return him to the Fasti which were full of him,/can Fortune hold me down, though struck by a lighter blow?" (*an Libycae Marium potuere ruinae/erigere in fasces et plenius reddere fastis,/me pulsum leviori manu fortuna tenebit?*). Pompey thus likens the disaster at Pharsalus to the destruction of Carthage. At 8.528-529, the Egyptian courtier Pothinus rhetorically likens Pompey's defeat in the civil war to the destruction of Rome: "Ptolemy, can you prop up the fall of Magnus, the fall/beneath which Rome lies crushed?" (*tu, Ptolemaee, potes Magni fulcire ruinam,/sub qua Roma iacet?*). See p. 174, n. 14, above for discussion of Pompey's metaphorical identification of Lesbos, the refuge of his wife Cornelia, as his own personal Rome (8.131-133); the fate of the *Urbs*, now in Caesar's hands, no longer preoccupies him.

city (*Aen.* 2.557-558): “He’s now a huge trunk lying dead on the seashore,/head torn away from his shoulders, a thing without a name, a cadaver” (*iacet ingens litore truncus,/avulsumque umeris caput et sine nomine corpus*). Servius, followed by many modern commentators, interprets Vergil’s account of Priam’s death as an allusion to the death of Pompey.⁸³ The Priam-like death of Pompey at the end of Book 8 completes the circle of poetic reference: Vergil bases Priam’s death on that of the historical Pompey, while Lucan echoes the death of Priam in Pompey’s death scene. Pompey’s Priam-like death in turn reinforces Lucan’s persistent image of the civil war as a whole and of Pharsalus in particular as Rome’s recapitulation of the downfall and destruction of Troy.⁸⁴

To sum up this section, Lucan interprets Pompey’s abandonment of the republican army in light of Book 7’s persistent theme of Rome’s metaphorical presence and destruction at Pharsalus. Pompey justifies his flight on the basis that Rome should survive his defeat, i.e. no further Roman soldiers should die in his name now that his defeat is a *fait accompli*. The separation of Pompey from the embodiment of Rome (i.e. the republican army) would at first glance seem to signify the end of the union between Rome and Pompey outlined in earlier passages of the

⁸³ Commenting on the word *ingens* in line 2.557 of the *Aeneid*, Servius remarks, “He [Vergil] touches upon the history of Pompey when he says *ingens* and not *magnus*” (*Pompei tangit historiam, cum “ingens” dicit non “magnus”*). Bowie 1990, 473ff., further develops Servius’ claim, especially with regard to the displacement of Priam’s decapitated body from his palace within the city to the Trojan shore (*Aen.* 2.557-558) in imitation of the circumstances of Pompey’s seaside decapitation. Bowie 1990, 478, also correlates Priam’s murder at the hands of Neoptolemus (Virgil uses this name at *Aen.* 2.549 instead of Pyrrhus, the warrior’s more usual name in the *Aeneid*), the son of Achilles, with Pompey’s assassination by Achilles, a counselor to the new (νέος) Ptolemy on Egypt’s throne, Ptolemy XIII.

⁸⁴ For Lucan’s use of *Aen.* 2.554-558 as a point of reference when he narrates the death of Pompey at *Phars.* 8.698-711, see Narducci 1973; Mayer 1981, 167; Hinds 1998, 8-10 and 100; and Rossi 2001, 322-323.

book. However, Lucan does not portray this separation as negative. Rather, Pompey's departure from Pharsalus actually frees the senators to die in their own name as patriotic Romans and not merely as minions of Pompey. In his flight, Pompey meets in the city of Larisa a proxy for Rome; even though their city will fall to Caesar on account of Pompey's defeat, the Larisaeans enthusiastically greet him as the Romans would if they had the opportunity. Lastly, Pompey's Priam-like death in Book 8 marks the culmination of Rome's Troy-like symbolic destruction at Pharsalus. Just as Pompey and Rome are united in the dream sequence at the beginning of Book 7, Pompey's fate during and after the Battle of Pharsalus is inextricably bound up with the downfall of his city.

VIII. Caesar and the Pompeian camp

Pompey's visit to Larisa is only the first of two scenes in which Lucan deploys the theme of the *urbs capta* at the end of the Pharsalus narrative. When the Caesarians win the battle, they enter and loot Pompey's camp. In this section, we shall see that Lucan explicitly identifies Pompey's camp as a proxy for the city of Rome insofar as the Caesarians sack the Pompeian camp in place of the *Urbs*.

Before we address Caesar's capture and sack of Pompey's camp, it is necessary to recall the final lines of Caesar's exhortation to his troops before the Battle of Pharsalus. Caesar commands his troops to destroy their own camp's palisade in anticipation of their occupation of the Pompeian camp (7.326-329):

sternite iam vallum fossasque implete ruina,
exeat ut plenis acies non sparsa manipulis.

parcite ne castris: vallo tendetis in illo
unde acies peritura venit.

Level now the rampart and with fallen debris fill the ditches,
so the army can march out not straggling but in full companies.
Do not spare your camp: you will bivouac inside that rampart
from where the doomed army comes.

The order to destroy the camp conflicts with Caesar's own historical account of the battle, and among other ancient sources it appears only in Appian (*B.C.* 2.74).⁸⁵ Why would Lucan invent such a scene, or, if he found it in some historical source, why would he choose to follow this historical tradition in opposition to Caesar's claim that he left soldiers behind in his camp? The likely reason is that Lucan wishes to amplify the theme of the Caesarians' self-destructive violence. While Caesar proffers a reason for his decision to demolish his own fortifications (he claims that he will not need it once he occupies Pompey's camp, 7.328-329), nonetheless Caesar's decision testifies to an extreme proclivity to acts of mass destruction, especially ones directed at objects, structures, and persons that a Roman general would normally seek to protect. This profound self-destructive tendency is epitomized in Laelius' vow to level the walls of Rome (1.383-386). The Caesarians do not destroy the walls of their own city, but they do destroy those of their own camp. The camp thus functions as a sort of proxy for the *Urbs* in that it is the physical site and place of habitation that bears the brunt of the Caesarians' deep-seated, self-destructive violence.

⁸⁵ Goebel 1981, 81. Caesar claims to have left troops behind in his camp during the battle, which shows that he did not order the camp to be destroyed: "He [Caesar] had left two cohorts in the camp to serve as a garrison" (*cohortes II castris praesidio reliquerat*, *B.C.* 3.89.2). Dilke 1978, 118, doubts that Appian draws upon Lucan, while Perrin 1884 and Gagliardi 1975, 52, affirm that he does.

At the end of the battle narrative, the Caesarians enter the Pompeian camp (7.728ff.). Caesar urges on his soldiers by appealing to their desire for spoils. He mentions the accumulated wealth taken from Italy by the republicans and from the East by Pompey's foreign allies (7.737-746).⁸⁶ However, the Caesarians are not satisfied with the vast spoils (7.752-760):

invenere quidem spoliato plurima mundo bellorum in sumptus congestae pondera massae, sed non implevit cupientis omnia mentes. quidquid fodit Hiber, quidquid Tagus expulit auri, quod legit dives summis Arimaspus harenis, ut rapiant, parvo scelus hoc venisse putabunt. cum sibi Tarpeias victor desponderit arces, cum spe Romanae promiserit omnia praedae, decipitur quod castra rapit.	755 760
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And for sure they found an enormous mass of bullion heaped up from a plundered world to pay the costs of war; but not enough for minds which wanted everything was all the gold mined by the Iberian, disgorged by Tagus, or gathered from the surface of the sands by wealthy Arimaspan; though they seize it, they will think their wickedness sold cheaply. Since they have pledged themselves in victory the Tarpeian citadel and promised everything in their expectation of looting Rome, the plunder of a camp is a cheat.	755 760
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The fact that the soldiers are disappointed because they have sacked a mere camp instead of the Capitol (*Tarpeias . . . arces*, 7.758)⁸⁷ demonstrates yet again that Lucan interprets Pharsalus as a battle fought over the fate of the *Urbs*. Book 7 is the story of

⁸⁶ At *B.C.* 3.96.1-2, the historical Caesar claims that the furnishings of the Pompeian camp were overly luxurious and cites this as evidence of the Pompeians' dissolution and over-confidence; see Rossi 2000b for discussion of this passage.

⁸⁷ The reference to the Tarpeian Rock and to the sack of Rome recalls Caesar's willingness to let his rebellious soldiers pillage the city, including "the Tarpeian seat of Jupiter" (*Tarpeiamque Iovis sedem*, 5.306), before he finds an alternative way of defeating their mutiny (5.305-307). The Tarpeian Rock (*rupes Tarpeia*, 3.154) also features in Lucan's account of the despoliation of the Temple of Saturn, on which occasion all of the spoils went to Caesar himself (3.168).

Rome's metaphorical capture and destruction by Caesar, yet the battle narrative is set far from the actual city, which is safe. When the Caesarians lament that they are not sacking Rome, it is as though they acknowledge the incongruity between the import of their victory and their distance from the *Urbs*. The Caesarians recognize that Caesar has substituted the sack of the republican camp for the sack of Rome. The readers of the *Pharsalia* recognize that Lucan too has substituted the sack of a mere camp for the sack of Rome that his narrative seems to require.

The Caesarians' destruction of their own camp and their occupation of Pompey's represent the triumph of the Caesarian instantiation of Rome over the Pompeian one. As Masters notes, one of the recurring motifs of the *Pharsalia* is the spatial juxtaposition of Pompey and Caesar's opposing campsites.⁸⁸ There should be but one camp for Roman soldiers, but due to civil war there are two set against each other. Once the Caesarians level their walls and defensive ditches and occupy the Pompeian camp, the Pompeians no longer have any fortification to house, protect, and symbolically represent them. For their part, the Caesarians have effaced the physical evidence that they once were a mere faction warring for control over Rome as opposed to the sole possessors of political and military hegemony. The battle ends with only one Roman camp in existence, but far from signifying genuine Roman unity and the peaceful resolution of the civil war, this means only that Caesar has won a decisive victory. As the two armies and camps represent two instantiations of Rome, one tyrannical and one republican, the Caesarian occupation of the rival camp represents the reduction of two Rome's to one – Caesar's.

⁸⁸ Masters 1992, 49-52.

IX. Caesar and Sulla, Pharsalus and Rome

On the day following Pharsalus, Caesar tours the battlefield and gazes with delight upon the mangled corpses (7.786-799). Caesar goes so far as to dine while looking down upon the bodies of the slain (7.789-794):

cernit propulsa cruore
flumina et excelsos cumulis aequantia colles 790
corpora, sidentis in tabem spectat acervos
et Magni numerat populos, epulisque paratur
ille locus, vultus ex quo faciesque iacentum
agnoscat.

He sees rivers driven on
by gore and mounds of corpses high as lofty 790
hills, he watches heaps sinking into putrefaction
and counts the peoples of Magnus; a place for feasting
is prepared from where he can discern the faces and the features
of the dead.

The massacre that Caesar has committed in Thessaly resembles that committed by Sulla at Rome in Book 2 of the *Pharsalia*.⁸⁹ Sulla also takes delight in viewing his victims' dead bodies (2.207-209):

intrepidus tanti sedit securus ab alto
spectator sceleris: miseri tot milia vulgi
non timuit iussisse mori.

Unperturbed, indifferent, from a lofty seat he watched
the terrible crime, not dismayed that he had consigned to death
so many thousands of the lowly masses.

⁸⁹ The similarity between Sulla and Caesar's voyeuristic viewing of their victims' corpses has been remarked on before by other scholars, e.g. Leigh 1997, 288ff., and Narducci 2002, 119.

Why does Lucan establish this parallel between Caesar and Sulla? As we have seen, Caesar exhorts his troops before the battle by claiming that a Pompeian victory would result in a repetition of Sulla's massacres at Rome (7.303-307). Caesar's warning has proven ironic, hypocritical in fact.⁹⁰ In part, his prediction is accurate – Pompey has been defeated and no massacre will be committed at Rome. However, Caesar himself has imitated Sulla, but he commits his massacre on the battlefield of Pharsalus (the *Emathios* . . . **campos** of *Phars.* 1.1) instead of on the Campus Martius (*Saeptorumque nefas et clausi proelia Campi*, 7.306). Henderson comments⁹¹:

All 'battlefields' in *BC*, however 'Emathian' at the concrete level, will take place on, on a displacement of, the *Campus Martius*. This is the arena, wherever the war for Rome merely happens to be fought, because this is the centre, and the point, of Roman/world civil war.

Pharsalus, not Rome, is where the city meets its demise. At the same time, however, the war's effect will be felt at Rome and in Italy in future generations, as Lucan states in numerous passages scattered throughout Book 7.

Caesar's new, tyrannical Rome triumphs over Pompey's republican instantiation of the city because Caesar is willing to play the role of Sulla. The *senex*'s prophecy of future massacres (2.67-233) surpassing those of Marius and Sulla has finally been fulfilled. Furthermore, the precedent of Sulla serves to distinguish Pompey from Caesar. Whereas Caesar gladly imitates Sulla at Pharsalus, he can do so only because Pompey backed away from crushing Caesar's own army at Dyrrachium

⁹⁰ Due 1962, 104, briefly characterizes Caesar's speech before his soldiers at Pharsalus as hypocritical but does not specify in what respects this is so.

⁹¹ Henderson 1998, 179; emphasis in the original. See *ibid.*, 176-186, for further comments on the displacement of civil strife from Rome to other parts of the empire and especially the role Sulla's massacres play as precedents for Caesar.

in Book 6. Had Pompey annihilated Caesar's army, he would have been the true heir of Sulla (6.301-303): "Fortunate you could have been,/and free of tyrants, Rome, and your own mistress, had a Sulla/conquered for you there" (*felix ac libera regum,/Roma, fores iurisque tui, vicisset in illo/si tibi Sulla loco*). Victory in the civil war thus goes to the general who is willing to replicate the sort of violence that turned the *Urbs* into a veritable hell during the 80s B.C.

X. Conclusion

In conclusion, the narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus in Book 7 marks both the climax of the *Pharsalia* and the fullest development of Lucan's comparison of the civil war to the destruction of a city. The physical *Urbs* and its safety are a constant point of reference throughout the battle narrative and its numerous digressions. Despite Pompey's desire to spare the city violence by fighting in the distant land of Thessaly, the fates of the physical city of Rome and of the Roman state are intricately entwined. Pompey's dream at the beginning of the book portrays a republican Rome consisting of himself, the *Urbs*, and the various classes of the *populus* united in harmony. This is the idealized Rome that will be shattered during the course of the battle. Thanks to the republicans' premature desire to return home, the fateful day has come that will mark the end of the republic, much as a single fateful day destroyed Troy.

Both Caesar and Pompey claim to defend the *Urbs* from dire consequences that await it should the other side win. Contrary to Pompey's hopes, the distance of Thessaly from the *Urbs* does not spare the city the consequences of Caesar's victory,

i.e. tyranny. The mass slaughter of Romans at Pharsalus will result in the abandonment and destruction of various cities in Italy and the admixture of large numbers of foreigners into the population of Rome. Rome perishes at Pharsalus in the persons of Pompey's foreign allies, whose nations will soon be incorporated into the Roman citizen body, and of the republican senators. After the battle, Larisa and the Pompeian camp serve as proxies for the *Urbs* for Pompey and Caesar, respectively. In the end, Caesar surveys the bodies of the slain at Pharsalus much as Sulla had taken pleasure in gazing upon the corpses of his victims at Rome. Pharsalus may have supplanted the *Urbs* as the location where the Romans play out their civil wars, but Pompey, the Senate, and the people of Rome – the *armata urbs* to which Pompey refers in Book 2 – are destroyed all the same.

Chapter 4

Cato and the Revival of the Republic

As mentioned above, the death of Pompey in Book 8 provides an effective coda to Pharsalus; he and his army play the roles of a latter-day Priam and Troy, respectively. But despite Lucan's hyperbolic account of Pharsalus and Pompey's death, the *Pharsalia* does not end with Book 8. Ahl observes¹:

Yet Pharsalus is not the literal destruction of the physical existence of Rome; looked at from another angle it is the transformation of Rome into something different, and the transformation of the struggle from the purely physical to the ideological. For after Pharsalus Caesar is ruler not rebel. He has destroyed the republic, but can he destroy the ideal? In this other sense, Pharsalus is not the end, but the beginning of Lucan's tale.

In this chapter, I address the sojourn of the republican army in Libya in Book 9. With Cato having succeeded Pompey as the exiled republicans' Aeneas-like leader, they commit themselves once more to the struggle against Caesar. The republicans' anxiety about separation from their homes comes to a head when many of them attempt to sail away from Cato and accept Caesar's authority (9.217ff.). Cato then convinces them that true Romans fight for *libertas* even in the most desperate of situations. This is how Cato transforms Rome into a political ideal instead of a mere city that changes hands as armies win and lose wars.

In earlier books, the imagery of the physical destruction of cities foreshadowed the republic's destruction at Pharsalus. Now, however, Lucan uses the imagery of city destruction and foundation to cast Cato as the restorer of Rome, i.e. of the devastated

¹ Ahl 1968, 137. For the persistence of the republican *civitas* as an ideal for Cato and his troops, cf. Due 1962, 115; Lintott 1971, 503; and Ahl 1976, 57.

civitas and *armata urbs* of the republican army. Or, to use suitably metaphorical language, Cato must found Rome anew in the course of his Libyan march; as Morford notes, “The disaster at Pharsalia meant that Rome must be *rebuilt*.”² For instance, Lucan refers to the republican soldiers as “the fragments of the Emathian collapse” (*Emathiae . . . fragmenta ruinae*, 9.33). Lucan later uses a subtle Vergilian allusion to compare Cato’s preservation of his army to the foundation of the city of Carthage in *Aen.* 1. In the course of their desert march, the republicans also successfully resist a sandstorm that obliterates the homes and walls of African cities; I argue that Lucan treats the ruined African cities as analogues for the metaphorical *ruinae* of the republican army. In short, the desert march provides a virtual reconstruction of the Roman Republic that counterbalances its destruction at Pharsalus. Furthermore, Lucan portrays the republican camp in Africa as the true seat of *Romanitas* in opposition to the actual *Urbs* occupied by Caesar.³

I believe that the theme of Rome’s metaphorical reconstruction bears on a larger debate in contemporary Lucanian scholarship. A number of modern scholars (Johnson, Leigh, Skleňár, etc.) have read Lucan’s praise for Cato’s *virtus* as ironic, parodic, or self-contradictory. According to this interpretation, the details of the march across the desert (particularly the snake episode at 9.607-937) so subvert the narrator’s assertions of Cato’s success that he must be regarded as a failure and his attempt to instill *virtus* in his troops as futile.⁴ I join scholars such as Narducci,

² Morford 1967a, 14; emphasis added to stress the metaphor of physical destruction and reconstruction.

³ Ahl 1976, 57, observes, “From Pharsalia onwards, *libertas*, the republic, no longer exists at Rome, though it continues as an ideal, enshrined in men like Cato.”

⁴ Johnson 1987, 35-66; Batinski 1992, 71-80; Bartsch 1997, 29-35; Leigh 1997, 265-282; Saylor 2002, 458-463; Skleňár 2003, 59-100.

D'Alessandro Behr, and Bexley in defending the non-ironic interpretation of Cato's influence and his march through Libya against these critical readings.⁵ While I do not devote a specific section of this chapter to the ongoing debate surrounding Lucan's portrayal of Cato, I hope to show throughout the chapter that Lucan uses the theme of cities, their destruction, and their construction to present Cato's effect on the republican army in Book 9 in a generally favorable light.

I. The apotheosis of Pompey and the purification of the republican cause

As I briefly discussed in the last chapter, the death of Pompey in Book 8 evokes the death of Priam in *Aen.* 2. The destruction of the Roman Republic thus recalls the destruction of Troy, Rome's mother city. There are also a number of points of comparison between the re-grouping of the republicans after the Battle of Pharsalus in *Pharsalia* 9 and the aftermath of Troy's destruction in the *Aeneid*. Just as the fall of Troy leads to the foundation of Rome, Lucan portrays the defeat at Pharsalus and the death of Pompey as opportunities for the republicans to renew their devotion to *libertas*. As Ahl notes, Pompey and a number of the republican leaders portrayed in earlier books of the epic (e.g. Sextus Pompey and Appius Claudius) represent the republic in its degeneracy.⁶ As long as Pompey lives and commands the republican camp, he can be accused of treating the Senate as his own private faction.⁷ Lucan removes this ambiguity from the republican cause at two critical moments in the epic.

⁵ Narducci 2001, 171-186; D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 113-161; Bexley 2010.

⁶ Ahl 1976, 128, 134-137, 148-149, 155, 158-159.

⁷ The republicans and Cicero, their spokesman, level this accusation against Pompey at 7.45-85. See Ch. 3 (pages 175-180) for a discussion of this passage. Caesar condemns Pompey and his followers as partisans at 1.299-351.

As we saw in the last chapter, he extols Pompey's early departure from the Battle of Pharsalus on the grounds that the soldiers prove their loyalty to the republic by fighting on even after their general has left the field. If they were merely Pompey's partisans, they would surrender or flee at this point (7.647-697). Next, in Book 9 the death of Pompey results in the purification of the republican cause from the taint of partisanship. First, the death of Pompey leads to the spiritual purgation and apotheosis of his soul, a spiritual transformation that Lucan relates to the revival of the republican army's fighting spirit and devotion to *libertas*. Secondly, Pompey's death permits Cato to become the spiritual leader of the republican camp, a change of command that removes the charge of base, partisan motives from the republicans.

Lucan foreshadows the purification of the republican cause when he has Pompey's soul undergo purgation and apotheosis after death (9.1-18)⁸:

at non in Pharia manes iacuere favilla nec cinis exiguus tantam compescuit umbram. prosiluit busto semustaque membra relinquens degeneremque rogi sequitur convexa Tonantis. qua niger astriferis conectitur axibus aer	5
quodque patet terras inter lunaeque meatus, semidei manes habitant, quos ignea virtus innocuos vita patientes aetheris imi fecit et aeternos animam collegit in orbes: non illuc auro positi nec ture sepulti	10
perveniunt. illic postquam se lumine vero implevit, stellasque vagas miratus et astra fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte iaceret nostra dies risitque sui ludibria trunci. hinc super Emathiae campos et signa cruenti	15
Caesaris ac sparsas volitavit in aequore classes, et scelerum vindex in sancto pectore Bruti sedit et invicti posuit se mente Catonis.	

⁸ In comparing the fate of Pompey's soul after his death with the re-orientation of the republican cause after Pharsalus, I follow Ahl 1976, 188-189. See also Easton 2009.

But his [Pompey's] shade did not lie in Pharian embers
 nor did the scanty ash imprison such a mighty ghost;
 it leapt up from the tomb and, leaving half-burnt limbs
 and the ignoble pyre, it heads for the Thunderer's dome.
 Where dark air – all that space opening out between the earth 5
 and paths of the moon – is linked to starry skies,
 live the half-divine shades, who, innocent in life,
 are enabled by their fiery excellence to bear the lower
 ether, their spirit gathered into the eternal spheres:
 somewhere people laid in gold or buried with incense 10
 do not reach. There, when it had filled itself with real
 light and marvelled at the wandering planets and stars
 fixed in the sky, it saw the depth of the night beneath which
 lies our day and laughed at the insults to its torso.
 From here it flitted above the fields of Emathia, the standards 15
 of blood-stained Caesar and the fleets dispersed upon the sea
 and, avenging wickedness, it settled in the sacred breast
 of Brutus and stationed itself in the mind of invincible Cato.

Lucan emphasizes the release of Pompey's soul from the confines of his earthly existence. It transcends the paltry circumstances of his makeshift pyre (1.1-4) and ascends to those regions of heaven inhabited by "half-divine shades" (*semidei manes*, 9.7). Pompey's soul is filled with true celestial light (*lumine vero*, 9.11) and learns how superior it is to the light of terrestrial day (9.11-14). Even the outrage committed against his corpse now seems trifling (9.14). In short, Pompey's soul is purified from all that was base and ignoble about his earthly lot.

In order to undergo purgation and apotheosis, Pompey's spirit must depart from the earth. Pompey's death is also the condition for the renewal of the republican cause under Cato's spiritual direction. Lucan explicitly links Pompey's apotheosis to the republicans' rally in Book 9 when he portrays Pompey's soul descending upon

Cato and Brutus (9.15-18) as an “avenger of crimes” (*scelerum vindex*, 9.17).⁹

Although Cato had joined the Senate in supporting Pompey against Caesar in Book 2, Cato hated Pompey (*oderat et Magnum*, 9.21) and feared tyranny regardless of which man won the war (9.19-22).¹⁰ However, there is no conflict between supporting both the republic and the legacy of a dead, defeated Pompey whose power no longer can threaten *libertas*: “but after the Thessalian disaster, now with all his heart/he [Cato] supported Pompey” (*at post Thessalicas clades iam pectore toto/Pompeianus erat*, 9.23-24). Pharsalus renders Cato a Pompeian because Pompey’s death absolves his troops of the charge of un-patriotic partisanship: “his party after Magnus’ death was wholly/that of freedom” (*totae post Magni funera partes/Libertatis erant*, 9.29-30).¹¹

Lucan portrays Cato’s assumption of the leadership of the republican camp¹² not only as the renewal of the army’s morale but of the nation (*patria, populus*) itself (9.24-29):

patriam tutore carentem
excepit, populi trepidantia membra refovit,
ignavis manibus proiectos reddidit enses,

25

⁹ See Easton 2009 for a more detailed discussion of Pompey’s soul as a *scelerum vindex* in Books 9 and 10. He notes that Pompey first addresses his troops at Capua with the words, “O you avengers of crime” (*O scelerum ultores*, 2.531).

¹⁰ Cato also acknowledges Pompey’s tyrannical leanings at 2.319-323. Cato’s eulogy for Pompey is critical of his shortcomings (9.190-214); see pages 239-240 and 244-245 below.

¹¹ I shall address the importance of *libertas* in Book 9 below (see pages 239-246).

¹² As Frederick Ahl has pointed out to me, Lucan’s focus on Cato in Book 9 belies the fact that it was actually Metellus Scipio, not Cato, who ultimately succeeded Pompey as commander of the republican army as a whole (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 56.3-57.3; cf. Ahl 1976, 253). Lucan mentions Metellus Scipio at 2.472-474, 6.310-311, 6.788-789, 7.222-223, and 9.277, and notes that he was supreme commander in Africa at 7.223 (*Libyco dux primus in orbe*). In Book 9, however, Lucan focuses almost exclusively on the group of republican soldiers whom Cato led from Corcyra to the Roman province of Libya. The only other group of republicans mentioned is that which had accompanied Pompey to Egypt (9.51-166) and later joined Cato at Cape Palinurus. Pompey’s widow Cornelia and his son Sextus were part of this contingent. Lucan concludes Pompey’s last will and testament with the following command to his sons: “One man alone will it be right/to obey, if he takes the side of freedom – Cato” (*uni parere decebit, si faciet partes pro libertate, Catoni*, 9.96-97).

nec regnum cupiens gessit civilia bella
nec servire timens. nil causa fecit in armis
ille sua . . .

He took into his care the fatherland
when it lacked a guardian, revived the people's trembling limbs, 25
restored the swords thrown down by coward hands,
he waged a civil war without desiring power
or fearing slavery. In warfare he did nothing
for himself . . .

The expression *populi trepidantia membra* evokes earlier passages in the *Pharsalia* where the *patria* or *Roma* is said to be “trembling.”¹³ More specifically, the image of Cato reviving the limbs of a personified Rome recalls Cato's promise to conduct a funeral procession for Rome (2.297-303)¹⁴:

ceu morte parentem
natorum orbatum longum producere funus
ad tumulos iubet ipse dolor, iuvat ignibus atris
inseruisse manus constructoque aggere busti 300
ipsum atras tenuisse faces, non ante revellar
exanimem quam te complectar, Roma; tuumque
nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram.

As grief itself
bids the father robbed of his son by death conduct the long
funeral procession to the grave, he wants to thrust
his hands into the black fires, and on the pyre's piled-high mound 300
himself to hold the torches black, so I will not be torn away
before embracing your lifeless body, Rome; and, Liberty,
your name, even an empty shade, I shall follow all the way.

However, Cato does not merely place his hands into the flames of Rome's pyre (2.299-302). Rather, Lucan presents the country's *membra* as still trembling and

¹³ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 19-20; Henderson 2010, 470, n. 149. Cf. *patriae trepidantis imago* (1.186), *trepidantis moenia Romae* (3.298), and *trepidam . . . Romam* (5.381).

¹⁴ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 20. Cf. pages 109-110 above.

claims that Cato revives them (*refovit*, 9.25).¹⁵ Whereas Pompey's soul undergoes apotheosis, Cato metaphorically raises Rome (i.e. the *civitas*, embodied in the republican army) from its deathbed. In the following sections of this chapter, we shall follow the course of this revival throughout Book 9.

II. The aftermath of Pharsalus and the Trojan *nostoi*

In the preceding chapter, we saw that Lucan alludes several times to the *excidium Troiae* in *Aeneid* 2 in his narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus. Lucan reprises the theme of Rome's Troy-like demise in Book 9 in order to cast Cato as the renovator of the republican army. He alludes to the Trojan War and its aftermath, notably the wanderings of Odysseus and Aeneas, as he narrates the mustering of the republican forces after the Battle of Pharsalus and the death of Pompey (9.30-293). Cato visits many of the same sites Odysseus does and tries to keep his men from succumbing to their weaknesses as Odysseus did for his own comrades. More importantly, Cato also resembles Aeneas. Just as Aeneas led the Trojan refugees to Libya en route to Italy, Cato gathers the survivors of Pharsalus, leads them to Libya, and attempts to restore their sense of *Romanitas*. As we shall see in the next few sections, Lucan alludes to the wanderings of Aeneas because he wishes to characterize Cato's own voyage as a

¹⁵ Lucan also uses the verb *refoveo* when he describes Pompey reviving Cornelia after she collapses "half-dead" with grief: *frustra que attollere terra/semianimem conantur eram; quam pectore Magnus/ambit et astrictos refovet complexibus artus* ("... and [Cornelia's servants] try in vain to lift/their half-dead mistress from the ground; Magnus clasps her/to his breast and **revives** her rigid frame with his embrace," 8.65-67; I find "half-dead" to be a better translation of *semianimis* in this dramatic, emotionally charged passage than Braund's "half-conscious"). Prose authors of the classical period sometimes use *refoveo* to refer to political re-organization, e.g. Seneca in his description of Gnaeus Pompey the Younger's campaign in Spain in 45 B.C.: "when the elder Pompey had been conquered, and his son was yet **reviving** the broken republican armies in Spain . . ." (*victo patre Pompeio, adhuc filio in Hispania fracta arma refovente*, *De Brev. Vit.* 5.2; this example is cited by Wick 2004, Vol. II, 20).

quest to re-establish the republican *civitas* of Rome. The republican army thus appears once more as the exiled *armata urbs*. Now, however, Cato must defend this metaphorical city from both the strain of continued separation from the physical *Urbs* and the dual blows of Pharsalus and Pompey's death.

First, Lucan describes Cato's sea voyages after the Battle of Pharsalus in terms that recall the Trojan War and the subsequent *nostoi* of its heroes. Lucan first deploys this theme when he narrates Cato's naval voyage from Dyrrachium to Corcyra (9.32-35)¹⁶:

. . . Corcyrae secreta petit ac mille carinis
abstulit Emathiae secum fragmenta ruinae.
quis ratibus tantis fugientia crederet ire
agmina, quis pelagus victas artasse carinas? 35

[H]e headed for the seclusion of Corcyra and in a thousand ships
he took away with him the fragments of the Emathian collapse.
Who would think that on so many vessels traveled troops
in flight? Or that for conquered ships the sea was too narrow? 35

Historical sources indicate that Cato's fleet numbered only 300 or 500 ships.¹⁷ As classical authors frequently use the expression "one thousand ships" to refer to Agamemnon's fleet, it is likely that Lucan exaggerates the size of Cato's fleet in order to fit the Trojan paradigm.¹⁸ Lucan may also compare the republican fleet after

¹⁶ Cato did not fight at Pharsalus. Pompey had left him at Dyrrachium in command of fifteen cohorts (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 55.1-2).

¹⁷ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 21. For the figure 300, see App. *B.C.* 2.87. For the figure 500, see Plut. *Cato Min.* 54.3 and *Pomp.* 64.1 and Cass. Dio 41.52.2.

¹⁸ While the actual number of Greek ships catalogued at *Il.* 2.494-759 is 1,186, it was customary for both Greek and Roman authors to round this number down to 1,000 (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 45; Eur. *Or.* 352; Plaut. *Bacch.* 928; Verg. *Aen.* 2.198 and 9.148). Some sources also say that Xerxes had 1,000 ships with him when he invaded Greece (e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 341; Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.48). For sources and discussion, see Wick 2004, Vol. II, 21. See also Ch. 2 (pages 120-124) for a discussion of Lucan's treatment of the Battle of Salamis as a precedent for the civil war.

Pompey's defeat to that of Agamemnon at Troy because Pompey's critics mocked him with the nicknames "Agamemnon" and *rex regum*, a rough translation of Agamemnon's Homeric title ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν.¹⁹ In the context of the Trojan War, it is noteworthy that Lucan compares the remnants of Pompey's army to the ruins of a collapsed building or city by means of the metaphor *Emathiae . . . fragmenta ruinae* (9.33). Instead of sailing forth to destroy a city as did Agamemnon's fleet, Cato's thousand ships carry away with them the metaphorical ruins of Rome. There is also an element of *aemulatio* in Lucan's allusion to Troy. Whereas Agamemnon's fleet numbered approximately 1,000 ships when it was intact, the republican fleet numbers this many *after* the catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus. Hence, the magnitude of Rome's fall far surpasses that of Troy.²⁰

The course of Cato's journey from Greece to Libya also recalls the *nostos* of Odysseus after the Trojan War.²¹ Cato begins by seeking the "seclusion of Corcyra" (*Corcyrae secreta petit*, 9.32). At line 5.420, Lucan follows the literary tradition that identified Corcyra with Homer's Phaeacia.²² Cato seeks refuge in the seclusion

¹⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 67.3, *Comp. Ages. et Pomp.* 4.3, *Caes.* 41.4; App. *B.C.* 2.67; Cass. Dio 42.5.5. See Bowie 1990, 475-476, and Champlin 2003, 297, for further analysis of these accusations, as well as pages 175-180 above. In Book 3, Lucan claims that Pompey's fleet was larger than Agamemnon's: "Not . . . when the avenger of his brother's love [Agamemnon]/struck the waters with such mighty fleets/did so many kings have a single leader" (*non . . . fraternique ultor amoris/aequora cum tantis percussit classibus, unum/tot reges habuere ducem*, 3.284-288). Lucan also links the republicans with Agamemnon's fleet at 5.236 when he associates the site of Appius Claudius' burial with "Aulis, treacherous to fleets" (*iniquam classibus Aulin*). For parallels between Homer's characterization of Agamemnon in the *Iliad* and Lucan's characterization of Pompey, see Lausberg 1985, 1576-1578, and Green 1991, 232-239.

²⁰ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 21.

²¹ For the identification of Cato as an epic successor to Odysseus, see especially Lausberg 1985, 1599-1605, and Von Albrecht 1999, 231. Of course, Vergil's Aeneas also follows in the footsteps (or, rather, the wake) of Homer's Odysseus when he sails from Troy to Libya en route to Italy. I shall discuss the relevance of the Vergilian model to Cato's journey below.

²² At 5.420, Caesar refers to Corcyra as "Phaeacia's shore" (*Phaeacum e litore*). For other ancient texts that identify Corcyra as Phaeacia, see Thuc. 1.25.4; Ap. Rh. 4.1209ff.; Tib. 1.3.3; Verg. *Aen.*

(literally, “the secret places,” *secreta*) of Corcyra. A secure harbor hidden from enemies is precisely what Phaeacia affords its inhabitants and Odysseus in the *Odyssey*.²³ From his stopping-point at Corcyra, Cato proceeds past Malea, Taenarus, and Cythera (9.36-37) on his way to Libya. As Wick observes, Odysseus travels from Cape Malea past Cythera to the land of the Lotus-Eaters (*Od.* 9.80-85), which commentators on Homer located in Libya.²⁴ Hence, Cato’s route replicates the first segment of Odysseus’ journey. Lucan’s epithet for Taenarus, *apertam Taenaron umbris* (“Taenarus accessible to the shades,” 9.36), refers to the opening to Hades allegedly found there. Perhaps the epithet provides a certain Homeric *color* by hinting at Odysseus’ *nekuia*.²⁵

By implicitly identifying Cato with Odysseus, Lucan stresses his role as the would-be restorer of Rome after the catastrophe of Pharsalus. The replication of Odysseus’ *nostos* highlights Cato’s status as the survivor of the (metaphorical) destruction of a city, even if Odysseus was on the winning side of the Trojan War and Cato on the losing side of the Roman civil war. Lucan’s Homeric allusions may also hint at Cato’s quest to restore order within the Roman state, just as Odysseus restored

3.291; and Pliny *N.H.* 4.52. For further discussion, see Barratt 1979, 136; Hainsworth 1988’s commentary on *Od.* 6.8; and Maltby 2002’s commentary on Tib. 1.3.3. Aeneas sails past Corcyra at *Aen.* 3.291, where *Phaeacum* appears at the same *sedes* in the line as at *Phars.* 5.420. According to Apollonius of Rhodes, Jason and the Argonauts also visited Corcyra (called Δρεπώνη and identified with Homer’s Phaeacia, *Arg.* 4.982-1227) before voyaging to Libya (4.1232-1628). For the numerous parallels between *Arg.* 4 and *Phars.* 9, see Ahl 1976, 262; Shoaf 1978, 143-154; and Fantham 1992b, 113-119. I do not dwell upon the similarities between Cato’s journey and that of the Argonauts because the theme of city destruction is not as pervasive in Apollonius as in the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid*.

²³ See in particular *Od.* 6.1-10 and 8.555-571.

²⁴ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 22. For the location of the Lotus-Eaters in Libya, see Herod. 4.177 and Pliny the Elder 5.28 among other ancient sources. Ahl 1976, 261, compares Cato’s march across the desert to Odysseus’ visit to the land of the Lotus-Eaters (*Odyssey* 9.82ff.). See also note 29 below.

²⁵ Odysseus’ *nekuia* in *Od.* 11 was also one of the sources for Sextus Pompey’s necromancy at 6.413-830 (Lausberg 1985, 1602-1603). Batinski 1992, 74-75, argues for several further Odyssean parallels for Cato’s quest; for instance, she compares the republican fleet’s journey through the treacherous Syrtes with Odysseus’ voyage through “unchartered seas.”

his rule over the city of Ithaca after returning home from Troy. We may say that Cato's journey after Pharsalus is an *Odyssey* whose analogue for Ithaca is not so much the physical city of Rome as a restored republic, at least insofar as the republic is embodied in Cato's soldiers themselves. Thus Batinski is not entirely correct when she claims, "Cato, however, will not reestablish order in Rome, as Odysseus had in Ithaca. Nor will he found a new city as Aeneas had done."²⁶ She is thinking of the physical city of Rome and the foundation of a new *Urbs*. Rather, Cato's *Odyssey* and, as we shall see below, his *Aeneid* take place primarily on the moral, spiritual, and ideological planes.

Cato's paramount concern is to instill in his men the virtues necessary for them to maintain their dignity in the face of their defeat at Pharsalus. They must endure their extreme labors even if they can find liberty only in facing death bravely.²⁷ Cato's effort to restore in his men a proper sense of their own *Romanitas*²⁸ is comparable to Odysseus' ultimately vain attempts to combat his men's base temptations (e.g. when they succumb to the lotus²⁹) and bring them home alive. As

²⁶ Batinski 1992, 75.

²⁷ See discussion of the desert march in subsequent sections of this chapter (p. 263ff.). Lausberg 1985, 1600-1601, notes that both Odysseus and Cato encounter implausible wonders (*speciosa miracula* in Lausberg's words) in their respective journeys. Odysseus meets Scylla, Charybdis, the Cyclopes, etc. Lucan indulges in the fantastic in Book 9 by introducing mythical elements (e.g. the Garden of the Hesperides at 9.358 and the head of Medusa at 9.619-699) into his description of Libya and by rendering the effects of snakebite surreal.

²⁸ Cato declares that it will be Roman (*Romanumque*, 9.392) to endure the march across the desert. See further discussion below (p. 264ff.).

²⁹ As noted in n. 24 above, Ahl 1976, 261, compares Cato's resolve in his march across Libya to that which Odysseus displayed when he refused the pleasures of the lotus (*Od.* 9.82ff.). Dorchak 1995, 230, n. 57, notes that Cato and his soldiers successfully refrain from excessive violence when they capture the city of Cyrene (see pages 261-263 and n. 100 for discussion) whereas Odysseus fails to restrain his men from self-indulgent, self-destructive behavior after they sack the city of the Kikones (*Od.* 9.43ff.).

Shoaf notes, Lucan's uncle Seneca had earlier compared Odysseus and Cato as Stoic *sapientes* only to praise the latter as the better *exemplar*.³⁰

A Vergilian allusion also reinforces Cato's status as the leader of the Romans after the catastrophe of Pharsalus. He and his men establish their main camp in Libya at a site named for Palinurus, Aeneas' helmsman (*Phars.* 9.41-44):

. . . et hinc placidis alto delabitur auris
in litus, Palinure, tuum (neque enim aequore tantum
Ausonio monimenta tenes, portusque quietos
testatur Libye Phrygio placuisse magistro), . . .

. . . and from here [Phycus] he glides on gentle breezes over the deep
to your shore, Palinurus (since not only in Ausonian
water have you memorials, but Libya proves
that its tranquil harbors satisfied the Phrygian helmsman).

Lucan here reinterprets the name of a location on the coast of Cyrenaica, variously called *Paliouros*, *Paliuris*, and *Paniouros*,³¹ as a memorial to Palinurus. Aeneas' helmsman is more famously associated with Cape Palinurus in Lucania, where Vergil says he was killed (*Aen.* 6.337-383). Lucan's apostrophe to Palinurus is one of the clearest references to Vergilian epic in the *Pharsalia* and casts Cato as the epic successor to Aeneas. Both Aeneas and Cato lead refugees expelled from their cities.

³⁰ Sen. *De Const. Sap.* 2.2-3, cited by Shoaf 1978, 150: "Moreover, the immortal gods gave us Cato as a more certain *exemplar* of a wise man than Ulysses and Hercules in earlier ages" (*Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortalis dedisse quam Vlixem et Herculem prioribus saeculis*). Shoaf's article argues that Lucan alludes to the legend of Hercules in Book 9 in order to portray Cato as "the *purified idea* of Hercules" (ibid.); cf. Ahl 1976, 271, n. 48, and 271-274.

³¹ See Wick 2004, Vol. II, 24, for the relevant sources. *Paliouros*, the most common variant, appears at Ptol. 4.4.8 and 4.5.2 and Strabo 17.3.22. Wick sees in *placidis . . . ventis* (9.41) a *figura etymologica* explaining the last two syllables of *Paliouros*; the Greek οὔρος signifies a fair wind.

Aeneas sought to provide a new city for the refugees from Troy, and Cato will attempt to re-organize the republican survivors of Pharsalus.³²

Lucan does not deny that there is an Italian cape named for Palinurus. Rather, he asserts that both Italy and Africa have sites named for him. The republicans, the *ruinae* of the Roman *civitas*, have been permanently separated from Italy. They nonetheless find in Africa a site named for a historically significant location in their native land. The placement of a second Cape Palinurus in Libya therefore reflects the doubling or, better, the multiplication and displacement of Rome throughout the *Pharsalia*.

Lucan's reference to Palinurus suggests that Africa is the final geographical destination of Cato's journeys. Vergil's Palinurus falls overboard just before Aeneas arrives in Hesperia (*Aen.* 5.833-871), the land where he will found Lavinium and his descendants will found Alba Longa and Rome. Whereas Aeneas' sojourn in Libya in Books 1-4 of the *Aeneid* is a digression from his journey to Italy, Cato will perform his greatest exploits and die gloriously in Libya. The fact that Cato makes landfall at a site named for Palinurus therefore prefigures his heroic *aristeia* in Libya.³³

It remains to be seen whether Lucan seeks more to emulate the Vergilian account of Troy's destruction or that of Aeneas' struggle to found Lavinium and lay the foundation for the Roman race. In other words, does the identification of Cato with Aeneas merely confirm that Rome has perished or does it also hold forth the

³² Ahl 1976, 253, notes both these general similarities between Cato and Aeneas and the allusive ramifications of Cato's landing at Cape Palinurus.

³³ Ahl 1976, 253, observes, "Cato's arrival in Africa marks the beginning of a new and crucial phase of the civil war. The first steps have been taken in the campaign that will culminate in the battle of Thapsus and the death of Cato at Utica."

prospect of a new beginning? In the following sections, we shall investigate whether Cato's performance as a latter-day Aeneas is more successful than Pompey's.

III. The dual falls of Pompey and of Rome

At Palinurus, the republicans first learn the full extent of Rome's catastrophe when they hear of Pompey's death from Sextus Pompey, who has just arrived from Egypt with Cornelia, Pompey's widow (9.45-50). The identification of Pompey with republican Rome that has marked the preceding narrative of the *Pharsalia* again comes to the fore. In his first interview with his brother Sextus, the younger Gnaeus equates the fate of his father with that of Rome (9.123-125):

dic ubi sit, germane, parens; stat summa caputque
orbis, an occidimus Romanaque Magnus ad umbras
abstulit?

Brother, tell me where our father is; is the crown and head of the world
still standing or are we felled – has Magnus taken to the shades
the Roman destiny?

Gnaeus applies to his father the title *summa caputque orbis*, a title that would apply equally well to Rome. Lucan twice refers to Rome as the *caput mundi* (2.136, 2.655).³⁴ As Philip Hardie observes, Gnaeus' reference to his father as the "crown and head of the world" virtually identifies the decapitation of his father with the loss of Rome to Caesar.³⁵ The fates of Pompey and Rome are once more equated by the word

³⁴ Dinter 2005, 302; Bexley 2009, 460-461. Wick 2004, Vol. II, 47, provides parallel passages elsewhere in Latin literature, e.g. Livy's reference to Rome as "the head of world affairs and the summit of *imperium*" (*caput rerum summaque imperii*, 5.54.7). See Dinter 2005, 301-304, for discussion of Lucan's persistent head (*caput*) imagery.

³⁵ Hardie 1993, 7, cited by Dinter 2005, 302.

Romanaque in line 124, which Wick interprets as a periphrasis for *Roma*.³⁶ As Gnaeus identifies his father so closely with Rome, Pompey's assassination constitutes the final phase in the metaphorical destruction of the city that commenced at Pharsalus.

Sextus' reply to his brother (9.126-145) evokes the violence committed in Rome during the civil war between Sulla and the Marians as narrated in Book 2. Sextus speaks of the Egyptians parading Pompey's head through the streets of an unnamed city, which is either Pelusium or Alexandria (9.136-139)³⁷:

sed me nec sanguis nec tantum vulnera nostri
affecere senis quantum gestata per urbem
ora ducis, quae transfixo sublimia pilo
vidimus: . . .

But I was not affected so much by our aged father's
blood and wounds as by the leader's head paraded
through the city, which we saw held high with javelin driven
through; . . .

Lines 9.137-138 (*gestata per urbem/ora ducis, quae transfixo sublimia pilo*) echo the passage in Book 2 where Sulla has his enemies' heads paraded through the streets of Rome: *colla ducum pilo trepidam gestata per urbem/et medio congesta foro* ("Leaders' heads are carried on javelins through terrified Rome/and heaped up in the middle of the Forum," 2.160-161).³⁸ Lucan's failure to name the Egyptian city at 9.137 facilitates the recollection of the earlier scene; both processions proceed *per*

³⁶ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 47. Wick notes that Lucan uses the neuter substantive *Romana* to refer to the affairs of Rome at 8.288, 8.341, and 8.545.

³⁷ *ibid.*, 51. Wick observes that Lucan's narrative does not actually permit Sextus to have witnessed the scene he narrates; Sextus could not have seen the head being carried through a city while he remained aboard his ship off the coast. As often with striking images of violence and destruction, Lucan dispenses with narrative realism in order to include the street procession in the speech.

³⁸ *ibid.* Cf. p. 79ff. above.

urbem, the procession in Book 9 “through a city” and the one in Book 2 “through The City, the *Urbs*.”

In Book 2, the display of a severed head within Rome represents the utter abjection to which civil war reduces the city both as *civitas* and as *Urbs*. The *senex* recounts Sulla’s atrocities because he fears that the new civil war will cause worse scenes of violence to play out at Rome. Caesar similarly warns his troops in Book 7 that they will be waging war “with a general of Sulla” (*cum duce Sullano*, 7.307) who, if victorious, would display Caesar’s severed head on the Rostra and leave his body unburied (*et caput hoc positum rostris effusaque membra*, 7.305).³⁹ In Book 9, Pompey suffers the very sort of outrages that Caesar predicted he himself would suffer at the hands of a victorious Pompey – the public display of his head and the refusal of burial to his corpse. The outrage takes place in Egypt and not at Rome, but the epic’s persistent prefiguration of intra-urban carnage is ultimately realized nonetheless. In light of the imagery in earlier books, the procession accompanying Pompey’s head through the Egyptian city testifies both to the consummation of Rome’s self-destruction and to the displacement of the Roman *civitas* to foreign lands.

IV. Libyan pyres, Apulian fields, and revivifying flames

While the dual disasters of Pharsalus and Pompey’s death signify how low the republic’s fortunes have sunk, Lucan nonetheless characterizes the republicans’ response as one of renewed commitment to their cause. First, Lucan employs imagery of natural renewal when he describes the funereal ceremonies held by the republicans

³⁹ See pages 185-187 above for further discussion of this passage.

at Palinurus. Cornelia burns a pyre laden with Pompey's effects as a tribute to her late husband (9.171-179).⁴⁰ Next, her obsequies inspire the republican soldiers to burn empty pyres in honor of their comrades who fell at Pharsalus and whose bodies Caesar left uncremated (9.179-185).⁴¹ Lucan compares the burning of the proxy pyres to the renewal of worn-out fields and pastures by controlled burning⁴²:

accipit omnis	
exemplum pietas, et toto litore busta	180
surgunt Thessalicis reddentia manibus ignem.	
sic, ubi depastis summittere gramina campis	
et renovare parans hibernas Apulus herbas	
igne foveat terras, simul et Garganus et arva	
Vulturis et calidi lucent buceta Matini.	185

All devotion	
takes up her example and pyres rise on all	180
the shore to offer fire to the shades of Thessaly.	
So when the Apulian prepares to make the grass grow high	
on plains grazed bare and to renew the winter's fodder	
and warms the land with fire, then together Garganus	
and Voltur's fields and warm Matinus' pastures glow with light.	185

The simile presupposes a yearly (*hibernas*, 9.183) agricultural cycle in which the burning of the grass ends a phase of diminished productivity (*depastis*, 9.182) and initiates a new period of fertility (*renovare*, 9.183). In this scheme, fire does not so much destroy as restore that which has perished. As the pyres in Libya are burnt in honor of the slain republicans, the analogue of the Apulian vegetation in the simile is

⁴⁰ At 8.712-872, Cordus provides a very meager funeral for Pompey's body. Cornelia seeks to provide him with a more satisfactory ceremony.

⁴¹ Caesar refused to bury the Pompeian dead at Pharsalus (7.797-846).

⁴² The most prominent instance of this *topos* in Roman literature is *Georgics* 1.84-93. For further parallels, see Wick 2004, Vol. II, 64-66. A number of ancient sources show that agriculturalists commonly, though incorrectly, thought that such burning fertilized the soil (Mynors 1990, 19).

the republican army. The simile therefore portends renewal within the republican camp.

This simile is very striking in that it is one of the few images of renewal in an epic that is usually unrelenting in its bleakness. In particular, the image of regeneration by fire counterbalances Lucan's treatment of *ekpyrosis* in the *Pharsalia*.⁴³ According to standard Stoic accounts, *ekpyrosis* entailed the cyclical destruction and re-creation of the entire universe by fire. The periodic renewal of the fields by fire is thus analogous to the traditional account of *ekpyrosis*; it is *ekpyrosis* writ small. However, Lucan apparently does not envision the universe being restored after its fiery destruction. Instead, he seems to portray the universe being destroyed once without cyclical repetition.⁴⁴ The fire simile thus provides what Lucan's account of cosmic cataclysm does not: the hope of restoration after defeat and destruction. The simile therefore stands in contrast to the generally nihilistic and pessimistic cosmology that pervades so much of the *Pharsalia*.⁴⁵ Lucan may not postulate that the world as a whole will be renewed after its destruction by fire, but neither is his universe subject to universal, unmitigated entropy and dissolution. The revivification of the Apulian field thus holds out hope for the rejuvenation of the republican army after the crippling, near fatal blows delivered at Pharsalus and in Egypt.

Additionally, the imagery of the simile recalls the apotheosis of Pompey, in whose honor one of the pyres is burnt. The purgation of Pompey's spirit and the regenerative effects of the fire in the simile both point to a better existence after death

⁴³ See the introduction to the dissertation (pages 17-18) for a brief discussion of *ekpyrosis* and its appearances in the epic.

⁴⁴ Skleňár 1999, 281-284.

⁴⁵ Skleňár refers to Lucan's cosmology as "nihilistic" in the title to his 1999 article.

and apparent destruction. Lucan associates Pompey with those heroes who possessed “fiery virtue” (*igneae virtus*, 9.7). Similarly, the farmer uses the element of fire to restore the strength of his fields.

Lucan also draws upon a traditional Roman literary *topos* when he compares the revival of Rome after a catastrophe to plant life growing back after a fire. When Livy describes the reconstruction of the city after the Gauls burned it in 390 B.C., he refers to Rome as “reborn from its roots more luxuriantly and with greater fertility” (*ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis*, 6.1.3).⁴⁶ Livy uses the model of plant regeneration again to describe the resilience of Rome after the Battle of Cannae: “[because] against his [Dasius Altinius’] hope and prayers the Roman state seems to rise again just as though from its roots” (*res Romana contra spem votaue eius velut resurgere ab stirpibus videatur*, 24.45.3).⁴⁷ Lucan depicts Pharsalus as a worse defeat for the Romans than were the battles of the Allia (the prelude to the Gallic Sack) and Cannae (7.408-411), and he censures Caesar for failing to bury the republican dead after the battle, which even Hannibal did for the Roman dead after Cannae (7.799-803). Nevertheless, Lucan employs the same plant imagery to illustrate Rome’s regeneration after Pharsalus that Livy uses after his narratives of the Gallic Sack and Cannae. Accordingly, he proffers the hope that, in some way, republican ideals may survive Pharsalus just as the republic survived previous catastrophes.

⁴⁶ For a discussion of this passage and a catalogue of other instances of this *topos*, see Kraus 1994, 87-88; Oakley 1997, 385-386; Rossi 2000a, 583; and Wick 2004, Vol. II, 64-65. One noteworthy parallel from outside of Livy occurs at Sen. *Tro.* 535-536 and 541-545, where Astyanax is compared to a young shoot (*stirps*) and sapling (*virga*) that will grow up to restore Troy to its former greatness.

⁴⁷ Cf. Livy’s description of the resilience of the Scipio family: “favor the name of the Scipios, the descendants of your commanders, having grown back just as though from cut roots” (*favete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum vestrorum velut accisis recrescenti stirpibus*, 26.41.22).

This is not the first appearance of an Apulian farmer in the *Pharsalia*. In Book 5, Caesar passes through the Apulian countryside in order to attack Pompey at Brundisium (5.403-406)⁴⁸:

inde [a Roma] rapit cursus et, quae piger Apulus arva
deseruit rastris et inerti tradidit herbae,
ocior et caeli flammis et tigride feta
transcurrit, . . . 405

Hurrying his course from Rome, he races on through fields
deserted by the Apulian, inactive with his hoes, and surrendered
to the useless grass, swifter than the flames of heaven,
than a tigress with her young. 405

While Lucan does not clearly state that the farmer abandons the field because of Caesar's advance, this is the passage's most logical meaning and fits the response shown to Caesar's advance elsewhere in the epic.⁴⁹ In any case, Lucan clearly associates Caesar with agricultural decline in Italy.⁵⁰ The Apulian farmer of the simile in Book 9 restores the same fields to health that the Apulian farmer in Book 5 abandons due to Caesar's march. Likewise, Cato and the republicans redress Caesar's sacrilegious negligence in Book 7 when they burn pyres for the dead. Hence, the simile and the burning of the pyres represent the restoration of order on several levels

⁴⁸ Lucan also mentions Mt. Garganus (see 9.184) at 5.380, where he narrates Caesar's requisitioning of ships for his assault on Brundisium.

⁴⁹ Barratt 1979, 130, follows Weise 1835 (*ad loc.*) and Duff 1943 (*ad loc.*) in attributing the Apulian's indolence to the disturbances of the war. In contrast, Haskins 1887 ascribes the cessation of agriculture to a shift to pastoralism in Apulia. However, such an extraneous detail of Apulian agriculture seems otiose in the context of Caesar's speedy march toward Brundisium. Moreover, it would be uncharacteristic of Lucan to pass up a chance to attribute a disorder of any variety to Caesar. Lucan characterizes Caesar as a threat to the Italian countryside at 2.443-445: "He would rather smash the city-gates/than enter them wide open, with sword and fire devastate/the fields than tread them with the farmer unresisting" (*non tam portas intrare patentis/quam fregisse iuvat, nec tam patiente colono/arva premi quam si ferro populetur et igni*). The reason why the Apulian farmer's indolence (*piger Apulus*, 5.403) is so marked is that Horace specifically calls Apulian farmers diligent (*impiger Apulus*) at *Carm.* 3.16.26, the most obvious intertext for this line (Barratt 1979, 130).

⁵⁰ Cf. 1.28-29; 1.167-170; 7.399-403.

– the revival of the grass after summer’s heat, of the practice of agriculture in Italy after the disruption of civil war, and of the republican cause after Pharsalus.

The burning of the honorary pyres in Libya also recalls the passage in Book 2 where Cato imagines himself conducting a funeral for the city. When Cato justifies his participation in the civil war in the face of Brutus’ objections, he imagines Rome lying dead upon a pyre and himself as a grieving father leading the funeral procession (2.297-303).⁵¹ Cato realizes this simile when he literally serves as the eulogist for Pompey (9.186-214), who thus plays the role of *Roma exanimis* (2.302). The Libyan pyres are, symbolically speaking, pyres for Rome.

Cato embraces a lifeless city in the simile from Book 2 cited earlier in this chapter.⁵² In the context of Book 9, however, the funeral of Rome is but the beginning of a new phase in the city’s life.⁵³ When Cato takes control of the republican army in Book 9, he “revives the people’s trembling limbs” (*populi trepidantia membra refovit*, 9.25). Life returns. The verb *refoveo* links this passage to the agricultural simile at 9.184, where the Apulian farmer replenishes the soil by warming it with fire: *igne foveit terras*. The correspondences between 2.297-303, 9.24-25, and 9.182-185 thus strongly suggest that Cato presides over the symbolic funeral and resurrection of Rome in Libya.⁵⁴

⁵¹ I quote the passage earlier in this chapter. Lucan elsewhere refers to Cato as both the father and husband of the city: *urbi pater est, urbique maritus* (2.388). See discussion in Ch. 2 (pages 109-111).

⁵² See p. 223 above.

⁵³ Cf. p. 217 above.

⁵⁴ Lintott 1971, 502, uses the same metaphor to describe the rehabilitation of Pompey’s character when he nobly accepts death in Book 8: “Death, however, provides his resurrection.”

V. *Libertas* in Libya vs. tyranny in the *Urbs*

In what sense does Cato revive Rome? In Book 9 as in the books leading up to Pharsalus we see tension between the definitions of Rome as *Urbs* and as republican *civitas*. After the funeral, Cato's men attempt to return home and submit to Caesar. However, we shall see in this section that Cato succeeds in persuading his men to endure exile in Africa in the name of *libertas*, republican freedom. Cato therefore champions the definition of Rome as an ideological construct over the geographical or ethnic definition of the city. In this respect, he avoids the fatal mistake that Pompey made in Thessaly when he acceded to his army's desire to return to the *Urbs* prematurely. Whereas Pompey's acquiescence resulted in catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus, Cato manages to preserve his army in existence.

Cato introduces the theme of *libertas* in his eulogy for Pompey (9.190-214). The opening words of the speech set the tone for the whole: "A citizen has died" (*civis obit*, 9.190). To call Pompey *civis* is both to praise him (he served the republic instead of destroying it) and to limit his honor to that which befits one citizen among many.⁵⁵ In the same breath, Cato notes that Pompey was far inferior to his ancestors (*multum maioribus impar*, 9.190), yet under him the freedom of Rome and her citizens was safe (*salva/libertate potens*, 9.192-193).⁵⁶ After praising Pompey for staying

⁵⁵ For the significance of *civis obit* in Cato's characterization of Pompey's career, see Ahl 1974, 308: "The highest compliment which Cato gives Pompey is in the first two words of his encomium: *civis obit*, a citizen has died. For above all else, Pompey had kept himself within the bounds of citizenship, even if, at times, he had stretched those bounds to the utmost."

⁵⁶ Ahl 1974, 307-308; Lintott 1971, 502; and Sklenář 2003, 82-85, note that the speech is marked by sharp antitheses such as *civis* ("citizen"), a compliment, and *multum maioribus impar* ("far inferior to our ancestors"), a criticism. It is by means of these antitheses that Cato tries to do justice to Pompey's favorable and unfavorable aspects alike. While Sklenář interprets the eulogy as "an oblique *damnatio memoriae*" of Pompey (ibid., 85), I follow Lintott in seeing Cato's "antithetical *laudatio*" (502) as part of the rehabilitation of Pompey after his death. As Lintott notes, Cato's praise of Pompey may be

within the bounds of republican rule (9.190-203), Cato notes that *libertas* – or, rather what had passed for *libertas* between the rule of Sulla and the fall of Pompey – has now perished (9.204-207):

olim vera fides Sulla Marioque receptis
 libertatis obit: Pompeio rebus adempto 205
 nunc et ficta perit. non iam regnare pudebit,
 nec color imperii nec frons erit ulla senatus.

Long ago, when Marius and Sulla were admitted, the true
 guarantee
 of liberty disappeared: with Pompey taken from the world, 205
 now even the bogus guarantee has gone. Now tyranny will be no
 shame,
 nor will there be a screen for power nor will the Senate be a mask.

Cato concludes at the end of the speech that he too would rather be killed than lose his own *libertas* by falling into another's power (9.212-214). The speech is astoundingly bleak about the prospects of Rome's survival as a free republic. Seemingly, the only two remaining alternatives are tyranny and death.

After such a pessimistic assessment of the political situation, it is not surprising that a number of Pompey's soldiers decide to abandon the cause and submit to Caesar (9.217-254).⁵⁷ They are "weary of the camp and warfare after Magnus' death" (*castrorum bellicae piget post funera Magni*, 9.218). The Cilician king

qualified, but it is markedly more favorable than is Cato's earlier negative assessment of him as an aspiring world conqueror (2.319-323). For the more positive and sympathetic presentation of Pompey in later parts of the *Pharsalia*, see also Martindale 1984, 70, and Bartsch 1997, 75ff.

⁵⁷ Taken literally and in isolation, Cato's bleak assessment that *libertas* exists no longer even as a fiction (9.204-207) might be interpreted as the vitiation of any further reason to struggle against Caesar on behalf of the republic. This is the overly pessimistic reading of Sklenář 2003, 84-85, who sees Cato's eulogy as "the subversion of Cato's own ideals" (ibid., 85). While I disagree with Sklenář's reading of the passage, it is understandable that Cato's listeners at Palinurus, hearing only this speech and not privy to Cato's defense of participation in the civil war in Book 2 (2.284-325), would come to regard further resistance as futile.

Tarcondimotus, an ally of Pompey, orders his troops to set sail (9.219-220). One of the deserters provides an indignant Cato (9.220-224) with three reasons why he and his comrades are departing (9.225-252). First, they are partisans who made war only out of love for Pompey and have no reason to fight now that he is dead (9.227-230). Secondly, they miss the homes and families whom their military service defends from no foreign enemy (9.229-239)⁵⁸:

ille iacet, quem paci praetulit orbis, causaque nostra perit; patrios permittite penates desertamque domum dulcesque revisere natos. nam quis erit finis si nec Pharsalia pugnae nec Pompeius erit? perierunt tempora vitae, mors eat in tutum; iustas sibi nostra senectus prospiciat flammas: bellum civile sepulchra vix ducibus praestare potest. non barbara victos regna manent, non Armenium mihi saeva minatur aut Scythicum fortuna iugum: sub iura togati civis eo.	230 235
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The man the world preferred to peace lies dead; Our cause has disappeared; allow us to return to our native house-gods, deserted homes, and children dear. What end to battle will there be if it is not Pharsalia or Pompey? Phases of our lives have gone for nothing: let our death pass into safety, let our old age see ahead its rightful flames; the civil war hardly can provide burial for just its leaders. No barbarian tyranny awaits the conquered; brutal Fortune does not threaten me with Armenian or Scythian yoke: I pass into the power of a citizen in toga.	230 235
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⁵⁸ I quote this passage at length because it highlights the soldiers' desire to return home. In the sections to follow, I will detail the strain the Roman soldiers experience fighting in such distant and un-Roman terrain as Libya.

Here we once more see a conflict between the centrifugal military strategy championed by Cato and the centripetal desire to return home.⁵⁹ We may compare the deserters' desire to return to civilian life to the republicans' desire to invade Italy after the Battle of Dyrrachium (6.316-319) and their wish to conclude the war decisively at Pharsalus and return home (7.45-85).⁶⁰ The protection and recovery of the *Urbs* is one of the reasons that Pompey gives his soldiers for fighting at Pharsalus: "Whoever desires his land and house-gods dear,/his children, marriage-chamber, the ties he has left behind, must win them/by the sword" (*quisquis patriam carosque penates,/qui subolem ac thalamos desertaque pignora quaerit,/ense petat*, 7.346-348). Pompey then cites his own imperiled dignity as a further reason to fight (7.376-382). With Pompey dead, there is little left to counterbalance the republicans' longing for home.

Furthermore, the recovery of Italy no longer requires fighting. All one needs to do is submit to Caesar. The third reason that the anonymous deserter at Palinurus gives for abandoning the war is that Caesar now is all-powerful and his political authority should be acknowledged (9.238-251). Caesar is not a foreign barbarian (9.236-238) but rather a Roman, "a citizen in a toga" (*togati/civis*, 9.238-239). While the deserter will have no leader (*ducem*, 9.242) but Pompey, he will accept the master

⁵⁹ In the following discussion, I treat the physical city of Rome as representative of all of the individual home cities and territories to which the republicans and their allies (e.g. Tarcondimotus' Cilicians) seek to return. While Cato at first reproves Tarcondimotus in particular (9.220-224), the Cilician king's attempt to sail away from Palinurus is only one example of the greater conflict within the republican camp: "Meanwhile discord of the masses rumbled,/weary of the camp and warfare after Magnus' death" (*fremit interea discordia vulgi,/castrorum bellique piget post funera Magni*, 9.217-218). Indeed, after the anonymous deserter's speech and before Cato's response it seems that the entire republican army is at a loss as to what they should do: "It would have been the end for the Roman State, and all the mass/was seething on the shore, between one slavery and the next" (*actum Romanis fuerat de rebus, et omnis/indiga servitii fervebat litore plebes*, 9.253-254).

⁶⁰ See pages 166-167 for discussion of the passage in Book 6 and pages 175-180 for the passage in Book 7.

whom the disaster of Pharsalus has imposed upon him (*dominum, quem clades cogit, habebo*, 9.241). Only Caesar can spare the conquered (9.246-247), and thus the deserter accepts Caesar's claims to political legitimacy now that Pompey is dead (9.249-251): "If, Cato, you will always follow/public laws and the fatherland, then let us seek the standards/which a Roman consul holds" (*si publica iura,/si semper sequeris patriam, Cato, signa petamus,/Romanus quae consul habet*, 9.249-251). As noted in Ch. 2,⁶¹ Caesar has performed the sham political procedures at Rome and Alba Longa necessary to claim legitimacy for his government (5.381-402). His success now compels the republicans to acknowledge this authority as legitimate: "Everything is in the power of Caesar's fortune" (*fortuna cuncta tenentur/Caesaris*, 9.244-245).

The stakes for Cato and for Rome could not be greater. To return to the *Urbs* is to accept Caesar's claims to lead the Roman *civitas*. If Cato permits the deserters to return home, the republican version of Rome-in-exile will simply vanish; Lucan remarks, "It would have been the end for the Roman State" (*actum Romanis fuerat de rebus*, 9.253). The challenge facing Cato is to find a substitute for Pompeian partisanship that is strong enough to outweigh desire for home. He also needs to motivate his soldiers to reject Caesar's charade of republican legitimacy. In other words, he must make the *armata urbs* of the republican army seem to be a more authentic embodiment of Rome than is the physical *Urbs* where Caesar reigns supreme.

⁶¹ See pages 118-119 above.

Cato responds by defining Rome in terms of *libertas* and explaining that the republicans can still pursue this freedom even after Pharsalus and Pompey's death (9.256-283). First, he castigates the deserters for having been not Romans but rather Pompeians (9.256-258):

ergo pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus,
tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti,
non Romana manus?

So was it with a similar wish that you waged war, young men,
were you too in favour of masters, and were you the troops
of Pompey not of Rome?

In line 9.258, Cato questions the very title that Pompey had given his men in his first speech in the *Pharsalia*: "O truly Roman army" (*O vere Romana manus*, 2.532).

Only an army whose Roman character is defective could switch their allegiance to Caesar merely because Pompey is dead. Republican *libertas*, not ethnicity, defines *Romanitas*.⁶²

Cato interprets the death of Pompey as a boon for the republican cause: now that the partisan leader is dead, the republicans are fighting not for him but for themselves and the *patria* (9.258-265). Whereas once three men dominated Rome (Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus), only one now remains (9.265-269).⁶³ In this sense, the death of Pompey has not only destroyed the fiction of freedom that has prevailed

⁶² Similarly, Lucan claims at 7.432-436 that *libertas* has gone into exile in the realms beyond the Tigris and Rhine. Hence, the lands that the anonymous deserter terms barbarian at 9.236-238 would, by Cato's standards, be more Roman than Rome itself will be under Caesar and his heirs.

⁶³ Cato also shames his men by saying that the Egyptians and Parthians, two peoples ruled by tyrants, did more for constitutional government (*leges*, 9.267) by killing Pompey and Crassus than the Romans themselves did (9.266-269).

since the time of Marius and Sulla,⁶⁴ but has also brought *libertas* closer than ever; Cato asks, “[N]ow do you refuse your fatherland your throats and swords/when liberty is near?” (*nunc patriae iugulos ensesque negatis,/cum prope libertas?* 9.264-265).⁶⁵ Therefore, it is preposterous that men who have lost one *dominus* (Pompey, as chief of a faction) should trade their new-found freedom for yet another master, Caesar (9.258-262, 9.274-275).

But what does Lucan mean by *libertas* in this passage? How does commitment to freedom relate to the reconstitution of the Roman *civitas* as embodied in the republican army? Martindale observes⁶⁶:

Libertas in the *Bellum Civile* is sometimes the Republican constitution and sometimes the spiritual freedom that the *sapiens*, in Lucan’s somewhat pessimistic version of Stoicism, alone can achieve, as a last resort if necessary by suicide. The two concepts meet in the figure of Cato, and it may be felt that the freedom of the mind is even more important to Lucan than the freedom of the state.

The semantic range of *libertas* explains why Cato promotes continued republican resistance even after Pompey’s death. In the eulogy for Pompey, Cato characterizes the freedom found under the old republic as a fiction that perished with Pompey (9.204-206). Why then should the republicans fight on? When Cato later rebukes the

⁶⁴ See 9.204-206: “Long ago, when Marius and Sulla were admitted, the true guarantee/of liberty disappeared: with Pompey taken from the world,/now even the bogus guarantee has gone” (*olim vera fides Sulla Marioque receptis/libertatis obit: Pompeio rebus adempto/nunc et ficta perit*).

⁶⁵ Cf. the ideological ramifications of Pompey’s departure from Pharsalus; see pages 203-205 above.

⁶⁶ Martindale 1984, 71. As Martindale notes, the spiritual, philosophical sense of *libertas* in death may be what Lintott refers to when he says, “The moral of the poem was not a political programme . . . but a prescription to the individual” (Lintott 1971, 503). The ambiguity of *libertas* is a trait of post-Augustan literature generally: “*Libertas* means either personal and civic rights, or republicanism, or both, and, while under each of these heads fall several cognate but distinct notions, it is not always easy to ascertain exactly what *libertas* means in each particular instance” (Wirszubski 1950, 125).

deserters, he does not promise them that they will restore freedom within the state.

Rather, he focuses upon their own ability to fight and die as free men (9.258-262):

quod non in regna laboras,
quod tibi, non ducibus, vivis morerisque, quod orbem
acquiris nulli, quod iam tibi vincere tutum est, 260
bella fugis quaerisque iugum cervice vacanti
et nescis sine rege pati.

Now that you are not laboring for tyranny
now that you live and die not for your leaders but yourselves, now
that
you win the world for no one, now that it is safe for you to 260
conquer,
you run away from war, and with your neck devoid of one you
seek a yoke
and do not know how to live on without a king.

Even if the republicans fail to defeat Caesar and restore the republic as a full-fledged political regime, at least they will fight and die in their own interest. Cato sums up his position when he asks the following rhetorical question: “What question, Labienus, do you bid me ask? Whether I prefer/to meet death in battle, free, to witnessing tyranny?” (*quid quaeri, Labiene, iubes? an liber in armis/occubuisse velim potius quam regna videre?* 9.566-567). Furthermore, thanks to their corporate conversion to *libertas*, they will fight and die as a restored, united, truly Roman *civitas*.⁶⁷

VI. The Carthaginian hive and the Trojan meadow

Just as Lucan concludes the funeral for Pompey and the dead of Pharsalus with the fire simile at 9.182-185, he marks the success of Cato’s speech with another simile

⁶⁷ Lintott 1971, 499-500, writes, “For Cato the civil war was not a struggle for his freedom – that was assured – it was to see whether he would have any companions with which to share it.”

depicting agricultural renewal.⁶⁸ Now he compares the return of the republican fleet to the restoration of order in a disturbed beehive (9.283-293)⁶⁹:

dixit, et omnes	
haud aliter medio revocavit ab aequore puppes	
quam, simul effetas linquunt examina ceras	285
atque oblita favi non miscent nexibus alas	
sed sibi quaeque volat nec iam degustat amarum	
desidiosa thymum, Phrygii sonus increpat aeris,	
attonitae posuere fugam studiumque laboris	
floriferi repetunt et sparsi mellis amorem:	290
gaudet in Hyblaeo securus gramine pastor	
divitias servasse casae. sic voce Catonis	
inculcata viris iusti patientia Martis.	

He spoke, and summoned back	
all the ships from mid-sea, just as when the swarms	
together leave the wax which brings forth young	285
and do not intertwine their wings, forgetful of the honeycomb,	
but each flies independently and now no longer sips lazily	
the bitter thyme: the sound of Phrygian brass rings out,	
and, stunned, they stop their flight, return to their pursuit	
of flower-bearing toil and love of scattered honey:	290
the shepherd free from worry on the grass of Hybla now rejoices	
that the riches of his hut are safe. So by Cato's utterance	
endurance of rightful warfare was impressed upon the warriors.	

Here, Lucan is most explicit in presenting Cato's activities in Book 9 as a refoundation of Rome. First, the passage alludes to the simile in *Aen.* 1 where Vergil compares the construction of Carthage to the activities of a swarm of bees (*Aen.* 1.430-436). Secondly, as we shall see, Lucan subtly deploys certain key words (e.g. *securus*) that he will reprise at the end of Book 9 when Caesar visits the ruins of Troy and promises to rebuild the city. Lucan thereby suggests that Cato's task in reinvigorating the

⁶⁸ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 64, notes the link between the two similes.

⁶⁹ For discussion of 9.283-293, see Ormsby 1970, 53-60; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 104-108; and D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 122-123 and 144-147.

republican army is analogous to the foundation of a city. Rather than rebuild a physical city, the *Urbs* of Rome, Cato renews his soldiers' desire to fight on behalf of *libertas*. In this respect, they embody the Roman *civitas*.

The most striking intertext for the extended simile at 9.283-293⁷⁰ is *Aen.*

1.421-437, where Aeneas gazes upon Carthage for the first time:

miratur molem Aeneas, magalia quondam, miratur portas strepitumque et strata viarum. instant ardentis Tyrii pars ducere muros, molirique arcem et manibus subvolvere saxa, pars optare locum tecto et concludere sulco.	425
iura magistratusque legunt sanctumque senatum; hic portus alii effodiunt; hic alta theatris fundamenta locant alii, immanisque columnas rupibus excidunt, scaenis decora alta futuris.	430
qualis apes aestate nova per florea rura exercet sub sole labor, cum gentis adultos educunt fetus, aut cum liquentia mella stipant et dulci distendunt nectare cellas, aut onera accipiunt venientum, aut agmine facto ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent:	435
fervet opus, redolentque thymo fragrantia mella. 'O fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!'	

Awed by the gates, by the noise, the paved roadways, Aeneas just
 marvels.
Fired-up Tyrians work at their tasks; some extend the defense
 walls,
strengthen the castle and, with bare hands, lever masonry uphill.
Some decide housing-sites, mark boundary lines with a furrow. 425
Magistrates, legal codes, and a sacred senate are chosen.
Others excavate ports, still others are laying foundations,

⁷⁰ For discussion of this and other intertexts, see the analyses of D'Alessandro Behr, Ormsby, and Wick (particularly p. 104) cited in the preceding note. Some commentators have suggested that Lucan is particularly influenced by *Il.* 2.87-90, where the Greek troops on the beach are likened to a swarm of bees. Homer places this simile just before Agamemnon tests his troops' devotion to the cause and they begin to desert. Odysseus then convinces them to fight to the end. Likewise, Lucan's bee simile follows upon the republicans' attempted desertion and Cato's successful appeal to them to remain (Von Albrecht 1970, 275; Lausberg 1985, 1600-1602; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 83-84). Comparisons between a beehive and a human polity are frequent in classical texts; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 104, notes various parallels between Lucan's simile and Verg. *Geor.* 4.51-108 in particular.

deep in the ground, for a theater. Some chisel out from the
 cliff-sides
 tall columns, massive in size; décor for a stage in the future.
 Work keeps bees just as busy as this in the sunshine of early 430
 summer across meadows covered with flowers when they lead out
 the now grown
 new generation from hives, as they store up the streams of honey,
 stretching the combs' wax cells to the full with the sweetness of
 nectar,
 or when unloading the incoming swarm, or when, massed like an
 army,
 driving those useless creatures, the drones, from the bounds of the 435
 compound.
 Work seethes; thyme's sweet savor enhances the fragrance of
 honey.
 'Oh, how blessed are people whose ramparts are already rising!'

As Ormsby notes, the initial disruptive stage in Lucan's bee simile is written "in close antithesis to Vergil's conceit" in *Aen.* 1.430-436.⁷¹ Where Vergil's bees care for their younger comrades (*Aen.* 1.431-432), acquire honey and nectar (1.432-433), and ward off unproductive drones (1.434-435), Lucan's bees have proven deficient in these three areas of *labor*. They abandon "the wax which brings forth young" (*Phars.* 9.285), no longer gather honey (9.287-288), and cease to guard the hive.⁷² Furthermore, Lucan's bitter thyme and lazy bees contrast with the fevered activity and fragrant thyme of *Aeneid* 1.436. The tasks that Vergil's bees perform so readily are precisely those which Lucan's have abandoned, perhaps because they have proven too bitter (*amarum*/. . . *thymum*, 9.287-288). Lastly, whereas the Carthaginians in *Aen.* 1 are busy with the task of founding their city, the disintegration of the republican army

⁷¹ Ormsby 1970, 56-57. In the text above, I follow Ormsby's enumeration of the particular points of contrast between the two similes (*ibid.*, 56-58).

⁷² The words *non miscent nexibus alas* at 9.286 play on the military meaning of *ala* ("flank" or "squadron"); the bees neither fly nor fight together as a unit. In contrast, Vergil's bees fight in closed ranks, *agmine facto*, at *Aen.* 1.434. See Ormsby 1970, 54, and D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 146-147, for discussion of military resonances in these passages.

after Pompey's funeral would represent the end of the Roman *civitas* (*actum Romanis fuerat de rebus*, 9.253).

Lucan's specific allusion to *Aen.* 1 invites the reader to compare and contrast Cato's attempt to re-establish the republic with Dido's foundation of Carthage. The parallelism is especially apt given that Cato's camp is located in Libya at a place named after one of Aeneas' companions. Cato may not be building a physical city, but he is attempting to instill the values of the *res publica* in his troops. There is no physical attack upon the hive or the swarm in the bee simile in *Phars.* 9. Similarly, the *Urbs* is under no military threat at this point in the epic. Rather, the organization of the bee community has disintegrated. So too has the order of the Roman "hive" collapsed as each contingent of the republican army begins to go its separate way. Hence, each bee in the simile "flies for itself" (*sibi quaeque volat*, 9.287).⁷³ Cato calls his men back to order by means of his voice (*voce Catonis*, 9.292), which is represented in the simile by the shepherd clashing the Phrygian bronze (*Phrygii sonus increpat aeris*, 9.288).⁷⁴ Though far removed from the *Urbs*, Cato successfully induces the Romans under his command to function once more as members of a collective greater than themselves – as *cives* of one *civitas*.

⁷³ See Ormsby 1970, 58-59, for further discussion of the theme of "disruption which is turned to order" (ibid., 58) in Lucan's simile as it applies to the military and political situation Cato and his men face in the *Pharsalia*.

⁷⁴ D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 147; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 107. Ormsby 1970, 55-56, claims that the *pastor* of the simile is aloof (*securus*, 9.291) from what goes on around him. He does not seem to think that the *pastor* is the unnamed person who clashes the Phrygian cymbals, which is the most plausible interpretation of the passage. Vergil alludes to the use of cymbals to calm a disorganized swarm of bees at *Geor.* 4.64: "excite the ringings and shake the cymbals of the Great Mother round about" (*tinnitusque cie et Matris quate cymbala circum*). The *Mater* of the passage is the Phrygian goddess Cybele (D'Alessandro Behr 2007, 146; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 106). See Wick 2004, Vol. II, 106, for other texts that mention the use of loud noises to quell agitated bees.

One might interpret Lucan's allusion to the foundation of Carthage as an ironic commentary on Cato's ultimate failure to renew the republic. Like the Carthaginians, the republican forces will suffer defeat – military, if not moral – at the hands of Caesar, the heir of Aeneas.⁷⁵ According to this interpretation, Cato is re-building not so much Rome as another tragically flawed anti-Rome, a successor to Carthage, Rome's former archenemy. Considered in this light, Lucan's implicit comparison of Cato's army to Carthage recalls the republicans' attempts to establish bases at Capua, Corfinium, Epirus, and Dyrrachium. As with those past efforts, one must ask how the Roman identity of the republicans is affected by their alienation from the *Urbs* and their assimilation to a former nemesis of Rome. Lucan has already adverted to the perils of seeking safety in Africa. He faults the republicans in Book 4 for seeking the assistance of the Numidian King Juba, who defeats the Caesarian lieutenant Curio (4.788-793). Later, Pompey spurns the idea of seeking help from Juba because he is a latter-day Hannibal bent on using the Roman civil war to his own advantage (8.283-288).⁷⁶ At the very least, one of the great reversals of republican history⁷⁷ occasioned by the civil war is that Cato the Younger, great-grandson of the censor who ended his

⁷⁵ Cf. Ahl 1968, 159-160, and Casamento 2003, 235ff., for further discussion of the legend of Aeneas and Dido and of Caesar's descent from Aeneas (proclaimed by Caesar at 1.195-197 and 9.990-999) as they pertain to Lucan's depiction of the the civil war's African campaigns. Like the Carthaginians, the republicans will also lose to a Scipio. An old legend stated that an army commanded by a Scipio could not fail in Africa. As the republican commander at Thapsus was Metellus Scipio, a consular and Pompey's father-in-law, it seemed that a republican victory was assured. Caesar reacted to this oracle by appointing an insignificant member of the Scipio family as the temporary, titular head of his own army (Plut. *Caes.* 52.4-5). See Ahl 1968, 159, and *ibid.* 1976, 109-110, for further discussion.

⁷⁶ “. . . and much in his foolish breast is/Hannibal” (*multusque in pectore vano est/Hannibal*, 8.285-286). Pompey also claims that Juba is related to Hannibal (8.284-287). Cato marches toward Juba's realm in Book 9 and wishes that, if he must die as Pompey did, Juba should play the part of Ptolemy and decapitate him (9.211-214). For Lucan's characterization of Juba in Book 4, see p. 129, n. 47, above.

⁷⁷ Ahl 1968, 158-161, characterizes Caesar's victories over the republicans in Africa as the climactic moment in the *Pharsalia*'s “utter reversal of history” (*ibid.*, 159).

speeches with the sentiment *Carthago delenda est*, finds himself defending a Punic city (Utica) against the forces of a regime based at Rome.⁷⁸

We last see Cato as he draws near Leptis in Book 9 (9.948-949).

Unfortunately, we do not know how Lucan would have addressed Cato's interaction with the Punic natives of Libya or with King Juba in whatever part of the epic remained to be written.⁷⁹ This would shed further light on how we should read Lucan's implicit comparison of the republican camp to Carthage in Book 9.

According to Plutarch, Cato stressed the political sovereignty and Roman identity of the republican camp when he joined Scipio Metellus and Juba in the province of Africa. In a speech addressed to the Romans gathered at Utica, he insisted that their country "was not Utica, nor Adrumetum, but Rome, and had many times by her greatness recovered from worse disasters."⁸⁰ He also strenuously resisted Juba's attempts to manipulate internal rivalries among the Roman leaders.⁸¹ Given Lucan's association of Juba with Carthage in Books 4 and 8, Cato's conflicts with Juba may

⁷⁸ According to Plut. *Cat. Min.* 63.2, a number of Cato's Roman forces refused to enter Utica's walls because they mistrusted the Punic inhabitants of the city. Furthermore, Lucan links the deaths of Juba (relative of Hannibal), Metellus Scipio (of the same *gens* as the Scipiones Africani), and Cato (descendant of Cato the Censor) at 6.309-311; Ahl 1976, 109, notes the relevance of Metellus Scipio and Cato's names and ancestries in this context. Hence, Caesar's opponents were linked by family to both sides of the Punic Wars and died fighting together on the republican side in Africa. Lucan states that if Pompey had won the war at Dyrrachium, Scipio would not have "appeased the Carthaginian ghosts with blood/poured out" (*Poenorumque umbras placasset sanguine fuso/Scipio*, 6.310-311). In other words, he implies that Scipio Metellus' death was retribution for the damage that earlier generations of Scipios did to Carthage. Lucan begins line 6.311 with the name *Scipio* and ends it with *Catone*, thereby framing the line with the names of the republican heroes who strove for Carthage's destruction. See p. 106, n. 1, and 129, n. 47, above for further analysis of the Punic theme in Lucan.

⁷⁹ Ahl 1968, 160-161, goes so far as to compare Cato's suicide at Utica, hypothetically depicted in the final scene of the *Pharsalia*'s unwritten twelfth and final book, to the suicide of Dido at Carthage; as Dido died cursing Aeneas, Cato dies defying Caesar, Aeneas' purported descendant. I will address the disputed end-point of the *Pharsalia* in the next chapter.

⁸⁰ . . . [τὴν πατρίδα] ἣν οὐκ ἴτύκην οὐδ' Ἀδρούμητον οὔσαν, ἀλλὰ Ῥώμην, πολλάκις ἐκ χαλεπωτέρων σφαλμάτων ὑπὸ μεγέθους ἀναφέρεσθαι (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 59.5, trans. Perrin).

⁸¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 57.1-58.2.

have given Lucan an opportunity to reaffirm the Roman character of Cato's army and mission despite their sojourn in Libya.

While some degree of identification of Cato's camp with Carthage seems inevitable in light of the bee simile, I argue that the salvific role of the Phrygian bronze (9.288-290) places a limit on how far we can pursue an ironic reading of this passage. Aeneas views the city of Carthage unfolding in wondrous order. His blessing of the new endeavor (*o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt*, *Aen.* 1.437), however, proves to be ironic. The entrance of Aeneas and his fellow Phrygians⁸² into the city results in the death of Dido and, generations later, the destruction of the Carthaginian "hive" (i.e. city) by the Romans.⁸³ The situation is reversed in Book 9 of the *Pharsalia*. In Lucan's simile, the shepherd intervenes by ringing Phrygian cymbals and thereby restores order to a disorganized hive. The cymbals represent Cato's power of persuasion and the hive represents the Roman state as embodied by the republican camp. The ethnonym *Phrygii* (9.288) recalls Aeneas at the same time that it contrasts his effect upon the newly-founded city of Carthage with Cato's effect upon the imperiled *civitas* of Rome. When Lucan alludes to Aeneas' disastrous appearance in Carthage in the *Aeneid*, he does not foreshadow Cato's military defeat at the hands of Caesar so much as he foregrounds Cato's positive role in rallying his troops.

⁸² Juno refers to Aeneas as Dido's "Phrygian husband" (*Phrygio . . . marito*, *Aen.* 4.103). In *Aen.* 9, Numanus Remulus mocks the Trojans by calling them Phrygians (9.599, 9.617) and making fun of their cymbals (*tympana*, 9.619).

⁸³ Cf. Ormsby 1970, 60: "The simile [at *Aen.* 1.430-436] does not extend to include the disruption of the order of Carthaginian society which is caused by Aeneas' involvement with Dido. Lucan's simile, combining the themes of disruption and order, provides a more complete picture of his city's fate."

The bee simile also foreshadows Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy at the end of Book 9. When Caesar tours the ruins of Troy, he confidently strides across a patch of grass that a local identifies as the scene of Priam's death (9.974-979):

inscius in sicco serpentem pulvere rivum
 transierat, qui Xanthus erat. securus in alto 975
 gramine ponebat gressus: Phryx incola manes
 Hectoreos calcare vetat. discussa iacebant
 saxa nec ullius faciem servantia sacri:
 'Herceas,' monstrator ait, 'non respicis aras?'

Unwittingly, he had crossed a stream creeping
 in dry dust – this was Xanthus. Oblivious, he placed 975
 his footsteps in the deep grass: the Phrygian local tells him
 not to tread upon the shade of Hector. Scattered stones
 were lying there, preserving no appearance of anything sacred:
 the guide says: 'Have you no respect for the Hercean altars?'

Two aspects of this passage recall the bee simile at 9.285-292. First, Caesar's confidence in stepping securely over the ruins of Troy (*securus in alto/gramine ponebat gressus*, 9.975-976) recall 9.291-292, where Lucan compares Cato to a shepherd in Hybla's pasture: *gaudet in Hyblaeo securus gramine pastor*. Secondly, the Phrygian native (*Phryx incola*, 9.976) who berates Caesar for his disrespect recalls the Phrygian cymbals that summon back the bees to their hive (*Phrygii sonus . . . aeris*, 9.288). By extension, the *Phryx incola* is also analogous to Cato, who upbraids the republicans for their disregard for their own city's freedom. In light of Lucan's reminiscence of the bee simile at 9.974-979, we can see Cato's task of renewing the republican army as both analogous and superior to Caesar's project of refounding Troy. Cato too is renewing a destroyed city, but in his case the city in question is republican Rome. Furthermore, Cato's serenity (his *securitas*) has the solid ground

that Caesar's lacks.⁸⁴ Cato is mindful of *libertas* and of Rome's past while Caesar is ignorant of the ruins he treads upon.

Vergil's account of the construction of Carthage and Aeneas' participation therein (*Aen.* 1.418-438, 4.259-276) also alludes to Caesar and Augustus' own physical reconstruction of the city after the civil war.⁸⁵ Lucan's allusive bee simile may therefore highlight Cato's patriotism in contrast to Caesar's indifference to Rome's past enmity toward Carthage. The result of Caesar's campaign in Africa is his decision to rebuild Rome's former nemesis.⁸⁶ In contrast, Cato's mission in Africa is to rebuild the Roman Republic.

In short, the bee simile likens Cato's effect upon his troops to the physical construction of a city by alluding to the bee simile in *Aen.* 1. The idea that Cato's army resembles Dido's Carthage may suggest that his attempt to re-create Rome in Africa proves deficient. However, Cato's constructive effect upon the internal order of the Roman "beehive" contrasts with Aeneas' disruptive effect at Carthage. Additionally, the positive portrayal of the self-assured (*securus*) shepherd in the simile sets Cato apart from Caesar, whose *securitas* as he treads upon the ruins of Troy testifies to his obliviousness to his actions and their meaning. Lastly, the Vergilian allusion may actually set Cato's army in opposition not to the Roman Republic but to

⁸⁴ Commenting on *securus* in line 9.975, Ormand 1994, 52, n. 39, suggests that Caesar here appears as "a perverse version of Cato *securus sui* (2.241)." See Ormsby 1970, 54-56, on the persistent theme of Cato's *securitas*.

⁸⁵ See pages 22-23 of this dissertation, especially notes 60-61.

⁸⁶ According to Appian (*B.P.* 136), Caesar was inspired to rebuild Carthage when he was encamped near the city's ruins during his campaign against Metellus Scipio. He dreamt that he saw an entire army weeping at the site and took this as a sign that he should rebuild the city. Ahl 1976, 109, speculates that Lucan would have mentioned Caesar's decision to rebuild Carthage had he lived to carry the narrative of the *Pharsalia* down to the Battle of Thapsus: "And last, but not least, Lucan could hardly have resisted noting that Caesar undertook the rebuilding of Carthage once the war was over – the crowning act of historical irony." Cf. pages 22-23 and 129-139 above for discussion of historical irony in Lucan.

Caesar's new regime and his new colony at Carthage. In light of these considerations and especially after Pompey's signal failure to preserve the republican *armata urbs* in the face of internal and external opposition, I argue that the net effect of the simile is to portray Cato as a force of restoration and reconstruction in the midst of the civil war's cataclysmic devastation. To quote Ormsby, "Lucan shows disruption turned to order in the immediate purposes of the republican cause. Implied in his simile is the notion that Rome, disrupted by the loss of the republic, can once again turn to constructive progress."⁸⁷

VII. Cities destroyed and cities spared

In the previous section, we saw how Lucan alludes to the construction of Carthage, the most famous city destroyed by Rome, when he describes Cato's metaphorical refoundation of republican Rome. In this section, we shall see how the theme of the destruction of cities develops over the course of Book 9 as Cato assumes control of the republican camp and re-directs its attention toward *libertas*. Whereas in early books of the epic the *urbs capta* topos usually signals the destruction of the republic, here we see the republicans progress in strength and self-confidence after the nadir of Pharsalus. Essentially, the republicans re-assert themselves, take the offensive in the war, reject excessive and self-defeating reactions to the death of Pompey, and ultimately adopt a more merciful attitude toward defeated foes. We can discern this development by studying how Lucan's treatment of the theme of captured

⁸⁷ Ormsby 1970, 60. This quotation is a continuation of the passage cited above at n. 83.

and destroyed cities changes in the scenes leading up to Cato's march across the desert.

When Cato first reaches Libya, the people of the city of Phycus⁸⁸ deny him a landing in their harbor (9.38-41):

. . . Dictaea legit cedentibus undis
litora. tunc ausum classi praecludere portus
impulit ac saevas meritis Phycunta rapinas 40
sparsit, . . .

. . . and [Cato] follows the Dictaeian shores
as the waves give way. Then, when Phycus dared to bar its
harbors
to the fleet, he overthrew and pulverized the town, deserving 40
savage
plunder, . . .

Cato's retaliation against Phycus marks three changes in Lucan's treatment of the theme of the destruction of cities: 1.) the republicans, not the Caesarians, defeat and destroy a city, 2.) the defeated foreign city is not a proxy for Rome as has been the case with most imperiled cities in the epic thus far, and 3.) the narrator justifies the city's destruction. Cato's destruction of Phycus demonstrates the republicans' ability to assert themselves militarily even after the catastrophe at Pharsalus. In order for the republicans to revive their cause, they need to take some initiative in the war instead of merely reacting to Caesar. The destruction of Phycus is perhaps the most vivid manifestation of the republicans' renewed resolve.⁸⁹ The lack of such resolve caused Pompey to spare Caesar's army at Dyrrachium, a tragic decision that resulted in republicans' own catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus. Under Cato's leadership, the

⁸⁸ Phycus was located at the promontory now known as Ras Sem (Wick 2004, Vol. II, 23).

⁸⁹ This point is made by Seewald 2008, 52-53.

republicans are no longer the passive victims of Caesar that they have so often been throughout the epic.

Furthermore, one interpretation of Lucan's compressed diction in lines 9.40-41 is that Cato physically destroyed (*sparsit*) Phycus but spared the city the savage looting that it deserved (*saevae meritum Phycunta rapinas*).⁹⁰ While the townspeople were left homeless, they did not have to endure the mayhem and violence of a sack. If this interpretation is correct, Cato exercises merciful restraint even while destroying a city. In contrast, Caesar would be willing to let his troops loot Rome in order to satisfy their lust and greed (5.305-309).⁹¹

The theme of retaliatory destruction reappears when Gnaeus responds to his father's death in Egypt (9.148-164). Sextus claims that Egyptian birds and dogs may have devoured Pompey's corpse: "But whether dogs of Pharos or the ravenous birds tore/his body apart . . . I know not" (*nam corpus Phariaene canes avidaeque volucres/distulerint . . . ignoro*, 9.141-143). This formulation evokes Achilles' disregard for the Trojan dead as described at *Il.* 1.4-5,⁹² an allusion reinforced by the fact that one of Pompey's assassins is named Achillas.⁹³ Despite Sextus' assimilation of Pompey to Achilles' Trojan victims, Gnaeus' response resembles Achilles'

⁹⁰ Sklenář 2003, 81 and 135. Shackleton Bailey glosses the line as meaning that Cato was "less severe than Phycus deserved" (*citra meritum severus*). This restraint may hint at the historical Cato's policies for dealing with captive cities. According to Plutarch, Cato persuaded Pompey to forbid the sacking of any city subject to Rome (*Cat. Min.* 53.4). He also prevented Metellus Scipio from ordering the destruction of Utica in retaliation for the city's pro-Caesarian tendencies (*ibid.*, 58.1-2).

⁹¹ See Ch. 1 (pages 56-61 and 102-103) for discussion of the brutal scenarios imagined by Laelius and Caesar in Books 1 and 5.

⁹² As Wick 2004, Vol. II, 52, notes in her discussion of *Phars.* 9.141-142, Homer says that Achilles gave many bodies of heroes as spoils to dogs and birds: αὐτοῦς δὲ ἐλώρια τεύχε κύνεσσιν/οἰωνοῖσι τε πᾶσι (*Il.* 1.4-5). Wick (*ibid.*) also discusses other Greek and Latin poetic texts that refer to dogs and birds devouring corpses.

⁹³ Bowie 1990, 478, cites the Homeric resonance of Achillas' name as evidence that Vergil models the death of Priam in *Aen.* 2 on the death of Pompey; see p. 208, n. 83, above.

embittered reaction to the death of Patroclus. He threatens to kill King Ptolemy (9.152) and desecrate the bodies of Alexander, the pharaohs, and the Egyptian gods (9.153-159). He concludes his speech with a proposal to depopulate the land of Egypt (9.161-164):

has mihi poenas
terra dabit: linquam vacuos cultoribus agros,
nec, Nilus cui crescat, erit, solusque tenebis
Aegypton, genitor, populis superisque fugatis.

The land will pay
this penalty to me: I shall leave the fields devoid of cultivators,
nor will there be anyone to benefit from rising Nile; you will be
sole lord
of Egypt, father, when I have driven out the gods and peoples.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, Lucan blames the Battle of Pharsalus (where Caesar set a precedent for Gnaeus' threats against the dead by sacrilegiously refusing to bury the slain republicans) for the depopulation and physical deterioration of Rome and other Italian cities and the abandonment of the Italian countryside.⁹⁴ Hence, Gnaeus proposes to unleash upon Alexandria and Egypt the sort of violence that Caesar has wrought upon Rome and Italy.⁹⁵ Furthermore, if we accept the manuscript reading *arces* in line 9.153, Gnaeus explicitly threatens to destroy Alexandria: "Shall

⁹⁴ See pages 189-195 above.

⁹⁵ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 45, additionally observes that Gnaeus' speech may be modeled in part on Dido's furious diatribes against Aeneas in Book 4 of the *Aeneid*. Gnaeus' indignant reference to his father's "unburied shade" (*inhumatos . . . manes*, 9.151) recalls Dido's wish for Aeneas' body to lie unburied on the sand (*mediaque inhumatus harena*, *Aen.* 4.620). Additionally, Gnaeus wishes to tear apart the mummified corpse of the Egyptian god Osiris: "and Osiris clothed in linen I shall scatter through the crowd" (*et tectum lino spargam per vulgus Osirim*, 9.159). Dido wishes that she had dismembered Aeneas' body and scattered his limbs: "Could I not have taken him off, torn his body to pieces/scattered it over the sea" (*non potui abreptum divellere corpus et undis/spargere*, *Aen.* 4.600-601; emphasis in Ahl's translation). Gnaeus' threats against Egypt therefore recall the enmity that engulfed Rome and Carthage in warfare and ultimately destroyed the latter city.

I not engulf in sluggish [Lake] Mareotis the citadels of Pella,/Alexander's body from
its sanctuary uncovered?" (*non ego Pellaeas arces adytisque resectum/corpus
Alexandri pigra Mareotide mergam?* 9.153-154).⁹⁶

Why does Lucan attribute to Gnaeus, a republican, such an ostensibly
Caesarian goal as the ravaging and depopulation of an entire country? Gnaeus'
father's goal was always to prevent such violence as much as possible by deferring
battle and fleeing toward the borders of the empire. Furthermore, why does Cato
approve of the young man's anger even as he restrains it: "[B]ut Cato praised and
curbed the young man's wrath" (*sed Cato laudatam iuvenis compescuit iram*,
9.166)?⁹⁷ I suggest that the transfer of the war to Egypt and Africa may partly explain

⁹⁶ I have here substituted "citadels" (*arces*) for the "rotting flesh" (*caries*) of Braund's translation. A number of modern scholars have found the manuscript reading *arces* in line 9.153 to be problematic and have emended the line. Wick 2004, Vol. II, 55, finds *arces* out of place at the beginning of a tirade in which Gnaeus focuses specifically on disinterring bodies from their tombs, not on assaulting Alexandria. Shackleton Bailey, followed by Braund, proposes the emendation *caries*, which would have Gnaeus submerging the rotting flesh of Alexander and other past kings of Egypt in Lake Mareotis; see Wick 2004, Vol. II, 56, for further discussion of this emendation and several alternatives, including *cineres*, "ashes," i.e. the cremated remains of the kings. I suggest that *arces* may be the original reading, or at least may be preferable to the proposed corrections. While *caries* and *cineres* might better suit the passage's theme of corpse desecration, another theme in 9.153 and the following lines is the violation of physical structures, e.g. the removal of Alexander's corpse from its sacred chambers (*adytisque resectum/corpus Alexandri*, 9.153-154), the tearing of Amasis' body out of the pyramids (*pyramidum tumulis evolsus Amasis*, 9.155), and punishment inflicted upon all the tombs of Egypt (*omnia dent poenas . . . sepulchra*, 9.157). The toppling and submersion of Alexandria's citadels in the lake would complement the devastation of Egypt's tomb structures. The destruction of the city also complements the murder of Ptolemy (9.152) and the depopulation of the Egyptian countryside (9.161-164); king, capital, and countryside alike pay for Pompey's murder.

⁹⁷ Sklenář 2003, 81-82, sees in Cato's praise for Gnaeus' anger a violation of the Stoic position that anger is a passion always to be avoided. He therefore concludes that Lucan undercuts Cato's status as a sage. For further interpretations of Lucan's Cato as a faulty, inconsistent, or even parodic *exemplum* of Stoicism, see Johnson 1987, 35-66; Leigh 1997, 265-282; Bartsch 1997, 29-35; and Sklenář 2003, 59-100. However, Wick 2004, Vol. II, 60-61, observes that it would be incorrect to expect Lucan's Cato, a character in an epic and not a philosophical treatise, to always abide by strict Stoic orthodoxy. Wick notes that Lucan may have modeled Cato's reaction to Gnaeus on the Homeric scene where Athena stops the vengeful Achilles before he kills Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.188-221). The force of epic tradition occasionally overrides the philosophical self-consistency that some modern scholars wish to impute to Lucan. D'Alessandro Behr 2007 (*passim*) and Bexley 2010, 145, n. 41, call into question both over-generalized accounts of Stoic "orthodoxy" and the degree to which Lucan purportedly adheres to such a party line.

Cato's approbation for such zeal. Up until now, the civil war has been fought in Italy, the provinces of the empire (e.g. Spain and Thessaly), or in allied territory (e.g. Massilia). Destructive measures taken against the civilian population always entailed damage to Rome itself. Only Caesar, indifferent to the well-being of his fellow citizens, could countenance such devastation. Now, however, a foreign power – Egypt – has intruded into what had been a civil war. In the proem to the epic, Lucan laments that swords that should have been aimed at foreign countries were aimed at Rome's own vitals (1.8-23). Gnaeus now wishes to direct weapons that had been stained with Roman blood against a foreign enemy. Additionally, while zeal to avenge the Egyptians' wrongdoing may be strategically misguided, Gnaeus at least wants the republicans to take the initiative in the conflict. Cato redirects this desire for action toward the more productive task of restoring *libertas*.

After he halts the deserters at Palinurus, Cato assigns his troops to dig earthworks in the sands of the beach (9.294-296). This act of military discipline⁹⁸ prepares the republicans for their next task, the capture of the city of Cyrene (9.297-299):

proximus in muros et moenia Cyrenarum
est labor: exclusus nulla se vindicat ira,
poenaeque de victis sola est vicisse Catonem.

Their next task is against the city-walls and the defences of Cyrene: though shut out, with no anger does he avenge himself; the only penalty exacted from the conquered was that Cato conquered them.

⁹⁸ Seewald 2008, 170-171, interprets the digging of the sand as an act of training and discipline for the troops that prepares them for their future challenges.

The republicans' strikingly merciful treatment of Cyrene⁹⁹ immediately after they leave Palinurus balances their destruction of Phycus just before their arrival at Palinurus (9.39-41). In fact, Lucan may well have manipulated the historical details of Cato's arrival in Cyrene in order to provide a counterpoint to the destruction of Phycus. Plutarch claims that the Cyrenaeans received Cato peacefully although a few days before they had refused entry to the republican leader Labienus.¹⁰⁰ The republicans' shift in policy toward defeated cities suggests that they have changed their priorities since landing at Palinurus and conducting funeral rites for Pompey and the other slain. Whereas the destruction of Phycus represents the republicans' renewed sense of initiative, the mercy Cato shows toward Cyrene bespeaks confidence and moderation.¹⁰¹ Caesar grants hypocritical pardons to men who rightly fought

⁹⁹ Seewald 2008, 172, provides a detailed study of the mercy and self-restraint Cato demonstrates in imposing no additional penalty upon the Cyrenaeans once he captures their city. Seewald notes that Roman military custom would have mandated the city's destruction and the enslavement of the inhabitants had the Cyrenaeans resisted Cato as Lucan claims they did.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. *Cato Min.* 56.2. See Wick 2004, Vol. I, 5; *ibid.*, Vol. II, 109; and Seewald 2008, 172, for discussion. Lausberg 1985, 1601, argues that Lucan may have adapted his sources so as to make Cato's capture of Cyrene parallel Odysseus' capture of the city of the Kikones (*Od.* 9.39ff.) at the beginning of his voyage home from Troy (cf. Seewald 2008, 172). Dorchak 1995, 230, n. 57, speculates that Lucan may allude to Odysseus' ultimately disastrous campaign against the Kikones in order to highlight by way of contrast Cato's successful maintenance of discipline and self-restraint among his soldiers at Cyrene (see also n. 29 above).

¹⁰¹ Wick 2004, Vol. I, 4-5, also notes Cato's contrasting severity at Phycus and lenience at Cyrene but provides an alternative explanation. She explains that Cato's need for supplies after crossing the Mediterranean drove him to extreme measures against Phycus. Wick interprets Cato's clemency at Cyrene as Lucan's correction ("korrigieren") of the negative portrayal ("negative Bild") of his earlier behavior at Phycus. I agree with Wick's interpretation of Cato's clemency toward Cyrene as a repudiation of his earlier violence, but I find it doubtful that historical accuracy alone would compel Lucan, a poet otherwise willing to alter historical details (see the preceding note), to include a negative portrayal of Cato requiring later correction. Perhaps the historical Cato did have cause to destroy Phycus, but we cannot know this with certainty because the *Pharsalia* is, as Wick observes (*ibid.*), the only extant testimony for Cato's landing there. We therefore cannot assume that the destruction of Phycus was simply an inconvenient historical datum for which Lucan needed to provide an apology. While Cato's reactions to hostile Libyan cities does seem to progress from violence toward moderation, I see even in the violence at Phycus the republicans' progression away from their crippling defeat at Pharsalus and toward initiative.

him.¹⁰² In contrast, the republicans show *clementia* toward opponents who actually deserve punishment.

Furthermore, the decision to spare Cyrene complements Cato's recent intervention to save the republican army when it was on the verge of collapse. Having demonstrated their might and resolve at Phycus, the republicans show that they are also capable of preserving a city. Renewing and preserving Rome (currently instantiated in the republican army) is Cato's goal. Though Cato is fighting a civil war and has been excluded from the *Urbs*, his motivation is not factional vendetta but rather the restoration of liberty, law, and order. Unlike Caesar, he fights with no anger: *nulla se vindicat ira* (9.298). Cyrene thus serves as a proxy for Rome; just as Cato does not damage Cyrene once he has captured the city, he does not wish his prosecution of the civil war to imperil Rome as did Caesar's victory at Pharsalus.

VIII. Sandstorms and allegorical ruins

Cato's march across the Sahara between Cyrene and Leptis occupies the bulk of Book 9 (9.371-949). As the republicans begin their trek, Cato tells them that the desert will give them an opportunity to prove their *virtus* and *Romanitas* (9.379-406). He draws an analogy between the physical hardship of the march and the difficult political and military task of restoring the republic: "Hard is the path toward legality and love of crashing fatherland" (*durum iter ad leges patriaeque ruentis amorem*,

¹⁰² Lucan best expresses his disdain for Caesar's pardons at 2.519-521: "The citizen's worst punishment for joining the army/of his fatherland, his leader Magnus, all the Senate is—to be forgiven" (*poenarum extremum civi, quod castra secutus/sit patriae Magnumque ducem totumque senatum, ignosci*). See p. 41, n. 3, above for secondary sources that discuss Lucan's sinister interpretation of Caesar's *clementia* in the *Pharsalia*.

9.385). Lucan uses the march and its hardships as an allegory for the republicans' political and moral struggle against tyranny.¹⁰³ Cato proclaims that his comrades will be those men who deem it beautiful and Roman to suffer with him as witness (9.390-392):

hi mihi sint comites, quos ipsa pericula ducent,
qui me teste pati vel quae tristissima pulchrum
Romanumque putant.

I want as my companions men attracted by the very dangers, 390
who think it fine and Roman to endure even the bitterest,
with me their witness.

The theme of cities is a little-noticed but significant aspect of this passage. First, Lucan sets Libya in opposition to the *Urbs* as the preferable location for the republicans; their labors on behalf of *libertas* will prove sweeter than life with their families in Rome and Italy would be. Secondly, the republicans encounter a sandstorm that destroys city walls and carry them over long distances. These displaced ruins allegorically represent the republicans, the metaphorical ruins of Rome that have been displaced to Africa.

Cato portrays the march through Libya as preferable to returning home and accepting Caesar's rule. According to him, all the perils of the desert will prove sweet: "Serpents, thirst, and heat of sand/are sweet to heroism; endurance in adversity

¹⁰³ Morford 1967a, 49, writes, “The storm [9.445-492] is the first of the trials of Cato’s *virtus* (cf. 444-445), and in this respect may be taken as symbolic of the adversity through which the Roman *iuventus* (481) must pass in the uphill road towards liberty and constitutional government (*durum iter ad leges*: 385).” On Lucan’s usage of the desert landscape for the purposes of moral allegory, see in particular Thomas 1982, 108-123, and Leigh 2000, 102-103.

rejoices” (*serpens, sitis, ardor*¹⁰⁴ *harenae/dulcia* *virtuti; gaudet patientia duris*, 9.402-403). This assessment is directly opposed to that of the mutineers who wished to abandon the war effort in order to visit their “sweet children” (*dulcesque revisere natos*, 9.231) at home. Lucan concludes that only patient endurance of Libya can possibly compensate for the dishonor the republicans incurred at Pharsalus: “Libya alone with its brood of evils can show/that it is honourable for warriors to have fled” (*sola potest Libye turba praestare malorum/ut deceat fugisse viros*, 9.405-406). Provided the republicans regain their lost honor, the trek through Africa will prove sweeter than immediate and shameful return to a homeland ruled by Caesar.

The desert is for the most part uninhabited and there are no cities along the way. According to Lucan, Minerva told Perseus to journey over this part of the world with Medusa’s head so as to avoid petrifying the cities of Europe (*Europae . . . urbes*, 9.686). Only when the republicans approach the city of Leptis at the end of Book 9 (9.948-949) do they find themselves among even the most primitive of dwellings: “and rustic huts of heaped-up straw began to rise” (*surgere congesto non culta mapalia culmo*, 9.945).¹⁰⁵ One of the reasons why the republicans encounter so few permanent settlements in the desert¹⁰⁶ is that powerful winds sweep away the houses and city walls of the natives (9.458-460, 490-492)¹⁰⁷:

¹⁰⁴ As I accept Braund’s reading of *harenae* as genitive (“heat of sand,” not “heat, sands”), I do not place a comma between *ardor* and *harenae* as does Shackleton Bailey.

¹⁰⁵ The word *mapalia* occurs earlier in the epic when Marius is driven through “deserted huts” (*vacuisque mapalibus actus*, 2.89), indicating that the huts were empty at the time due to the desolation of Carthage and its environs after the city’s destruction in 146 B.C. For further comments on *mapalia* in Lucan, see p. 76, n. 69.

¹⁰⁶ The Temple of Jupiter Ammon is the only permanent human structure that Cato encounters in Italy (9.511-586); see discussion below (pages 274-276).

¹⁰⁷ Shackleton Bailey brackets lines 9.490-492 on the grounds that they repeat the same basic idea as lines 9.458-460, but Dorchak 1995, 232, n. 62, and Seewald 2008, 271-272, provide apt defenses of the

regna videt pauper Nasamon errantia vento
 discussasque domos, volitantque a culmine raptae
 detecto Garamante casae. 460

The impoverished Nasamonian sees his kingdom floating in the
 wind,
 his home pulverized; the cottage flies away, torn off roof first,
 uncovering the Garamantian. 460

saxa tulit penitus discussis proruta muris 490
 effuditque procul miranda sorte malorum:
 qui nullas videre domos videre ruinas.

It [the wind] shattered walls, knocked down their stones, and 490
 carried them afar
 and at a distance dropped them, in an amazing disaster:
 those who saw no houses saw portions of them tumbling down.

The desert is thus a place hostile to permanent settlement and to organized, urban life.

In contrast to their campaigns in Italy, Epirus, and elsewhere, the march through Africa does not provide the republicans with a foreign city with which they can identify or a fortification in which they may hide from Caesar as they did in their previous campaigns.¹⁰⁸ It is no longer Caesar but the very environment of Africa that imperils the survival of both neighboring cities and of the exiled republican army.

The description of the Nasamonians' ruined towns recalls the desolation of Italy after the civil war. As we saw in the introduction to this dissertation, the opening

received reading. For a commentary on the Libyan sandstorm in the context of other storms depicted in the *Pharsalia*, see Morford 1967a, 49-51. See also Wick 2004, Vol. II, 169-171, for an analysis of various sources and parallel passages in other texts.

¹⁰⁸ At 2.494, Caesar lashes out at Domitius for hiding behind the city walls of Corfinium: "Are hiding-places behind walls not enough for your terror?" (*non satis est muris latebras quaesisse pavori?*).

passage of the *Pharsalia* refers to the shattered stone walls and buildings of Italy's depopulated cities (1.24-27)¹⁰⁹:

at nunc semirutis pendent quod moenia tectis
urbibus Italiae lapsisque ingentia muris 25
saxa iacent nulloque domus custode tenentur
rarus et antiquis habitator in urbibus errat, . . .

But now the walls are tumbling in the towns of Italy,
the houses half-destroyed, and, the defenses collapsed, 25
the huge stones lie; no guardian occupies the homes,
and in the ancient cities wanders only an occasional inhabitant; . . .

The march through Africa thus provides the republicans with a preview of what Italy will look like on account of Caesar.

It is tempting to interpret Libya's winds as the natural world's analogue for the destructive force Caesar wields in the political and military realms.¹¹⁰ Libya is inhospitable because of its winds (9.445-492). In Italy, it is Caesar who renders the land desolate by ruining cities and countryside alike. Furthermore, Lucan explains the power of Auster (the South Wind) in Libya in terms that evoke the theme of civil war: "progressing freely, he [Auster] inflicts Aeolus' fury on all the sands" (*liberque meatu/Aeoliam rabiem totis exercet harenis*, 9.453-454). *Rabies* is a word that Lucan routinely uses to characterize the fury of civil war generally and of Caesar in particular.¹¹¹ Lucan strongly associates Caesar with stormy weather, most notably in

¹⁰⁹ Cf. the description of Gabii, Veii, Cora, Alba Longa, and the Laurentine ruins at *Phars.* 7.392-394. We will return to this passage below (p. 271).

¹¹⁰ Dorchak 1995, 230-231, makes the same observation but cites different passages in support of his claim.

¹¹¹ For Caesar's personal *rabies*, see 2.535, 2.544, 7.245, 7.551, 7.557, and 10.72. *Rabies* is used of civil war generally at 1.666, 5.262, 6.63, and 10.530. It also describes Scaeva's frenzied pro-Caesarian fanaticism (6.224), the Pompeians' suicidal desire for battle at Pharsalus (7.51), and the madness that led Crastinus to cast the first missile at Pharsalus (7.474). Caesar refers to the mutiny in his army as

the lightning simile (1.151-157) and in the famous passage in Book 5 where Caesar attempts to cross the Adriatic during a nocturnal storm (5.504-677).¹¹² Just as the snakes “fight for Caesar” (*pro Caesare pugnant*, 9.850) when they beleaguer Cato’s troops later in their march, the African sandstorm assumes Caesar’s customary roles as instantiation of city-destroying *rabies* and chief threat to the republicans.

Lucan’s reference to “Aeolus’ fury” (*Aeoliam rabiem*, 9.454) also recalls the scene in the *Aeneid* where Juno induces the god Aeolus to release the winds from his cavern (*Aen.* 1.50-141).¹¹³ As a result, Aeneas’ fleet is driven ashore on the coast of Libya in the vicinity of the Syrtes (*Syrtis*, *Aen.* 1.146). Vergil explicitly compares the disturbance of the winds to a political revolution (*Aen.* 1.148-150):

ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est
 seditio, saevitque animis ignobile vulgus,
 iamque faces et saxa volant – furor arma ministrat . . . 150

Much the same happens within a great nation, where lawlessness
 often
 Bursts into riots, where people become mobs savage with passion,
 Firebrands, stones start flying through air (fury furnishes 150
 weapons) . . .

Cato, a latter-day Aeneas, likewise experiences *Aeoliam rabiem* as he crosses the Libyan desert. A windstorm also besets the republican fleet as it attempts to cross the Syrtes (9.319-347).¹¹⁴ Furthermore, much as Vergil’s simile likens Aeolus’ tempest to

rabies at 5.359. Lucan also compares the Pompeians’ willingness to turn on the Caesarians who have recently parleyed with them at Ilerda to the *rabies* of wild beasts that abandon tame behavior when they taste blood (4.240). The description of Auster as free (*liberque*, 9.453) also carries a political connotation in the context of a civil war waged between the forces of Caesar and republican *libertas*.

¹¹² See Morford 1967a, 37-44, for further discussion of the storm in Book 5.

¹¹³ Seewald 2008, 258-259.

¹¹⁴ Batinski 1991, 75, notes the common location where Aeneas and Cato’s fleets encounter problems.

civil unrest, Lucan casts the winds that harry Cato's troops in a destructive role analogous to that which Caesar plays in the Roman civil war.¹¹⁵

The ruined walls and houses of the Sahara also foreshadow Caesar's visit to Troy at the end of Book 9. Lucan says of Troy that "[s]cattered stones/were lying there" (*discussa iacebant/saxa*, 9.977-978). The *discussa saxa* of Troy recall the ruined homes (*discussasque domos*, 9.459) and stone walls (*saxa . . . discussis proruta muris*, 9.490) of Africa that appear earlier in the same book.¹¹⁶ Africa then is not merely a hostile natural environment but, like Italy under the Caesars and Troy after its destruction, a wasteland strewn with the ruins of cities.

I suggest that the displaced ruins of the African cities function as a physical analogue for the abject state of Cato's men after the disaster of Pharsalus.¹¹⁷ First, Lucan begins Book 9 by characterizing the republican forces as the "fragments of the Emathian collapse" (*Emathiae . . . fragmenta ruinae*, 9.33).¹¹⁸ Secondly, the republicans do not see the distant cities, walls, or houses that the windstorm destroys. They do, however, see the cities' displaced ruins: "those who saw no houses saw

¹¹⁵ It is also worth noting that the winds tear away the republicans' weapons and armor (9.471-480). Likewise, Caesar attempts to pacify his opponents and render them defenseless.

¹¹⁶ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 415, notes the parallels between Lucan's descriptions of the Libyan and Trojan ruins. She also cites three passages in Vergil's narrative of the fall of Troy that may inform Lucan's account of the Libyan ruins (*ibid.*, 176). The winds pick up the Garamantes' huts by their roofs (*a culmine*, *Phars.* 9.459). Vergil uses *a culmine* twice when he describes the physical collapse of Troy's buildings: "Troy collapses from its lofty summit" (*ruit alto a culmine Troia*, *Aen.* 2.290); "[the gods' inclemency] casts down Troy from its summit" (*sternitque a culmine Troiam*, *Aen.* 2.603; these two translations are my own). The scattered stones of the African cities may also recall the demolished structures of Troy: "Here, where you see massive bastions wrecked, blocks torn from supporting/blocks" (*hic, ubi disiectas moles avulsasque saxa/saxa vides*, *Aen.* 2.608-609; cf. *saxa . . . proruta*, *Phars.* 9.490). Ormsby 1970, 107ff., finds further parallels between Lucan's depictions of Libya at 9.822 and of Troy at 9.966-969.

¹¹⁷ Morford 1967b, 125, similarly interprets the storm that besets the republican fleet in the Syrtes at 9.319-347 as symbolic of "the bewilderment of the Pompeians after Pharsalia, and its result (the division of the fleet) is symbolic of the division among the Pompeian leaders."

¹¹⁸ See p. 225 above.

portions of them tumbling down” (*qui nullas videre domos videre ruinas*, 9.492).

Similarly, the civil war has torn the republicans themselves – the ruins of the former regime – away from the *Urbs*. Neither the old republic nor the distant *Urbs* are visible in Book 9 as we follow the surviving republicans to Libya and Caesar to Alexandria. The immense physical distance between Rome and Libya (vividly reflected in the un-Italian¹¹⁹ climate and terrain of the desert) represents the metaphorical distance between the former republic and the conditions of civil war in which Cato and his men find themselves.¹²⁰ When the republicans see only the ruins of distant, destroyed cities, they see a reflection of their own plight; they themselves are the displaced fragments of republican Rome.¹²¹

Furthermore, Lucan describes the effect of the sandstorm on Cato’s soldiers in terms that implicitly liken the soldiers themselves to a physical city or wall (9.481-489):

sic orbem torquente Noto Romana iuventus
procubuit timuitque rapi; constrinxit amictus
inseruitque manus terrae nec pondere solo
sed nisu iacuit, vix sic immobilis Austro;
qui super ingentis cumulos involvit harenae
atque operit tellure viros. vix tollere miles
membra valet multo congestu pulveris haerens.
alligat et stantis affusae magnus harenae
agger, et immoti terra surgente tenentur.

¹¹⁹ Lucan contrasts Libya with the “fruitful lands” (*frugiferas . . . terras*, 9.687) of Europe at 9.685-688.

¹²⁰ Leigh 2000, 103, claims that “the featureless and empty terrain of Libya is that of the Stoic pilgrim’s progress.” I would note that the terrain is not entirely empty. Rather, Libya contains displaced city ruins that mirror the status of Cato’s soldiers as the exiled remnants of the republic.

¹²¹ Cato’s Romans are not the only people in the Libyan desert who have lost their homes; the windstorms also deprive the Nasamones and Garamantes of their dwellings (9.458-460). Dorchak 1995, 232, n. 61, typifies the Nasamones as nomads and suggests that they may be yet another race of exiles whose history of displacement and dispossession, like that of the Phocaeans who founded Massilia, complements the plight of the exiled republicans who sojourn among them. Cf. p. 132, n. 53, above.

With Notus torturing the world like this the Roman troops lay
down,
afraid they would be swept away; they fastened tight their clothing
and they clutched the earth and lay there not by weight alone
but with an effort, hardly unaffected by the Auster even so;
it rolled above them mighty heaps of sand, enveloping 485
the warriors with earth. Hardly were the soldiers strong
enough to raise their limbs, embedded in the mighty mass of dust.
A great rampart of piled-up sand fettered even
those still standing, and they were held immobile as the ground
rose.

The language in this passage echoes that found in accounts of the destruction of cities elsewhere in the *Pharsalia*. First, the wind threatens to blow the republicans away (9.481-484) just as it does the cities and homes of the Africans in the lines that frame this passage (9.458-460, 490-492). Secondly, the sandstorm buries Cato's troops in dust (*pulveris*, 9.487). In the *Pharsalia*, the fate of a ruined city is to be buried in dust.¹²² In Book 7, Lucan claims that dust obscures the ruins of the great cities of Italy (7.392-394)¹²³:

Gabios Veiosque Coramque

pulvere vix tectae poterunt monstrare ruinae
Albanosque lares Laurentinosque penates [.]

Gabii and Veii and Cora
and the Alban lares and Laurentine penates scarcely
will the ruins covered **in dust** be able to make visible.

¹²² Henderson 1998, 209-210, mentions the Libyan desert and city ruins among the various permutations of Lucan's sand/dust/ash motif, which he terms "the 'pulverization' of *BC*: the ruination of ruination; the *pulvis* of battle and of duststorm; the *harena* of shore, coast, desert and amphitheatre; the *cinis* of the uncreated City," etc.

¹²³ The translation is my own.

Similarly, when Caesar finds that Pompey has breached his *agger* at Dyrrachium, it is covered in dust as though it were the wall of an ancient city: “he found the walls knocked down, the dust already settled/and discovered signs of ruin cold, as if of long ago” (*invenit impulsos presso iam pulvere muros,/frigidaque, ut veteris, deprendit signa ruinae*, 6.280-281).¹²⁴

Furthermore, Lucan uses the word *agger*, “heap,” to describe the pile of sand that rises around the republicans and keeps them immobile: *alligat et stantis affusae magnus harenae/agger, et immoti terra surgente tenentur* (9.488-489, translated above). *Agger* is also the word that Lucan uses to describe the Caesarian siege works that threaten to immobilize Pompey’s armies at various points in the war.¹²⁵ I suggest that the *agger* of sand and dust heaped up by the sandstorm takes the place of Caesar’s siege works in this episode. The winds metaphorically besiege the republican army with sand and dust and thus delay their quest. The republicans’ own bodies take the place of the fortifications behind which they customarily protect themselves when confronted by Caesar. Immediately after characterizing the pile of sand as an *agger* immobilizing the republicans (9.488-489), Lucan describes the wind destroying stone walls (9.490-492). This segue further assimilates the republicans to a besieged wall.

¹²⁴ See also pages 160-161 above.

¹²⁵ Out of twenty-three instances in the *Pharsalia*, the word *agger* denotes Caesarian siege works ten times. Lucan uses *agger* of Caesar’s siege works at Brundisium (2.678), Massilia (3.382, 3.398, 3.455, 3.508), and Dyrrachium (6.31, 6.44, 6.69, 6.137, 6.170), as well as of a mound Caesar stands on when he addresses his troops (5.316). At 6.272-278, Lucan also implicitly likens Caesar’s rampart at Dyrrachium to a dyke (*aggere*, 6.272) built along the banks of the Po. *Agger* less frequently refers to the rampart of Pompey’s camp (7.649), the fortifications of Italian cities that are preparing to resist Caesar (2.449), and fortified earthworks generally (1.517, 7.749). See Masters 1992, 29ff., for an extensive discussion of the Caesarian *aggeres* during the sieges of Brundisium in Book 2 and Massilia in Book 3.

Just as Scaeva becomes a wall for Caesar in Book 6, Cato's men so embody the *civitas* of Rome that Lucan subtly likens them to a city's physical fortifications.

In short, Lucan assimilates the republicans, the exiled embodiment of Rome, to physical ruins in the account of the sandstorm. The storm first threatens to uproot them as it does African cities, then it threatens to bury them in dust like the ruins of Italy's cities. The *agger* of sand may even be seen as analogous to the siege works with which Caesar besieges the republicans' fortified urban bases earlier in the *Pharsalia*. Yet the republicans continue to resist these destructive natural forces under the guidance of Cato, their Aeneas-like leader. In this way, they demonstrate their commitment to embody and preserve Rome (i.e. the republic) even in the inhospitable environment of Africa.

IX. *Romanitas* in Africa

Despite the great perils of the march through Africa, Lucan repeatedly contends that it was better to join Cato there than to stay in Rome. In fact, throughout Book 9 Lucan juxtaposes two means of defining *Romanitas*, namely republicanism and physical residence in the *Urbs*. Even before Cato's trek, Cornelia claims to prefer the Egyptian shoreline where her husband was killed to the countries he conquered and the chariot that he rode in his triumphs at Rome (9.78-83). Lucan later praises Cato's eulogy for Pompey as greater than any honors that he could have received from the Rostra in the Forum (9.215-217).

vocibus his maior, quam si Romana sonarent
rostra ducis laudes, generosam venit ad umbram

215

mortis honos.

By these words greater honour in his death came 215
to the noble ghost than if the Roman Rostrum had resounded
with the general's praises.

In the following section, I shall analyze how Cato's camp in the desert surpasses and
supplants the *Urbs* itself as a seat of *Romanitas* over the course of the republicans'
journey.

First, Lucan contrasts the stark severity of the Temple of Jupiter Ammon with
the lavish decorations of Roman temples in the Late Republic and Early Empire
(9.515-521):

non illic Libycae posuerunt ditia gentes 515
templa, nec Eois splendent donaria gemmis:
quamvis Aethiopum populis Arabumque beatis
gentibus atque Indis unus sit Iuppiter Hammon,
pauper adhuc deus est, nullis violata per aevum
divitiis delubra tenens, morumque priorum 520
numen Romano templum defendit ab auro.

There the Libyan tribes have not put wealthy temples, 515
and treasure-chambers are not bright with eastern gems.
Although for peoples of the Ethiopians and wealthy tribes
of Arabs and the Indians, Jupiter Ammon is the only god,
still he is poor and occupies a shrine profaned
through ages by no wealth and, a deity of the ancient ways, 520
he defends his temple against Roman gold.

Lucan's praise for poverty recurs throughout the *Pharsalia*, most notably when he
attributes the civil war to the corrupting influence of wealth upon the Roman people

your altars, Rome: you will never be ashamed to swear by him
and you will make a god of him, now, one day,
if you ever stand with neck unfettered.

In this passage, Lucan does not merely prefer the Libyan march to a triumph.¹²⁷

Rather, the “remotest parts of Libya” become the scene of a *triumphus* (9.598) that one might call *plus quam Romanus* insofar as the *virtus* displayed there surpasses that shown in Rome’s earlier accomplishments. The Sahara and Cato have displaced the Via Sacra and all earlier Roman victors (including Pompey) as the measure of Roman valor. As triumphs were celebrated on the Capitol, the triumph was an extremely localized honor one normally could receive only at Rome.¹²⁸ Lucan interprets Caesar’s possession of Rome and his temporal victory in the civil war to Cato’s advantage; if not for the Libyan march, Cato’s *virtus* and that of his men might not have been placed in such stark relief.

While Lucan professes a preference for Cato’s Libya over Caesar’s Rome, Cato’s own troops show discomfort with their separation from home or, indeed, from any land they are familiar with. In the course of a long lamentation (9.848-880), one soldier exclaims that he no longer recognizes his surroundings as being part of Africa (9.871-874):

patriae non arva requiro
Europamque alios soles Asiamque videntem:

¹²⁷ Lucan aptly compares the march through the desert to Marius’ triumph over the Numidian Jugurtha – a Libyan triumph, as it were. Lucan’s reference to Pompey’s three triumphs (9.599-600) also complements Cato’s march through Africa. The first of Pompey’s triumphs was over the Numidian Jarbas, and Lucan explicitly mentions this victory over Africa (*Libyamque*, 6.816) at 6.816-817. See Wick 2004, Vol. II, 63, for a brief discussion of the theme of Pompey’s three triumphs in the *Pharsalia* and other Roman texts.

¹²⁸ See Versnel 1970, 165-166, 183, 192ff., and 281ff. for discussion of the triumphs occasionally celebrated on the Alban Mount.

qua te parte poli, qua te tellure reliqui,
Africa?

I do not seek the fields
of my fatherland or Europe or Asia, which sees other suns:
but Africa – in what part of the sky, in what land
did I leave you?

The soldier then wonders whether Cato's army has passed so far beyond the Equator that they now stand at the antipodes of Rome: "now perhaps Rome herself/is beneath my feet already" (*nunc forsitan ipsa est/sub pedibus iam Roma meis*, 9.877-878).¹²⁹ It seems as though there is no place on earth more remote from the *Urbs*. In this complaint we see the centripetal desire to return home reassert itself among the republicans as it did earlier at Dyrrachium, Pharsalus, and Palinurus.

I suggest that, to some extent, Cato's physical presence counteracts the enervating effect that separation from the *Urbs* has on his soldiers. At the end of the soldier's lamentation, Lucan details the ways in which Cato uses his influence to help his men overcome all the trials that face them (9.880-889). Most importantly, by being at hand for the soldiers, he teaches them to endure their sufferings bravely: "as spectator [Cato] shows that mighty pain is powerless" (*spectatorque docet magnos nil posse dolores*, 9.889).¹³⁰ Cato is at hand to instill in them the motivation necessary to continue their trek: "He – just one man – is there at every death" (*omnibus unus adest fatis*, 9.884). At Pharsalus, Pompey tells the republicans to imagine the city of Rome

¹²⁹ For recent studies of this passage, see Seewald 2008, 391-409, and Raschle 2005, 69-77. According to Seewald (408-409), Lucan mentions the antipodes in order to suggest that the farthest limits of the world have witnessed Cato's *virtus*.

¹³⁰ For discussion of Cato's role as a witness to his men's suffering, see most recently Bexley 2010, who rebuts the contention of Leigh 1997, 265-291, that Lucan portrays Cato as a failed teacher of *virtus*.

before them with the matrons and senators begging for safety (7.369-376). Though they are in Thessaly, Pompey deems it necessary for his men to fight as though the *Urbs* were at hand and waiting to be sacked should Caesar win.¹³¹ During the Libyan march, Cato does not have his men imagine the far distant *Urbs* in order to encourage them in their labors. Rather, I suggest that Cato himself replaces the *Urbs* as the instantiation of *Romanitas*. He becomes a mobile *monumentum* (reminder) of what they are fighting for, just as his march becomes a *triumphus* (9.598). The lamentation of the soldier (9.848-880) shows that prolonged separation from Rome and the redefinition of *Romanitas* in terms of ideology instead of geography are changes fraught with peril. However, Cato supplies the requisite exemplar of *patientia* and *virtus* (9.880-889).

X. The successful lustration of Cato's camp

Implicit rivalry between the *Urbs* and the republican camp also marks Lucan's account of the Psylli, the native snake-charmers who relieve the republicans of the snakes that have attacked them.¹³² This passage both recalls the unsuccessful lustration performed at Rome in Book 1¹³³ and foreshadows Caesar's arrival at Troy just fifty lines later in Book 9. One of the Psylli's remedies is to purify each campsite (9.911-915):

qui tum Romana secutus
signa, simul iussit statui tentoria ductor,

¹³¹ See pages 187-189 above.

¹³² See Raschle 2001, 343-371, for a recent commentary on the intervention of the Psylli and relevant bibliography.

¹³³ See discussion of the ritual of *amburbium* in Ch. 1 (p. 71).

primum, quas valli spatium comprehendit, harenas
expurgat cantu verbisque fugantibus angues.
ultima castrorum medicatus circumit ignis. 915

At that time they were following
the Roman standards and as soon as the commander ordered
shelters to be erected
first the sand surrounded by the rampart's length they purify
with incantation and with words which drive away snakes.
The camp's extremities are enclosed by a medicated fire. 915

As Caesar advances against Rome in Book 1, the people of Rome ritually process around the city (*urbem/circumeunt*, 1.605-606) and purify the walls (*purgantes moenia lustris*, 1.593) in a vain attempt to secure the gods' protection of the city (1.592-606). The Psylli similarly purify and process around (*expurgat*, 9.914; *circumit*, 9.915) the republican camp in Libya.

The threats facing the city and the camp are equally lethal. A few dozen lines before the Psylli purify Cato's camp, a soldier laments, "In place of Caesar, Dipsads/fight; Cerastae finish off the civil war" (*pro Caesare pugnans/dipsades et peragunt civilia bella cerastae*, 9.850-851). Whereas the procession around the *Urbs* fails to ward off Caesar, the Psylli's magic proves effective in keeping the camp safe from snakes: "So the night is made safe for the warriors" (*sic nox tuta viris*, 9.922). In contrast, the republicans did not remain a single night at Rome when word came of Caesar's approach: "[B]ut, Rome, as soon as the word 'war' is heard/you are deserted, your walls not trusted for a single night" (*tu tantum audito bellorum nomine, Roma,/desereris; nox una tuis non credita muris*, 1.519-520). Lucan thus contrasts Caesar's successful attacks on the *Urbs* and the older, decrepit republic with the invulnerability of Cato's camp to the snakes, Caesar's symbolic proxies in the desert.

The contrast between Lucan's portrayal of the *Urbs* and the Libyan camp therefore shows that the republican cause is more secure under Cato's guidance than it was before Pharsalus.

The scene that follows immediately after the narrative of Cato's march lends support to my reading of the passage. After the republicans reach Leptis, Lucan turns his attention to Caesar and his tour of the ruins of Troy (9.950-999). Caesar first walks around (*circumit*, 9.964) the city in search of its former walls and then unknowingly tramples over the ruins of the city, including the altar where Priam was killed (9.975-979). As noted above, the word *circumit* also appears forty-nine lines earlier (9.915) when Lucan narrates the purificatory fumigation of the republican camp: "The camp's extremities are enclosed by a medicated fire" (*ultima castrorum medicatus circumit ignis*). The recurrence of this word helps highlight Cato and Caesar's differing effects upon Rome as represented by the republican camp and Trojan ruins. The Psylli render Cato's camp impervious to outside attack by snakes. In contrast, Troy has no defenses against Caesar; the walls are mere traces (*vestigia*, 9.965) at best and the city nothing but scattered stones (9.973, 9.977-978). Caesar's freedom to walk over the former site of Troy sets in sharper relief the inability of the Libyan snakes to enter Cato's camp. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the two scenes suggests that the camp's impenetrable defense against the snakes symbolizes Cato and the republicans' moral imperviousness to Caesar's tyranny. We shall see in the next chapter that Caesar's tour of Troy speaks to his political and military triumph over the

republicans.¹³⁴ However, Cato has already achieved personal, moral, and spiritual victory over Caesar.

My reading of the Psylli episode is more favorable to Cato than are some other interpretations that have been advanced in recent years. According to some modern scholars, the intervention of the Psylli exposes the inability of *virtus* (at least as defined by Cato) to deliver the republicans from their perils.¹³⁵ First, devotion to Cato is generally of no avail to victims of snakebite. One of the passions that Cato seeks to curb in his soldiers throughout their march is thirst.¹³⁶ Nonetheless, Cato's moral instruction is not enough to stop the mad thirst inspired by the bite of the snake known as the *dipsas*.¹³⁷ Cato cannot constrain Aulus' thirst when the soldier is bitten: "Not the glory of the state, not the authority of saddened Cato/could stop the burning warrior" (*non decus imperii, non maestis iura Catonis/ardentem tenere virum*, 9.747-748). As Aulus digs for water in the sand, drinks seawater, and eventually opens his veins to drink his own blood (9.755-760), Cato responds by hiding the fate of Aulus from the other soldiers: "Cato bids the standards be hurried off without delay: none was allowed/to learn that thirst had so much power" (*iussit signa rapi propere Cato*:

¹³⁴ See pages 287-330 below.

¹³⁵ In the following two paragraphs, I draw upon the arguments of Johnson 1987, 49ff.; Batinski 1992, 71-80; Bartsch 1997, 35; Leigh 1997, 267-273; and Saylor 2002, 458-463. All of these authors question whether or deny that Cato has a positive effect upon his soldiers as they face the snakes. For the opposing view, see notes 138 and 142 below.

¹³⁶ Cato lists *sitis* as one of the chief challenges of the Sahara at 9.402. He vows that he will not drink unless his men do: "Whoever sees me drinking, let him thirst, . . . if it is known by any difference whether I go/as a general or a soldier" (*sitiat, quicumque bibentem/viderit . . . si quo fuerit discrimine notum, /dux an miles eam*, 9.398-399, 9.401-402). Notably, when a soldier offers Cato the little water that he could find, Cato spills it on the ground in contempt; he will not drink unless there is enough water for all of his troops (9.500-510). He drinks last except on one occasion when his men fear that a particular water source is poisoned; then he drinks first to test the water (9.591-593, 9.607-618).

¹³⁷ The name *dipsas* is derived from the Greek word for thirst, δίψα. Lucan translates the name with the epithet *torrida*, "parched," at 9.718. See Eldred 2000, 66-68, and Martindale 2005, 221-223, for discussion of Lucan's use of Greek etymology (including *torrida dipsas*) in the snake episode.

discere nulli/permisum est hoc posse sitim, 9.761-762).¹³⁸ Later, Tullus is bitten by a *haemorrhoids* and bleeds to death (9.805-814).¹³⁹ The fact that he was “a noble youth and an admirer of Cato” (*Tullo,/magnanimo iuveni miratorique Catonis*, 9.806-807) does not spare him.

Cato finds no reliable prophylaxis or cure for snakebite until he encounters the Psylli in the course of his march. Morford refers to the Psylli as a *deus ex machina* because of their sudden, late intervention in the role of the republicans’ saviors.¹⁴⁰ Lucan makes the meeting with the Psylli unintentional on Cato’s part: “Reluctantly and late did Fortune weary of such mighty dangers/and give assistance to them in their distress” (*vix miseris serum tanto lassata periclo/auxilium Fortuna dedit*, 9.890-891). In contrast to Lucan, Plutarch records that Cato anticipated the problem of snakebite and set out on his march with Psyllan physicians in his company (*Cat. Min.* 56.3). Noting this discrepancy between the *Pharsalia* and the historical tradition, Morford argues that Lucan postpones the Psylli’s arrival in part so as to stress Cato’s self-sufficiency.¹⁴¹ The question naturally arises whether Cato’s attempt to rely solely on moral teaching and inspiration only left the army prone to perils that outsiders, the Psylli, must cure by physical means. Does the Psylli’s effective treatment of the republicans’ bodies demonstrate the futility of Cato’s moral inspiration?

I do not think so. Bexley has pointed out that, even before the Psylli arrive, the last victim of snakebite manages to save his life by cutting off his infected arm before

¹³⁸ Leigh 1997, 269ff., cites Aulus’ death and Cato’s reaction to it as particularly strong evidence that Cato’s methods of protecting his men are a failure. Bexley 2010, 143-149, shows that Cato’s response to these horrible scenes of death is not so anomalous in the context of Stoic ethical practice. See also n. 142 below.

¹³⁹ Once more, the snake’s name matches the effect of its venom.

¹⁴⁰ Morford 1967b, 129.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

the poison reaches the rest of his body (9.828-833). This act requires the sort of determined self-discipline that Cato teaches.¹⁴² I add that the Psylli's intervention in the battle with the snakes is analogous and complementary to the moral and philosophical guidance Cato offers his men. This complementarity is evident in the names of some of the drugs used in the purification of the camp. Among the magical herbs the Psylli burn as they purify the campsite (9.916-921) are Thessalian centaury (*Thessala centaurea*, 9.918) and Sicilian *thapsos* (*Erycinaque thapsos*, 9.919). By choosing these particular herbs, Lucan alludes to the Battles of Pharsalus (fought in Thessaly) and Thapsus. Broadly speaking, these two battles frame Cato's career as republican leader.¹⁴³ The words *Thessala centaurea* recall Lucan's catalogue of Thessalian centaurs at 6.386-394. This catalogue forms part of the long digression on the land of Thessaly (6.333-412) that sets the stage for the Battle of Pharsalus. The Battle of Thapsus was the major republican defeat in Libya that would motivate Cato to commit suicide at Utica.¹⁴⁴ As Ahl observes, the name Thapsus itself appears

¹⁴² Bexley 2010, 148-149. Bexley points out that Murrus, the soldier who cuts off his own arm, is the last soldier to be bitten. Lucan therefore ends the catalogue on a positive note; Catonian ethics can indeed prove useful in combating the snakes. Significantly, the snake that bites Murrus is named the *basiliscus*, "king-snake" (9.828), a species which "on the empty sand is king" (*in vacua regnat basiliscus harena*, 9.726). This name recalls the republicans' struggle against Caesar's *regnum* (ibid., 140; Eldred 2000, 70-72).

¹⁴³ I have yet to find any secondary sources that connect the names of these drugs to the battles.

¹⁴⁴ One might object that the Battle of Thapsus took place in Libya whereas Lucan specifically locates the herb *thapsos* in Sicily, the location of Mt. Eryx and the city of the same name (*Erycinaque thapsos*, 9.919). Additionally, Wick 2004, Vol. II, 390-391, links the name of the plant with the Sicilian city named Thapsos. However, Lucan often uses toponyms that ostensibly refer to one location while also alluding to yet another. For instance, in Book 6 Lucan refers to a Thessalian city named Thebes but links the city with the myth of Agave, native of the more famous Boeotian Thebes (6.355-359); see Masters 1992, 161-162, for discussion of the toponymic polysemy in this passage. It is therefore in keeping with Lucan's allusive method to use the name of a Sicilian plant to allude to an African battle.

nowhere in the *Pharsalia*.¹⁴⁵ Given Lucan's habitual use of allusive wordplay, however, the appearance of a drug named *thapsos* as Lucan's troops approach the region of Libya containing Thapsus is not likely to be a coincidence. Although the republicans lost the military engagements at Pharsalus and Thapsus, Lucan stresses the *virtus* the republicans displayed even in defeat. Defeat at Pharsalus and Pompey's subsequent death helped the republicans outgrow their earlier Pompeian partisanship and become devotees of *libertas*. In turn, Cato's command in Libya steels his men for their stand at Thapsus. The names of the drugs centaur and *thapsos* therefore link the Psylli's victory over the snakes with the republicans' moral victories at Pharsalus and Thapsus.

To sum up this section, I contend that the Psylli's successful purification of the republican camp at the end of Cato's march testifies to his successful moral instruction. This purification stands in contrast to the unsuccessful lustration of Rome on the eve of Caesar's invasion. The republican camp is morally invulnerable to Caesar (symbolically represented by the Libyan snakes) whereas the old republic and the *Urbs* were not. Through Cato's efforts, the republican army becomes a better incarnation of the Roman *civitas* than at any earlier point in the epic.

XI. Conclusion

In conclusion, Lucan portrays Cato's endeavor to metaphorically reconstruct republican Rome in a generally positive light. The death of Pompey purifies the

¹⁴⁵ Ahl 1976, 253, speculates that Lucan deemphasizes the significance of both Thapsus and Metellus Scipio, the republican commander there (see p. 222, n. 12, above), in order to highlight Cato and his final actions at Utica.

republican army of the taint of partisanship. Cato assumes the reins of leadership as a latter-day successor of Odysseus and Aeneas, a hero attempting to secure a way home for himself and his followers. However, Cato defines “home,” and hence Rome, in ideological, spiritual, and moral terms. As Caesar controls the *Urbs*, Cato tells his men that true Romans must seek *libertas*, even if that means death in Africa, rather than the comforts of their homeland. When he persuades the deserters to return to shore, Cato overcomes the centripetal attraction of the *Urbs* that earlier drove the republicans into the disaster at Pharsalus. In the process, he preserves the republican army from disintegrating.

Not only does Cato preserve the republican army in existence, but Lucan characterizes this persistence with images of renewal that stand out against the generally unrelenting bleakness of the *Pharsalia*. When Lucan compares Cato to a shepherd restoring order in beehive, he testifies to Cato’s rejuvenating effect upon the Roman *civitas* as embodied in the republican army. When the republicans encounter a sandstorm in the desert, the wind-strewn ruins of Africa’s cities represent the ruined state of the Roman Republic. Nonetheless, the troops successfully resist the wind’s destructive force and thereby preserve the *civitas* they embody. As the champion of *libertas*, Cato represents Rome and instills Roman *mores* in his men in the face of all the perils Libya unleashes upon them. In the end, the Psylli’s successful purification of the republican camp symbolically answers the unsuccessful lustration of the *Urbs* in Book 1. The republican camp appears as a revived Roman *civitas*, as impervious to the threat Caesar poses to *libertas* as it is to the snakes and other dangers of Libya.

The separation of the *civitas* from the *Urbs* is still problematic. The civil war presents no wholly satisfactory options. Cato admits as much in Book 2 when he states that civil war is a supreme evil but the fates draw him to it nonetheless: “That civil warfare is the greatest crime, I admit, Brutus,/but where the Fates lead, confident will Virtue follow” (*summum, Brute, nefas civilia bella fatemur,/sed quo fata trahunt virtus secura sequetur*, 2.286-287).¹⁴⁶ Cato makes the best of the situation facing him because his relationship with Rome differs from Pompey’s. Pompey and his men are too in love with the *Urbs*. Pompey wishes to draw the war away to the empire’s frontiers in order to save Rome and Italy. His troops wish to win a decisive victory in order to end the war and return home. Cato, on the other hand, accepts the metaphorical death of Rome (2.297-303). For Cato, the *Urbs* is not the essential point of reference that it is for Pompey, Cicero, and the other officers who wanted to bring the war to a premature conclusion. He is willing to fight in the most inhospitable environment of Africa because he pursues a positive goal there that outweighs the comforts of home: “and, Liberty,/your name, even an empty shade, I shall follow all the way” (*tuumque/nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram*, 2.302-303). It is Cato’s definition of Rome in spiritual, moral, and ideological terms that enables him and his army to instantiate the Roman Republic more successfully in their African journey than at any point before Pharsalus and Pompey’s death.

¹⁴⁶ For a response to recent attempts to interpret this passage as an indictment of Cato, see Narducci 2001, 176ff.

Chapter 5

Rome, Alexandria, and Troy Reborn

Cato is not the only figure who commits himself to reconstructing a city in Book 9. At line 9.950, Caesar reappears for the first time since the end of Book 7. Caesar first finishes his tour of the battlefield of Pharsalus and then leaves Thessaly to hunt down the fugitive Pompey (9.950-960). Next, in one of the most famous episodes in the *Pharsalia*, Caesar halts his pursuit of Pompey to tour the ruins of Troy (9.961-999). This is the most prominent and evocative instance of the theme of destroyed cities in the entire *Pharsalia*. Standing upon the ruins of the city whose destruction provides the background for both the Homeric epics and the *Aeneid*, Caesar vows to rebuild Troy (9.990-999). Lucan calls his promise, “prayers not unfulfilled” (*votaque . . . non irrita*, 9.989). While the historical Caesar resettled Capua, Corinth, and Carthage, he did not rebuild Troy, nor does Lucan portray Caesar physically refounding the city. In what sense are Caesar’s prayers fulfilled?

In this chapter, I propose that Caesar symbolically fulfills his promise to rebuild Troy when he visits Alexandria and then remakes Rome in Alexandria’s image. First, Lucan uses recurring themes and mythical allusions to portray Alexandria as a new Troy, a decadent city on the verge of destruction. Secondly, Lucan highlights how Caesar and his successors will transform Rome. They will corrupt the republican *mores* of the city, a cultural decline evident in the construction of luxurious palaces on the model of those found in Alexandria. The civil war ultimately does destroy the old *Urbs*, but the context is not a bloody repetition of the

Gallic Sack. Rather, it is the creation of imperial edifices after the war ends, the imposition of an indelible stamp demonstrating the ascendancy of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Insofar as Lucan portrays Alexandria as a latter-day Troy, the physical and political transformation of Rome in the image of Alexandria renders Rome into a new Troy, a royal city dominated by the Julii, scions of Troy's ruling dynasty.¹

Moreover, Lucan completes his portrayal of Ptolemaic Alexandria and Julio-Claudian Rome as latter-day versions of Troy when he models his account of the Alexandrian War on the Trojan War. As Alexandria burns down around him, Caesar finds himself facing imminent death. Lucan provides two reasons for why Caesar escapes alive. First, Caesar relies upon the courage of Scaeva, the fanatical soldier who defended the Caesarian rampart at Dyrrachium. Caesar thus has the protection of his soldiers, his living wall. Secondly, Lucan attributes Caesar's survival to the providential intervention of Pompey's ghost. Caesar is fated to die in the *Urbs* at the hands of republican senators, not in Alexandria at the hands of Egyptians. Caesar's death therefore is temporally deferred and spatially displaced from Alexandria to Rome. I propose that we read this account of Caesar's assassination in light of the contrasting centrifugal and centripetal impulses that characterize the republicans'

¹ In her 2005 article, "Lucan's Follies: Memory and Ruin in a Civil-War Landscape," Diana Spencer discusses the interrelations of "three key moments of concrete and psychological ruin in Lucan's *Bellum Civile* (B.C.) that express the psychic and cultural impact of the Empire on its landscapes," these three moments being Lucan's accounts of Pompey's seaside grave, Caesar's visit to the ruins of Troy, and Caesar's visit to Alexandria (Spencer 2005, 47). As I note in the citations for this chapter, Spencer and I discuss many of the same links between Lucan's portrayals of Troy, Alexandria, and Rome. For instance, Spencer interprets Lucan's conceptualization of Rome as "bounded by a Trojan past and 'Alexandrian' future" (ibid., 48), a reading I share with her. However, she is less interested in the specific details by which Lucan relates Neronian Rome to Troy via Alexandria than in the interpretive application of the concept of the "folly" ("an architectural structure that evokes cultural memories and acts as a concrete articulation of physical and intellectual space," ibid., 56) to the *Pharsalia* and to Neronian Rome alike.

flight from the *Urbs*. After all of the violence that Caesar commits throughout the Mediterranean world as he pursues the republicans from one land to the next, he is brought back to Rome to meet his fate. Instead of marking the climax of Alexandria's near destruction in the Alexandrian War, Caesar's death takes place in an *Urbs* transformed to resemble Alexandria and, via Alexandria, Troy. In this way, Lucan integrates the assassination of Caesar into his over-arching account of Rome's metaphorical self-destruction.

I. Troy, the *Urbs*, and Pharsalus

Let us begin with Lucan's rich description of Caesar's tour of the site of Troy (9.961-979):

Sigeasque petit famae mirator harenas et Simoentis aquas et Graio nobile busto Rhoetion et multum debentis vatibus umbras. circumit exustae nomen memorabile Troiae magnaue Phoebei quaerit vestigia muri.	965
iam silvae steriles et putres robore trunci Assaraci pressere domos et templa deorum iam lassa radice tenent, ac tota teguntur Pergama dumetis: etiam periery ruinae. aspicit Hesiones scopulos silvaeque latentis	970
Anchisae thalamos; quo iudex sederit antro, unde puer raptus caelo, quo vertice Nais luxerit Oenone: nullum est sine nomine saxum. inscius in sicco serpentem pulvere rivum transierat, qui Xanthus erat. securus in alto	975
gramine ponebat gressus: Phryx incola manes Hectoreos calcare vetat. discussa iacebant saxa nec ullius faciem servantia sacri: 'Herceas,' monstrator ait, 'non respicis aras?'	

And admiring glory, he seeks Sigeum's sands,
Simois' waters, Rhoeteum renowned for its Greek tomb

and the ghosts that owe so much to bards.
 He walks around a memorable name – burnt-out Troy –
 and seeks the mighty traces of the wall of Phoebus. 965
 Now barren woods and trunks with rotting timber
 have submerged Assaracus' houses and, with roots now weary,
 occupy the temples of the gods, and all of Pergamum
 is veiled by thickets: even the ruins suffered oblivion.
 He sees Hesione's rock and Anchises' marriage-chamber hiding 970
 in the woods; the cave where the adjudicator sat; the place
 from which the boy was snatched to heaven; the peak
 where Naiad Oenone grieved; no stone is without a story.
 Unwittingly, he had crossed a stream creeping
 in dry dust – this was Xanthus. Oblivious, he placed 975
 his footsteps in the deep grass: the Phrygian local tells him
 not to tread upon the shade of Hector. Scattered stones
 were lying there, preserving no appearance of anything sacred:
 the guide says: 'Have you no respect for the Hercean altars?'

In this section, I shall draw upon a number of past studies of Lucan as well as my own observations to show that the physical ruins of Troy represent the metaphorical destruction of the Roman Republic. First, Lucan explicitly compares his role as the poet of the *Pharsalia* (and hence of the republic's downfall) with Homer's role as the poet who commemorated the fall of Troy in the *Iliad*. Lucan's description of the site of Troy recalls his earlier descriptions of Italy's ruined cities in Books 1 and 7. Caesar's tour of the site also resembles his tour of the battlefield of Pharsalus and Sulla's inspection of his victims at Rome in Book 2. These parallels show that the ruins of Troy represent the destructive violence Caesar has committed against Rome. Furthermore, Lucan models his description of Troy in part upon Vergil's account of the future site of Rome in Book 8 of the *Aeneid*. Lucan cannot portray the *Urbs* lying in physical ruins as his persistent reliance upon the imagery of city destruction seems

to require. Hence, he employs the remains of Troy to convey the extreme violence Caesar did to Rome.

In lines 9.980-986, Lucan breaks off his narrative of Caesar's visit to Troy to apostrophize² first the labor of poets that preserves the memory of the past and then Caesar, whose memory Lucan's own poem will preserve:

o sacer et magnus vatum labor! omnia fato	980
eripis et populis donas mortalibus aevum.	
invidia sacrae, Caesar, ne tangere famae;	
nam, si quid Latiis fas est promittere Musis,	
quantum Zmyrnaei durabunt vatis honores,	
venturi me teque legent; Pharsalia nostra	985
vivet, et a nullo tenebris damnabimur aevo.	

O how sacred and immense the task of bards! You snatch	980
everything	
from death and to mortals you give immortality.	
Caesar, do not be touched by envy of their sacred fame;	
since, if for Latian Muses it is right to promise anything,	
as long as honors of the Smyrnaean bard endure,	
the future ages will read me and you; our Pharsalia	985
shall live and we shall be condemned to darkness by no era.	

It is not my intention to analyze this passage in depth.³ Rather, I am interested in how, as Green, Ormand, Bartsch, and Rossi have observed, Lucan establishes a parallel between the role of the Phrygian guide who advises Caesar in his tour and that of

² See D'Alessandro Behr 2007 for Lucan's use of apostrophe.

³ Scholars have debated why the apostrophe appears where it does, who the precise addressee in lines 9.980-981 is (*labor*? the *Phryx incola*? Lucan himself?), how the apostrophe bears upon Lucan's conception of his poetic program, and whether the expression *Pharsalia nostra* in line 9.985 indicates the epic's title. For more detailed treatments of the passage, see Ahl 1976, 219-220, 325-332; Ciechanowicz 1982, 265-275; Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 341-346; Johnson 1987, 120-123; Ormand 1994, 50-54; Bartsch 1997, 133-134; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 416-421; and Tesoriero 2005, 210-212. For an analysis of Lucan's concept of the *vates* as revealed throughout the *Pharsalia*, see O'Higgins 1988. For a treatment of the concept of the *vates* in the Augustan literature in which Lucan was versed, see Newman 1967.

Lucan as *vates*.⁴ Green goes so far as to claim, “The Phrygian native can only be Lucan himself.”⁵ The *vates* preserves the memory of past peoples for all time to come. The most famous *vates* – the Smyrnaean bard, Homer – preserves the memory of Troy in the *Iliad* (9.984). Likewise, the Phrygian *monstrator* preserves the memory of Troy when he restrains Caesar from stepping on the sites of Hector’s tomb and Priam’s death (9.976-979). Lucan, himself a *vates*,⁶ guards the memory of the Roman Republic, which perished in the civil war. In this capacity, he resembles both Homer and the Phrygian guide at Troy.

Lucan’s role as *monstrator* of the ruins of the republic is most conspicuous in his depictions of Italy’s desolation after the civil wars and in his description of the battlefield of Pharsalus. That Lucan’s description of Troy evokes earlier descriptions of Italy is a commonplace in modern interpretations of the passage, as is the conclusion that the ruins of Troy are a metaphor for the destruction of the republic.⁷

First, in the proem to the epic, Lucan portrays Italy as an under-populated wasteland (1.24-32)⁸:

⁴ In the following three paragraphs, I draw upon Green 1991, 251-252; Ormand 1994, 50; Bartsch 1997, 133-134; and Rossi 2001, 320-321. Tesoriero 2005, 210-211, claims that Lucan distinguishes the role of the Phrygian *monstrator* from that of a *vates* because, among other reasons, the title *monstrator* is not generally used in Latin to refer to a poet. I find that Tesoriero’s reading is far too literal and dismissive of the analogy between the roles of the tour guide and of Lucan as poet. Both preserve the memory of the past.

⁵ Green 1991, 252, n. 32.

⁶ Lucan refers to himself as such at 1.63 and 7.553. See O’Higgins 1988, 208, n. 2, for discussion of these passages and other figures in the poem whom Lucan designates as *vates*.

⁷ For discussion of the parallelism between Lucan’s descriptions of Italy at 1.24-32 and 7.391-411 and his depiction of Troy in Book 9, see Thompson and Bruère 1968, 18; Ahl 1976, 214-220; Green 1991, 251; and Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 357-358. For a concise treatment of Lucan’s use of Troy’s ruins as a metaphor for Rome, see Ahl 1976, 209-222. Masters 1992, 158, remarks, “This war [the Trojan War] is important in Lucan’s poem . . . because, as in Virgil, Horace and others, the fall of Troy works as a model for the fall of the Roman republic, by the same system of historical parallelism that makes Aeneas an obvious model for Augustus as a refounder of the old civilization with some major changes.”

⁸ See also pages 1-2 and 266-267 above.

at nunc semirutis pendent quod moenia tectis
 urbibus Italiae lapsisque ingentia muris 25
 saxa iacent nulloque domus custode tenentur
 rarus et antiquis habitator in urbibus errat,
 horrida quod dumis multosque inarata per annos
 Hesperia est desuntque manus poscentibus arvis,
 non tu, Pyrrhe ferox, nec tantis cladibus auctor 30
 Poenus erit: nulli penitus descendere ferro
 contigit; alta sedent civilis vulnera dextrae.

But now the walls are tumbling in the towns of Italy,
 the houses half-destroyed, and, the defenses collapsed, 25
 the huge stones lie; no guardian occupies the homes
 and in the ancient cities wanders only an occasional inhabitant;
 Hesperia bristles now with thorns, unplowed
 through many a year, lacking the hands for fields which demand
 them –
 the author of such a great calamity will prove to be not you, 30
 fierce Pyrrhus, nor the Carthaginian; no foreign sword has ever
 penetrated
 so: it is wounds inflicted by the hand of fellow-citizens that have
 sunk deep.

The cities of Lucan's Italy are well on their way toward looking like the ruins of Troy.

The Trojan and Italian city walls have both collapsed (*lapsisque . . . muris*, 1.25;
vestigia muri, 9.965) and stones lie strewn over the abandoned sites (*ingentia . . . saxa*
iacent, 1.25-26; *discussa iacebant/saxa*, 9.977-978). Furthermore, both the Italian
 countryside and Troy are overgrown with thorns (*horrida quod dumis . . . Hesperia*
est, 1.28-29; *tota teguntur/Pergama dumetis*, 9.968-969).

Lucan's description of Troy also recalls his description of Italy at 7.391-396:

tunc omne Latinum
 fabula nomen erit; Gabios Veiosque Coramque
 pulvere vix tectae poterunt monstrare ruinae
 Albanosque lares Laurentinosque penates,

rus vacuum, quod non habitet nisi nocte coacta 395
invitus questusque Numam iussisse senator.

Then all
the Latin name will be a fable: Gabii, Veii, Cora
hardly will be indicated by their dust-covered ruins,
the hearths of Alba and the house-gods of Laurentum,
an empty country which no senator inhabits except unwillingly 395
on night ordained, complaining of the decree of Numa.

The Latin “name” (i.e. the Latin League) has become a fable: *tunc omne*

Latinum/fabula nomen erit (7.391-392). Likewise, Troy, no longer a reality, has been reduced to a “memorable name”: *nomen memorabile* (9.964).⁹ Troy and its environs are also covered in dry dust (*in sicco . . . pulvere*, 9.974). In lines 7.392-394, we see that the dust-covered ruins (*pulvere . . . tectae*, 7.393) will scarcely be able to show forth (*monstrare*, 7.393) the ancient cities of Latium and its environs.¹⁰ It is the poet Lucan who reminds his reader that these cities once existed, even if they now are barely visible.¹¹ In this sense, his project as *vates* is analogous to the role of the Phrygian *monstrator* who reminds Caesar of the former existence of Troy despite the fact that the city is invisible to the eye.

There are also striking parallels between Lucan’s descriptions of Troy and the battlefield of Pharsalus. Caesar visits Troy after he has taken his fill of touring the carnage at Pharsalus: “Caesar left, satiated with the slaughter of Emathia” (*Emathia*

⁹ Ahl 1976, 215-218, and Rossi 2001, 322, observe that Lucan uses the empty name theme to link the ruins of Troy with those of Italy.

¹⁰ See pages 270-272 above for discussion of the dust motif in Lucan’s description of ruined cities.

¹¹ Ahl 1976, 220, notes that the *vatum labor* in lines 9.980-986 is to give life “to the peoples, *populis*, not to the victorious warrior,” i.e. Caesar, and that “the focus is on the debt *Troy* owes to the poets, not the debt Caesar owes them” (emphasis in the original). Ahl goes on to note that for Lucan Rome, the New Troy, is a figment of the past just as dependent on poets (i.e. Lucan) for its persistence in human memory as the original Troy was dependent on Homer.

satiatus clade recessit, 9.950).¹² Caesar dines while gazing upon the corpses and gore (7.789-795):

cernit propulsa cruore	
flumina et excelsos cumulis aequantia colles	790
corpora, sidentis in tabem spectat acervos	
et Magni numerat populos, epulisque paratur	
ille locus, vultus ex quo faciesque iacentum	
agnoscat. iuvat Emathiam non cernere terram	
et lustrare oculis campos sub clade latentes.	795

He sees rivers driven on	
by gore and mounds of corpses high as lofty	790
hills, he watches heaps sinking into putrefaction	
and counts the peoples of Magnus; a place for feasting	
is prepared from where he can discern the faces and the features	
of the dead. He is delighted that he cannot see the Emathian land	
and that his eyes scan fields hidden underneath the carnage.	795

Lucan stresses the way in which the remains of dead republican soldiers obscure the terrain of Pharsalus. The corpses are as high as hills (7.790-791) and the fields lie hidden (*latentes*, 7.795) under the carnage. Caesar is pleased that he cannot recognize the land (7.794). However, the situation at Pharsalus will change vastly by Lucan's own time. The bodies will be devoured by scavengers or sink into the ground (7.825-846). Where once Roman bodies hid the land, in Lucan's day the land hides the remains of the Roman dead (7.847-872). Lucan protests that the Thessalian plowmen (*arator*, 7.861) and shepherds (*pastor*, 7.864) treat the battlefield of Pharsalus as a

¹² See Ahl 1976, 212-214, for the thematic link between Caesar's tours of the recent carnage at Pharsalus and the ancient ruins at Troy. Wick 2004, Vol. II, 415, notes the irony in the Phrygian native's order forbidding Caesar to tread upon (*calcare*, 9.977) the tomb of Hector and the site of Priam's death; Caesar has just trod upon the remains of dead kings and "trampled on the Senate's/limbs with face unmoved" (*calcatos . . . reges*, 7.293; *qui duro membra senatus/calcarat vultu*, 9.1043-1044). Rossi 2001, 323, remarks, "Through these evocative images, Rome and Troy become interchangeable, and Caesar's tour of Troy becomes simultaneously a metaphorical tour of Rome and its most recent history. Symptomatically, Caesar is shown duplicating his own actions toward the *Urbs*."

common field or pasture. As interpreter of Pharsalus, Lucan looks beyond the thorns (*dumeta*, 7.863) and the grass (*herbam*, 7.865) to render the destruction of republican Rome visible for his readers. He therefore functions much as the Phrygian *monstrator* does at Troy, where the ruins are also covered by thorns (*dumetis*, 9.969) and grass (*alto/gramine*, 9.975-976) or are hidden (*latentis*, 9.970) by trees (9.970-971; cf. 7.795). At Troy, Caesar sees what subsequent generations of Romans will see at Pharsalus – an inconspicuous piece of countryside in need of an interpreter. However, Lucan as *vates* reveals to his contemporaries and subsequent generations what Caesar once saw on the fields and pastures of Pharsalus – the end of the republic in the form of the republican dead.¹³

At the end of Ch. 3, we examined how Lucan uses the Pompeian camp and the city of Larisa as proxies for the *Urbs*.¹⁴ They take the place of a pillaged Rome in Lucan's adaptation of the *urbs capta* topos. Following naturally upon the account of Caesar's tour of Pharsalus and sharing several common themes with the earlier scene, Caesar's visit to Troy represents the culmination of the *urbs capta* theme both in respect to the Battle of Pharsalus in particular and the *Pharsalia* as a whole. The scant ruins of Troy thus symbolize the destruction of the *civitas* of Rome at Pharsalus and take the place of the *Urbs* as the physical correlative of the ruined republic within Lucan's narrative.

¹³ Green 1991, 254, aptly remarks, "Battlefields are only plots of land, and men are not immortal. It is the epic poet who grants eternal fame to those who fought, and it is the epic poet who gives names to the stones that mark their altars and remembers the heap of earth that covers their graves and makes their battles and their cities and their lands live forever."

¹⁴ See pages 205-207 and 209-212 above.

Furthermore, Caesar's tour of Troy evokes Sulla's inspection of his victims at Rome in Book 2.¹⁵ As we saw in Ch. 1, Rome under Sulla is a hellish place that evokes the memory of Troy during its downfall as narrated in Book 2 of the *Aeneid*.¹⁶ Lucan describes Sulla looking down upon the violence without emotion: "Unperturbed, indifferent, from a lofty seat he watched the terrible crime" (*intrepidus tanti sedit securus ab alto/spectator sceleris*, 2.207-208). In Ch. 3, we saw how Caesar assumed the persona of Sulla while observing the destruction he wrought at Pharsalus (7.786-799).¹⁷ Caesar reprises his role as successor of Sulla when he steps over the site of Troy in a passage that echoes Sulla's sense of security at Rome: "Oblivious, he placed his footsteps in the deep grass" (*securus in alto/gramine ponebat gressus*, 9.975-976). While the precise circumstances differ (Sulla is sitting in a high position and Caesar is walking through high grass),¹⁸ the expressions *securus ab alto* (2.207) and *securus in alto* (9.975) at the end of their respective lines link the two scenes. The Phrygian guide immediately warns Caesar not to trespass upon sites associated with Priam and Hector's deaths (9.976-979). The guide thus reminds him that the place where he walks once was a scene of carnage (not to mention the site of a city) similar to Rome under Sulla. While Caesar did not imitate Sulla in actually carrying out atrocities when he entered the *Urbs*, the symbolism of Caesar's tour of

¹⁵ Spencer 2005, 47, observes that the accounts of Pompey's grave, Caesar's tour of Troy, and Caesar's visit to Alexandria in the final three books of the *Pharsalia* "feed into Lucan's earlier vision of Sullan Rome" in Book 2. Cf. *ibid.*, 69.

¹⁶ See pages 80-83 above.

¹⁷ See pages 213-215 above.

¹⁸ Ormand 1994, 52, observes that the order of Lucan's wording in lines 9.975-976 at first gives the impression that Caesar is placed in a lofty position: "He is, even at the moment of being *inscius*, high above the ruins. And that is exactly what the second half of line 975 begins to say: he is *securus in alto* – a veritable god, at least from his own perspective. We, of course, have a more complex perspective. We are able to read the next line, see that the adjective *alto* goes with *gramine*, and read the irony of Caesar stumbling onto Hector's grave."

Troy confirms yet again that he played a Sulla-like role in presiding over Rome's metaphorical destruction at Pharsalus.

Lucan establishes further correspondences between Rome and Troy by modeling Caesar's tour of Troy upon Aeneas' tour of the future site of Rome in Book 8 of the *Aeneid*.¹⁹ Aeneas tours Evander's rustic settlement on the Palatine (Pallanteum) and the bucolic environs of the seven hills (*Aen.* 8.310-369). Aeneas marvels at the terrain of Rome as he walks around the *future* site of the city: "Letting his eyes roam freely, Aeneas surveyed his surroundings" (*miratur facilisque oculos fert omnia circum*, *Aen.* 8.310). Lucan's Caesar comes to Troy as an "admirer of fame" (*famae mirator*, 9.961) and walks around (*circumit*, 9.964)²⁰ the *former* site of the city. Aeneas is led by Evander, who points out (*monstrat*, *Aen.* 8.337, 8.345) the various locations to him. In the *Pharsalia*, the Phrygian guide (*monstrator*, 9.979) who upbraids Caesar plays the role of Evander. Aeneas' Rome is a pastoral environment where cattle graze on what will become the Roman Forum and the neighborhood of the Carinae (*Aen.* 8.360-361). The Capitol is a forest of thorns: "Up to . . . the Capitol Hill he escorts him,/Golden now; in the past just bristling forested thickets" (*Capitolia ducit/aurea nunc, olim silvestribus horrida dumis*, *Aen.* 8.347-348). Local rustics (*agrestis*, *Aen.* 8.349) revere the forest and stone (*silvam*

¹⁹ Thompson and Bruère 1968, 17-19; Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 351-353; Martindale 1993, 49-52; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 405-406; and Spencer 2005, 51 and 54, have previously pointed out the various parallels between Aeneas' tour of the future site of Rome and Caesar's tour of Troy that I mention in the following two paragraphs.

²⁰ Tesoriero 2005, 206, claims that *circumit* here means "skirts past" as opposed to "walks around," and therefore imagines that Caesar virtually overlooks the ruins. However, Tesoriero does little more than assert this particular reading of *circumit* when nothing in the contexts suggests it. Just forty-nine lines earlier (9.915), Lucan uses *circumit* to describe the passage of the purificatory fire around Cato's camp (see pages 278-281 above). In the absence of any contextual evidence to the contrary, I maintain that we should attribute the meaning "walks around" to *circumit* in line 9.964.

saxumque, *Aen.* 8.350) of the Capitol as the home of a god (*Aen.* 8.349-354). Lucan describes Troy in much the same terms; the ruins, mere stones (*saxum*, 9.973; *saxa*, 9.978), are covered by sterile woods (*silvae steriles*, 9.966) and thorns (*tota teguntur/Pergama dumetis*, 9.968-969). Troy represents a Rome that has been reduced to the state in which Aeneas first found it: uninhabited wilderness.²¹

Most significant for our present study is the fact that Aeneas sees the ruins of two cities, Saturnia and Janiculum, on the Capitoline and Janiculum hills, respectively (8.355-358):

haec duo praeterea disiectis oppida muris,	355
reliquias veterumque vides monimenta virorum.	
hanc Ianus pater, hanc Saturnus condidit arcem;	
Ianiculum huic, illi fuerat Saturnia nomen.	

Those two additional towns you can see where the walls have	355
been shattered	
Those are what's left of the previous folk and recall their existence.	
This one had Janus as father and founder, the other had Saturn.	
This, when it stood, bore the name of Janiculum, that of Saturnia.	

The pastoral, pre-urban landscape of Rome therefore is already haunted by the memories of past cities. The correspondences between *Aen.* 8 and *Phars.* 9 suggest that the Trojan ruins are the equivalent of the ruins Aeneas sees on the Capitol and Janiculum. The pre-Roman ruins surrounding Evander's Pallanteum become the ruins of the republic at Lucan's Troy.

²¹ I here ignore Evander's settlement on the Palatine because Lucan mentions no similar habitation at Troy. See Labate 1991 for an extensive treatment of the theme of the "dead city" ("città morte") in Augustan literature. Labate notes that Augustan writers often treat the condition of a ruined city as equivalent to the wild state that preceded the city's foundation (ibid., 173-175). Other Late Republican and Early Imperial Latin texts that treat the reduction of a city to a pre-urban state of wilderness, pasture, or agriculture include Hor. *Epode* 16.9-14 and 17-22, and Prop. 4.10.27-30. For further observations on Greek and Roman literary depictions of ruined cities, see Azzarà 2002.

II. Troy's promised rebirth

Having explored how Troy relates to the *Urbs*, let us now return to the narrative of Book 9. When Caesar has satisfied his desire to tour Troy, he prays to his ancestral Trojan gods and vows to rebuild the city (9.990-999):

‘di cinerum, Phrygias colitis quicumque ruinas, 990
Aeneaeque mei, quos nunc Lavinia sedes
servat et Alba, lares, et quorum lucet in aris
ignis adhuc Phrygius, nullique aspecta virorum
Pallas, in abstruso pignus memorabile templo, 995
gentis Iuleae vestris clarissimus aris
dat pia tura nepos et vos in sede priore
rite vocat. date felices in cetera cursus,
restituam populos; grata vice moenia reddent
Ausonidae Phrygibus, Romanaque Pergama surgent.’

‘Gods of the ashes, you who live in Phrygian ruins, 990
and household gods of my Aeneas, now preserved
in Lavinian abodes and Alba and on whose altars
the Phrygian fire still shines; and Pallas looked upon
by no male, the memorable guarantee in the hidden temple:
upon your altars the most glorious descendant of the Julian clan 995
offers holy incense and he solemnly invokes you in your
former home. Grant me a prosperous passage for the future:
I shall restore the people; in gratitude the Ausonians will give back
their walls to the Phrygians, and Pergamum will rise Roman.’

As we shall see in the following section, Caesar defines both Troy and Rome in terms of his own family, the Julii. The promised reconstruction of Troy refers to the transformation of Rome into another Troy, a royal city ruled by the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The prominent role Rome's Trojan origins play in the literature, art, and architecture of the Julio-Claudian period facilitate this interpretation of Caesar's promises to rebuild Troy. Lucan's identification of Caesarian Rome as a new Troy is

also foreboding. In both Vergil's *Aeneid* and Horace's *Odes*, the goddess Juno warns against the any attempt to rebuild Troy. Lucan thus characterizes Caesar's new regime as Trojan, dynastic, and inimical to the peace and security of Rome.

Before proceeding to the vow itself, we must note that Caesar's depiction of Italy in his prayer is unsupported by Lucan's references to Italy's desolation throughout the *Pharsalia*. Caesar recognizes Troy's desolation when he addresses his ancestral gods as, "Gods of the ashes, you who live in Phrygian ruins" (9.990). In contrast, he implies that all is well in Italy (9.991-994); for instance, the Phrygian hearth fire still burns on Alba's altars (*quorum lucet in aris/ignis adhuc Phrygius*, 9.992-993).²² Lucan's reader knows that Caesar's contrast between a ruined Troy and an intact Italy is not valid. As Ahl has observed,²³ the civil war has destroyed these gods' new homeland just as the Trojan War destroyed their former location. Although Caesar imagines an Alba Longa that still preserves his *lares* in safety, Lucan has already informed us that the city's ruins barely manifest where its *lares* are (7.393-394, cited above at pages 293-294). If we are to believe Lucan's description in Book 7, the Alban altars to which Caesar refers probably resemble the scattered stones of the Hercean altars at Troy (9.977-979).

Conveniently absent from Caesar's prayer is any reference to the republic, whose history, institutions, and destruction he ignores as he turns his attention to the

²² Wick 2004, Vol. II, 422, identifies the *ignis Phrygius* in question with a cult located at Alba Longa, not with the Temple of Vesta in Rome. She cites Juv. 4.60-61: "although ruined Alba preserves the Trojan fire and worships a lesser Vesta" (*quamquam diruta servat/ignem Troianum et Vestam colit Alba minorem*).

²³ Ahl 1976, 220-221. Ahl here notes the ambiguity of *di cinerum*, which may refer either to the Alban or Phrygian gods. See also Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 357-358.

Trojan and specifically Julian foundations of Rome and its cults.²⁴ The Trojan *lares* preserved at Lavinium and Alba Longa, Rome's two mother cities within Italy, belong not to Rome as a polity but rather to Caesar, who addresses these gods as belonging to his ancestor Aeneas (*Aeneaeque mei*, 9.991). Caesar identifies himself not as a Roman but specifically as the scion of the Trojan royal house (*gentis Iuleae . . . clarissimus*, 9.995). One would not guess from Caesar's prayer the heavy price Rome paid in order to become so closely identified with the Julian dynasty. Perhaps the Phrygian native has opened Caesar's eyes to the ruins of Troy lying about him (9.976-979), but Caesar still seems oblivious to the destruction of the Roman Republic.

Caesar promises to establish a new population in Troy and rebuild the city walls (9.998-999), a vow Lucan has apparently invented. There is some historical evidence that Caesar passed through this part of Asia Minor and granted the existing city named Ilion special honors on account of the Romans' descent from the Trojans and his own claimed descent from Iulus. Strabo claims that Caesar, being an admirer of Alexander the Great, also wished to imitate the visit to Troy Alexander made when he first invaded Asia. Accordingly, Caesar granted Ilion freedom and exempted the city from tribute.²⁵ However, there is no evidence that the historical Caesar actually

²⁴ Edwards 1996, 65, comments, "Julius Caesar's necromantic invocation of the gods of Troy makes clear his personal connection with the city. Indeed, Lucan's Caesar thus makes clear his perverse desire to appropriate Roman history as his own [.]". See Ormand 1994, 50-53; Rossi 2001, 317-322; and Spencer 2005, 51-56, for further observations on the significance Caesar gives Troy as the homeland of the Julian *gens*. Spencer 2005, 55, sees in the disappearance of Troy's ruins (*etiam periere ruinae*, 9.969) Lucan's commentary on Rome's "crumbling connexion with Republican, pre-Julio-Claudian history" (cf. *ibid.*, 53). Caesar's prayer is but one scene of many in the final books of the *Pharsalia* where "Lucan triangulates Rome, Troy, and Alexandria, redefining and obliterating [republican] Rome in the memories evoked by the others" (*ibid.*, 49).

²⁵ Strabo 13.1.27. Suet. *Div. Claud.* 25.3 records that Ilion enjoyed the same privileges during Claudius' reign. Other writers mention Caesar's beneficence toward the cities of the Hellespont and the coastland of Asia Minor without mentioning Ilion in particular (Plut. *Caes.* 48.1; App. *B.C.* 2.89; Cass. Dio 42.6.3). Also, as we shall see later, Suetonius reports a rumor to the effect that Caesar wished to

visited the site of Priam's Troy or that the story of the vow at Troy predates Lucan.²⁶

Furthermore, neither Lucan nor the historical sources portray Caesar actually rebuilding a city on the site.

Yet Lucan refers to the promise as fulfilled vows – *votaque . . . non irrita* (9.989). In what way is Caesar's vow fulfilled? I believe that the reconstruction of Troy is in part a metaphor for the monarchical regime Caesar establishes to supplant the republic. The refoundation of Rome as a personal monarchy answers the question Lucan poses before he recounts the Battle of Pharsalus: "what Rome will be" (*Roma quid esset*, 7.132).²⁷ The identification of the Caesarian regime with a re-built Troy carries deep symbolic significance. We see the Trojan redefinition of Rome *in nuce* in Caesar's prayer to the *di cinerum*. Caesar defines Troy as the home city of the Julii and Latium as the land that received them and their gods. To stress the Trojan origins of Rome is to reaffirm the centrality of Caesar's dynasty, first and foremost Aeneas and Iulus, in the history and national consciousness of Rome. To construct the Julian regime at Rome is to metaphorically construct a new Troy with the same royal house in power.²⁸

move the imperial capital to Ilion (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 79.3). See Zwiernlein 2004 (1986), 346, and Wick 2004, Vol. II, 401, for discussion of the historical records for Caesar's movements in Asia Minor after Pharsalus and his relations with the cities there.

²⁶ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 401; Zwiernlein 2004 (1986), 346.

²⁷ Johnson 1987, 121, aptly notes, "At the moment when Caesar lays claim to the royal heritage that his conquest has proved to be rightfully his, Lucan lays claim to *him*. In a certain sense, this is the climax of the poem as we have it: Caesar shows what Pharsalus means to him, and in a savage, cool, unforgettable satiric image, Lucan shows what Pharsalus, anytime, anywhere really means."

²⁸ Here I follow the interpretation of Rossi 2001, 325: "As founder of the new dynastic family who will rule over the destiny of Rome, Caesar in the end will indeed rebuild the walls of a new city, but he will neither restore the people (*restituam populos*) nor will he bring back the ancient walls (*moenia reddent*) as he had vowed. Caesar's role as a founder is bound to mirror his role of writer. As Caesar the writer has fashioned from the ruins of the past a Julian history, so, from these same ruins, Caesar the founder will build a Julian Rome."

The Trojan nature of the new regime is no more evident than in Augustan and later Julio-Claudian literature, art, and architecture that proclaimed the dynasty's descent from Troy.²⁹ In a sense, Troy was metaphorically refounded at the *Urbs* in the propaganda that reinforced the myth of Aeneas and the Julian dynastic claims that came with it. Catherine Edwards observes, "it is the Caesars who have the power to make Rome into Troy or vice versa."³⁰ The Julian *gens* is a Trojan dynasty and their Rome a new Troy. The connection between Rome and Troy is most notable in Vergil's *Aeneid*, Books 13-15 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and Propertius 4.1.³¹ Tesoriero finds in *Romanaque Pergama surgent* (9.999) an allusion to Propertius' *Troica Roma resurges* (4.1.87); both Propertius' Trojan Rome and Lucan's Roman Troy testify to the fusion of Trojan and Roman identities.³²

Part of the Julio-Claudian program was a transformation of the physical layout of Rome so massive as to qualify as the virtual reconstruction of the *Urbs*. Suetonius famously remarks that Augustus found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble (*Div. Aug.* 28). Augustus himself boasted of his monumental construction projects, notably the restoration of eighty-two temples in 28 B.C. (*Res Gest.* 19-21).³³ Among the monuments meant to honor the Caesars and their legendary Trojan lineage were

²⁹ In linking the *non irrita vota* (9.989) to the Trojan motif in Early Imperial propaganda, I follow Tesoriero 2005, 213-214. He observes, "though Augustus did not move the capital city to Troy, he did recreate many aspects of Troy in his Rome" (ibid., 214).

³⁰ Edwards 1996, 66.

³¹ I do not claim that these poems are mere propaganda or that they are sincerely pro-Augustan, nor do I deny subversive readings. I merely note that they participate in a general cultural trend to give Rome and the Julian dynasty Trojan origins.

³² Tesoriero 2005, 214.

³³ Spencer 2005, 51, cites this section of the *Res Gestae* in her explication of the Augustan background for Lucan's approach to architecture, landscape, and the idea of ruin.

Julius Caesar's Temple of Venus Genetrix and Augustus' Temple of Mars Ultor.³⁴

Hence, Caesar and his successors metaphorically rebuilt Troy through their literary and architectural projects and patronage at Rome. They systematically refashioned Rome in the image of Troy in order to solidify their own monarchy.

There is particularly strong evidence for Nero's fascination with Troy.³⁵ In A.D. 53, he successfully delivered a speech in favor of exempting the city of Ilion from taxation (Tac. *Ann.* 12.58). He also composed his own poem on Troy, the *Troica*, and performed it in public (Cass. Dio 62.29.1).³⁶ Most famously, Nero is rumored to have sung of the fall of Troy while Rome burned in the Great Fire of A.D. 64 (Tac. *Ann.* 15.39; Cass. Dio 62.18.1; Serv. *ad Aen.* 5.370).³⁷ As Lucan likely wrote the last books of the *Pharsalia* after the fire and had written a work about it,³⁸ Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy may have been particularly evocative in light of Nero's plans to reconstruct Rome.³⁹

When Lucan identifies the establishment of Caesar's regime as the rebirth of Troy, he also hints at its discontinuity with the republic. While Lucan's Caesar sees

³⁴ The Temple of Venus Genetrix celebrated Caesar's descent from Venus via Aeneas and Iulus. The courtyard of the Temple of Mars Ultor prominently featured statues of Aeneas and other members of the Julian *gens* (Zanker 1988, 194). For the Trojan motif in the architectural projects of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, see Zanker 1988, 193-210; Evans 1992, 42-52; and Galinsky 1996, 197, 204-206, 210-212 (sources cited by Tesoriero 2005, 214, n. 50).

³⁵ In this paragraph, I draw upon the research of Néraudau 1985 and Connors 1998, 94-95. Cf. Seng 2003, 129.

³⁶ See Néraudau 1985, 2042-2044, for discussion of extant evidence for Nero's *Troica*.

³⁷ Spencer 2005, 47, speculates that Caesar's visit to Troy in *Phars.* 9 "retrospectively foreshadows (perhaps) the rumour that Nero (Caesar's last imperial descendent) recalled Troy as he watched Troy burn."

³⁸ See the introduction to this dissertation (pages 10-12).

³⁹ De Nardai 2000, 337-338. Spencer 2005, 67-68, relates the Great Fire of 64 A.D. with Lucan's portrayal of the Alexandrian fire in Book 10 as well as with Troy's destruction: "The destruction that Alexandria spreads across the Roman world is finally matched with a fire (10.491-505) which must surely suggest Rome's counterpoint as Trojan ruin, the great fire whose effects were still a key feature of the city's heart." See Balland 1965, 349-393, for discussion of Nero's urban projects at Rome.

himself as the natural Roman heir to Trojan Aeneas, a number of commentators have observed that the reconstruction of Troy would actually undo Aeneas' work.⁴⁰ Aeneas and his fellow Trojans endured their arduous struggles in order to reach Hesperia. Taken literally, however, Caesar's vow to rebuild Troy means that at least some of the Romans must forsake Rome in order to rebuild the Asiatic city Aeneas had abandoned. Caesar thereby imperils the specifically Italian identity the Romans' ancestors forged precisely by leaving Troy.

Furthermore, both Vergil's *Aeneid* and Horace's *Odes* contain passages that associate the reconstruction of Troy with a new Trojan War. In Book 12 of the *Aeneid*, Juno relinquishes her war against Aeneas and his people on the condition that they forsake Trojan national identity in all spheres except religion (*Aen.* 12.821-828):

cum iam conubiis pacem felicibus (esto)	
component, cum iam leges et foedera iungent,	
ne vetus indigenas nomen mutare Latinos	
neu Troas fieri iubeas Teucrosque vocari	
aut vocem mutare viros aut vertere vestem.	825
sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges,	
sit Romana potens Italia virtute propago:	
occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia.	

When, and so be it, they settle their peace in fulfillment of	
marriage,	
When they shape treaties and laws in their confederation	
together,	
Don't require those who were born here, the Latins, to alter their	
ancient	
Name, become "Trojans," be known as "The Teucrians," or alter	
their language	
Don't make them change their traditional dress. Let Latium	825

⁴⁰ This point has been made by numerous earlier commentators, notably Thompson and Bruère 1968, 19-20; Ahl 1976, 221-222; Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 358-359; De Nádai 2000, 324-325; and Wick 2004, Vol. II, 423-424. Most of these authors make reference to both the passage from *Aen.* 12 and the passage from Hor. *Ode* 3.3 that I cite in the following paragraph.

continue,
Let there be Alban kings who will span all the centuries. And let
Roman stock get its strength from Italian concepts of courage.
Troy is destroyed. Now permit Troy's name to share her
destruction.

Likewise, in Horace's *Ode* 3.3, Juno permits the apotheosis of Romulus on the condition that the Romans never rebuild the city of Troy (*Ode* 3.3.37-44, 57-68). Should they rebuild it, Juno swears that she will destroy the city yet again (*Ode* 3.3.61-68):

Troiae renascens alite lugubri
fortuna tristi clade iterabitur,
ducente victrices catervas
coniuge me Iovis et sorore.

Ter si resurgat murus aeneus
auctore Phoebo, ter pereat meis
excisus Argivis, ter uxor
capta virum puerosque ploret.

65

But the fortune of Troy reborn with an
evil omen will be repeated with baleful disaster,
while I, wife and sister of Jupiter,
will lead the victorious throngs.

If the bronze wall of the city should rise again three times
with Phoebus as architect, three times would it perish,
cut down by my Argives, three times the wife,
captive, would bewail her husband and sons.

65

Vergil and Horace both imply that Trojan identity is incompatible with specifically Italian and Roman *mores*; the life of Rome is contingent upon the death of Troy.⁴¹ *Romanaque Pergama* (*Phars.* 9.999) is therefore at least an oxymoron, if not a

⁴¹ Relying in part upon the observations of Serres 1991, 38-39, Kraus 1994 discusses the role this contingency plays in Livy's account of Roman origins. See p. 182, n. 38, above.

contradiction.⁴² When we consider what Lucan's poetic predecessors say about the idea of rebuilding Troy, we see that Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy both imperils Roman and Italian identity and threatens to provoke a repetition of the Trojan War.⁴³ Caesar cannot restore Troy without jeopardizing the identity and peace of Rome. Predicated on his own destruction of the republic, Caesar's project of reconstruction portends further destruction.

III. Alexandria, a New Troy

In the preceding section, I have suggested some ways in which the actions of the historical Caesar and his successors may be interpreted as the metaphorical resurrection of Troy. However, these interpretations refer generally to the establishment of Caesar's regime or to building projects that Lucan does not explicitly mention within the *Pharsalia*. I shall now argue that Lucan shows us Caesar metaphorically resurrecting Troy during his sojourn in Alexandria in Book 10. Immediately after vowing to rebuild Troy, Caesar resumes his pursuit of Pompey and sails for Alexandria (9.1000-1005), where he remains for the entirety of Book 10. By means of a dense web of references to the *Aeneid* and the Trojan legend in general, Lucan portrays Alexandria as a second Troy and the Alexandrian War as a repetition of the Trojan War. First, Caesar's tour of the city is modeled on his earlier tour of

⁴² Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 359, finds in the expression *Romana Pergama* the summation of Caesar's perversion of Aeneas' quest to found an *altera Troia* in Italy (*Aen.* 3.86; 7.233; 8.36ff.; 10.26-27; 10.74-75).

⁴³ Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 358-360, and Wick 2004, Vol. II, 423-424, note how provocative Caesar's vow is in light of Juno's threats. His impiety may incite another Trojan War. Edwards 1996, 63-66, juxtaposes the passages of *Aen.* 12, *Odes* 3.3, and *Phars.* 9 cited above in her discussion of Troy and Rome's problematic relationship with one another in Latin literature. Edwards observes, "Troy itself is repeatedly presented as having the power to displace Rome, to reclaim its identity" (*ibid.*, 64). On the subject of Troy's threatened displacement of Rome, cf. Spencer 2005, 48, 52-53, 55-56, and 68.

Troy. The similarity between the two scenes is especially striking since Lucan models Caesar's visit to Troy on that which Alexander the Great is said to have made and Caesar soon thereafter visits Alexander's tomb in Alexandria. Next, Lucan explicitly and implicitly compares Caesar's love affair with Cleopatra to Paris' affair with Helen.

A. Caesar's sightseeing at Alexandria and Troy compared

Caesar's visit to Troy is a digression from the narrative of his pursuit of Pompey after Pharsalus. After departing from Troy, Caesar makes his way to Egypt, where he is presented with Pompey's head (9.1000-1108). In pursuing a course from Troy to Alexandria, Caesar follows not so much in the footsteps⁴⁴ of Pompey the Great as those of Alexander the Great, whose title Pompey adopted as his cognomen.⁴⁵ There is no historical evidence that Caesar ever visited Troy and it is generally accepted that Lucan has modeled the episode on Alexander's tour of Troy before he attacked Persia.⁴⁶ Both men had dynastic links with Troy; just as Caesar claimed

⁴⁴ Caesar begins his journey "[f]ollowing his [Pompey's] traces scattered uselessly/on land, with rumour as his guide" (*cuius [Pompei] vestigia frustra/terris sparsa legens fama duce*, 9.952-953).

⁴⁵ Henderson 1998, 171, points out Lucan's implicit play on names in Caesar's dual military pursuit of Pompey the Great and symbolic imitation of Alexander the Great. See Plut. *Pomp.* 13.4-5 for Sulla's bestowal of the cognomen *Magnus* on Pompey. Green 1989, 4-6, comments on Pompey's own appropriation of the Alexander legend, especially with respect to his military career in the East. For instance, Plutarch mentions that some of Pompey's defenders were so insistent upon identifying him with Alexander that they said he was thirty-three (Alexander's age when he died) at the time of his third triumph in 61 B.C. instead of in his forties; it was in this triumph that Pompey celebrated his victories in the East (*Pomp.* 46.1). See Henderson 1998, 171, 177, 181, and 202-203, for observations on the ideological implications of Pompey's title *Magnus*. Henderson remarks, "If Pompeius and Caesar fought a war, then it was a struggle for this name *Magnus*" (ibid., 202).

⁴⁶ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 401-402, 412, 415, and 418, provides all of the relevant sources, e.g. Strabo 13.1.26; Diod. Sic. 17.17.3; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.7; and Plut. *Alex.* 15.7-9. For further discussion of Lucan's identification of Caesar with Alexander, see Morford 1967a, 13-19; Ahl 1976, 219-220; Zwiernle 2004 (1986), 346-350; Green 1989, 7; Seng 2003, 127 and 131-133; and Eigler 2005, 192-193. I draw upon these sources in this paragraph. Plutarch juxtaposes the lives of Alexander and Caesar in his *Parallel*

descent from Aeneas, Alexander claimed descent from Achilles' son Neoptolemus and Hector's widow Andromache.⁴⁷ By having Caesar imitate Alexander's symbolic gesture at Troy, Lucan identifies him as the successor of Alexander, whom Lucan later denounces in a lengthy digression as a wicked tyrant (10.20-52). Alexander's conquests took him from the sacrifice at Troy to burial in Alexandria in Egypt, the most splendid of all the cities he founded and named after himself. Hence, in following Pompey the Great's *vestigia* from Greece to Troy to Egypt (the location of Pompey's own meager grave), Caesar is also following in the footsteps of Alexander, the original *Magnus* (ὁ Μέγας).

Lucan further links Troy and Alexandria when he narrates Caesar's entrance into the latter city. First, Caesar is described as carefree as he enters the city: "From there he passes untroubled into the Paraetolian city" (*inde Paraetioniam fertur securus in urbem*, 10.9). Caesar was similarly devoid of care (*securus*, 9.975) when he stepped upon the ruins of Troy and was upbraided by the Phrygian native (9.975-979, approximately 140 lines before 10.9). He has unwittingly stumbled upon that part of Troy where Priam was slain in the course of the city's fiery downfall. Caesar's lack of concern at Alexandria is also based on a failure to comprehend his environs; just lines later (10.11-14) we learn that the Alexandrians are angered by his presence in their city. We shall see that by the end of Book 10 Caesar will cower in fear for his life as the Alexandrians besiege him in a palace. Caesar's literally misplaced sense of

Lives. Xerxes too is reported to have visited Troy en route to Greece during the Persian War (Herod. 7.42-43; Wick 2004, Vol. II, 401).

⁴⁷ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 402. Plut. *Alex.* 2.1 claims that Alexander's mother Olympias descended from Neoptolemus. For discussion of Neoptolemus' purported descendants in the Balkans, see Malkin 1998, 120-155.

security when he tramples over the sites of Hector's tomb and Priam's death thus foreshadows his equally oblivious entry into Alexandria. Indeed, Caesar will narrowly escape the fate that befell Priam at the Hercean altars he so blithely stepped upon at Troy.

Caesar's visit to Alexander's grave also echoes his earlier visit to Troy (10.14-22):

tum vultu semper celante pavorem	
intrepidus superum sedes et templa vetusti	15
numinis antiquas Macetum testantia vires	
circumit, et nulla captus dulcedine rerum,	
non auro cultuque deum, non moenibus urbis,	
effossum tumulis cupide descendit in antrum.	
illic Pellaei proles vaesana Philippi,	20
felix praedo, iacet, terrarum vindice fato	
raptus . . .	

Then with his face always concealing fear,	
undeterred he visits the gods' abodes and temples of ancient	15
deity which declare the Macedonians' might	
of old, and charmed by no delights, not by gold	
or by adornment of the gods, not by city-walls,	
he eagerly descends into the cavern hollowed out for a burial-place.	
There the crazy offspring of Pellaean Philip	20
lies, the lucky bandit, seized by destiny avenging	
the earth . . .	

First, Lucan uses the same verb to describe Caesar's tour – *circumit* (10.17) – that he uses for Caesar's earlier tour of Troy (9.964). Lucan also depicts Alexandria as a city that, like Troy, has fallen from its past glory. At Alexandria, Caesar looks upon the temples of the "ancient god" that bear witness to the former power of Macedon (*templa vetusti/numinis antiquas Macetum testantia vires*, 10.15-16). At Troy, Caesar

takes his fill of viewing the *veneranda vetustas* (“venerable antiquity,” 9.987) of the city.⁴⁸

The individual items on Caesar’s itinerary at Troy and Alexandria are also similar. The dictator does not focus on the splendor of the Alexandrian temples, buildings, or walls that surround him; he is “charmed by no delights, not by gold/or by adornment of the gods, not by city-walls” (*nulla captus dulcedine rerum,/non auro cultuque deum, non moenibus urbis*, 10.17-18). Similarly, at Troy he does not picture to himself the splendid palaces or temples that formerly stood there. Instead, some of the sites Caesar does see (or imagine seeing) at Troy are the tombs of the Greek heroes, including Achilles (9.961-963),⁴⁹ the location whence Ganymede was abducted (*unde puer raptus caelo*, 9.972), and the cave where the Trojan Alexander (i.e. Paris, who is not named) judged the goddesses Aphrodite, Hera, and Athena (*quo iudex sederit antro*, 9.971). At Alexandria, Caesar focuses his attention⁵⁰ on yet another so-called cave (*antrum*, 10.19),⁵¹ the tomb where Alexander the Great, the legendary descendant of Achilles, was laid to rest when he was “abducted” by death (*fato/raptus*, 10.21-22).⁵²

⁴⁸ Wick 2004, Vol. II, 404, notes similarities between Caesar’s tours of Troy and Alexandria, especially (“vor allem”) the presence of *circumit* and words indicating antiquity (*vetusti*, *vetustas*) in each scene.

⁴⁹ “And admiring glory, he seeks Sigeum’s sands/Simois’ waters, Rhoeteum renowned for its Greek tomb/and the ghosts that owe so much to bards” (*Sigeasque petit famae mirator harenas/et Simoentis aquas et Graio nobile busto/Rhoetion et multum debentis vatibus umbras*, 9.961-963). Achilles’ grave was purportedly located at Sigeum and Ajax’s at Rhoetium (Wick 2004, Vol. II, 411-412). Cicero explicitly mentions that Alexander the Great visited Achilles’ tomb at Sigeum (*Pro Arch.* 24).

⁵⁰ Caesar “eagerly descends” (*cupide descendit*, 10.19) into the tomb. Ahl 1976, 223, notes the contrast between the disregard Caesar shows toward the “cultural wealth” and “charming sites” of Alexandria (see 10.17-18, cited above) and his intense interest in Alexander’s tomb.

⁵¹ Berti 2000, 71, explains *antrum* at 10.19 as a subterranean burial chamber within a pyramidal structure. Cf. Mayer’s comments on *antro* at 8.694.

⁵² Spencer 2005, 65, writes, “At first (10.14-24) Alexandria appears to offer a step back to Troy, as we hear that Caesar has reverted to tourist mode and gone sightseeing for tombs; here the *antrum* is Alexander’s (10.17-19)” (cf. Seng 2003, 131-133). While Spencer here links Caesar’s visit to

In his vow to rebuild Troy, Caesar defines both Troy and Rome in terms of his own Julian dynasty, i.e. in terms of himself. I propose that Caesar's *modus interpretandi* is quite similar at Alexandria, a point Lucan emphasizes by means of the key words and images that link Lucan's descriptions of Troy and Alexandria. Alexandria is of interest to Caesar primarily as the resting place of his fellow conqueror and "lucky bandit" (*felix praedo*, 10.21), Alexander the Great. Furthermore, Caesar ignores the immense violence Alexander wrought upon the world, which Lucan catalogues at length in lines 10.20-52. At Troy and Alexandria, Lucan reveals how Caesar and his successors define cities: in terms of their tyrants, whose crimes they ignore. Alexandria is merely a function of its founder, just as after the death of the republic Rome is merely a function of Caesar himself: "Caesar was everything" (*omnia Caesar erat*, 3.108).⁵³ Thematically speaking, Lucan's denunciation of the founder of Alexandria in lines 10.20-52⁵⁴ is the *Pharsalia* writ small, for the epic as a whole is a denunciation of Caesar, the Alexander-like founder of the new Caesarian Rome.

Alexander's grave with his earlier tour of the Greek heroes' tombs at Troy, she does not explicitly note the correspondence between Paris' *antrum* at Troy and Alexander's at Alexandria. The link between Paris' cave in Book 9 and Alexander's tomb in Book 10 may nonetheless lurk behind Spencer's characterization of Troy as a landscape of grottoes (Spencer 2005, 55), her identification of Alexander's tomb as a grotto (see her translation of *antrum* at 8.694 and 10.19; *ibid.*, 61), and the implication that Caesar saw an *antrum* at Troy before he came to Alexandria (*ibid.*, 65). Insofar as Paris' decision to abduct Helen resulted in the deaths of all the Greeks and Trojans who died at Troy, even his *antrum* on Mt. Ida is linked to death and burial. See *ibid.*, 63-64, for the possible influence of the "Troy-as-tomb" motif in Catullus 68 upon Lucan's treatment of the city in the *Pharsalia*.

⁵³ Spencer 2005, 56-60 and 64-68, observes how Neronian and earlier Julio-Claudian building programs at Rome had the effect of "domesticating the city," i.e. of asserting the emperor's personal and dynastic dominion over the *Urbs*.

⁵⁴ See Morford 1967a, 13-19, and Berti 2000, 71-73, for an analysis of the rhetoric Lucan employs in this denunciation.

B. Cleopatra: the specter of another Helen

I argued above that Lucan's description of Alexander the Great's tomb as a cave (*antrum*, 10.19) links the tomb with Paris' cave on Mt. Ida. I believe that the specific point of this Trojan allusion is to foreshadow Caesar's affair with Cleopatra. In exchange for judging Aphrodite to be more beautiful than Hera or Athena, the goddess offered Paris the love of Helen. The result, of course, was the Trojan War. After the digression in Book 10 in which Lucan condemns Alexander the Great (10.20-52), he introduces Cleopatra as a second Helen (10.60-76):

quantum impulit Argos	60
Iliacasque domos facie Spartana nocenti,	
Hesperios auxit tantum Cleopatra furores.	
terrui illa suo, si fas, Capitolia sistro	
et Romana petit imbelli signa Canopo	
Caesare captivo Pharios ductura triumphos;	65
Leucadioque fuit dubius sub gurgite casus,	
an mundum ne nostra quidem matrona teneret.	
hoc animi nox illa dedit quae prima cubili	
miscuit incestam ducibus Ptolemaida nostris.	
quis tibi vaesani veniam non donet amoris,	70
Antoni, durum cum Caesaris hauserit ignis	
pectus? et in media rabie medioque furore	
et Pompeianis habitata manibus aula	
sanguine Thessalicae cladis perfusus adulter	
admisit Venerem curis, et miscuit armis	75
illicitosque toros et non ex coniuge partus.	

As much as the Spartan woman	60
with her harmful beauty knocked down Argos and the homes	
of Ilium,	
so Cleopatra swelled the madness of Hesperia.	
With her rattle she alarmed the Capitol, if such a thing can be,	
and she attacked the Roman standards with unwarlike Canopus,	
in her intent to lead a Pharian triumph with Caesar as a captive;	65
and doubtful was the outcome on the Leucadian flood:	
would a woman – not even Roman – rule the world?	
This spirit she acquired from that night which first in bed	

united Ptolemy's impure daughter with Roman generals.
 Who would not excuse your crazy love, 70
 Antony, when fire devoured Caesar's stubborn
 heart? Even in the midst of madness, in the midst of frenzy
 and in the court inhabited by Pompey's shade,
 while drenched with blood of the Thessalian slaughter,
 adulterously
 he [Caesar] shared his anxieties with Venus and combined with 75
 war
 illicit union and progeny not born from wife.

After Caesar tours the city destroyed by Paris and Helen's love, he and Cleopatra replicate that legendary affair.⁵⁵ Like Paris, Caesar fatefully makes a choice in favor of the goddess Venus: "he shared his anxieties with Venus" (*admisit Venerem curis*, 10.75).⁵⁶ Indeed, Lucan explains Caesar's decision to support Cleopatra in her struggle with Ptolemy in terms that, *mutatis mutandis*, could apply equally well to Paris at the judgment of the goddesses: "She bribes the judge and spends an unspeakable night" (*exigit infandam corrupto iudice noctem*, 10.106). Both Paris (*iudex*, 9.971) and Caesar (*iudice*, 10.106) are judges bribed by the promise of love.⁵⁷ By characterizing Cleopatra as a new Helen and Caesar as a new Paris, Lucan turns Alexandria into a new Troy. At the symbolic level, Caesar has fulfilled his vow to resurrect the city.

If Alexandria is a new Troy playing host to successors of Helen and Paris, the city runs the risk of replicating Troy's fate in the Trojan War.⁵⁸ However, in another

⁵⁵ See Seng 2003, 133-135, for an earlier study of Lucan's comparison of the two love affairs in light of the *Pharsalia*'s persistent Trojan motif.

⁵⁶ Of course, Venus is also Caesar's ancestor; in Book 9, Caesar imagined looking upon the house where she conceived his Trojan ancestor, Aeneas (9.970-971).

⁵⁷ However, as Pietro Pucci has pointed out to me, while Paris seduces Helen, it is Cleopatra who seduces Caesar.

⁵⁸ We shall discuss below (pages 336-337) which characters in Book 10 of the *Pharsalia* are modeled on which characters in the Trojan saga.

sense it is Rome that will play the role of Troy. According to the Trojan saga, Paris seduced Helen and took her from Sparta to Troy; Lucan explicitly refers to Helen as the Spartan woman (*Spartana*, 10.61). In contrast, Cleopatra seduces Caesar, who in turn takes her with him to Rome. Lucan explicitly portrays Cleopatra as a threat to Rome when he describes her frightening the Capitol with her *sistrum* and threatening to lead an Egyptian triumph (10.63-65). Lucan's references to the Capitol and the triumph serve to characterize Cleopatra as a threat to the very *Urbs* of Rome for triumphs traditionally took place only within Rome and ended on the Capitol.⁵⁹ She is also called "the disgrace of Egypt, deadly Erinys of Latium" (*dedecus Aegypti, Latii feralis Erinys*, 10.59). This line recalls *Aen.* 2.573, where Aeneas calls Helen the "common Erinys of Troy and the fatherland" (*Troiae et patriae communis Erinys*).⁶⁰ As the peril Cleopatra poses to Rome is analogous to that which Helen posed to Troy, Caesar threatens to bring down a new Trojan War upon both Rome and Alexandria. Lucan may acknowledge Cleopatra's threat to both Alexandria and Rome when he portrays Helen as the destroyer of two cities as well, Troy and Argos (10.60-61). Argos, the city of Agamemnon, stands by way of synecdoche for the home cities of the Greek contingent that fought at Troy.

In the course of Book 10, Caesar and Cleopatra do not leave the city of Alexandria. We are left asking in what way Lucan's Cleopatra threatens Rome. First, Lucan alludes to Cleopatra's prominent role in subsequent phases of the Roman civil wars. In lines 10.66-72, Lucan explicitly refers to the Battle of Actium and

⁵⁹ See p. 276, n. 128, above.

⁶⁰ Bruère 1964, 267-268, defends the authenticity of the Helen episode in *Aen.* 2 on the basis of Lucan's putative allusion to it at 10.59. See also Berti 2000, 97.

Cleopatra's affair with Antony. In poetic treatments of this later conflict, Cleopatra is often portrayed as a threat to the Capitol and the *Urbs* itself.⁶¹ Additionally, in Book 10, Lucan's "Pharian triumphs" refer either to triumphal celebrations held in Rome by victorious Egyptians or to triumphs over Rome celebrated in Egypt. Plutarch records that Antony celebrated a triumph in Alexandria to the consternation of Romans who thought that such a rite should be celebrated exclusively in Rome (*Ant.* 50.4). Hence, we see in Lucan's characterization of Cleopatra as a new Helen a foreshadowing of the threat she poses to Rome long after the end-point of the *Pharsalia*'s extant narrative.

However, Cleopatra's destructive impact upon Rome is already palpable within Book 10 via her grip upon Caesar. Lucan imagines that Caesar will be led captive by Cleopatra in her un-Roman triumph (*Caesare captivo*, 10.65). Berti is right to point out that *Caesare* in line 10.65 may refer to Octavian, who fought Cleopatra at Actium (10.66-67).⁶² However, he incorrectly claims that *Caesare* obviously ("ovviamente") means Octavian; rather, the ambiguous name embraces both the future *princeps* and his adopted father. Cleopatra metaphorically triumphs over Caesar when she seduces him and, as we shall see below, inspires in him desire for the exotic luxury of Alexandria. Later in Book 10, Caesar's favoritism for Cleopatra will draw down upon him the wrath of Ptolemy's party in Egypt's own civil war. Cleopatra's hold upon Caesar's passions proves to be a threat to the *Urbs* itself because under the

⁶¹ The image of Cleopatra threatening the Capitol appears at Hor. *Carm.* 1.37.6-12, Prop. 3.11.45-46, Ov. *Met.* 15.827-828, and Manil. 1.918. Cass. Dio 50.5.4 claims that Cleopatra threatened to hold court on the Capitol. These and other parallel passages have previously been noted by Nisbet and Hubbard 1970, 412-413; Zwiernie 2004 (1974), 315-316; and Berti 2000, 100-101.

⁶² Berti 2000, 100-101.

new Roman regime the fate of individual strongmen – Caesar, Antony, Octavian – is identical with the fate of Rome.⁶³ Any threat to the ruler’s safety or independence is a threat to the city. Hence, Caesar’s debasement of himself in Alexandria is the debasement of the Roman state itself. Since Cleopatra metaphorically triumphs over Caesar, the *Urbs* itself cowers in fear before her (10.63).

IV. Troy, Alexandria, and Caesar’s alienation from the *Urbs*

There is a further link between Alexandria and Troy. As several commentators have proposed, Caesar’s promise to rebuild Troy may allude to historical rumors that Caesar wished to move the capital of the empire away from Rome.⁶⁴ Suetonius lists the two prospective new locations as Ilium, ancestral city of the Julii, and Alexandria, Cleopatra’s capital.⁶⁵ At the end of Book 9 of the *Pharsalia*, Lucan first vows to rebuild Troy and then moves on to Alexandria. Lucan thus links the two cities to which the historical Caesar purportedly wished to transfer the capital.⁶⁶ As the visit to

⁶³ See n. 68 below.

⁶⁴ Ceașescu 1976, 85; Ahl 1976, 109, n. 44; Zwierlein 2004 (1986), 359; Edwards 1996, 64; Spencer 2005, 53, n. 19. Ahl argues that Caesar’s colonization of Corinth and Carthage would have lent credence to the rumors that he wished to move the capital; these rumors in turn might have inspired Lucan to have his fictional Caesar vow to rebuild Troy (Ahl 1976, 109, n. 44; cf. Seng 2003, 127). Heinze-Kiessling 1930, 261-262; Ogilvie 1970, 741-743; Mazzolani 1970, 159-162; and Ceașescu 1976, 88, have proposed that the rumored transference of the capital provides the historical context for Juno’s warnings against the persistence of Troy in *Aen.* 12 and Hor. *Ode* 3.3 and Camillus’ speech against the proposed migration of the Roman people to Veii at Livy 5.51-54. Fraenkel 1957, 267-268, however, rejects the notion that such rumors influenced Hor. *Ode* 3.3. See also p. 22, n. 61, above.

⁶⁵ Suet. *Div. Iul.* 79.3: “Indeed, even an unreliable rumor became widespread to the effect that he [Caesar] was about to move to Alexandria or Troy, simultaneously transfer the wealth of the empire there, drain Italy by means of military levies, and concede the government of Rome to his friends” (*quin etiam varia fama percrebruit migraturum Alexandream vel Ilium, translatis simul opibus imperii exhaustaque Italia dilectibus et procuratione urbis amicis permissa*). The claim is also found in the history of Nicolaus of Damascus, *Caes.* 20 (FrGH 90, F 130, 20). See Ceașescu 1976, 81, for further discussion. See also pages 26-29 of the introduction, especially notes 82 and 83.

⁶⁶ Spencer 2005, 53, n. 19, contextualizes Caesar’s promise to rebuild Troy by citing “rumours of Rome’s displacement by Alexandria that clustered around both Caesar and Antony.”

Troy is likely Lucan's invention, the juxtaposition of the two cities is all the more conspicuous.

There were also persistent rumors in antiquity to the effect that various emperors before and during Lucan's time (e.g. Caligula and Nero) wished to relocate the capital.⁶⁷ In his definitive study of this theme in classical literature, Ceașescu concludes that the rumor in part reflects anxiety over the centralization of power in the hands of one individual, the reigning Caesar.⁶⁸ Should an emperor permanently establish himself in a city other than Rome, the center of the empire would move with him. Writing in the third century A.D., Herodian has an adviser of Commodus remark that Rome is metaphorically located wherever the emperor is.⁶⁹ Under later emperors, Rome ceased to be the center of government as the emperors moved first to various regional capitals (Milan, Trier, Sirmium, Nicomedia) and then to Constantinople.⁷⁰

In earlier books of the *Pharsalia*, it was the republicans who risked alienation from the *Urbs* as they journeyed across the empire and occupied foreign cities. Now

⁶⁷ Cassius Dio claims that in the days before his assassination Nero "wished to kill the senators and burn Rome to the ground and sail to Alexandria" (ἐβουλεύσατο μὲν τοὺς τε βουλευτὰς ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν πόλιν καταπρῆσαι ἔς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν πλεῦσαι, 63.27.2). Ceașescu 1976, 95-96, discusses this report and its historical context. See p. 28, n. 82, of the introduction of this dissertation for a brief discussion of how these rumors surrounding Nero bear upon the *Pharsalia*.

⁶⁸ Ceașescu 1976, 103-104, argues that in the rhetoric of the Early Empire the idea of moving the capital was viewed as a symptom of imperial autocracy. In contrast, the Senate was seen as uniquely bound to the *Urbs*. See Henderson 1998, 206-208, for comparable comments on the threat Lucan's Caesar, a geographically mobile tyrant, poses to the *Urbs*' status as unique focal point of the Roman world.

⁶⁹ Herodian 1.6.5: "And there is Rome, wherever the emperor is" (ἐκεῖ τε ἡ Ῥώμη, ὅπου ποτ' ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς ᾖ). I thank Michael Fontaine for bringing this passage to my attention. Edwards 1996, 64-66, briefly mentions this passage immediately after discussing those passages in the *Pharsalia*, e.g. Lentulus' speech in Epirus (5.7-47) and Caesar's visit to Troy (9.950-999), where Lucan problematizes Rome's status as imperial center. Edwards (ibid., 66) also notes that later in Herodian's history a speech made by Septimius Severus testifies to Rome's persistent significance as center of the empire (2.10.9).

⁷⁰ Mazzolani 1970, 207; Ceașescu 1976, 105-107. It is ironic that Caesar passes by Byzantium (9.958) on his way to Troy. Unbeknownst to Lucan, Byzantium would later become the site of the new imperial capital, Constantinople.

Caesar finds himself in the presence of Troy and Alexandria, two great cities of the East. The risk of cultural corruption and deracination is particularly high for Romans in Egypt. Lucan harshly condemns those Roman soldiers who have joined the service of the Ptolemaic dynasty (10.402-410)⁷¹:

pars maxima turbae
plebis erat Latiae, sed tanta oblivio mentis
cepit in externos corrupto milite mores
ut duce sub famulo iussuque satellitis irent
quos erat indignum Phario parere tyranno. 405
nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra secuntur,
venalesque manus; ibi fas ubi proxima merces:
aere merent parvo, iugulumque in Caesaris ire
non sibi dant.

Most of the multitude were of
the Latian people; but such immense forgetfulness had seized
their minds – the soldiers were corrupted into foreign ways –
that they marched beneath a slave general, at the bidding of a 405
minion,
when it was scandalous for them to hearken to the Pharian tyrant.
No loyalty, no duty have the men who follow camp, and their hands
are up for sale; there lies right – where pay is nearest:
they earn a little cash and offer to attack Caesar’s throat
not for themselves.

⁷¹ Spencer 2005, 67, cites this passage as evidence of the “loss of identity” that Caesar (dallying in Cleopatra’s palace, 10.412-413) and the other Romans residing in Egypt incur as a result of the empire’s “spatial destabilization,” i.e. the displacement of peoples from their traditional homes and cultures as a result of imperial politics. Cf. Lucan’s denunciation of Septimius, a Roman (*Romanus*, 8.596) who nonetheless serves as a minion (*satelles*, 8.597) of Ptolemy and assassinates Pompey (8.595-610). Caesar similarly condemns the Roman soldiers of Gabinus who had become accustomed to life in Egypt and fought for Achilles, an Egyptian military commander: “These troops [of Achilles] consisted of soldiers of Gabinus who had now become accustomed to the Alexandrian lifestyle and license and had unlearned the Roman name and discipline and had married native wives, with whom most had children” (*haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant*, B.C. 3.110).

Following in the footsteps of these corrupted Roman soldiers is Caesar, whom Lucan portrays as the virtual client of Cleopatra.⁷² Just as Aeneas was waylaid in Carthage on his way to Hesperia, Alexandria distracts Caesar from the affairs of Rome, namely the civil war.⁷³ Indeed, his delay in Alexandria as he woos Cleopatra gives the republicans time to regroup their forces in Libya (10.78-81). Alexandria and its delights therefore threaten to displace Rome, whether considered as *Urbs* or as *civitas*, from the center of Caesar's attention.⁷⁴ In the following section, we shall examine the particular features of Alexandrian culture that seduce Caesar.

V. Alexandrian *luxuria*: harbinger of a transformed *Urbs*

In this section, I argue that one of the specific ways in which Cleopatra threatens Rome is by loosening Caesar's already tenuous attachment to traditional Roman values. When Caesar joins Cleopatra for a banquet in her royal palace (10.107-333), Lucan stresses the un-Roman wealth and decadence of Alexandria. Caesar's desire to obtain such luxury for himself bespeaks his own un-Roman degeneracy. As we shall see below, Lucan claims that luxury of the type Caesar finds in Alexandria had not yet been imported to Rome before the civil war. The implication is clear: under the Caesars, Rome will in fact succumb to the decadence that typifies Alexandria. This cultural change will be made manifest in the

⁷² At 10.81, Lucan denounces Caesar since "he prefers to make a gift of Pharos, not to conquer for himself" (*donare Pharon, dum non sibi vincere mavult*). See Ahl 1976, 227, for discussion of the corruption and effeminization of Caesar's character during his stay in Alexandria.

⁷³ See Zwierlein 2004 (1974), 324ff.; Ahl 1976, 226-227; Seng 2003, 135; and Rossi 2005, 239-241, for the influence of Vergil's depiction of Aeneas and Dido upon Lucan's account of Caesar and Cleopatra. Zwierlein 2004 (1974), 326-327, and Seng 2003, 135, note how the love affairs with Dido and Cleopatra distract Aeneas and Caesar from their respective missions.

⁷⁴ Spencer 2005, 48, observes that Rome "is no longer at the heart of its own story, displaced by Troy and Alexandria."

construction of luxurious pleasure-palaces that testify to the death of the republic and its replacement by an imperial dynasty not unlike the Ptolemies. In this way, the civil war ultimately does transform the *Urbs*. The old configuration of the city that exemplified republican values perishes while a new Alexandrian-style city is constructed in its place. Furthermore, Lucan implicitly contrasts Caesar, whose Roman identity is threatened by the exotic pleasures of Alexandria, with Cato, who reaffirms Roman *mores* in his march across the desert. To the extent that Alexandrian *luxuria* will infect the *Urbs* during the reign of Caesar and his successors, Cato's army stands out that much more as the true instantiation of exiled Rome.

The luxury of Cleopatra's banquet (10.107-171) foreshadows the decadent tyranny that Caesar will establish in Rome. Caesar's exposure to such exotic delights inflames his desire: "Caesar learns to squander the riches of a plundered world" (*discit opes Caesar spoliati perdere mundi*, 10.169).⁷⁵ One of the most striking signs of Alexandrian decadence is the opulence of Cleopatra's palace (10.107-113):

pax ubi parta ducis donisque ingentibus empta est,
 excepere epulae tantarum gaudia rerum,
 explicuitque suos magno Cleopatra tumultu
 nondum translato Romana in saecula luxus. 110
 ipse locus templi, quod vix corruptior aetas
 extruat, instar erat, laqueataque tecta ferebant
 divitias crassumque trabes absconderat aurum.

Once the general's truce was gained and bought by mighty gifts,
 a banquet celebrated the joys of such great events
 and with a huge commotion Cleopatra displayed
 her own extravagance, not yet transferred to Roman generations. 110
 The place itself was equal to a temple which an age

⁷⁵ Cf. 10.146-149: "O what madness, blind/and frantic with ostentation – to reveal one's treasures/to a man waging civil war, to inflame the mind/of a guest bearing arms" (*pro caecus et amens/ambitione furor, civilia bella gerenti/divitias aperire suas, incendere mentem/hospitis armati*).

more corrupt would hardly build; the paneled ceilings
showed her riches, thick gold concealed the beams.

Among the various other accoutrements of the palace are onyx floors (10.116-117), ebony and ivory (10.117-119), and teams of eunuchs (10.133-135). Particularly noteworthy is Lucan's observation that such luxury had not *yet* been "transferred to Roman generations" (*nondum translatos Romana in saecula luxus*, 10.110). Lucan implies that such regal palaces will in fact be built at Rome after Caesar wins the civil war and establishes his dynasty.⁷⁶ It is noteworthy that Lucan does not say that such luxury will simply arise in Rome but that it will be imported there from abroad during the reigns of Caesar and the Julio-Claudians; indeed, Lucan implies that it will be imported specifically from Alexandria. In other words, Rome will be progressively refashioned in the image of the Egyptian capital.⁷⁷

As the *Urbs* takes on its new, Alexandrian stamp, the old republican city must perish. Traditional *mores* will yield to luxury and imperial palaces will replace the more modest dwellings that befit a republic.⁷⁸ In this sense, Caesar and his successors do ultimately destroy the *Urbs*, but in a much more insidious manner than the republicans had feared in Books 1-3.⁷⁹ The republicans had speculated that Caesar's

⁷⁶ Among the most notable examples of decadent palatial architecture to which Lucan might be referring are the Domus Transitoria and the Domus Aurea, whose construction commenced after the literal destruction of much of the *Urbs* in the Great Fire of 64 (Croisille 2002, 158-159; Spencer 2005, 56-60 and 65-66). Berti in his commentary on lines 10.111-126 and Rossi 2005, 252, n. 70, observe that the description of Cleopatra's palace resembles the Domus Aurea.

⁷⁷ See Brisset 1964, 204-223, on the topic of Lucan's opposition to Nero's orientalizing policies.

⁷⁸ In a footnote discussing the anti-republican ideological ramifications of luxurious architecture, Spencer 2005, 66, n. 46, remarks: "By indulging in 'Alexandrian' luxury, Caesar divorces himself from republican *auctoritas* and thereby from acceptable public display."

⁷⁹ Spencer 2005 notes the thematic connection Lucan posits between the theme of ruin and the rise of palatial culture under the Caesars. She identifies "the new kind of 'ruin' that Rome will experience" as "the moral and ethical ruin-that-follows-success" represented by the "complacent, destructive corruption of Alexandria in Book 10" (ibid., 68-69). Citing Tac. *Ann.* 15.42 and Suet. *Nero* 31.1-2 as

Gallic troops would sack Rome. Instead, the foreign threat that metaphorically overwhelms and ravages the city takes the form of Alexandrian palatial culture and architecture. Ahl writes⁸⁰:

Caesar's ultimate victory in the civil wars, then, brings to Rome the trappings of Eastern luxury, religion, and monarchy – and very nearly an Egyptian woman to rule it. Pothinus, Achilles, and Ganymede are but forerunners of the mercenaries and eunuchs who were to control the Roman empire, people who, until the time of Caesar, had no place in the politics of Rome. To Lucan's contemporary reader, the scenario of Alexandria in *Pharsalia* 10 must have been something all too familiar in the Rome of their own day.

We should therefore see in Lucan's descriptions of Cleopatra's luxurious palaces (and palace intrigues) a prefigurement of what the *Urbs* will become under the Julio-Claudians.

As Lucan so strongly identifies Alexandria with Troy, I suggest that Caesar and his successors' physical and cultural refashioning of Rome in Alexandria's image is one way in which he fulfills his *vota non irrita* to rebuild Troy. The progressive refashioning of the *Urbs* by the Julio-Claudians is the metaphorical reconstruction of

parallels for Lucan's description of Cleopatra's luxurious palace, Spencer writes, "Tacitus specifically comments that the Domus Aurea was a function of Rome's ruin (*ruina*)," a ruin that is both physical in the form of the Great Fire that preceded the palace's construction and cultural in the form of the building's decadence (ibid., 65-66, n. 46). While my own analysis of Julio-Claudian building projects as destructive of the republican city mirrors that of Spencer, her goal is not to relate her observations to the greater theme of the *Urbs*' threatened destruction throughout the epic. For instance, Spencer cites part of Laelius' speech (1.373-374, cited at p. 58 above) to note the poem's "anxiety about and interest in the relationship between the site of Rome, its physical integrity, and Roman historical destiny," but she neither cites the actual lines in which Laelius threatens to level Rome to the ground nor does she mention the republicans' persistent fears on behalf of the *Urbs* (ibid., 53). Spencer does, however, interpret Caesar's role as renewer of Troy as the culmination of his role throughout the *Pharsalia* as a devastator, a characterization for which she cites the description of Caesar as "rejoicing to create his path by destruction" (*gaudensque viam fecisse ruina*, 1.150; ibid.).

⁸⁰ Ahl 1976, 229. Spencer 2005, 69, speaks of the ultimate product of civil war in the *Pharsalia* as an "alternative Rome represented by Alexandria" and "forever implicated in 'orientalist' decadence and perversion (10.53-171)." See ibid., 64-69, for further analysis of Cleopatra's palace and banquet in Book 10 in light of Rome's imperial, palace-centered culture under Nero.

Troy. Rebuilt on the model of Priam's Troy and Cleopatra's Alexandria, imperial Rome is a new city whose palatial architecture reflects the ruling passions of Caesar and his successors.⁸¹

The ornamentation of Cleopatra's palace highlights the contrast between Caesar's tastes and the *mores* of the old republic. Lucan claims that the palace is so lavish that it would tempt even the most austere of Rome's early heroes (10.149-154):

non sit licet ille nefando	
Marte paratus opes mundi quaesisse ruina;	150
pone duces priscos et nomina pauperis aevi	
Fabricios Curiosque graves, hic ille recubat	
sordidus Etruscis abductus consul aratris:	
optabit patriae talem duxisse triumphum.	

Even though it were not he, ready	
in abominable warfare to seek riches in the ruin of the world;	150
put there the generals of old, names of an age of poverty,	
Fabricii and solemn Curii, let here recline that	
consul brought grimy from his Etruscan plow:	
he will wish to lead a triumph like this for his fatherland.	

The reference to Early Republican heroes serves two purposes. First, it highlights the un-Roman character of both Caesar and the Alexandrian-style palaces he and his successors will build in Rome. The exemplars of traditional Roman *mores* were poor, hardy farmers unaccustomed to such opulence as Caesar will introduce.⁸²

⁸¹ Spencer 2005, 56-60 and 64-66, proposes that Caesar's tours of both Troy and Alexandria should be read in light of Nero's palatial architecture at Rome, e.g. the Domus Transitoria and Domus Aurea. However, she does not interpret Alexandria in Book 10 as a *Troia rediviva*, a point critical for understanding Caesar's promise to rebuild his ancestral city.

⁸² See 1.158-182 for praise of Early Republican poverty and a denunciation of the role of wealth in corrupting the Roman state. See p. 275, n. 126, above for further discussion.

Accordingly, the traditional *Romanitas* of the *Urbs* will be violated when Caesar and his successors build massive palaces in the Alexandrian style.⁸³

Furthermore, Lucan implicitly praises Cato the Younger by excluding him from the list of model Romans whom Egyptian wealth would tempt. Lucan cites Fabricius, Curius, and plowmen-consuls like Cincinnatus and Serranus⁸⁴ as exemplars of Roman austerity. At the same time, Lucan also acknowledges the limits of these heroes' resistance to luxury. However, Cato the Younger, the greatest exemplar of traditional austerity in the *Pharsalia*, is exempted from the catalogue of republican heroes at 10.151-154. This is noteworthy in that Cato often appears alongside Fabricius and Curius in poetic catalogues of exemplary Romans.⁸⁵ By implication, Cato is impervious to temptations to which even Romans of pristine *virtus* were susceptible. In Book 2, Lucan explicitly praises Cato for the modesty of his house; for Cato, "to ward off winter/with a roof was a mighty palace" (*magnique penates,/summovisse hiemem tecto*, 2.384-385). In Book 9, Lucan declares that all of

⁸³ For further observations on the "loss of Romanness" in Rome's steady descent into Alexandrian-style decadence and palace intrigue, see Ahl 1976, 229-230.

⁸⁴ The scholiasts who wrote the *Adnotationes* (ed. Endt) and the *Commenta Bernensia* (ed. Usener) identify the consul at the plow in line 10.153 as Atilius Serranus on the basis of the similarity with Verg. *Aen.* 6.844-845: "Or Fabricius, the peasant/General? Serranus the ploughman serrating and sowing the furrows" (. . . *parvoque potentem/Fabricium vel te sulco, Serrane, serentem*). Berti 2000, 150-151, prefers to identify the consul as Cincinnatus. Lucan is probably ambiguous precisely because the "consul-at-the-plow" type applies to several legendary individuals.

⁸⁵ In Hor. *Ode* 1.12, Cato the Younger (1.12.35-36) appears alongside Fabricius (1.12.40) and Curius (1.12.41-42); see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970 and Brown 1991 for discussion of Horace's reference to Cato. Vergil places the ambiguous *magne Cato* (6.841) among the republican heroes lauded in Book 6 of the *Aeneid*; Serranus appears at 6.844. Manilius ranks *Cato fortunae victor* ("Cato victorious over fortune," 1.797) with *Fabricius Curiusque pares* ("the pair Fabricius and Curius," 1.787) in his catalogue of moral exemplars. Martial lists the (once again ambiguous) Cato with Fabricius and Curius as models of sternness: "I who was able to have made Cato a spectator and relax the stern Curii and Fabricii" (*qui spectatorem potui fecisse Catonem,/solvere qui Curios Fabriciosque graves*, 9.28.3-4). Within the *Pharsalia* itself, Lucan places the Curii (6.787) and Cato the Elder (6.789-790) among the republican heroes in the underworld. In this passage, Cato the Elder laments the coming death of his great-grandson in the war against Caesar.

Rome's praiseworthy successes before the time of Cato were the result of *fortuna* (9.593-596)⁸⁶:

si veris magna paratur
fama bonis et si successu nuda remoto
inspicitur virtus, quidquid laudamus in ullo
maiorum, Fortuna fuit. 595

If great renown
is won by real merit, if excellence is examined naked
with success removed, whatever in any of our great ancestors 595
we praise – was luck.

In Book 10, we see part of what Lucan meant at 9.593-596: had fortune brought Fabricius or Cincinnatus to Alexandria, they too would have felt the temptation to which Caesar succumbs. In respect to *virtus* and *Romanitas*, the heroes of the Early Republic serve as a middle term between Cato, who displays his imperviousness to pleasure in his march through Libya, and Caesar, who becomes the slave to base passions in Alexandria.

Lucan does not portray the Fabricii, Curii, and plowmen-consuls as entirely devoid of the *virtus* normally attributed to them. He claims that they would desire Alexandrian treasure for the specific purpose of adorning their triumphal marches. Hence, they would use such wealth to give glory to Rome (*patriae*, 10.154) in a public military procession, not for the purpose of adorning private palaces such as the one Caesar enjoys in Alexandria. In a similar manner, Lucan uses the metaphor of the triumphal march as a gauge of Cato and Caesar's respective devotion to and disregard for *Romanitas* in Books 9 and 10. Just lines after he assigns all past Roman success to

⁸⁶ This passage is also cited above at p. 275.

fortuna, Lucan proclaims that he would rather join Cato's metaphorical triumph in Libya than ascend the Capitol in an actual triumph with Pompey (9.598-600).⁸⁷ The concept of a Libyan triumph shows the extent to which the republic, embodied in Cato's men, has been displaced from the *Urbs*. Lucan reprises the theme of the displaced triumph when he refers to Cleopatra's "Egyptian triumphs" (*Pharios . . . triumphos*, 10.65). Since the republic is embodied in Cato's army and the new tyrannical regime in the person of Caesar, both factions in the state have been displaced from Rome to Africa. However, the republicans become more Roman through their labors; their march is the greatest triumph of them all, a veritable *triumphus plus quam Romanus* in a *bellum plus quam civile* (1.1). In contrast, while Caesar will return to the *Urbs* and celebrate a triumph over Egypt, he is corrupted by exotic pleasure and risks becoming a captive in Cleopatra's Egyptian triumph.

Worse yet, Caesar's pursuit of Cato into Libya will contribute to the establishment of Alexandrian-style decadence in Rome. Lucan subtly contrasts Caesar's sumptuous feast in Alexandria with Cato's Libyan march via references to tables made of citrus wood. Tables made from the wood of the citrus tree, a tree native to North Africa, were a sign of wealth and refinement in ancient Rome.⁸⁸ In Book 9, Lucan stresses the primitive frugality of life in the Libyan desert; the natives lived amid citrus trees without thinking to turn them into tables (9.426-430):

tantum Maurusia genti
robora divitiae, quarum non noverat usum,
sed citri contenta comis vivebat et umbra.
in nemus ignotum nostrae venere secures,

⁸⁷ See pages 275-276 above.

⁸⁸ See sources cited in Wick 2004, Vol. II, 164-165, e.g. Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.37.

extremoque epulas mensasque petimus ab orbe. 430

The people's only source of riches
is Maurusian timber: its benefit they did not know
but lived content with foliage and shade of the citrus-tree.
Into the unfamiliar grove have gone our axes,
and from the world's extremity we sought feasts and tables. 430

In crossing the desert, Cato and the republicans experience the asceticism that life in Libya imposes.⁸⁹ They clearly have not ventured there in pursuit of exotic earthly treasures. In contrast, Caesar enjoys the delights of Cleopatra's palace, which is adorned with tables made from citrus wood (10.144-146):

dentibus hic niveis sectos Atlantide silva
imposuere orbes, quales ad Caesaris ora
nec capto venere Iuba. 145

Then they set on snowy tusks round tables cut
in Atlas' forest, such as Caesar never saw,
not even when he captured Juba. 145

Juba is the African ally of the republicans whom Cato is marching to join in Libya.⁹⁰ After Caesar whets his desire for citrus wood tables and other luxuries during his stay in Alexandria, he will defeat Juba and the republican army and take citrus tables back to Rome among the spoils of the African king. In this way, Lucan directly links Caesar's defeat of the austere Cato with the introduction of exotic, Alexandrian-style opulence at Rome.

Thus Cato's Libyan march in Book 9 and Caesar's Alexandrian sojourn in Book 10 provide the two competing models for Rome's restoration after Pharsalus.

⁸⁹ See Thomas 1982, 108-123, and Leigh 2000, 102-103, for discussion of how the African march functions as an allegory for Stoic *virtus* in action.

⁹⁰ See 9.213, 9.300-301, and 9.868-869.

Cato revives the old republican *mores* while Caesar adopts the un-Roman vices that he will establish in the *Urbs* after he returns there. Specifically, Caesar learns to love the decadence of Alexandria's pleasure-palaces. He and his dynastic successors will build similarly luxurious palaces at Rome, in the process destroying the old physical configuration of the city's republican period. Insofar as Lucan closely identifies Alexandria with Troy, I suggest that the refashioning of Rome's architecture and *mores* in the image of Ptolemaic Alexandria is one aspect of Caesar's promised reconstruction of Troy. Caesar's new "Trojan" *Urbs* therefore presupposes the political, cultural, and even physical destruction of the republican Rome whose heritage Cato champions and seeks to vindicate.

VI. The Alexandrian War: the Trojan War renewed

I return now to Caesar's liaison with Cleopatra and the civil war between Cleopatra and her brother Ptolemy. We saw earlier that Lucan casts Caesar and Cleopatra as a new Paris and Helen.⁹¹ He also portrays the war their love occasions, the Alexandrian War, as a new Trojan War. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I shall analyze the themes of the destruction and re-creation of cities in Lucan's account of the Alexandrian War. First, the names and actions of various actors in the war recall the names and actions of Greeks and Trojans familiar from the *Aeneid* and other accounts of the Trojan War. Most importantly, the siege of the royal palace evokes Vergil's account of the deaths of Polites and Priam in the Trojan palace. Rather than playing the role of victor as in the rest of the *Pharsalia*, Caesar is the

⁹¹ See pages 314-318 above.

victim cowering in fear. In fact, he narrowly escapes death as Alexandria takes on the aspect of Troy during its fiery fall to the Achaean army.

While Caesar feasts in the palace, Ptolemy's advisers Pothinus and Achillas conspire to attack him. Although Egyptian, Achillas ironically takes on "a Roman's role" by fighting against Caesar (*in partem Romani venit Achillas*, 10.419). In the third book of his *Bellum Civile*, Caesar claims that Achillas marched against Alexandria with a considerable army numbering 20,000 infantrymen, including a number of Roman soldiers, and 2,000 cavalrymen.⁹² I suggest that Lucan takes literary advantage of Achillas' name (a fact of history) by casting him in the role of the Greek warrior Achilles.⁹³ Achillas marches against a city that Lucan has already likened to Troy and his specific goal is to kill Cleopatra and Caesar,⁹⁴ whom Lucan has characterized as a latter-day Helen and Paris. It may also be relevant that Lucan describes Achillas as *non lentus Achillas* ("Achillas not slow") at the end of line 10.398. I suggest that Lucan here adapts the Homeric name-epithet formula πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς ("Achilles fleet of foot"), which appears thirty-one times at line-end in the *Iliad* (cf. *Il.* 1.58). Like πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, *non lentus Achillas* begins after the caesura in the fourth foot of the line and testifies to the swiftness of

⁹² Caes. *B.C.* 3.110: "There were with Achillas such troops that they seemed deserving of contempt neither in respect to their number nor the type of men nor their experience in military matters. For there were twenty thousand under arms. . . . There were besides 2,000 cavalrymen" (*erant cum Achilla eae copiae, ut neque numero neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnendae viderentur. milia enim XX in armis habebat. . . . erant praeterea equitum milia duo*). See p. 320, n. 71, above for Caesar's comments on the soldiers of Gabinius who had become deracinated by living in Alexandria.

⁹³ Seitz 1965, 231, n. 2, recognizes the Homeric undertone in Lucan's deployment of Achillas' name but does not explore the idea further than to note the incongruity of characterizing someone named after the great hero Achilles in the role of a mere *satelles*, "minion" (10.418).

⁹⁴ Pothinus informs Achillas of his plot to murder Caesar and Cleopatra at 10.353-398.

the warrior in question. The names Achilles and Achillas both appear in the same location at the end of the line.

Moreover, Lucan implicitly likens Achillas' army to the Greek army at Troy by providing a brief *τειχοσκοπία* (10.434-439):

Lucifer a Casia prospexit rupe diemque
misit in Aegypton primo quoque sole calentem, 435
cum procul a muris acies non sparsa manipulis
nec vaga conspicitur, sed iustos qualis ad hostes
recta fronte venit: passuri comminus arma
laturique ruunt.

Lucifer looked down from the Casian rock and sent
the daylight into Egypt, warm even in the earliest sun, 435
when far off from the walls is seen an army, not wandering
or with scattered companies but such as comes with straight array
towards their full-strength enemy: ready to experience and to
inflict
close-quarters fighting, on they rush.

Considered in the abstract, this *τειχοσκοπία* might be little more than an instance of a *topos* common in the epic genre. However, in light of the fact that the army is led by a warrior named Achillas and approaches a city Lucan likens to Troy, it is tempting to see even in this nondescript passage an allusion to the famous passage in Book 3 of the *Iliad* where Priam and Helen view the Achaean army from the walls of Troy (*Il.* 3.146ff.).

Achillas' army successfully occupies those parts of Alexandria not defended by Caesar's own troops and even assaults the palace where Caesar resides.⁹⁵ Not trusting in the city's walls (*moenibus urbis/diffisus*, 10.439-440), Caesar hides in "an

⁹⁵ See also Caes. *B.C.* 3.111.

ignoble hiding-place” (*degeneres . . . latebras*, 10.441)⁹⁶ within a small corner of the palace (10.439-444). Lucan explicitly compares the siege of the palace to the sack of a city (10.454-460):

quem non violasset Alanus,	
non Scythia, non fixo qui ludit in hospite Maurus,	455
hic, cui Romani spatium non sufficit orbis,	
parvaeque regna putet Tyriis cum Gadibus Indos,	
ceu puer imbellis vel captis femina muris,	
quaerit tuta domus; spem vitae in limine clauso	
ponit, et incerto lustrat vagus atria cursu, . . .	460
The man whom the Alani would not have outraged	
nor the Scythian nor the Moor who ridicules the wounded	455
stranger,	
this man for whom the Roman world’s expanse is not enough	
and who would think the Indians with Tyrian Gades a tiny	
kingdom,	
like an unwarlike boy or a woman in a captured city,	
[Caesar] seeks the safety of a house; his hope of life he places	
in a threshold shut,	
and with uncertain path he roams and wanders through	460
the halls, . . .	

In these lines, Lucan does more than compare Caesar to an anonymous boy or woman cowering in fear.⁹⁷ When Lucan compares the assault on the palace to the capture of a city (*captis . . . muris*, 10.458), it is Troy in particular to which he refers. Line 10.460 alludes to *Aen.* 2.526-529, where Polites flees through (*lustrat*) the *atria* of Priam’s palace⁹⁸:

⁹⁶ Caesar’s retreat into the *degeneres latebras* (10.441) of the palace shows how far Caesar’s fortune has changed since he taunted Domitius for hiding within Corfinium’s walls: “Are hiding-places behind walls not enough for your terror?” (*non satis est muris latebras quaesisse pavori?* 2.494).

⁹⁷ See Ziolkowski 1993, 71-73, for discussion of ancient testimonia documenting the rape of women and boys during the sack of cities. Paul 1982, 147 and *passim*, documents the desperate plight of women and children among the usual features of the *urbs capta* topos.

⁹⁸ Bruère 1964, 267; Berti 2000, 309; Rossi 2005, 253-254. As Berti notes (p. 310), Vergil also compares Iturna, who is guiding Turnus’ chariot before his death, to a swallow that flies through the

ecce autem elapsus Pyrrhi de caede Polites,
unus natorum Priami, per tela, per hostis
porticibus longis fugit et **vacua atria lustrat**
saucius.

Look, one of Priam's sons, named Polites, has just escaped Pyrrhus'
Murderous hand. He has fled through the spears, past the foeman
Down through long colonnades and is crossing the now empty courtyard
Wounded.

Lucan's *vagus* (*Phars.* 10.460) also reproduces some of the sound of Vergil's *vacua* in *Aen.* 2.528. By identifying Caesar with Polites, Lucan casts the siege of the Alexandrian palace as a repetition of the Greek assault on Priam's palace during the Trojan War.

Moreover, Caesar narrowly avoids repeating the fate of Neoptolemus' most famous Trojan victim, Priam. In *Phars.* 9, Caesar fails to recognize the scene of Priam's death (9.979). Likewise, he is ignorant of Pompey's Priam-like death in Egypt, which transpires at approximately the same time as Caesar's tour of Troy. In Book 10, Caesar re-enacts Polites' flight, the scene that immediately precedes Priam's death in the *Aeneid*. Pothinus plans to execute Caesar by decapitation, the same manner in which he murdered Pompey: "His misdeeds gave him [Pothinus] so much spirit that he ordered/Caesar's head to be cut off and your father-in-law united with you, Magnus" ([*Pothino*] *tantum animi delicta dabant ut colla ferire/Caesaris et socerum iungi tibi, Magne, iuberet*, 10.347-348). As Lucan models Pompey's death on that of Priam in *Aen.* 2 and the siege of Cleopatra's palace on the fall of Troy,

lofty halls of a house: *alta atria lustrat hirundo* (*Aen.* 12.474; cf. *vacua atria lustrat*, *Aen.* 2.528). Hence, Lucan may also liken Caesar to the doomed Turnus when he uses the words *lustrat vagus atria* at *Phars.* 10.460.

Caesar's Pompey-like death would also recapitulate the death of Priam. Caesar is the personal ruler – in fact, the king in all but name – of the new “Trojan” regime that has supplanted the Roman Republic. As descendant of Aeneas and Iulus, he is the heir to Priam's throne.⁹⁹ It therefore would be fitting for his death to mirror that of the Trojan King Priam.

In turn, Caesar himself threatens to channel Neoptolemus by inflicting upon Ptolemy, whom he is holding hostage, a Priam-like death by decapitation (10.460-464):

... et incerto lustrat vagus atria cursu, 460
 non sine rege tamen, quem ducit in omnia secum
 sumpturus poenas et grata piacula morti
 missurusque tuum, si non sint tela nec ignes,
 in famulos, Ptolemaee, caput.

... and with uncertain path he roams and wanders through 460
 the halls,
 yet not without the king: he takes him everywhere with him
 to exact retribution and welcome atonement should he die
 and, if the weapons and the firebrands run out, to launch your
 head against your slaves, Ptolemy.

Caesar thus reverses the roles that the different characters in the Alexandrian War have been playing as they recapitulate the Trojan War. Having been threatened with a Pompey-like death himself, Caesar now threatens to behead Ptolemy, with whose royal assent Pompey was decapitated (8.536-538). Like the Trojan King Priam before

⁹⁹ Already in Homer, Achilles mentions a dynastic rivalry between Aeneas and Priam (*Il.* 20.178ff.). When Poseidon intervenes to rescue Aeneas from Achilles, he states that Aeneas and his descendants will rule over the Trojans (*Il.* 20.307-308). For an insightful treatment of this passage, see Ch. 15 of Gregory Nagy's *Best of the Achaeans*, “The Best of the Achaeans Confronts an Aeneid Tradition.”

him, the Egyptian king comes close to being beheaded in a besieged palace within his own capital.

Unlike Priam, Ptolemy is not a feeble old man. However, his youth does render him a pathetic figure amidst the machinations of the Alexandrian War. According to lines 10.351-353, Ptolemy is an “unwarlike boy” (*puer imbellis*, 10.351)¹⁰⁰ helpless against the intrigues of Pothinus and Achillas. As the victim of circumstances over which he is powerless, Ptolemy resembles Hector’s son Astyanax, the Trojan prince who was murdered during the fall of Troy. Like Astyanax, Ptolemy is the young scion of a royal house whose city has become a battlefield. While Lucan does not narrate Ptolemy’s death in the *Pharsalia*,¹⁰¹ he does have Caesar threaten to kill him. Ptolemy thus risks sharing Astyanax’s tragically young death.

So far, we have seen at Alexandria latter-day versions of Helen (Cleopatra), Paris (Caesar), Achilles (Achillas), Neoptolemus (Caesar), Polites (Caesar), Priam (first Pompey, then Caesar and Ptolemy by turns), and Astyanax (Ptolemy¹⁰²). One final figure from Trojan legend reappears in the person of the eunuch Ganymedes, the servant of Cleopatra and Ptolemy’s sister Arsinoë. Ganymedes first helps Arsinoë join the army besieging Caesar and then, after the execution of Achillas, takes charge of the Egyptian forces (10.519-532). In Book 9, Caesar notes the location on Mt. Ida

¹⁰⁰ As noted above (p. 333), Caesar cowers in terror “like an unwarlike boy” (*ceu puer imbellis*, 10.458) during the siege of Cleopatra’s palace. Berti 2000, 309, notes that this line recalls 10.351, where Ptolemy is described as a *puer imbellis*. Berti concludes from the parallelism that Achillas’ siege of Caesar in the palace reduces Caesar to the same helplessness that characterizes Ptolemy.

¹⁰¹ The pseudo-Caesarian author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* claims that Ptolemy later drowned in the Nile after the point at which Lucan’s narrative of the Alexandrian War breaks off (*Bell. Alex.* 31). However, Strabo 17.1.11 provides a variant account according to which Caesar did in fact put Ptolemy to death.

¹⁰² Insofar as Caesar is reduced to the status of a *puer imbellis* (see n. 100), he too is an Astyanax figure.

whence the Trojan Ganymede was taken up to heaven to be Zeus' catamite (*unde puer raptus caelo*, 9.972). Insofar as the major characters of the Alexandrian War assume the roles of figures in the Trojan legend, Caesar symbolically succeeds both in establishing a new Troy (Alexandria) and in renewing the war that destroyed the city. The Alexandrian War thus fulfills Juno's threat to launch another Trojan War should the Romans endeavor to rebuild Troy.¹⁰³

VII. Caesar's death delayed and displaced to the *Urbs*

As Ahl observes, Caesar's vulnerability during the Alexandrian War seems out of character. While Lucan typically portrays him as an indomitable force, in the final lines of the *Pharsalia* Caesar is uncertain as to whether he should fear death or hope for it (*dubiusque timeret/optaretne mori*, 10.542-543).¹⁰⁴ In light of Caesar's striking vulnerability, the question arises as to how Lucan accounts for the obvious historical fact that Caesar survived the Alexandrian War.

I suggest that we may profitably compare this scene to an earlier one in which Caesar – and his new Rome – nearly perished. In the Battle of Dyrrachium, Pompey's forces nearly overwhelmed and destroyed Caesar's army.¹⁰⁵ Two forces came to Caesar's rescue. First, the Caesarian hero Scaeva blocked a breach in the Caesarian rampart (6.140-262). Secondly, Pompey spared Caesar, his former father-in-law, when he was on the verge of annihilating his army (6.299-313). Both Scaeva and

¹⁰³ See discussion of *Aen.* 12.821-828 and Hor. *Ode* 3.3.37-44, 57-68, above (pages 306-308). Henderson 1998, 202, notes that the *Pharsalia* fulfills "the terms of Juno," i.e. the terms according to which Juno will avenge herself upon Rome.

¹⁰⁴ Ahl 1976, 225; cf. Masters 1992, 256-257.

¹⁰⁵ See discussion in Ch. 2 (pages 160-164).

Pompey come to Caesar's rescue at Alexandria as well. In the last lines of the epic, Caesar spies Scaeva among his soldiers (10.542-546); presumably he is coming to Caesar's rescue. Furthermore, Lucan explains that Pompey's ghost protects Caesar so that he does not die in Egypt. I propose that there are further parallels between the Battle of Dyrrachium and the Alexandrian War that relate to the theme of the destruction of cities. The intervention of Scaeva and Pompey at Dyrrachium leads, as we saw in Ch. 3, to the metaphorical destruction of republican Rome at Pharsalus. In contrast, Scaeva and the avenging spirit of Pompey spare Caesar so that he may die in the new Rome that he has fashioned for himself. The ending of the *Pharsalia* thus foreshadows the return of civil war to the very *Urbs* that the Pompeians abandoned to Caesar at the beginning of the epic.

A. Alexandria's conflagration, Scaeva, and the refoundation of Rome

The first reason why Caesar survives the Alexandrian War is that his own character, that of his followers (notably Scaeva), and that of his enemies serve him well in the siege. The Egyptians lack battering rams and siege works and do not wish to employ fire against the palace (10.478-482). They do not even attack the wall in formations (10.482-484). Their attack consequently proves ineffectual: "The Fates say no [to the Egyptians] and Fortune maintains the function of a wall" (*fata vetant, murique vicem Fortuna tuetur*, 10.485). Fate and fortune¹⁰⁶ here operate through the

¹⁰⁶ See Ahl 1976, 297-305, for a discussion of the relationship between *fatum* and *fortuna* in the *Pharsalia*.

national character of Egypt since Lucan portrays the Egyptians as stereotypically unwarlike.¹⁰⁷ The weak Egyptians can hem in Caesar for only so long.

The expression *mirique vicem Fortuna tuetur* recalls the intervention of Scaeva in Book 6: “firm he stands, no frail wall in front of Caesar” ([*Scaeva*] *stat non fragilis pro Caesare murus*, 6.201).¹⁰⁸ As I noted in Ch. 2,¹⁰⁹ one of the central themes of the Scaeva episode is the reversal of besieged and besieger, of city and siege work. Caesar’s vast circumvallations of Pompey’s camp at Dyrrachium look like the city walls of Babylon or Troy (6.48-50). When Pompey breaks through the wall, the Caesarians find their own positions besieged. Then Scaeva intervenes and becomes the assailant even as he defends the rampart (6.118-262). Caesar himself takes on the character of Scaeva as the Ptolemaic forces press in upon the palace.¹¹⁰ Though besieged within a Troy-like palatial compound, he fights as though he were the one besieging the Egyptians: “and while blockaded – so great is his firmness of mind – he performs/the work of a besieger” (*obsessusque gerit, tanta est constantia*

¹⁰⁷ We have already seen how Lucan characterizes Ptolemy as an unwarlike boy (*puer imbellis*, 10.351; see p. 336 above). Cleopatra is so audacious that “she attacked the Roman standards with unwarlike Canopus” (*Romana petit imbelli signa Canopo*, 10.64). Canopus, a city near Alexandria, here refers by way of synecdoche to the country of Egypt taken as a whole. *Romana* in this passage carries the connotation of martial strength and hence contrasts sharply with *imbelli*. Lucan also associates Egypt with softness (*mollitia*). Cleopatra’s palace features “soft young men” (*mollita iuventus*, 10.133, i.e. eunuchs), some parts of the Nile flow with a soft current (*mollis lapsus*, 10.315), and Pothinus accuses Achilles of lounging on a soft bed (*mollibus . . . toris*, 10.353-354) when he should be fighting.

¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, Lucan makes Fortuna dependent upon Scaeva at Dyrrachium in Book 6: “[T]he place which Fortune could not win with a thousand squadrons/or with Caesar’s entire strength, a single man snatched/from the victors, stopped its capture” (*quem non mille simul turmis nec Caesare toto/auferret Fortuna locum, victoribus unus/eripuit vetuitque capi*, 6.140-142). Marti 1966, 255, discusses this passage in her treatment of the relationships between *virtus*, *fortuna*, and *felicitas* in the Scaeva episode.

¹⁰⁹ See p. 150ff. above.

¹¹⁰ Masters 1992, 257, n. 89, notes, “Lucan’s insistence on using the name ‘Caesar’ for Caesar’s troops (see esp. 10.488-9 ‘adest defensor ubique/Caesar et hos aditus gladiis, hos ignibus arcet’; also 10.507) implies a one-man-against-an-army scenario which parallels the Scaeva story.”

mentis,/expugnantis opus, 10.490-491). Caesar's character as a violent aggressor thus serves him well in repulsing the Egyptian attack and seizing the offensive.

Among other offensive maneuvers, Caesar sets fire to the Egyptian ships that are attacking the palace (10.488-497). These fires in turn set off a general conflagration (10.497-505):

nec puppibus ignis	
incubuit solis; sed quae vicina fuere	
tecta mari longis rapuere vaporibus ignem,	
et cladem fovere Noti, percussaque flamma	500
turbine non alio motu per tecta cucurrit	
quam solet aetherio lampas decurrere sulco	
materiaque carens atque ardens aere solo.	
illa lues in paulum clausa revocavit ab aula	
urbis in auxilium populos.	

And not	
on ships alone did fire settle; but the dwellings which were near	
the sea caught fire from its far-reaching heat	
and the Noti nurtured the calamity, and the flame, struck	500
by a whirlwind, ran through the dwellings as swiftly	
as a meteor often races with its trail in the ether,	
though lacking fuel and burning thanks to air alone.	
That destruction for a little time recalled the people	
from the besieged palace to help the city.	

I argue that the inferno set by Caesar is a further repetition of Troy's fiery downfall as narrated in Book 2 of the *Aeneid*. In fact, Lucan may exaggerate the historical records of the Alexandrian fire in order to render the scene more climactic and more in accordance with his Trojan paradigm. Whereas Lucan portrays the conflagration as catastrophic, the pseudo-Caesarian author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* states that the fires were insubstantial because the buildings of Alexandria were not built of

flammable materials.¹¹¹ By evoking the fire that destroyed Troy, Lucan completes his identification of Alexandria as the city where Caesar's reenactment of the Trojan War culminates.¹¹²

Furthermore, Caesar plays an Aeneas-like role in this Troy-like inferno. The Alexandrian fire holds off the Egyptians during Caesar's nocturnal evacuation to Pharos,¹¹³ the neighborhood of Alexandria's famous lighthouse (10.505-509):

nec tempora cladis	505
perdidit in somnos, sed caeca nocte carinis	
insiluit Caesar semper feliciter usus	
praecipiti cursu bellorum, et tempore rapto	
nunc claustrum pelagi cepit Pharon.	

And the period	505
of calamity Caesar did not waste in sleep but in blind night	
he leapt aboard the ships, successful always in his use	
of headlong speed of warfare, and he seized his opportunity	
and now took Pharos, the gateway of the sea.	

Caesar attempts to flee a burning city at night by ship. He thus resembles Aeneas, who according to Vergil fled Troy during the night of its fiery destruction and later sailed to Latium to lay the foundations of the Roman people. The Alexandrian War

¹¹¹ Ps.-Caes. *Bell. Alex.* 1: "For Alexandria is almost entirely secure against fire; the buildings have no carpentry or timber, and are composed of masonry constructed in arches and roofed with rough-cast or flag-stones" (*nam incendio fere tuta est Alexandria, quod sine contignatione ac materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut pavimentis*; the translation is a slight modification of Gardner's version).

¹¹² Spencer 2005, 60, mentions "Troy's sepulchral presence looming over the poem's fiery end" and later connects Alexandria's fire with the ashes of ruined Troy (*ibid.*, 67-68). However, she does not situate these observations in the context of the Alexandrian War qua Lucan's allusive recapitulation of the Trojan War.

¹¹³ Lucan notes that Pharos was once home to the sea-god Proteus: "An island once,/in the days of prophet Proteus, in mid-sea it had stood" (*insula quondam/in medio stetit illa mari sub tempore vatis/Proteos*, 10.509-511). This passage recalls Homer's account of Menelaus' visit to Proteus at Pharos (*Od.* 4.354ff.). As Berti notes in his commentary on these lines, Lucan's description of Pharos is an adaptation of Homer's: νῆσος ἔπειτά τις ἔστι πολυκλύστῳ ἐνὶ πόντῳ Αἰγύπτου προπάρειθε, Φάρον δὲ ἔκ κλήσκουσι (*Od.* 4.354-355). This mythological reference further contributes to the Homeric and Trojan undertones of Book 10.

continues for some time after Lucan's narrative breaks off, but the victorious Caesar does eventually sail back to Italy and the *Urbs*. As the heir of Iulus and founder of a new regime at Rome, the steps Caesar takes to survive the war and, more specifically, the conflagration at Alexandria are comparable to those Aeneas took at Troy.¹¹⁴

However, escape to Pharos is not enough to save Caesar and his new Rome. Achilles having been killed on Arsinoë's orders, Ganymedes assumes control of the Egyptian army and comes close to killing Caesar (10.529-533):

sed non auctore furoris	
sublato cecidit rabies; nam rursus in arma	530
auspiciis Ganymedis eunt ac multa secundo	
proelia Marte gerunt. potuit discrimine summo	
Caesaris una dies in famam et saecula mitti.	

But the frenzy did not disappear	
once the author of the madness was removed; again they go	530
to fight, now under the command of Ganymedes, and they wage	
many battles with favourable warfare. That single day could	
have passed into glory and the centuries because of Caesar's utmost	
danger.	

As Caesar prepares to board his ships, he finds himself surrounded; Egyptian land forces face him on one side and a hostile fleet on the other (10.534-538). The epic ends with Caesar, otherwise at a complete loss as to what to do, catching sight of Scaeva, whose return Lucan has already hinted at (10.538-546)¹¹⁵:

via nulla salutis,

¹¹⁴ Rossi 2005, 254-255, notes the similarities between Caesar's plight at Alexandria and Aeneas' at Troy. However, she stresses the fact that the fire at Troy is the beginning of Aeneas' story while Caesar's symbolic recapitulation of the fall of Troy at Alexandria marks the end of his story in the *Pharsalia*. The narrative of the *Pharsalia* therefore does not permit Caesar to escape Troy and the repetition of its fate.

¹¹⁵ See the discussion of lines 10.485 and 10.488-491 above at pages 338-340.

non fuga, non virtus; vix spes quoque mortis honestae.
 non acie fusa nec magnae stragis acervis 540
 vincendus tum Caesar erat sed sanguine nullo.
 captus sorte loci pendet; dubiusque timeret
 optaretne mori respexit in agmine denso
 Scaevam perpetuae meritum iam nomina famae
 ad campos, Epidamne, tuos, ubi solus apertis 545
 obsedit muris calcantem moenia Magnum.

No path of safety is there,
 not flight, not heroism; hardly can he even hope for honourable
 death.
 With no routed army or heaps of massive carnage, 540
 Caesar then was on the point of defeat, but without bloodshed:
 captured by conditions of the place, he is perplexed; and doubtful
 whether to fear or pray to die, he looked back at Scaeva in the
 crowded
 line, Scaeva who already had earned the fame of everlasting glory
 on your fields, Epidamnus, when after the walls were breached 545
 he alone blockaded Magnus as he trod upon the ramparts.

At this point the text breaks off. As Lucan explicitly recalls Scaeva's valorous defense
 of the siege work at Dyrrachium, it is reasonable to conclude that it is Scaeva who
 rescues Caesar from impending death at the hands of the Egyptians.¹¹⁶

Scaeva's intervention is significant, and not only if Lucan intended these to be
 the last lines of the epic.¹¹⁷ Scaeva saves Caesar when he is most vulnerable. The on-

¹¹⁶ Masters 1992, 255-257, notes the parallelism between Dyrrachium and Alexandria as the two scenes
 in the *Pharsalia* where Caesar is on the verge of annihilation and Scaeva intervenes to rescue him;
 Alexandria "is Dyrrachium all over again, except that this time we are not to be shown how Caesar
 lived to fight another day (nor can we guess!)" (ibid., 256). Henderson 1998, 171-176, also provides an
 excellent study of Scaeva's two appearances in the *Pharsalia* and the relationship between them.

¹¹⁷ I am of the opinion that, at least originally, Lucan intended the *Pharsalia* to be twelve books long
 and end with Cato's suicide at Utica. I here follow the arguments advanced by Ahl 1976, 306-326, and
 accepted by a number of subsequent scholars, e.g. Gorman 2001, 285; see Bexley 2009, 465, n. 29, for
 a more complete bibliography for treatments of this question. I accept this thesis because of the
 persistent parallelism in structure between the *Aeneid* and the *Pharsalia*, e.g. the similarities between
 the *excidium Troiae* in *Aen.* 2 and the *senex's* speech in *Phars.* 2. However, I am also sympathetic to
 the readings of Masters 1992, 216-259, and Rossi 2005, who claim that the epic is complete as it is.
 The narrative stops at roughly the same point where Caesar's *Bellum Civile* breaks off. Following
 Haffter 1957, Masters argues that Lucan intentionally ends the *Pharsalia* here in order for his epic to
 stand forever in opposition to Caesar's own narrative of the war. Furthermore, Rossi notes a number of

going physical destruction of Alexandria threatens to destroy Caesar's new Rome before it is fully born. Scaeva is the perfect savior for Caesar because, as we saw in Book 6, he embodies wreckless Caesarian fanaticism. Caesar and tyranny (a pairing that for Lucan is a hendiadys) survive because in moments of peril he can look back upon (*respexit*, 10.543)¹¹⁸ henchmen like Scaeva for salvation.

The theme of the destruction and refoundation of cities is evident in the last two lines of the epic, 10.545-546: "when after the walls were breached/he [Scaeva] alone blockaded Magnus as he trod upon the ramparts" (*ubi solus apertis/obsedit muris calcantem moenia Magnum*). Lucan here speaks of Dyrrachium in the same terms which we discussed in Ch. 3.¹¹⁹ The Caesarian rampart is implicitly compared to the walls of a city (*muris . . . moenia*) and the roles of besieger and besieged are reversed as Scaeva "besieges" (*obsedit*) Pompey, who is attacking the siege work. As Rossi points out, the image of Pompey treading on the walls of his kinsman (*calcantem moenia Magnum*) recalls the original sin that marred Rome's foundation, Remus' fateful leap over Romulus' wall.¹²⁰ In the opening to the *Pharsalia*, Lucan

features in Book 10 that provide closure to the epic's themes. I am tempted to speculate that Lucan originally intended the epic to be twelve books long but brought the work to an early conclusion in Book 10 because he realized that participation in the Pisonian Conspiracy might lead to imminent discovery and arrest. In this scenario, 10.546 would not be the random line Lucan happened to be writing when he was arrested. Rather, it would be the last line of an epic intentionally brought to a premature closure.

¹¹⁸ Masters 1992, 256, notes that *respicere* also has the metaphorical meaning "to look back in time," for which he cites an example in Book 7: "now you have leisure to **look back**/on happy times" (*nunc tempora laeta/respexisse vacat*, 7.687-688). According to this reading of the passage, Caesar looks back in time to Scaeva's *aristeia* at Dyrrachium as narrated in Book 6 in order to find a savior. Cf. the suggestions of Henderson 1998, 171, n. 28, that *respexit* at 10.543 may be interpreted as "thought of" and "looked back through the text." For a critical response to the suggestion that *respicere* here bears a metaphorical sense as well as a literal one, see Berti 2000, 39.

¹¹⁹ See p. 142ff.

¹²⁰ Rossi 2005, 256. The most famous account of this legend appears in Livy: "The more popular account is that Remus leapt over his brother's new walls in derision" (*vulgatior fama est ludibrio fratris Remum novos transiluisse muros*, 1.7.2).

treats the fratricidal death of Remus as a model for and foreshadowing of Rome's subsequent civil dissensions, in particular the first triumvirate's failure to share power peacefully (1.93-97):

nec gentibus ullis
credite nec longe fatorum exempla petantur:
fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri. 95
nec pretium tanti tellus pontusque furoris
tunc erat: exiguum dominos commisit asylum.

Do not rely
on any foreign races or seek examples of destiny afar:
Rome's first walls were drenched with a brother's blood; 95
nor were land and sea the prize of such great madness
then: the small Asylum set at variance its masters.

It follows that the *bellum plus quam civile* between the in-laws Pompey and Caesar is a recapitulation of Romulus' murder of Remus in Rome's first power struggle.¹²¹

Caesar is the new Romulus and Pompey the new Remus who attempted to thwart his kinsman's designs and paid for it with his life. The new Rome is the post-republican world of Caesar's tyranny.

Scaeva thus reprises the role he played at Dyrrachium as the living wall that preserves Caesar and his new regime from imminent annihilation. Much as the destruction of Troy led to Rome's first foundation, the fire in Alexandria provides the catastrophic background for the refoundation of Rome. By rescuing Caesar from the violence of Alexandria's Troy-like downfall, Scaeva permits the imperial regime and the refashioned *Urbs* to come into existence. He thereby enables Caesar to play the

¹²¹ This interpretation of the Roman civil wars as a recapitulation of Romulus' murder of Remus may be traced back in Latin poetry at least as far as Horace's *Epode* 7. For a history of this motif and bibliography, see Carrubba 1966 and Watson 2003, 282-286.

part of both Aeneas and Romulus for the new dynastic Rome that will supplant the republic.

B. Pompey's vengeance and Caesar's return to the *Urbs*

Let us revisit the scene at Dyrrachium. Lucan states that the civil war could have ended there had Pompey crushed Caesar's army: "All the blood of civil war/they could have shed, even to peace" (*totus mitti civilibus armis/usque vel in pacem potuit cruor*, 6.299-300).¹²² Yet Pompey decides to spare his former father-in-law (6.300-313). Similarly, Lucan ascribes Caesar's escape from almost certain death at Alexandria to Pompey's ghost¹²³ and the forces of cosmic justice that seek to avenge him. Specifically, the fates spare Caesar so that he may die at Rome at the hands of pro-republican senators. In other words, Caesar survives the Alexandrian War and returns to Rome only to die there. After the civil war takes the warring Caesarian and republican armies so far from home, the *Urbs* that Caesar took without a fight witnesses his personal defeat at the hands of Brutus.

First, Lucan explains the events of the Alexandrian War as the operation of a certain force of nemesis or cosmic justice that avenges the death of Pompey. For instance, Arsinoë's execution of Achillas, one of Pompey's murderers, is an act of retribution that avenges Pompey's ghost (10.524-529):

¹²² See discussion above at p. 162ff. Cf. Lucan's description of Caesar's plight at Pharos, cited above at p. 342: "That single day could/have passed into glory and the centuries because of Caesar's utmost danger" (*potuit discrimine summo/Caesaris una dies in famam et saecula mitti*, 10.532-533).

¹²³ In his 2009 APA conference paper entitled "Becoming a *Scelerum Vindex* or Why Pompey is Better Off Dead," Sean Easton discusses some of the passages cited below and notes that Pompey is more effectual as an avenging spirit than he was a living general. The author informs me that this paper is forthcoming as a published article.

altera, Magne, tuis iam victima mittitur umbris;
 nec satis hoc Fortuna putat. procul absit ut ista
 vindictae sit summa tuae. non ipse tyrannus
 sufficit in poenas, non omnis regia Lagi:
 dum patrii veniant in viscera Caesaris enses
 Magnus inultus erit.

525

A second victim [Achillas], Magnus, now is sent down to appease
 your ghost;
 but Fortune thinks this not enough. Far be it that
 that should be the sum of your revenge. Not himself the tyrant
 [Ptolemy]
 is enough as retribution, not all the royal house of Lagus:
 until his country's swords reach Caesar's guts,
 Magnus will be unavenged.

525

Achillas is the second victim (*altera . . . victima*, 10.524) offered to Pompey's ghost because Caesar has already killed Pothinus, the other Egyptian courtier responsible for plotting Pompey's assassination (10.515-519).¹²⁴ Caesar's assassination in Rome (10.528-529) will merely complete the vengeance that Pompey, operating even through the agency of Caesar himself, began to wreak upon his enemies in Alexandria. Caesar's death may be delayed in time and deferred in space, but he will succumb to the same agency or historical force that lies behind the Alexandrian War.¹²⁵

Furthermore, Lucan attributes Caesar's survival of the Alexandrian War to the intervention of Pompey's ghost (10.1-8):

¹²⁴ Caesar inflicted "the destiny and punishment/which Pothinus deserved" (*fatum meriti poenasque Pothini*, 10.515) for his role in Pompey's death.

¹²⁵ Masters 1992, 256-257, observes the significance of lines 10.528-529; just before Lucan portrays Pharos as a trap from which Caesar cannot escape alive (10.536-543), he foreshadows Caesar's assassination in his homeland. This observation forms part of Masters' argument that Book 10 is complete as it is; just lines before the final scene, Lucan anticipates the just punishment that Caesar will receive outside the scope of the epic's narrative proper (*ibid.*). Henderson 1988, 183, similarly remarks that Lucan's constant foreshadowing of events occurring after the "present" of his narrative "serves to obviate the need to extend the text to reach some further historical moment"; many events that critics think should occur within the putative remaining books are in fact anticipated within the extant narrative. While I still maintain that the textual evidence points to an original intended length of twelve books (see n. 117 above), Lucan's comments anticipating Caesar's assassination do seem to render unnecessary any actual narration of the event as such.

ut primum terras Pompei colla secutus
attigit et diras calcavit Caesar harenas,
pugnavit fortuna ducis fatumque nocentis
Aegypti, regnum Lagi Romana sub arma
iret, an eriperet mundo Memphiticus ensis 5
victoris victique caput. tua profuit umbra,
Magne, tui socerum rapuere a sanguine manes,
ne populus post te Nilum Romanus amaret.

As soon as Caesar, in pursuit of Pompey's head,
reached land and trod the dreadful sands,
the general's fortune and the destiny of guilty Egypt
fought: would Lagus' kingdom be subdued by Roman
force or would the sword of Memphis remove the head 5
of conqueror and conquered from the world? Your ghost
assisted him,
Magnus: your shade rescued your father-in-law from bloodshed,
to stop the Roman people loving Nile after your death.

Pompey's intervention to save his father-in-law (*socerum*, 10.7) recalls his decision to spare Caesar at Dyrrachium. Pompey saved Caesar there because he was a "righteous son-in-law" (*genero . . . pio*, 6.305).¹²⁶ However, Pompey's only reason for rescuing Caesar from the Egyptians is to prevent Egypt, a land made nefarious by Pompey's own death, from becoming favorable to the Romans on account of Caesar's demise. Pompey's ghost does not forego vengeance upon Caesar but merely defers this revenge until he leaves Egypt

It is not enough that Caesar should die in a land other than Egypt. Lucan explains that Caesar must die in Rome at the hands of Brutus and his fellow senators (10.338-344):

dignatur viles isto quoque sanguine dextras
quo Fortuna parat victos perfundere patres,

¹²⁶ See p. 164 above.

poenaeque civilis belli, vindicta senatus, 340
 paene data est famulo. procul hoc avertite, fata,
 crimen, ut haec Bruto cervix absente secetur.
 in scelus it Pharium Romani poena tyranni,
 exemplumque perit.

He [Pothinus] thinks his lowly hands are worthy to shed that
 blood too
 with which Fortune plans to drench the conquered Fathers:
 and the punishment for civil war, the Senate's vengeance, 340
 was almost granted to a slave. Fates, avert this crime
 afar, that this neck should be severed without Brutus there.
 The Roman tyrant's punishment is being added to the
 wickedness of Pharos
 and the warning lost.

Caesar must be killed by Romans acting on behalf of republican *libertas*, not by men serving another tyrant, Ptolemy. The senators' assassination of Caesar provides an *exemplum* for later Roman patriots who may rise up against an oppressive Caesar, e.g. for Lucan himself and his fellow members of the Pisonian Conspiracy.¹²⁷

The references in Book 10 to Pompey's avenging spirit and to Caesar's fated death in Rome are not the only ones in the *Pharsalia*. Pompey's spirit has already descended upon Cato and Brutus in order to inspire them to avenge the crimes committed by Caesar (9.15-18).¹²⁸ In Book 7, Lucan portrays Brutus attempting to assassinate Caesar on the very battlefield of Pharsalus. Lucan apostrophizes Brutus, ordering him to hold back until Caesar has reached the full height of tyranny (7.586-596):

¹²⁷ Ahl 1976, 45-46, sees in this passage and in Lucan's earlier apostrophe to Brutus in Book 7 evidence for Lucan's hatred of Nero and participation in the Pisonian Conspiracy at the time he wrote these lines. Ahl also notes that Caesar's death at the hands of pro-republican senators offers an *exemplum* for later tyrannicides not provided by the palace coups that ended the reigns of Caligula and Claudius (ibid., 229-230).

¹²⁸ See Ch. 4 (pages 219-224) for discussion of this passage.

illic plebeia contextus casside vultus
 ignotusque hosti quod ferrum, Brute, tenebas!
 o decus imperii, spes o suprema senatus,
 extremum tanti generis per saecula nomen,
 ne rue per medios nimium temerarius hostis, 590
 nec tibi fatales admoveris ante Philippos,
 Thessalia periture tua. nil proficis istic
 Caesaris intentus iugulo: nondum attigit arcem,
 iuris et humani columnen, quo cuncta premuntur,
 egressus meruit fatis tam nobile letum. 595
 vivat et, ut Bruti procumbat victima, regnet.

There, covering your face with a plebeian helmet
 and unknown to the enemy, what a weapon, Brutus, did you hold!
 O glory of the state, O final hope of the Senate,
 the last name of a family so great throughout the ages,
 do not race too reckless through the enemy's midst, 590
 do not hasten deadly Philippi upon yourself before its time,
 doomed to die in a Thessaly of your own. Nothing do you
 achieve here,
 intent on Caesar's throat: he has not yet reached the citadel
 or gone beyond the peak of human law controlling everything;
 he has not yet earned from Fate a death so distinguished. 595
 Let him live and let him rule, so he may tumble, Brutus' victim.

Caesar reaches the summit of his power when he has ostensibly subdued the
 republicans at Thapsus and Munda and is on the verge of quitting Rome to fight the
 Parthians in 44 B.C. Caesar's death at Rome is also prophesied at 1.690-691 by the
*matrona*¹²⁹ and at 6.810-811 by the witch Erictho. In fact, Erictho proclaims that the
 entire war is fought to determine whether Caesar or Pompey will die at Rome: "The
 question is, whose grave Nile and whose Tiber will lap/with waves: for the leaders,
 the battle concerns their burial alone" (*quem tumulum Nili, quem Thybridis alluat
 unda/quaeritur, et ducibus tantum de funere pugna est*).

¹²⁹ See discussion in Ch. 1 (pages 71-72).

While Pompey (or his ghost) fatefully spares Caesar at both Dyrrachium and Alexandria, there is a very important difference in the effects of these two interventions. Immediately after saving Caesar at Dyrrachium, Pompey declines to return to Italy because he refuses to wage war in the Forum and among Rome's temples (6.316-332). The decisions to spare Caesar and proceed into Thessaly result in Rome's metaphorical destruction at Pharsalus. Pompey's ghost intervenes to save Caesar again at Alexandria, but this time he does so with the result that civil war will now be waged within the *Urbs*. The *matrona* in Book 1 interprets Caesar's assassination as a continuation of the civil war in Rome's Senate-house: "Back I come to the abodes of my native Rome,/to impious war waged in the Senate's midst" (*patriae sedes remeamus in urbis,/impiaque in medio peraguntur bella senatu*, 1.690-691).¹³⁰ Also, Caesar's assassination at Rome in 44 B.C. marks the execution of a plan that Brutus had formed on the very field of Pharsalus four years earlier (7.586-596, cited above). In Book 10, Lucan portrays the assassination as a virtual continuation of the Alexandrian War; the avenging nemesis of Pompey that killed Pothinus and Achillas finally claims Caesar.¹³¹ Whereas Pompey wished to deflect major military operations away from the *Urbs*, his ghost apparently demands that Caesar die in a very small-scale battle fought in Pompey's own theater.¹³² If Caesar

¹³⁰ The *matrona* goes on to prophesy the next round of civil war that will make its way through the empire after Caesar's murder (1.692-695). I therefore do not wish to give the impression that the arrival of the civil war at Rome in the form of Caesar's assassination signifies the end of worldwide civil conflict. In fact, the assassination results in the repetition of Pharsalus at Philippi (1.694).

¹³¹ Lucan treats the Alexandrian War itself as an extension of the Roman civil war because so many of Achillas' soldiers are Roman (10.402-421); hence, Romans fight Romans in the streets of Alexandria. Cf. 8.595ff., where Lucan heaps scorn upon the participation of the Roman Septimius in Pompey's assassination.

¹³² See Plut. *Caes.* 66.12-13 for the famous detail that Caesar died at the foot of the statue of Pompey and drenched its pedestal with his blood.

refashions Rome in the image of Troy and Alexandria, it is in this new Rome that he meets the Priam-like fate he narrowly escaped at Pharos.

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, Caesar's visits to Troy and Alexandria in Books 9-10 represent the culmination of the theme of Rome's metaphorical destruction and reconstruction in the *Pharsalia*. I join other scholars in seeing Caesar's vow to rebuild Troy as a reference to the Julio-Claudian dynasts who built or re-built so much of the city of Rome and celebrated their legendary Trojan ancestry in literature, art, and architecture. I further argue that Lucan presents Alexandria in Book 10 as the model for this new Rome. Alexandria appears as a latter-day Troy where Caesar finds his own Helen (Cleopatra) and adopts a luxurious, decadent lifestyle. Lucan forecasts that the *Urbs* will soon be re-created in the image of royal Alexandria; lavish palaces will arise where republican *mores* once ruled. The old ways and the pre-Caesarian physical configuration of the city both perish. Caesar's destruction of the republican military at Pharsalus spells the destruction of republican culture at the *Urbs*. Lucan thus presents Caesar's reconstruction of the Roman state after the disaster of Pharsalus as a dystopia that stands in stark contrast to Cato's renewal of *Romanitas* and *libertas* among his troops in Book 9.

Moreover, war follows upon Caesar's adoption of Troy and Alexandria as models for Rome. As though in fulfillment of Juno's curses upon any attempt to revive Troy, Caesar's love affair with Cleopatra leads to the Alexandrian War, a conflict Lucan portrays as a new Trojan War. Achilles, a latter-day Achilles, leads his

army against Alexandria. Caesar, reduced to an uncharacteristic state of vulnerability, is nearly killed amidst the city's street-fighting and fires. Scaeva and Pompeys' ghost intervene to save Caesar, but with the sole result that he lives until Brutus can kill him at Rome.

I propose that Lucan's references to Caesar's death in Book 10 mark a great moment of *peripeteia* in his account of Rome's self-destruction. In a sense, Lucan portrays Caesar's fate as an inversion of that of the republican *civitas*. Both Pompey and Cato lead the republican army, the embodiment of the *civitas*, in a centrifugal route away from Rome. After winning at Pharsalus, Caesar pursues Pompey as far as Troy and Alexandria, cities that mark the apogee of Caesar's own motion away from the *Urbs* after he departed for the East at 5.403.¹³³ Caesar symbolically commits himself to the project of renewing Rome when he vows to rebuild Troy. He looks past the coming battles that he must fight with the surviving republicans and thinks of the postwar world. At Alexandria, Caesar finds a blueprint for the new regime, culture, and architecture he and his successors will establish at Rome. Lucan's references to Rome's future decadence and Caesar's assassination direct the reader's attention back toward the center of the empire, the *Urbs*. We look forward to Caesar's return to Rome and the erection of new imperial edifices there, the rise of a new, imperial, Caesarian city. But Caesar also unwittingly brings back with him the civil war and the avenging ghost of Pompey. When Caesar first entered the *Urbs* without bloodshed in Book 3, this did not mean that Rome was safe. It only signified that the republic's

¹³³ The theme of geographical limits is prominent in Book 10, particularly in Acoreus' speech (10.194-331). In response to Caesar's inquiry into the source of the Nile (10.188-192), Acoreus documents the earlier failures of Sesostris, Cambyses, and Alexander to discover it (10.268-283). See Rossi 2005 for further discussion.

destruction had been delayed and displaced to Pharsalus. Likewise, when Scaeva and Pompey's ghost intervene to save Caesar as Alexandria burns down around him, the tyrant's death is only delayed and displaced to the *Urbs*. Thus we see that Lucan integrates both the postwar cultural program of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and the assassination of Caesar into his general schema for understanding Rome's metaphorical destruction at Pharsalus.

Conclusion

I have sought to show that Rome's dual identity as both *Urbs* and *civitas* is critical to understanding how Lucan portrays the civil war in general and the Battle of Pharsalus in particular as the metaphorical destruction of the city. Although the topos of the destruction of cities features prominently in the epic, very few cities are actually destroyed. More importantly, while Lucan repeatedly portrays Caesar as a serious military threat to the city of Rome, he enters the city without bloodshed in Book 3. Therefore, one may initially be tempted to ascribe Lucan's references to destroyed cities to mere hyperbole, the desire to evoke pity, or a too generous appropriation of the *Aeneid*'s account of the fall of Troy. However, I show in this dissertation that the theme of the destruction of cities is far too integrated into the plot and political discourse of the *Pharsalia* to be explained on merely stylistic grounds. Lucan's identification of Pompey's army as Rome's exiled *civitas* – an *armata urbs* ("Rome under arms," 2.574), as Pompey describes it – subtends both a number of critical turns in the narrative of the civil war and much of the imagery, metaphor, rhetoric, and literary, geographical, mythological, and historical allusion Lucan employs in the poem. Most importantly, the identification of the republican army with the city explains Lucan's portrayal of Caesar's climactic victory at Pharsalus as the metaphorical destruction of Rome itself. The ruined, militarily threatened, and otherwise decrepit cities mentioned in both the buildup to Pharsalus and the narrative of Cato and Caesar's subsequent responses to the battle reflect Rome's ongoing disintegration and struggles to recover. The image of the destroyed city makes

manifest the violent divorce of Rome's republican *civitas* from the *Urbs* that the ostensible (and ostentatious) robustness of the city under the Julio-Claudians does not adequately convey.

First, the distinction between Rome's *Urbs* and its *civitas* helps explain Caesar's ostensible restraint when he enters Rome in Book 3. In the first two books of the epic, Caesar seems poised to sack and even destroy the city. His fanatical follower Laelius has pledged to level Rome if ordered to do so, Lucan repeatedly associates Caesar with Hannibal and the Gauls, Pompey and his followers flee from Rome in advance of Caesar's arrival, and an old man cites the atrocities committed at Rome by Marius and Sulla as precedents for what Caesar might do to the city. Yet Caesar's entry into the city is anticlimactic. This is because Caesar meets no major resistance there. Caesar's behavior at Ariminum in Book 1 shows that he does not sack or otherwise molest cities when he can capture them without a fight. Caesar's angry response to the tribune Metellus' weak attempt at protest shows that he would have committed violence within the *Urbs* had he met significant resistance there. Only Pompey's evacuation of the city precludes this. Thus Laelius' vow to level Rome and Caesar's anticlimactic occupation of the city are compatible with one another. Although Caesar did not literally flatten Rome's walls, Lucan nonetheless portrays him as ready and willing to do so. The reader is left asking where and when Caesar's full potential for destruction will be realized.

The exile of the republican *civitas* from Rome and the attendant tensions are recurring themes in Books 2-6. I argue that the republicans experience a crisis of identity as they flee to lands ever more remote from the *Urbs*. They are torn between

the necessity of flight and their attachment to home. Pompey and the consul Lentulus are keenly aware of how problematic their decision to abandon Rome is. Invoking the examples of the Athenians at Salamis, the Phocaeans who founded Massilia, and Camillus during the Gallic Sack, they argue that the Senate's legitimacy is not diminished even when it meets far from the *Urbs*. However, Lucan seems to undermine their claims or at least call them into question. Lentulus' appeal to Camillus for a precedent contradicts the standard historical account according to which the Romans did not entirely abandon their city during the Gallic Sack. Furthermore, the republicans establish bases in a number of cities and countries (e.g. Capua and Corfinium) that once fought against Rome. When the republicans defend these former enemy cities against the new, Caesarian regime ensconced at Rome, they testify to their own alienation from the *Urbs*.

The Battle of Dyrrachium marks both the summit of the republicans' military success and their tragic failure to defend the *civitas* they claim to embody. First, they are bested by Scaeva, a fanatical Caesarian whom Lucan portrays as the living embodiment of the new, Caesarian Rome. Scaeva metaphorically serves as a wall for Caesar when his physical rampart collapses. The republicans lack this sort of zeal. Secondly, misguided *pietas* prompts Pompey to spare Caesar rather than destroy his army. Pompey naïvely imagines that he and Caesar are still united by common bonds when in fact they belong to two different regimes, two different Romes. The republicans fail to act as decisively on behalf of their own instantiation of Rome as Caesar would on behalf of his and therefore squander their one opportunity to prevail against him.

The republicans' identity crisis leads directly to their catastrophic defeat at Pharsalus. I hope to have demonstrated that both the republicans' problematic separation from the *Urbs* and the *urbs capta* motif feature prominently in Book 7, the climax of the epic. Pompey has pursued a centrifugal course away from Rome in order to spare the city the horrors of war. This strategy has largely worked. Through their spokesman Cicero, however, the republicans demand that Pompey cease his flight toward the empire's borders. The republicans demand to take a centripetal course back toward the *Urbs*, the physical and conceptual center of their world. Here we see the tragic failure of Pompey and Lentulus' hope that the republicans could simultaneously maintain their Romanness while leaving the *Urbs* in Caesar's hands. When Pompey tragically accedes to his troops' demands, the result is Rome's virtual destruction at Pharsalus.

It is here that Caesar unleashes upon the exiled republican *civitas* the violence he spared the *Urbs*. Lucan likens the battle to the fall of Troy by means of several allusions to *Aeneid* 2. Rome is destroyed in the persons of the Senate and the foreign allies whose countrymen will one day repopulate the city after its native stock perishes at Pharsalus. Lucan blames Caesar's massacres for the subsequent abandonment of Latium's cities in his own day; hence, Italy's cities are destroyed regardless of Pompey's attempt to divert the war into foreign lands. Pompey, the various social classes of the *populus*, and the *Urbs* had formed a union under the republic. Now that union is rent asunder as plebeians butcher senators and Pompey flees the field of battle. Lucan reprises the *urbs capta* motif as Pompey tells the citizens of Larisa, a proxy for Rome, to surrender to Caesar. For their part, Caesar's troops sack Pompey's

camp in lieu of the *Urbs*. Finally, Caesar tours the carnage on the fields of Pharsalus as though he were Sulla overseeing atrocities on the Field of Mars. Thus the republicans' dissatisfaction with exile results in the virtual annihilation of their *civitas* and the consequent decline and fall of the *Urbs*. In short, Rome is metaphorically destroyed at Pharsalus.

Until Pharsalus, the theme of ruined cities speaks to Rome's ongoing self-destruction. After Pharsalus, however, Lucan reprises this theme to portray Cato's march across Libya as the renewal of the republican *civitas*. When the republican army is on the verge of dispersal, Cato successfully persuades his men to continue the war in the name of *libertas*. This redefinition of Rome in ideological terms helps the republicans endure the hardships of their march. Lucan compares Cato's effect on his troops to the restoration of order in a beehive in a passage that alludes to the foundation of Carthage in Book 1 of the *Aeneid*. The bee simile and the allusion to Carthage establish that Cato's project is nothing less than the refoundation of Rome as embodied in the republican army, the *armata urbs*. He and his men prove their *virtus* by enduring the perils of the desert, e.g. sandstorms so powerful that they literally destroy cities. While separation from Rome still poses problems for the republicans, the way Lucan deploys the theme of the destruction and reconstruction of cities in Book 9 leads me to disagree with recent interpretations of Cato as a failure or a parody. Rather, Lucan's imagery of renewal shows that, despite Caesar's temporal victories and the trials of the desert, Cato does the best he can to champion *Romanitas* and *libertas*.

The metaphor of Rome's destruction at Pharsalus also deeply informs the narrative of Caesar's actions at the end of the *Pharsalia*. First, he visits the ruins of Troy, which represent the destruction of the republic, and promises to rebuild the city. I contend that Book 10 recounts the symbolic fulfillment of this promise. Caesar continues his journey from Troy to Alexandria. I show that Lucan both implicitly and explicitly portrays Alexandria as a second Troy, a royal city on the verge of fiery destruction. For instance, Caesar finds in Cleopatra his own Helen of Sparta. It is in Cleopatra's palace that Caesar adopts the decadent, luxurious lifestyle that will prevail at Rome under his successors. This transformation of the *Urbs* in the image of Alexandria represents the virtual destruction of the pre-Caesarian city and stands in sharp contrast to Cato's rival project of renewing republican *mores* in the course of his Libyan march. Like Ptolemaic Alexandria, Julio-Claudian Rome will be a royal city filled with pleasure-palaces and dominated by a dynasty of monarchs. As Lucan presents Alexandria as a latter-day Troy, I suggest that Rome's Alexandrian metamorphosis partly fulfills Caesar's promise to rebuild Troy.

The symbolic revival of Troy cannot take place unless the Trojan War is renewed as well. I show that Lucan uses mythological and literary allusions to cast the Alexandrian War as a second Trojan War. Cleopatra's palace is besieged as was Priam's, much of the city burns down in a repetition of Troy's fate, and Caesar is very nearly killed in the final scene of the epic. Lucan attributes his survival to the intervention of Scaeva and Pompey's ghost. Caesar must live so that he may return to the *Urbs* and die there. The return of Caesar from Troy and Alexandria brings back to the geographical and conceptual heart of the Roman world the results of the civil war

– a victorious tyrant, a decadent palace culture, and civil war itself in the form of Caesar’s assassination. Pompey’s abandonment of Rome and Caesar’s anticlimactic occupation of the city at the beginning of the civil war are avenged when Brutus and his fellow pro-republican senators stab Caesar to death in Pompey’s Theater. Lucan thus integrates Caesar’s assassination into his account of Rome’s metaphorical destruction and even treats it as a counterpoint to the republicans’ exile and defeat at Pharsalus.

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¹ The author informs me that this paper will soon be published.

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² This is a revised version of the 1998 article.

³ The author informs me that this paper is part of a larger work to be published at a later date.

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⁴ In the footnotes to the dissertation, I cite this article and the following one with both the date of the anthology in which they appear and whose page numbers I cite and also with the dates when the articles were originally published (1974 and 1986).